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Series Editor’s Note
For the first time in my life, I feel a bit like a famous athlete. That athlete is the quarter-
back Bret Favre. As you may already know, Bret Favre was a Super Bowl-winning quar-
terback for many years with the Green Bay Packers. Two years ago, he tearfully retired 
from football, but not long after that he came out of retirement to be the quarterback for 
the New York Jets. I too retired as Series Editor of Methodology in the Social Sciences for 
The Guilford Press. However, when I saw this project I gladly came out of retirement to 
serve as the coeditor with Todd Little. I am happy to report that this project appears to 
be much more successful than Favre’s controversial year with the Jets. This book prom-
ises to be a valuable resource to social and behavioral sciences students and faculty.
We all know that when we write a journal article, a dissertation, or grant proposal, 
we need to have a theory. For many of us, this task is not so straightforward. I know 
from over 40 years of reading student papers and reviewing articles that many research-
ers have a very difficult time framing their research theoretically. They do not know 
where to start. I have had a difficult time trying to find a way to teach my students to 
think in terms of theory. Most of the resources on theory building that I would send my 
students to were dreadfully boring and, even worse, not very practical for the task that 
faced them. Finally, now I have something that can help them.
The book gives clear suggestions to the reader on how to come up with a theory. 
The two authors, who each have illustrious careers in two very different areas, one in 
attitudes and the other in consumer decision making, have combined to provide a read-
able and practical discussion of theory construction. The book provides a useful source 
for helping researchers come up with ideas for research and for fine-tuning the resultant 
theories that emerge from such thinking. Thankfully, they choose not to provide an 
abstract, formal guide to theory construction. Rather, they provide practical help illus-
trating cognitive heuristics and tricks of the trade that they have used in their careers.
I find it particularly interesting that the authors use ideas from a wide range of 
research methods to assist the reader in theory construction. They are equally comfort-
able discussing randomized experiments, mathematical modeling, simulations, causal 
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modeling, and qualitative methods in this endeavor. The authors adopt very much of a 
“mixed methods” approach to theory development. Researchers should try out several 
different approaches and eventually there will be one method that suits the research-
ers’ style and content. Although it may be impossible to teach people to be creative, this 
book comes the closest to doing so. It certainly challenges the reader to become more 
creative.
In sum, this book definitely scores a touchdown. In fact, it scores a good number of 
touchdowns and I feel it deserves to win the equivalent of publishing’s Super Bowl!
David A. Kenny
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Preface
Theory construction is at the heart of the scientific process. The strategies that social 
scientists use to generate and develop ideas are important to understand and foster 
in young academics and investigators as they prepare for a research-oriented career. 
Although books have been written about theory construction, there are surprisingly few 
books on the topic that tackle the problem of teaching students and young professionals, 
in a practical and concrete way, how to theorize. Students, especially graduate students, 
take one or more courses on research methods and data analysis, but few experience 
more than a lecture or two, or read a chapter or two, on theory construction. It is no 
wonder that students often are intimidated by the prospect of constructing theories.
This book provides young scientists with tools to assist them in the practical 
aspects of theory construction. It is not an academic discussion of theory construction 
or the philosophy of science, and we do not delve too deeply into the vast literature on 
these topics. Rather, we take a more informal journey through the cognitive heuristics, 
tricks of the trade, and ways of thinking that we have found to be useful in developing 
 theories—essentially, conceptualizations—that can advance knowledge in the social 
sciences. By taking this journey, we hope to stimulate the thinking and creative pro-
cesses of readers so that they might think about phenomena in new and different ways, 
perhaps leading to insights that might not otherwise have resulted. The intent of this 
book is to provide a practical, hands-on, systematic approach to developing theories and 
fostering scientific creativity in the conceptual domain. Relative to the vast majority of 
books on theory construction, this book is unique in its focus on the nuts and bolts of 
building a theory rather than on an analysis of broad-based systems of thought.
Science is about understanding nature and the reasons for things. It is one of human-
ity’s greatest ongoing adventures. This book is intended to help propel two types of 
readers along this exciting journey. First, the book is written for graduate and advanced 
undergraduate students interested in pursuing careers as researchers in the social sci-
ences, as well as for newly minted PhD social scientists. Second, the book also should 
benefit those who desire to pursue a professional career in the social sciences, but who 
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do not plan on becoming researchers. It will help them understand and evaluate the 
theories they read in professional journals and identify gaps in those theories. It will 
help them think about theories from different vantage points.
The book can be used in many different disciplines. We draw on examples from the 
fields of anthropology, business, communications, education, economics, health, mar-
keting, organizational studies, political science, psychology, social work, and sociology, 
to name a few. Some instructors may prefer more detailed examples in their particular 
field of study, but we believe that using examples from multiple disciplines helps stu-
dents appreciate the commonalities and value of multidisciplinary perspectives.
We have used drafts of the book as both a stand-alone text in a course on theory 
construction as well as one of several texts in graduate courses on research and research 
methodology. In terms of the latter approach, almost all traditional research methods 
books include a section or chapter on the nature of theory and/or theory construction. 
However, the treatment of theory construction usually is brief and of limited practical 
value. The present book is intended to provide the instructor with a useful source for 
helping students come up with ideas for research and for fine-tuning the resultant theo-
ries that emerge from such thinking. It provides more detail and more practical knowl-
edge than what is typical of chapters in books on research methodology. The social 
psychologist William McGuire often lamented about how research training with gradu-
ate students focuses at least 90% on teaching methods to test ideas, but no more than 
10% on how to get those ideas in the first place. Despite this difference in emphasis, the 
process of theory development is fundamental to successful scientific research. Indeed, 
many would say that there can be no theory testing without prior theory. An objective 
of this book is to move toward a much-needed balance in the emphases given to theory 
construction and theory testing.
In our research methods courses, we assign this book to be read during the first 
2–3 weeks of classes. We allow the book to stand on its own as a teaching device, and 
we spend 1 or 2 weeks of lectures/discussion on the material. Obviously, not all of the 
material can be covered in these sessions, so we select material to address based on the 
needs of the students. Part of the in-class coverage includes providing students with a 
verbal “road map“ to the book and an overview of each chapter. We stress that students 
must read the entire book, and we test them on the assigned material with essay and 
short-answer questions from a small sampling of the book. For some student cohorts, 
we do not assign certain chapters, depending on the students’ areas of emphasis. For 
example, students primarily oriented toward qualitative research might not be assigned 
the chapters on mathematical modeling and/or simulations. However, we omit chapters 
with reluctance, as our goal is to expand the theoretical toolbox of students.
In our courses on theory construction, we use the book as our main text and cover 
each chapter during lecture/discussion sessions. We ask students to read one or more 
chapters the week before class, then discuss those chapters the following week. After 
a few weeks of class, we start to assign empirical articles in journals that the students 
are to read. We ask one student to orally summarize in class the theory being espoused 
in the assigned article and to critique it. After the student has done so, we open discus-
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sion to all class members, who add further commentary or analysis. It is not uncommon 
for students to extract different interpretations and representations of the theory, and 
it is instructive when the class then sets about the task of resolving the discrepancies. 
Finally, we provide feedback relative to our own analysis and critique of the theory. The 
level of analysis becomes increasingly sophisticated as students learn more of the mate-
rial covered in the book.
A major assignment in the theory construction class is for each student to construct 
his or her own theory about a phenomenon of interest to him or her. We help students 
select a topic in the first weeks of class and then direct them to the relevant literatures 
to read and consider. Midway through the course, students present their initial theory, 
and we help them refine it, expand it, and finalize it over the rest of the course. We do 
this as part of an in-class exercise for each student, so that all students in the class can 
observe the creativity and process of refinement for each project. Indeed, we encourage 
other class members to contribute to and participate in the developmental process for 
each project. This repetition across projects helps students better internalize the prin-
ciples of theory construction.
The book has several pedagogical features that enhance its use as a textbook and as 
a source of learning. First, each chapter includes a section on suggested readings with 
commentary, where we direct the reader to key references for further study on the topics 
covered in the chapter. Second, each chapter has a list of key terms that highlights the 
most important jargon and terminology. Third, each chapter has a set of exercises that 
encourages the reader to think about the material that was presented in the chapter. We 
include exercises to reinforce concepts and exercises to apply the concepts to problems 
of interest. Finally, each chapter has a highlighted box that covers an interesting topic 
that applies the concepts covered in the chapter or that shows important uses of them.
We bring a wide range of personal experience in diverse research settings to this 
project, including laboratory studies, small-scale and large-scale surveys, simulations, 
and studies in naturalistic settings. Our research has attempted to advance basic theory 
as well as solve applied problems. We have worked with interdisciplinary teams, and 
we have “gone it alone.” We have interacted extensively with advertising researchers, 
anthropologists, biologists, communication theorists, demographers, economists, edu-
cationalists, epidemiologists, health researchers, historians, legal scholars, marketers, 
political scientists, social workers, and sociologists, and we appreciate the perspectives 
of these diverse disciplines. We have brought these perspectives to bear in this book. 
Nevertheless, we recognize how limited and constraining our experience has been rela-
tive to the vast array of topics and perspectives that have been pursued in the social sci-
ences. As such, this book is best viewed as a somewhat limited personal account of our 
own perspectives on the process of theory construction.
We appreciate that this book’s descriptions of theory construction may have more 
to say to “quantitatively oriented” than to “qualitatively oriented” behavioral scientists 
and to “variable-oriented” as opposed to “process-oriented” theorizing. In part, this is 
because variable-oriented theories have been more dominant in the behavioral sciences, 
at least in some disciplines (with the most notable exception being anthropology). That 
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said, we have tried to give both perspectives their due, and we believe that both are well 
represented in these pages. In our opinion, good theories incorporate both process- and 
variable-oriented perspectives, so it is important to consider both approaches without 
preconceived biases for or against one or the other. We think that scientists should have 
a broad theoretical toolbox from which to draw. Perhaps it is sometimes useful to think 
about phenomena in terms of “variables,” and perhaps it is sometimes useful to think 
about phenomena in terms of “processes.” This book encourages thinking from multiple 
perspectives rather than from one school of thought. In this sense, readers committed to 
a given method of thinking will need to keep an open mind.
When we have used the book with more qualitative, process-oriented students, we 
omit the chapters on mathematical modeling and simulations, as noted, but all other 
chapters are relevant. To be sure, we note to the students that some of the chapters are 
more “variable oriented” (e.g., the chapters on clarifying relationships using thought 
experiments and causal modeling), but we encourage the students to approach these 
chapters with open minds that might provide them with a unique way of thinking about 
matters as they adopt the more familiar grounded/emergent theory approach of Chapter 
10. We alter the order in which we ask qualitatively oriented students to read chapters, 
starting with Chapters 1–5 as introductions, then Chapter 10 on grounded theory, then 
Chapter 6 on clarifying relationships, and then Chapter 7 (Causal Models), Chapter 11 
(Historically Influential Systems of Thought), Chapter 12 (Reading and Writing about 
Theories) and Chapter 13 (Epilogue).
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BASIC CONCEPTS
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1
Introduction
The central role of theory in the social sciences is disputed by few. Scientists formulate 
theories, test theories, accept theories, reject theories, modify theories, and use theories 
as guides to understanding and predicting events in the world about them. A great deal 
has been written about the nature and role of theory in the social sciences. These writ-
ings have spanned numerous disciplines, including anthropology, economics, history, 
philosophy, political science, psychology, sociology, and social work, to name but a few. 
This literature has described, among other things, broad frameworks for classifying 
types of theories, the evolution of theories over time, the lives and scientific strategies 
of great scientific theorists, and general issues in the philosophy of science. Although 
this literature is insightful, much less has been written to provide social scientists with 
practical guidelines for constructing theories as they go about the business of doing 
their science. Most students are intimidated by the prospect of constructing their own 
theories about a phenomenon. Theory construction is viewed as a mysterious process 
that somehow “happens” and is beyond the scope and training of a young scientist try-
ing to find his or her way in the field. Whereas most graduate programs in the social sci-
ences require multiple courses in research methodology to ensure that students become 
equipped with the tools to test theories empirically, the same cannot be said for theory 
construction. In contrast to focusing on methods for testing theory, this work focuses 
on methods for generating theory.
The fundamental objective of this book is to provide students and young scientists 
with tools to assist them in the practical process of constructing theories. It does so via 
describing in some detail the strategies, heuristics, and approaches to thinking about 
problems that we have found to be useful over the more than 70 collective years that 
we have been doing social science research. This book is not an academic discussion of 
the literature on theory construction or the philosophy of science. We do not delve too 
deeply into the vast literature on these topics. Rather, we take a more practical journey 
through the cognitive heuristics, tricks of the trade, and ways of thinking that we have 
found to be useful in developing theories.
4 BASIC CONCEPTS
ORGANIZATION OF THE BOOK
The book is organized into four parts. Part I presents the basic concepts that form the 
backdrop for later chapters. In these early chapters we consider the nature of science and 
what it means to understand something. We develop the notion of concepts and highlight 
the central role of concepts in theories. We lay the foundations for communicating to 
others the concepts in one’s theory and then describe what separates science from other 
ways of knowing.
With this as background, we turn to developing core strategies for constructing a 
theory, the topic of Part II. In Chapter 4 we focus first on strategies for generating ideas 
and for stimulating creative thinking. Once you have a set of rough ideas, they need 
to be refined and focused to meet the criteria of a rigorous scientific theory. Chapter 5 
describes strategies for thinking through your constructs and discusses how to develop 
clear and communicable conceptual definitions of them. We provide numerous strate-
gies for making fuzzy constructs more precise and not overly abstract. Chapter 6 focuses 
on relationships between variables and develops strategies for making explicit the rela-
tionships you posit between variables. We show how to derive theoretical propositions 
based on a careful analysis of relationships.
Part III considers different frameworks for theory generation. Chapter 7 considers 
one of the most dominant approaches to theory construction in the social sciences: the 
framework of causal thinking. This approach elaborates the causes and consequences 
of different phenomena and views the identification of causal linkages as a central goal 
of science. Chapter 8 describes strategies for building mathematical models of different 
phenomena. Our intent here is to make clear the sometimes seemingly mysterious ways 
in which mathematics and social science theorizing interface. The chapter includes a 
brief introduction to chaos theory and catastrophe theory as examples of mathematical 
models. Chapter 9 describes the potential that simulations—in particular, the develop-
ment of simulations—have for theory construction. Chapter 10 develops grounded and 
emergent approaches to theory construction, which tend to rely on qualitative methods 
to identify constructs and relationships on which to focus a theory. The spirit of these 
approaches is that the theory emerges from the data. Some social scientists might argue 
that this chapter belongs in the previous section, where one initially identifies con-
structs and relationships to include in a theory. As we emphasize throughout this book, 
theory construction is not a set process, and a case like this could be made for almost 
every chapter in the current section. This book provides you with key ingredients for 
constructing a theory. How you choose to mix those ingredients to form your theoretical 
recipe depends on your predilections and the domains that you are studying. Chapter 11 
summarizes 12 broad-based theoretical frameworks that may help in the idea-generation 
process. These frameworks include materialism, structuralism, functionalism, symbolic 
interactionism, evolutionary perspectives, postmodernism, neural networks, systems 
theory, stage theories, reinforcement theories, humanism, and multilevel modeling.
In the final section we discuss strategies for reading journal articles and scien-
tific reports so as to make explicit the theories that the authors describe and subject 
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to empirical evaluation. We also discuss strategies for presenting theories in different 
kinds of reports. We close with an Epilogue that comments on the theory construction 
process in light of the material covered in previous chapters and that addresses some 
odds and ends that did not fit well into the other chapters.
THEORIES AND SETTINGS
This book is written primarily for students and professionals interested in pursuing a 
career as a researcher in the social sciences. It is intended to provide you with concrete 
strategies for building upon existing theories and constructing your own theories. Theo-
rizing does not occur in a vacuum. It occurs in the context of individuals pursuing a 
career in some professional setting, usually an academic setting. At times, we describe 
how the setting in which you work impacts the way in which you theorize and the kinds 
of questions you ask. We also discuss strategies for dealing with the constraints you face 
as a result of these settings.
Considering how to develop theory flows quite naturally into considering the empir-
ics involved in testing theory and the important interplay between the two. Yet to have 
included more than minor considerations of empirics not only would have generated a 
work of monumental size, but also would have diluted what we view as a necessary focus 
on theory construction, a topic we believe is seriously shortchanged in the education of 
social scientists. It is for this reason that this work contains fewer empirical illustrations 
than some might desire or expect.
For us, constructing theory is one of the most rewarding aspects of doing science—
on par with the excitement associated with empirically testing and finding support for 
theory. In all honesty, we probably are more captivated by research that questions the 
theories we have posited because of the ensuing call to “put on our detective hats” to 
figure out why we were wrong. This invariably demands that we approach the problem 
from a new conceptual angle. This book describes some (but not all) of the types of 
detective hats that we have put on over the years. We hope that we can help to start 
you down the path of a more enriched and productive approach to the construction of 
theories as you fashion your own strategies and set of detective hats for thinking about 
phenomena and solving problems.
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The Nature of Understanding
Reality is merely an illusion, albeit a very persistent one.
—Albert Einstein
The whole of science is nothing more than an extension of everyday 
thinking.
—Albert Einstein
Despite the fact that science has been practiced for thousands of years and countless 
books have been written on the subject, many people still consider it mysterious and 
forbidding. Perhaps the reason for this is because they view science as something fun-
damentally different from anything they normally do. Actually, this is not the case. 
The essence of science is something we all do, which is to try to understand ourselves 
and the world around us. Scientific research is a process that is designed to extend 
our understandings and to determine if they are correct or useful. The basic difference 
between everyday thinking, on the one hand, and science and scientific research, on 
the other, is that the latter strives to operate according to a more rigorous set of rules. 
Because science and the process of scientific research can be viewed as extensions of 
everyday thinking, we find them easiest to explain if we begin by considering how an 
individual tries to make sense of, and cope with, his or her world.
The present chapter explores the nature of understanding, relying on informal 
and everyday examples of human thought to draw parallels to scientific conceptions of 
understanding. In doing so, we build on Albert Einstein’s assertion that “the whole of 
science is nothing more than an extension of everyday thinking.” We begin by describ-
ing the different ways in which social scientists think about reality, considering the per-
spectives of realism, social constructionism, critical realism, and hypothetical realism. 
Next we address the building blocks of human understanding, namely, concepts and 
conceptual systems that relate one concept to another. Given that a scientist has evolved 
a conceptual system to address an issue, he or she then must communicate that system 
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to other scientists. We conclude the chapter by briefly considering the nature of com-
munication so as to set the stage for future chapters on how to derive precise conceptual 
definitions in theory construction.
THE NATURE OF REALITY
The process of understanding our world and making sense of reality is central to our wak-
ing lives. Accordingly, let us be more specific about what we mean by reality and under-
standing. Much philosophical thought has been devoted to the question of the nature of 
reality, and there is controversy among scientists about whether a single objective reality 
could ever be shown to exist.1 According to the traditional perspective, termed realism, 
reality exists independent of any human presence. There is an external world comprised 
of objects that follow a myriad of natural facts and laws. It is up to us to discover these 
facts and laws. Using this perspective, science has evolved and prospered as an approach 
for gaining knowledge that mirrors the presumed actualities of the real world.
In contrast to realism, the social constructionist perspective holds that reality is a 
construction of the human mind, that this construction is tied to a particular time and 
social context, and that what is considered reality changes as the social context changes. 
In its most extreme form, constructionism maintains that there is no reality and there 
are no facts until these are conceptualized and shared by some number of people. A 
more moderate position holds that, though there is an external reality independent of 
humankind, we can never know its units and true laws—or even if it has units and true 
laws. All we can know is our interpretation or construction of these experiences. Since 
the same experiences are open to many interpretations, any or all of which may be cor-
rect, the correctness of an interpretation depends upon the purposes of those doing the 
interpreting. Thus, as Scarr (1985) notes:
We do not discover scientific facts; we invent them. Their usefulness to us depends both on 
shared perceptions of the facts (consensual validation) and whether they work for various 
purposes, some practical and some theoretical. (p. 499; emphasis added)
As a simple example that drives the point home, we frequently draw a set of paral-
lel lines on a blackboard and ask our students to describe what they see. Some reply 
“a road,” others say “two lines.” When an attempt is made to focus their thinking by 
saying “Hint: It’s a number,” three principal interpretations emerge: “Arabic number 11, 
Roman numeral II, or binary number three.” Each of these responses represents a dif-
ferent, but potentially accurate, reconstruction of the same objective reality that reflects 
that individual’s mental perspective. This point is fundamental. Even if the existence 
1The discussion that follows is a simplified and not necessarily universally shared perspective on realism, 
social constructionism, and hypothetical realism. Philosophers and social scientists use these terms in 
different ways.
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of a single objective, external reality could be assumed, the way in which this reality 
is interpreted can vary within the individual over time, across individuals, and can be 
heavily influenced by context (e.g., someone immersed in the study of Roman antiquity 
is more likely to interpret two parallel lines as representing Roman numeral II). Every 
individual develops his or her own reality, so that a number of different realities may be 
constructed out of the same set of “objective” facts. As is increasingly being recognized, 
it is possible for more than one of these different realities to be correct and useful.
The social constructionist perspective has implications for the way in which science 
is viewed (see, e.g., Gergen, 1985; Gergen & Gergen, 2003). The principal implications 
of the social constructionist perspective do not affect so much the way in which scien-
tific empiricism is practiced, but rather the way in which the conceptualizations and the 
outcomes of the assessment process are interpreted. According to the realism perspec-
tive, conceptual systems and theories are created so as to precisely mirror an existing 
reality. The outcomes of the assessment process can be taken as direct representations 
of that reality, and it is possible to make claims regarding ultimate truths. By contrast, 
although the social constructionist perspective usually involves the researcher doing 
virtually the same things as are done in a realism perspective, the recognition that there 
exist multiple possible realities orients the researcher toward interpretations that reject 
more absolute perspectives on mapping out a single, existing reality:
The admission that reality is a construction of the human mind does not deny the . . . value 
of the construction. Indeed, we get around in the world and invent knowledge that is admi-
rably useful. But the claim that science and reality are human constructions denies that 
there is any one set of facts that is absolute and real. Instead, it asserts that there are many 
sets of “facts” that arise from different theory-guided perceptions. (Scarr, 1985, p. 501)
The social constructionist perspective can be discomforting because it makes us less 
certain of what we do and what we think we know. “How can we know what is right 
if there is no right?” (Scarr, 1985, pp. 511–512). On the other hand, this perspective 
enables us to more clearly recognize that any given conceptualization, and the facts that 
are given meaning by that conceptualization, is a function of the sociocultural time and 
space in which they occur.
A middle ground relative to these somewhat conflicting perspectives has been artic-
ulated by Blumer (1969). According to this view, reality is indeed seen through human 
conceptions of it. But the empirical world also “talks back” to our conceptions in the 
sense of challenging, resisting, and failing to bend to them. If a knife is plunged into 
someone’s heart, certain ramifications follow. The ways in which these ramifications 
are construed and interpreted may vary from one conceptual scheme to another. But 
the environment has spoken. It is this inflexible character of the world about us that 
calls for, and justifies, empirical science. Science seeks to develop conceptions that can 
successfully accommodate the obdurate character of the empirical world. Blumer’s view 
roughly maps onto a philosophy of science known as critical realism, though alternative 
formulations of it are many (e.g., Manicas, 2006; Sayer, 1992).
  The Nature of Understanding 9
Another influential perspective on the debate is that even if it cannot be proven 
that reality exists, it is useful to assume that it does. This approach has been termed 
hypothetical realism. Here the concept of reality is a heuristic device—something that 
helps us organize our thoughts and think about matters so as to accomplish certain 
goals and objectives. Strictly speaking, reality may or may not exist, but we approach 
the world and our attempts to understand the world as if it does. In doing so, we may be 
able to accomplish a wide range of goals, but we also may be constrained in our think-
ing, accordingly. Hypothetical realism derives from a broader approach to epistemology, 
called pragmatism. The approach is reflected in the work of the philosopher C. I. Lewis 
(1929), who argued that science does not provide a copy of reality but must work with 
conceptual systems that are chosen for pragmatic reasons so as to aid scientific inquiry. 
Assuming a hypothetical reality is one such aid.
In sum, whereas realism embraces a view that external reality exists and the goal of 
science is to discover the laws that govern that reality, constructionism emphasizes that 
reality is a construction of the human mind that is tied to a particular time and social 
context. There are many gradations of these viewpoints, such as the position advocated 
by Blumer (1969), which emphasizes that reality is seen through human conceptions of 
it but that there is an empirical world that “talks back” to our conceptions; and hypo-
thetical realism, which recognizes that one may not be able to prove that reality exists, 
but nevertheless approaches science with a working assumption that it does.
The broader literature on the philosophy of science explores a myriad of perspec-
tives on how scientists (and laypeople) think about reality. This literature presents more 
nuanced perspectives than what we present here, and interested readers are encouraged 
to pursue this literature (see the suggested readings at the end of the chapter).
How Reality Is Experienced
Assuming for the moment that reality exists, how is it experienced by the individual? 
Most would agree that we experience the world around us as a complex, dynamic flow 
of unique and unrepeatable phenomena and events. Further, most of these phenomena 
and events—from those occurring deep in intergalactic space to those occurring in the 
micromolecular structure of this book—are not directly observable. No wonder, then, 
that attempting to understand our world can be a difficult process.
Reality appears complex. Whatever else it is or may be, the world—especially the 
external world—that we experience is complex. Consider a lecture hall filled with 200 
students. Forget about the world beyond our immediate view; to describe, in precise 
detail, the sizes, shapes, colors (of clothing, objects, etc.), relationships, psychological 
components, and sociological components of that lecture hall at one instant in time 
could take months, years, or perhaps even lifetimes.
Reality appears dynamic. Moreover, things never stay the same. The world at any 
given instant is different from the world at the very next instant. From the tiniest par-
ticles that constitute physical matter to the largest galaxies, things are always in motion. 
The cells of living organisms are always growing or decaying, and the impulses in the 
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neuronal system are always at work. So even if we were able to describe in infinite detail 
our hypothetical lecture hall filled with students, once one or more students moved, we 
would have a set of different relationships and, hence, a different reality.  
Reality appears unique. Because of this dynamic quality, the universe at any given 
instant—and everything in it—is never the same as the universe at any other instant, 
either previous or subsequent. The water that flows at one particular instant or during 
any given day down the rivers of New Hampshire, the raindrops that fall on a particu-
lar evening in Houston, the expense account dinner that was eaten in Paris—all are 
unique and can never be repeated precisely. The planet contains more than 7 billion 
human inhabitants, yet no two people are precisely identical in all respects—from their 
mundane external features (e.g., fingerprints) to their more complex internal features 
(how and what they think and feel). Even the inanimate rock lying on the ground is 
unique. In theory, no two rocks are identical in terms of all their distinguishing char-
acteristics.
Reality appears mostly obscure. Probably the major share of reality remains hid-
den from direct detection by any of our senses. To be sure, scientific instruments are 
being developed that enable us to probe more deeply into space, see ever tinier particles 
of matter and, through functional magnetic resonance imagings (fMRI), observe how 
regions of our brains are activated as we think, but the vast majority of nature’s secrets 
still remains mysteriously hidden from direct view. These secrets cannot be seen, heard, 
tasted, smelled, or touched. With specific respect to human phenomena, whereas many 
are openly visible (e.g., we can see a person walking, eating a sandwich, purchasing a 
newspaper), a vast number of others are not. A person’s psyche—the inner thoughts 
and feelings that presumably guide much of our behavior—is one of the most obscure 
realms of all. We have yet to be able to see what we think is a motive or to point to the 
resting place of jealousy or pride.
The four characteristics just described—that reality is experienced as complex, 
dynamic, unique, and mostly obscured—refer to what is often termed the external envi-
ronment. More than a century ago, the famed philosopher and social scientist William 
James (1890) referred to this external environment as “a bloomin’, buzzin’ world of 
confusion.” These four characteristics apply to individuals’ “internal environments” as 
well.
CONCEPTS: THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF UNDERSTANDING
The Nature of Concepts
Confronted by this array of complex, dynamic, unique, and mostly obscured phenom-
ena, how do individuals manage to make sense out of this world? They do so, almost 
automatically and usually unconsciously, by conceptualizing—that is, by using their 
mental processes to consider and sort their experiences in terms of the concepts they 
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have acquired and stored in memory. They also develop new concepts to describe things 
they had never previously experienced. Just as concepts are the fundamental building 
blocks of everyday thinking, they also are the fundamental building blocks of scientific 
thinking.
According to Webster’s Dictionary, the word concept refers to something that is con-
ceived of in the mind. It is a generic idea or thought, usually developed from experienc-
ing one or more particular instances. Examples of concepts include shirt, book, dripping, 
chair, mother, ice cream, advertising, smashed, home, vacation, memory, love, prejudice, 
attitude, and expectations. As you can see, concepts refer to things that are tangible and 
denotable (e.g., shirts) as well as to things that are not as concrete and directly seen (e.g., 
memory).
Concepts are the building blocks for all thinking, regardless of whether that think-
ing occurs in the context of everyday living, art, politics, sports, religion, or science. In 
fact, without concepts, thought as we know it would be impossible. It is our concepts 
that enable us to achieve some basic understanding of the world.
The most basic level of understanding can be termed identification. We understand 
something, in part, when we can identify it. When experiencing the world about us, we 
use the concepts we have in mind to identify and classify our experiences: This is an ice 
cream cone; that is a shirt. Social scientists identify and classify people using concepts 
such as race, gender, intelligence, and attitudes. Because concepts are so central to all 
thinking, we examine their nature in somewhat greater detail.
Concepts are generalized abstractions. When an individual has a concept, it means 
that he or she has a general idea that can be applied across a number of specific 
instances. Consider the concept shirt, for example. Shirts differ in a great number of 
ways—in terms of their fabric, color or number of colors, sleeve length, the number of 
buttons (or whether they have buttons at all), the size and shape of the collar, whether 
there are pockets and the number of pockets, whether the shirt is squared off at the 
bottom or has tails, and so on. Yet having the concept shirt in mind is sufficient to 
enable the individual to sort things into two (or possibly three) categories: shirts, items 
that have some of the characteristics of shirts but are not shirts, and everything else. 
When we say that concepts are generalized abstractions, we mean that the general idea 
subsumes a universe of possible instances. Note, also, that concepts can be “fuzzy” at 
the margins. Does a woman’s blouse qualify as a shirt? What about a woman’s halter 
top? Such fuzziness can lead to disagreements among individuals and scientists alike. 
For example, a recent controversy in astrophysics involved how to define the concept 
of a planet.
Concepts encompass universes of possibilities. An important feature of concepts—one 
that has fundamental implications for scientific theory and research—is that each con-
cept consists of a universe of content. As just discussed, the concept shirt encompasses 
a universe of many specific possibilities. The concept ice cream cone encompasses a uni-
verse of possibilities. The concepts attitude toward abortion, romantic love, and so on, 
all encompass universes of possibilities.
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Concepts are hypothetical. Concepts are not reality, just ideas regarding reality. This 
point is easy to appreciate when concepts or constructs apply to nebulous, amorphous, 
abstract things, such as wanderlust, attitude, or sustainable development. But this point 
also applies to items that are denotable and concrete. For example, although the concept 
of a shirt exists in our minds, we do not walk around with little shirts in our minds. 
Neither the word shirt nor the thought that this word evokes in the person’s mind is 
a shirt. Until and unless neurological science tells us differently, concepts possess no 
tangible reality, in and of themselves. In this sense, all concepts are necessarily hypo-
thetical, and, although concepts are themselves hypothetical, the things to which they 
refer include both observable entities (e.g., shirts, tables, dogs), which form part of the 
external environment, and nontangible phenomena such as love, happiness, and hunger. 
Although we cannot see a person’s hunger directly, we can see the effects of this assumed 
state and, from these effects, infer its existence. Many of the concepts that populate our 
minds are of this indirectly observable variety.
(Most) concepts are learned. Most concepts are acquired creations. The infant does 
not come into the world already possessing the concept shirt. Rather, he or she must 
acquire this concept before being able to use it to understand reality and communi-
cate with others. When individuals experience something completely new and different, 
they must either acquire or create a concept to be able to identify this experience and 
distinguish it from all other aspects they perceive. Similarly, the scientist who observes 
something different under the microscope or in intergalactic space will need to first 
conceptualize it and then give it a unique label (e.g., chromosome, quasar) with which 
to identify this particular phenomenon and others like it. Although most concepts are 
learned, there is evidence that certain concepts may be “hardwired,” such as the face of 
a mother as perceived by a newborn (Bednar & Miikkulainen, 2003).
Concepts are socially shared. In order for communication to occur, the set of con-
cepts possessed by one individual generally needs to be similar to the sets possessed by 
others. Consider trying to discuss the notions of balks, punts, and love–15 with some-
one who does not understand baseball, football, or tennis, respectively. Or consider a 
researcher trying to discuss factor analysis with a nonresearcher who has never heard 
of the subject. Until both parties utilize shared concepts, communication cannot take 
place. That said, it is important to note that concepts in the social and behavioral sci-
ences often have contested meanings. As examples, after reviewing the scholarly litera-
ture, Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) found more than 500 definitions of attitude, and Jacoby 
and Chestnut (1978) found more than 50 definitions of brand loyalty.
Concepts are reality oriented (or functional). Although not physical reality themselves, 
most of our concepts presumably are tied to the external world and used as a guide for 
interpreting and reacting to this world. Concepts are thus functional. If a person’s inter-
pretation and labeling of experiences do not mirror the world, then his or her reactions 
could be dysfunctional, even fatal. Consider the implications of conceptualizing a lethal 
cobra as a nonlethal garter snake. We develop and share concepts because they seem 
useful for helping us understand the reality we experience.
Concepts are selective constructions. The world we experience can be conceptualized 
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in almost countless ways. For example, looking at a woman’s white blouse, we can think 
of it as something that provides a socially expected degree of modesty, as something that 
offers protection from the wind and sun, as something decorative, as something that can 
be used to wash a car, as a bandage, as a tourniquet, or as a white flag to indicate surren-
der. The ways in which concepts are applied to describe reality depend upon the needs 
and objectives of the individual doing the conceptualizing.
Concepts, Constructs, and Variables
As might be imagined, the adult individual’s mind contains a large number of concepts. 
Fortunately, most concepts cluster together under broader, more encompassing con-
cepts. For example, shirts and ties are both examples of clothing. Cats and dogs are both 
examples of mammals, which, along with snakes and insects, are examples of animals. 
Such higher order concepts are called constructs because they refer to instances that are 
constructed from concepts at lower levels of abstraction.
We form and use constructs because they are a powerful means by which we are 
able to handle greater portions of reality. For example, it is much easier to say “All ani-
mals must eat in order to stay alive” than it is to say “All apes, dogs, cats, frogs, snakes, 
etc., must eat in order to stay alive.” Not only do we use constructs because of their 
greater economy, efficiency and power, but also because they enable us to achieve a cer-
tain degree of order when dealing with the almost infinite number of separate concepts 
that populates our minds.
One type of construct that is used in many scientific theories is called a variable. A 
variable has, or is composed of, different “levels” or “values.” For example, gender can 
be conceptualized as a variable that has two levels or values. That is, it can be seen as 
being composed of two concepts or categories, male and female. Religion is a variable 
consisting of the conceptually distinct categories Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, Muslim, 
and so on. Time is a variable that can be conceptualized as consisting of the categories 1 
minute, 2 minutes, 3 minutes, and so on. Intelligence is a variable that has different levels 
ranging from low to high. Many theories in the social sciences focus on variables and the 
relationships between them, though the way theorists do so often differs considerably. 
This will become apparent in later chapters.
Variables are important because people and social entities (e.g., families, groups, 
organizations, nations) are thought to differ depending on the variable category or level 
that describes them. Males are thought to be different from females. A person with a low 
IQ score is thought to be different from a person with a high IQ score. Democracies are 
thought to be different from monarchies.
Although variables are central to many scientific theories, some theoretical 
approaches eschew variable-oriented approaches to theory construction. These theories 
tend to rely more on process-oriented characterizations of phenomena and/or on nar-
ratives (Mohr, 1982). For example, rather than thinking of gender as a variable that has 
two levels, male and female, these theoretical frameworks emphasize the many ways in 
which gender is understood by different individuals, which may include concepts such 
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as bisexual, transgendered, and questioning that are not treated as levels of a variable in 
a broader theory. (We discuss process-oriented approaches in greater depth in Chapter 
10.)
CONCEPTUAL SYSTEMS: THE BASES FOR DEEPER UNDERSTANDING
By enabling us to identify, describe, differentiate, classify, and segregate our experi-
ences, concepts assist us in achieving some rudimentary understanding of reality. Yet, 
used in isolation, concepts and variables typically provide a limited degree of under-
standing. It is only when concepts are placed into relationship with each other that they 
move us toward achieving a deeper understanding of our reality. Consider the concepts 
convict, chair, smashed, and hungry. Although we understand what each of these concepts 
means separate and apart from each other, as reflected by the statement “The hungry 
convict smashed a chair,” connecting the concepts with each other in this manner leads 
to seeing a number of relationships, including (1) chairs can be smashed, (2) convicts 
BOx 2.1. Concepts, Cultures, and Values
Concepts are an integral part of science. They form the foundation for the way 
in which a scientist thinks about a problem. A major tool used by humans in cat-
egorizing phenomena is language. Several linguists, such as Benjamin Whorf, 
have suggested that language is more than a convenient tool for communication. 
Rather, language shapes the way in which people think about things. Analysis 
of divergent cultures clearly demonstrates that languages categorize our environ-
ment in different ways. Navajo Indians, for example, have color terms that roughly 
correspond to our white, red, and yellow, but none that is exactly equivalent to 
our brown, gray, black, blue, and green. Our gray and brown are denoted by a 
single term, as are blue and green. The Navajo have two different terms to refer 
to black, one focused on objects and the other on darkness. In short, the Navajo 
language approaches the color spectrum differently from traditional English. Dif-
ferences in language do not necessarily limit the ability of an individual in one 
culture to “think” less well than an individual in another culture. Instead, language 
seems to direct perception and thought into culturally determined channels or 
categories. This being the case, it is evident that science is influenced by culture, 
including the way in which we are raised and the way we learn to categorize 
and relate different concepts. Many concepts are nearly universal, whereas other 
concepts are culture specific. In this sense, as well as others, science and scientific 
thought are influenced by the culture and environment in which its practitioners 
find themselves.
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can smash chairs, (3) convicts can be hungry, and (4) hunger may cause convicts to 
smash chairs.
Relationships can occur on a myriad of levels. Examples of relationships include 
spatial relationships (e.g., the car is on the street, parked next to the sidewalk), temporal 
relationships (the blue car reached the traffic light before the green car did; adolescence 
precedes adulthood), deterministic relationships (the slip on the ice caused her to fall), 
kinship relationships (Jon is Robin’s brother), and legal relationships (Jon is married 
to Beth). When two or more concepts are linked together to represent relationships, we 
have a rudimentary conceptual system. It is these conceptual systems that enable us to 
arrive at deeper levels of understanding.
Over the course of a lifetime, each individual tends to acquire tens of thousands, 
perhaps even millions, of concepts. When the number of permutations and combina-
tions is considered, it quickly becomes apparent that each person’s mind can contain a 
dizzying array of conceptual systems. The potential exists for all of these systems to get 
in the way of each other and impede understanding. This is where selection mechanisms 
come into play.
When the mental system is working effectively, concepts useful for understanding 
and coping with the experienced reality of the moment come into play. By analogy, it is 
like the situation involving the college freshman who, while standing on the steps of the 
administration building during his or her first day on campus, asks a passerby, “How do 
I get to the math building?” In answering the question, the passerby might draw a simple 
map to represent how he or she thinks the freshman should proceed. Clearly, the map 
would not depict every tree and blade of grass, every section of pavement, every build-
ing and parking lot. The only things that the map maker includes are those he or she 
believes will help the freshman get to the desired destination—that is, those items the 
mapmaker considers to be useful guides to reality. Had the freshman inquired instead 
“Where is the large oak tree on campus that everyone seems to be talking about?” the 
map might have contained different elements, even though both maps would be refer-
ring to the same physical space. 
When coping with the ongoing world, our conceptual systems are analogous to a 
mental “map” in the previous example, though in real life the systems can take many 
forms, such as mental narratives, numerical representations, pictorial representations, 
and so on. The nature of the conceptual system that is invoked depends upon the needs 
of the individual at that moment. It is useful to keep this analogy in mind when we later 
discuss the topic of scientific theory. At that point, the reader will be able to recognize 
that, like maps, scientific theories are essentially conceptual systems designed to be use-
ful in identifying, organizing, and, as discussed below, explaining or predicting some 
delimited portion of the experienced world.
A core facet of a conceptual system derived to provide insights into a phenomenon 
is what scientists call explanation. Although we may understand that two or more things 
are related, we may still not understand why this is so. Answering “Why?” involves mov-
ing to deeper levels of understanding, with the answers to such questions representing 
explanation. For example, why do some married couples who have been together for 20 
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years or more divorce? Why do some schools rely on standardized testing as an indicator 
of how well they are teaching their students? The answers to such questions are a form 
of explanation.
Another facet of understanding is being able to predict when something will happen 
in the future. Although prediction and explanation often go hand in hand, the two are 
distinct. The person who tells the auto mechanic “Every time I step on the car’s accelera-
tor, I hear a rattle in the engine—let me step on it and you can hear what I mean” may 
be able to predict without being able to explain. Similarly, as a moment’s reflection about 
weather forecasting will reveal, being able to explain how the weather we experienced 
today came to be does not necessarily mean that we also are able to accurately predict 
the exact date and time when this precise weather will occur again.
Yet another feature of understanding is that it allows us to differentiate between 
concepts and events. As Runkel and McGrath (1972) have emphasized, knowledge is 
“knowledge of differences,” namely, how things are similar and how things are different. 
Understanding a phenomenon implies we can describe what differentiates it from other 
phenomena or we can differentiate instances of it. Knowledge of males and females 
is knowledge of how males and females differ (or are similar) on different properties, 
dimensions, or behavior.
Thus, as used here, the term understanding encompasses identifying, describing, 
organizing, differentiating, predicting, and explaining. These basic ingredients of under-
standing are just as characteristic of the person on the street as they are of the scientist 
plying his or her profession.
Armed with an understanding of our world, we can begin to achieve important 
goals. These goals can be numerous and diverse, but two are especially noteworthy: 
satisfaction and control. Once we are able to identify, organize, and explain our experi-
ences, the world becomes less of a frightening, unfathomable experience. Thus, if it does 
nothing else, understanding enables the individual to achieve a measure of peace and 
satisfaction. Understanding also gives us some ability to control events or relationships. 
Controlling the environment involves two components: (1) understanding the relevant 
features of the environment, and (2) having the ability to manipulate those features.
COMMUNICATION
Having traversed the terrain from concepts to conceptual systems, we are now ready for 
a major extension. Up to this point we have focused on what presumably happens in the 
minds of each of us as we try to come to grips with the world around us. But what hap-
pens when we try to communicate this understanding to another person? How do the 
thoughts in the mind of one person come to be represented in the mind of another? This 
is a particularly interesting question when we realize that human communication need 
not involve face-to-face verbal interaction between two people, or even communication 
occurring at the same time. We are still reading and benefiting from the works of Plato, 
and much of our communication in this Internet era occurs through written words.
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When a person (whom we term the source) deliberately engages in communication, 
he or she does so because there is some thought or feeling that he or she wishes the 
other party (called the receiver) to understand. Communication is typically defined as 
a process whereby a source transmits a message over a medium to one or more receiv-
ers. Unfortunately, the thought that exists in the mind of a source cannot be directly 
transposed into the mind of a receiver. For the source to communicate a thought (i.e., 
evoke the intended meaning in the mind of the receiver), the source must convert it into 
some externally denotable form, such as the spoken word, written words, or some other 
detectable symbols, and convey these symbols to the receiver. In turn, the receiver must 
then decode—that is, interpret—this overt expression and extract meaning from it—
hopefully, the same meaning intended by the source.
The distinction between concepts (as internal mental representations) and symbols 
(the external observable expressions that are used to represent internal concepts) is 
important. Using the vocabulary that has evolved, meaning structure is the term used to 
designate the concepts or thoughts that exist in the minds of individuals, and surface 
structure is the term used to designate the symbols that are the externally visible expres-
sion of these thoughts. In communicating a particular thought (which we label Meaning 
Structure 1), the source uses some surface structure in an attempt to evoke the same 
thought (Meaning Structure 1) in the mind of the receiver. Should this surface structure 
evoke some other meaning in the mind of the receiver (say, Meaning Structure 2 or 3 or 
4), then we have a miscommunication in which meanings are not common or shared. 
Should the source succeed in evoking Meaning Structure 1 (MS1) but also evoke one or 
more other meaning structures, then we have ambiguous, confusing communication 
(i.e., a combination of accurate and inaccurate communication).
Suppose the source, trying to communicate that a particular automobile had sur-
reptitiously been taken from its rightful owner, said, “This car is hot.” Although the 
receiver might extract the intended meaning (i.e., MS1—the car is stolen), he or she 
might also extract some other meaning, such as MS2—the car has just been running 
hard, and the engine temperature is relatively high; or MS3—the car has been sitting 
out in the sun and its interior, particularly the seats, would not be a comfortable place 
to sit; or MS4—the car has excellent high-performance characteristics; and so on. The 
particular set of surface structure symbols used by the source in this instance does not 
seem to have accurately conveyed the meaning he or she had in mind.
Just as clearly, the source could have employed any number of different surface 
structures to convey the intended meaning. He or she could have said, “This car is 
stolen,” or “This is a stolen vehicle.” Instead of speaking these words aloud, he or she 
could have written them out, used Morse code or the gestures employed by American 
Sign Language, or even tried smoke signals, pantomime, or Braille. Earlier we noted that 
each concept (e.g., shirt) actually represents a universe of possible meanings. Now we 
see that each of these meanings can be expressed via a universe of possible symbols. 
Since symbols tend to possess more than one meaning (i.e., they can be ambiguous), 
communication—including scientific communication—is enhanced by careful atten-
tion to the selection and use of symbols.
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Several important points can now be summarized with respect to communication. 
First, it is necessary to make a distinction between people’s understanding of their envi-
ronment (as represented by the concepts they have in mind) and their description of that 
environment (as represented by the symbols, usually words, they use to describe their 
thoughts). Second, a number of different surface symbols could be used to communicate 
the same underlying meaning structure. Third, communication also requires that the 
receiver possess a concept comparable to the one in the mind of the source; otherwise, 
the communication of meaning is difficult. For example, the source could just as well 
have said, “The frammis is hot.” If the receiver had no idea of what a frammis is, there 
would be no transference of meaning. Fourth, for any number of reasons (including 
“noise” in the channel), though the surface structure may have been precise and accu-
rate, the recipient extracted an incorrect meaning. For example, the receiver may hear 
only part of what was said and, as a result, believe that the car is not a stolen vehicle. 
Fifth, even if he or she does extract the meaning intended by the source, the receiver 
may consider it to be inaccurate or incorrect in its description of reality (e.g., “I don’t 
care what you tell me, that’s not a stolen vehicle”). Sixth, just as the concept in our mind 
(e.g., of a car) is not equivalent to the elements of reality that are so conceptualized, so 
is the external symbol (e.g., the word car) not one and the same with the physical reality 
it describes. The symbols we use are arbitrary constructions. Finally, meaning must be 
interpreted in context, and a particular symbol may have different meanings in different 
contexts. For example, thin means something different when it is applied to people than 
when it is applied to liquids.
Of course, human communication is far more complex and dynamic than the above 
characterization. At this point, it is sufficient to recognize that our discussion regarding 
concepts and conceptual systems refers to what is happening in the mind of an indi-
vidual and that to communicate with others regarding these thoughts, the individual 
must convert thoughts to another system that requires the use of external symbols, 
usually language. Since much of the scientific enterprise involves the communication of 
information between individuals, it is important to understand the core elements that 
underlie that communication. We return to this key point in later chapters when we 
discuss developing conceptual definitions in theory construction.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The world that we experience is multifaceted, dynamic, unique, and mostly hidden from 
direct view. At a most basic level, individuals cope with this complexity by forming and 
using concepts to assign meaning to (i.e., to identify and describe) their experiences. 
People place concepts into relationships with other concepts and use these conceptual 
systems as guides to organizing and explaining the world they experience. Scientists 
disagree about the best way to conceptualize reality, as reflected in the philosophical ori-
entations of realism, social constructionism, critical realism, and hypothetical realism. 
In order to share and interact with others regarding these conceptualizations, people 
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(scientists) translate their internal concepts into external symbols or language. When 
both the symbols and the underlying conceptualizations to which they refer are rea-
sonably well shared, the exchange of meaning from one individual to another can take 
place.
Having described how the individual goes about achieving some measure of under-
standing of the world, we have provided the foundation for understanding what science 
is and where it fits into the world at large. In a nutshell, science is just one of a number 
of approaches (e.g., the arts, religion) for acquiring a deeper understanding of the world 
we experience. In the next chapter we examine scientific thought more formally, con-
trasting it with other ways of knowing things and with some of the core ideas discussed 
in the present chapter.
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ExERCISES
Exercises to Reinforce Concepts
 1. Explain how everyday thinking is similar to scientific thinking.
 2. Describe the nature of reality as people typically experience it.
 3. What is the difference between realism and social constructionism?
 4. What are critical realism, hypothetical realism, and pragmatism?
 5. Define the terms concept, construct, and conceptual system. Explain how each 
contributes to understanding our environment.
 6. What are the major characteristics of concepts?
 7. Explain how conceptual systems function as selection mechanisms. How does 
this aid understanding through explanation and organization?
2For all key terms, the number in parentheses indicates the page on which the term first appears.
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 8. Explain how understanding the environment results in prediction and con-
trol.
 9. Define what is meant by meaning structure and surface structure. Explain how 
they can result in different forms of communication.
Exercise to Apply Concepts
 1. The United States has one of the highest teen pregnancy rates among all devel-
oped countries in the world. A social scientist wants to better understand teen-
age pregnancy in the United States. How would the material in this chapter 
shape the way in which the scientist might think about this topic?
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Science as an Approach  
to Understanding
The work of science is to substitute facts for appearances, and 
demonstrations for impressions.
—John Ruskin (1859)
Chapter 2 described how individuals use concepts and conceptual systems to achieve an 
understanding of the world, with the premise that scientists draw upon many of these 
same strategies to construct scientific theories. In this chapter we delve more deeply 
into scientific thinking and theorizing. We begin by considering different socially based 
approaches to understanding, such as theology, philosophy, jurisprudence, the arts, lit-
erature, and science. We describe the key characteristics that separate science from these 
other “ways of knowing.” Next, we discuss key concepts in theory construction, includ-
ing the definition of a theory; the difference between theories, models, and hypotheses; 
and the different typologies that scientists use to characterize theories. We conclude 
with a discussion of the characteristics of a good theory and the role of objectivity in 
science.
SOCIALLY BASED APPROACHES TO UNDERSTANDING
There are many ways of gaining and organizing knowledge about one’s world, only 
one of which is science. These socially based approaches to understanding all involve 
internal conceptual systems that are communicated among individuals using an exter-
nally observable shared symbol system (e.g., words, gestures, mathematics). Being able 
to use such shared symbol systems opens the door to opportunities for improving and 
expanding personal understanding. Not only does it enable the individual to com-
municate his or her thoughts to others, but also to receive communications from oth-
ers. These others may have a more useful way of looking at the world that may lead 
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the individual to revise his or her thinking. In addition, communicating thoughts to 
others can help individuals clarify their logic through self-reflection during the com-
munication process.
The existence of shared symbol systems also enables us to tap into the accumulated 
wisdom of the past. After all, a great number of the things that each of us experiences 
has been experienced, thought about, and discussed by others at earlier points in time. 
It is possible that we would find these conceptualizations useful in our own attempt to 
understand our world. We refer to these bodies of knowledge as shared meaning systems. 
For the present, this term is meant to refer to both the underlying conceptualization 
as represented in our minds and the externally visible symbols used to communicate 
regarding this conceptualization.
There are many examples of shared meaning systems. Mythology documents 
myths that are or were used to explain otherwise unexplained natural phenomena 
(e.g., the sun dropping out of view in the evening and mysteriously reappearing the 
next day), imbuing these phenomena with meanings that made them appear less mys-
terious. Other perspectives also have evolved over the ages, including those in the 
diverse fields of theology, philosophy, jurisprudence, the arts, literature, and science, 
to name a few. Each reflects a different orientation to ordering and understanding the 
world we experience. The fact that these perspectives have persisted for centuries sug-
gests that each provides a satisfying way of extracting meaning from, and coping with, 
the world for significant numbers of people. In some key respects, science is like any 
of the other approaches mentioned above.
Commonalities across All Shared Conceptual Approaches
At least three fundamental characteristics appear to characterize all shared approaches 
to understanding. First, each approach consists of concepts and relationships among 
these concepts. In this regard, all shared approaches—including science—are like the 
conceptual systems used by individuals. The basic difference is that the shared systems 
tend to be more elaborate, more abstract, stabler over time, and more explicit.
Second, all shared belief systems are limited in how much of the world they address. 
Indeed, if they possessed no such limitation, they would be forced to grasp all of the 
complexity of the ongoing world as it progressed, and that would be impossible. As a 
consequence, no single orientation (including science) has an exclusive franchise on 
arriving at exhaustive and comprehensive understanding. The Nobel Prize-winning 
physicist Weisskopf (1977, p. 411) observed:
Human experience encompasses much more than any given system of thought can express. 
. . . There are many ways of thinking and feeling, each of them contains some parcel of what 
we may consider the truth. . . . Science and technology comprise some of the most powerful 
tools for deeper insight and for solving the problems we face . . . but science and technology 
are only one of the avenues toward reality: others are equally needed to comprehend the full 
significance of our existence.
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Recognition of the limits of science has been expressed in many ways. Consider what 
the psychologist Scarr (1985, p. 500) said:
Science, construed as procedures of knowing and persuading others, is only one form of 
knowing by the rules of one game. There are other games in town, some like art more intui-
tive, some like religion more determined by revelation and faith.
A third feature of shared belief systems is that they generally serve prescriptive and 
evaluative functions. The prescriptive function can be thought of as guidance regarding 
how we ought to approach or respond to some aspect of reality or experience. The for-
mal systems of religion, for example, may provide explicit guidance on such subjects 
as premarital sex and birth control. In certain instances, the formal system of science 
indicates what are and are not proper procedures to be followed. For example, scientists 
should subject theoretical propositions to empirical tests to gain perspectives on the 
viability of the propositions. Prescription provides a basis for evaluation. Given that we 
have some notion of what should be done, we can evaluate how well what has been done 
corresponds to what should have been done. The evaluative function permits labeling 
something as being good or bad, right or wrong. Shared systems thus generally provide 
a template or model against which to evaluate activities that purport to have been taken 
in accordance with that model.
Special Features of the Scientific Approach
If all shared belief systems consist of the same underlying foundation (concepts and 
relationships) and each can accommodate only limited portions of our environment, 
then what distinguishes science from these other approaches? The answer has to do 
with how the worth of the statements and inferences within the system is assessed. To 
be taken seriously, any shared system needs to demonstrate that it possesses utility, that 
is, that it provides some useful way of describing or coping with the world about us. A 
variety of avenues is available for assessing the usefulness of a conceptualization. Per-
haps the most common strategy is that known as consensual validation. In this approach 
the worth of a particular conceptualization is gauged by the degree of acceptance it is 
granted by others. The fact that other people believe that a particular conceptualization 
is correct is used as the basis for contending that it necessarily is correct. For example, 
in the legal context, if a jury agrees that some particular view must be correct (and this 
view has been sustained on appeal), then its verdict is accepted as being correct within 
the legal system. Consensual validation also typifies those religions where gaining and 
retaining adherents are interpreted as bearing on the validity of the underlying tenets. 
The fact that many believe in the religion is interpreted as an indication of its validity, 
since “so many people could not be wrong.” Consensual validation also surfaces in the 
arts, where public acceptance serves to validate an artistic conceptualization.
Expert validation is a related avenue for assessing the value of a particular con-
ceptualization. Here, the decision as to whether a particular conceptualization merits 
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BOx 3.1. The Fringes of Science
Scientific theories are subject to many types of validation. Several critics of sci-
ence believe that scientists are overly zealous in their application of one type of 
validation, consensual, and that this can hamper the advancement of knowledge. 
These critics contend that scientists are too quick to dismiss researchers and theo-
rists “working on the fringes” and that the scientific community only takes seri-
ously that which is acceptable to the prevailing views of that community. Stated 
another way, science is inherently conservative. As a result of relying on such 
consensual validation, there are many missed opportunities. A frequently cited 
example is that of Galileo. Based on his observations with the recently invented 
telescope, Galileo came to question many widely held beliefs about the universe, 
such as the Earth being at its center. Ultimately, much of what Galileo posited 
proved to be true, even though he was subjected to public ridicule and brought 
before the Inquisition in Rome.
It is, of course, true that strict adherence to prevailing views may blind the 
scientist to new insights and advances. But this does not mean that the scientific 
community should approach “fringe” claims without a healthy skepticism. Con-
sider, in retrospect, the case of Galileo. Even though Galileo was ridiculed by 
the general public, his observations were carefully scrutinized by the scientific 
community. With the invention of the telescope, scientists had no way of knowing 
whether what could be seen through the lens was, indeed, accurate. At the time, 
there was no theory of optics, and what is taken for granted today about the 
behavior of glass lenses was unknown at that time. Galileo asserted the validity 
of his telescope by examining objects on Earth with it and demonstrating its accu-
racy when compared to the case where the objects were directly observable to 
the human eye. Unfortunately, some distortions occurred at times, such as double 
images and color fringes. In addition, Galileo observed that while the telescope 
magnified planets and moons, fixed stars appeared smaller in size. Without a 
theory of optics, Galileo was unable to explain these phenomena, and, as such, 
the scientific resistance to his ideas may not have been as irrational as commonly 
portrayed.
Scientists must think carefully about the factors that influence their judgments 
regarding the validity of a theory, and be explicit about the criteria that they are 
using when evaluating that theory. Many of the “fringe theories” that occur in 
the popular press (e.g., biorhythms, the Bermuda triangle) simply do not hold 
up under careful empirical evaluation, despite claims by their adherents of being 
treated like Galileo.
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acceptance is determined by selected others who presumably have the knowledge and 
wisdom to discern what is and is not correct. Examples include relying on professional 
critics to determine the validity of artistic conceptualizations, on judges to decide the 
truth of legal matters, and on religious leaders to decide the truth of religious concep-
tualizations. Another confirmation strategy, internal validation, involves the application 
of formal rules of logic to examine the concepts and relationships within a particular 
conceptual system. If these concepts and relationships withstand the rigors of intensive 
logical assessment, then the conceptualization is said to be confirmed. Such a confirma-
tion strategy is typically employed in philosophy and mathematics.
Although science also employs consensual, expert, and internal validation, the sci-
entific approach can be differentiated from all others by the fact that it is the only one 
to place primary reliance on systematic empirical validation. Over the long run, scientific 
conceptualizations tend to be accepted only to the extent that they have been subjected 
to rigorous and systematic empirical testing and shown to be useful. We now consider 
this important point in greater depth.
THE ESSENTIALS OF SCIENTIFIC ENDEAVOR
At its core science can be thought of as consisting of a conceptual realm, on the one 
hand, and an empirical realm, on the other. The conceptual realm entails the develop-
ment of a conceptual system (consisting of concepts, constructs, and their relationships) 
that can be communicated unambiguously to others. The empirical realm refers to the 
process whereby the worth of the conceptualization is assessed through the conduct of 
scientific studies. For example, an organizational scientist might suggest a theoretical 
proposition (in the conceptual realm) that female applicants who are pregnant will be 
less likely to be hired for jobs than female applicants who are not pregnant. The scientist 
then subjects this proposition to an empirical test (in the empirical realm) by designing 
a study to discern if such bias actually occurs. For example, managers might be asked 
to evaluate videotapes of applicants with identical credentials and identical interview 
behavior, with the only difference between them being that one applicant is obviously 
pregnant and the other is not (for such a study, see Cunningham & Macan, 2007, who 
found evidence for such a bias).
Regardless of how detailed, formally explicit, or elegant they may be, by them-
selves, conceptual systems (such as theories, models, and hypotheses) are not scientific, 
only prescientific. To be fully scientific, they need to be subjected to empirical testing. 
As Carnap (1936, 1937), Pap (1962), and Popper (1963) have argued, “a scientific state-
ment that claims to say something about the actual world . . . is meaningful if and only 
if there are possible observations whose outcome is relevant to the truth or falsehood of 
the statement” (Pap, 1962, p. 24). Science avoids metaphysical explanations, that is, con-
ceptualizations that cannot be publicly observed and tested. For a conceptual system to 
be considered scientific, corresponding efforts must be generated toward its empirical 
verification (or falsification; see Popper, 1968).
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As an example, the concept of unconscious influences on behavior had a major 
impact on psychological theory when the unconscious was first popularized by the 
theories of Sigmund Freud. However, scientists soon became skeptical of the use of 
constructs about the unconscious because the constructs could not be validly measured 
and statements about them could not be subjected to empirical verification. It was pos-
sible for constructs about the unconscious to be invoked post hoc to explain most any 
behavior; without the possibility of empirical tests, such explanations could never be 
falsified. Interestingly, there has been a resurgence in the study of constructs about the 
unconscious as predictors of behavior as new technologies have become available that 
purportedly allow for the measurement of facets of the unconscious (e.g., Blanton & 
Jaccard, 2008).
Just as theoretical propositions must be addressed in the empirical realm for sci-
ence to progress, it also is the case that empirical systems make little sense without a 
corresponding conceptual system to organize them (see Kaplan, 1964, pp. 159–161). 
Any phenomenon or environment can be thought of as consisting of a great number of 
empirical “facts.” “Without some guiding idea, we do not know what facts to gather” 
(Cohen, 1956, p. 148). It is often said that research should be pursued without precon-
ceived ideas. This is impossible. Not only would it make every research investigation 
pointless, but even if we wished to do so, it could not be done (Poincaré, 1952, p. 143). 
Even when collecting “facts,” we must have some hypothesis or guiding ideas as to 
which facts are relevant to the investigation at hand, since we can hardly amass all the 
facts in the universe. A researcher interested in understanding the bases of poverty in 
the Maya living in the highlands of Guatemala cannot randomly collect information 
about the Maya to address this matter. Rather, the investigator thinks about different 
ways of gaining perspectives on the issue and, in doing so, inescapably imposes a con-
ceptual system, no matter how rudimentary it might be, onto the problem at hand. The 
basic point is that no observation is purely empirical—that is, free of any ideational 
element (Kaplan, 1964, p. 48). We return to this point in greater detail in Chapter 10 
on grounded theory.
The necessity for both conceptual and empirical systems cannot be overempha-
sized. Scientific theories do not constitute science until and unless they are (or at least 
can be) subjected to empirical testing. Without such tests, scientific theories represent 
only precursors of science, that is, propositions that have not been subjected to empiri-
cal evaluation. Correspondingly, even the most applied researcher interested only in 
answering the question of the moment cannot escape the fact that, regardless of how 
latent, some form of conceptualization precedes and guides the data he or she collects 
and the interpretation he or she derives. The emphasis on empirical confirmation or 
disconfirmation and the process by which this is accomplished are the sine qua non 
of science and distinguish it from all other approaches to generating understanding. 
Note that scientists also employ consensual, expert, and internal validation, and the 
nonscientific approaches may point to empirical phenomena as providing confirmation 
for their views. However, scientists recognize that the other forms of validation do not 
suffice for labeling a conceptualization as scientific. By the same token, though the non-
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scientific approaches may gather data in an attempt to confirm their conceptualizations, 
the rigor and controls reflected by systematic empiricism generally are absent.
THE PROCESS OF THEORY CONSTRUCTION
What Is a Theory?
As described in Chapter 2, as nonscientists we develop and use conceptual systems to 
better understand the physical and social world around us. When working as scientists, 
we do the very same thing. Such conceptualizations may be based on what we observe, 
imagine, or are stimulated to think about after engaging in mind games of our own, 
considering what others have said about the issue at hand, or after empirical observa-
tions have been made. The conceptualization is then given concrete expression via some 
external symbol system. That is, our ideas are converted into words, numbers, diagrams, 
and so on. The process of formulating conceptual systems and converting them into 
symbolic expressions is termed theorization or theory construction.
The term theory has been defined in a multitude of ways by social scientists. Some 
examples are:
A theory is a symbolic construction. (Kaplan, 1964, p. 296)
It will be convenient for our purposes to define a theory simply as a set of statements or 
sentences. (Simon & Newell, 1956, p. 67)
Basically, a theory consists of one or more functional statements or propositions that 
treat the relationship of variables so as to account for a phenomenon or set of phenomena. 
(Hollander, 1967, p. 55)
Although theories differ in many respects, we contend that, at their core, all theo-
ries consist of concepts and relationships between those concepts. For this reason, it is 
sufficient for the purposes of this book to define a theory very simply: A theory is a set of 
statements about the relationship(s) between two or more concepts or constructs.
Theories, Models, and Hypotheses
A term often used by scientists when referring to the conceptual realm is model. The 
distinction between theories and models in the social science literature is not always 
apparent. As examples, various authorities contend that models are a special type of the-
ory (e.g., Coombs, Dawes, & Tversky, 1970, p. 4; Kaplan, 1964, p. 263), that models are 
portions of theories (Sheth, 1967, p. 444; Torgerson, 1958, p. 4), that models are derived 
from theories (e.g., Pap, 1962, p. 355), that models are simplified versions of theories (e.g., 
Carnap, 1971, p. 54), that models represent correspondence between two or more theories 
(Brodbeck, 1968), or that theories represent specific interpretations of (i.e., are derived 
from) models (e.g., Green & Tull, 1975, p. 42). Others consider the terms to be synony-
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mous (cf. Dubin, 1976; Simon & Newell, 1956). Although there may indeed be meaning-
ful distinctions between theories and models, it also is the case that models, like theo-
ries, involve concepts and relationships between concepts. Accordingly, we use the terms 
theory and model interchangeably. A theoretical expression refers to any external symbolic 
representation of an internal conceptual system, regardless of whether that symbolic 
representation is more properly considered a theory or a model by others, and regardless 
of whether the representation is verbal, mathematical, pictorial/graphic, or physical.
Another term frequently used in scientific theorizing is hypothesis. The nature of 
a hypothesis, relative to theories and models, also is somewhat ambiguous in texts on 
research methods. Many scientists define hypotheses as empirically testable statements 
that are derived from theories and that form a basis for rejecting or not rejecting those 
theories, depending on the results of empirical testing. For example, a researcher might 
want to the test the theory that people can better recall negative information about a per-
son than positive information. This general proposition is translated into a hypothesis 
or prediction about what will happen in an experiment where college students are read 
a list of positive and negative adjectives (prechosen to occur with equal frequency in the 
English language) and asked to recall the adjectives 2 minutes later. The hypothesis is 
that the number of negative adjectives recalled by the students will be greater, on aver-
age, than the number of positive adjectives recalled. This hypothesis, stated in a form 
that is part of an empirical evaluation of a theory, was derived from the more general 
theoretical expression that the theorist wants to evaluate. Others define a hypothesis as 
a theoretical statement that has yet to be empirically validated. For example, the propo-
sition that “people can better recall negative information about a person than positive 
information” would be termed a hypothesis until it has been subjected to formal empiri-
cal testing.
Like theories and models, hypotheses are statements that involve concepts and rela-
tionships between them. For this reason, we do not distinguish them from theoretical 
and model-based statements. All three types of conceptual systems—theories, models, 
and hypotheses—can be classified for our purposes under the more generic term theo-
retical expression. Henceforth, the terms are used interchangeably in this book, with a 
full recognition that other social scientists may make distinctions between them.
Types of Theories
Philosophers of science have developed typologies of theories so as to better understand 
the range of theoretical expressions that occur in science. Examples include Albert Ein-
stein’s (1934) distinction between constructive and principle theories, Marx’s (1951) 
distinction between reductive and constructive theories, and Kaplan’s (1964) distinc-
tion between concatenated and hierarchical theories at either molar or molecular levels. 
More recently, theories have been characterized as being humanistic, behavioristic, con-
structionist, structuralist, functionalist, and so on.
Although all theories focus on concepts and relationships between concepts, the-
ories in the social sciences differ in the fundamental assumptions they make about 
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human behavior. These assumptions lead theorists to think about the same problem in 
different ways. For example, a humanist may identify and conceptualize an entirely dif-
ferent set of concepts when analyzing school performance in children than the concepts 
that a behaviorist might consider. The humanist might focus on concepts such as how 
the child construes the school environment, the child’s feelings about school, and the 
affective quality of the relationship between the teacher and the student. In contrast, 
the behaviorist might focus on the positive and negative reinforcers that the child is 
receiving and the nature of contingencies between performance of behaviors and the 
administration of rewards and punishment. Neither conception is more “correct” than 
the other, although one theoretical approach ultimately might satisfy the criteria of what 
constitutes a good scientific theory better than the other. We view broad-based typolo-
gies of theories, such as those mentioned above, as different launching points for identi-
fying concepts and relationships that we use to organize and understand our world. We 
discuss such perspectives in Chapter 11.
The Role of Theory in Basic versus Applied Research
An often-heard distinction is that between basic and applied scientific research, yet the 
essential difference between these two types of research is difficult to identify. Accord-
ing to one perspective, basic researchers use theories whereas applied researchers do 
not. Yet every scientist, even the “strict empiricist,” cannot escape the fact that, regard-
less of how hidden, some form of conceptualization precedes and guides the data that 
he or she collects and the interpretations he or she derives from it. Hence, reliance upon 
theory would appear to provide an unsatisfactory basis for distinguishing applied from 
basic research.
Another basis for distinguishing the two approaches emphasizes the intent of the 
researcher. When the intent is to address and hopefully solve an immediate real-world 
problem, the research is considered to be applied. In contrast, research conducted for 
the purpose of extending the boundaries of our collective body of understanding, not 
for the purpose of addressing a pressing problem, is termed basic. Theories are seen as 
being oriented toward basic or applied phenomena, depending on research objectives. 
According to this view, the applied and basic researcher could design and implement 
virtually identical studies yet, because of different research objectives, one would be 
termed applied and the other basic.
Another criterion that often is suggested for distinguishing between basic and 
applied research focuses on the abstractness of the concepts in the conceptual network. 
According to this perspective, applied research is typically concerned with relatively 
narrow and circumscribed concepts that are domain specific. For example, the blue 
jeans manufacturer interested in expanding sales might commission a study to deter-
mine whether the buying public contained a sufficient number of people ready for jeans 
in new colors, styles, and patterns. However, though interested in learning more about 
such innovators, he or she most likely would not be interested in funding research to 
learn whether respondents were also innovators in regard to other consumer products 
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(e.g., appliances, pens, foods). Understandably, the objective is to achieve some under-
standing of a concrete and limited problem. In contrast, basic research is typically inter-
ested in broader, less concrete concepts. In the present instance, basic researchers would 
likely strive to understand and draw inferences regarding innovators in general (i.e., 
across the range of consumer products) and how these innovative tendencies might be 
related to a broad spectrum of other concepts and constructs, usually ones that have 
been suggested and perhaps explored in prior research by others.
There seems to be no single basis that proves sufficient for clearly distinguish-
ing between basic and applied research. Perhaps the best approach is to note a set of 
attributes that, when employed in combination, seems to provide some basis for mak-
ing such a distinction. From this perspective, applied research can be characterized as 
research that focuses on an immediate problem, relies on concepts that are relatively 
narrow in scope, and produces results that are not intended to extend a general body 
of knowledge. In contrast, basic research is characterized as research that is not directly 
focused on pressing real-world problems, tends to rely on concepts that are relatively 
broad in scope, and produces findings with the intent of contributing to and extending 
our basic understanding of the phenomenon in question. Regardless of whether the 
research is characterized as basic or applied, however, both types of research necessarily 
begin with some sort of conceptual system. For more extended discussions of applied 
versus basic theory and research, see Brinberg and McGrath (1985) and Brinberg and 
Hirschman (1986).
CHARACTERISTICS OF A GOOD THEORY
How do we know if a theory is a good theory? Several criteria have been proposed for 
evaluating theoretical expressions. If we assume that the purpose of a theory is to help 
us better understand our world, then the paramount consideration is whether it does 
indeed offer such guidance. From this perspective, the primary evaluative criterion is 
utility. Theoretical expressions are valued to the extent that they serve as useful guides 
to the world we experience, that is, to the extent that they enable us to achieve some 
understanding of our world. Recognize that utility is a relative notion. Consider being 
adrift in the ocean with a leaky life raft. Unless a better life raft is available, we would be 
foolish to discard the one that leaks—it is the best we have. As another example, though 
a hand-drawn map may not be 100% accurate, it may be sufficiently accurate to be use-
ful. If a theory is flawed in some respect but still provides unique and useful insights in 
other respects, it tends to be retained until something better comes along.
Consensual validation is one basis by which theories are accepted or rejected by 
scientists. This term refers to the degree of consensus among the scientific community 
about the validity of the theory. If a theory enjoys widespread acceptance, then it is seen 
as being a “good” theory. The philosopher Karl Popper (1968) believed that adherents 
of what most scientists judge to be a “bad theory” eventually die off or leave science, 
rendering the theory obsolete with time. Shaw and Costanzo (1982) distinguish two 
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broad classes of criteria for determining a good theory: those criteria that are necessary 
if the theory is to be accepted by the scientific community, and those that are desirable 
but not essential to acceptance. In the former category, three criteria are crucial. First, 
internally, the theory must be logically consistent; that is, the theoretical statements 
within the conceptual system must not be contradictory, nor must the theory lead to 
incompatible predictions. Second, the theory must be in agreement with known data 
and facts. Third, the theory must be testable; that is, a theory must ultimately be subject 
to empirical evaluation. The previously discussed constructs about the unconscious, as 
introduced by Freud, provide an example of an untestable theory.
In the second category discussed by Shaw and Costanzo (1982) are six criteria. 
First, a theory should be stated in terms that can be understood and communicated to 
other scientists. Second, the theory should strive to be parsimonious in that it adequately 
explains a phenomenon, but with a minimum of concepts and principles. Scientists refer 
to this criterion as Occam’s razor, named after the 14th-century English philosopher 
William of Occam, which “cuts away” extraneous concepts and assumptions so as to 
yield a theory that is parsimonious yet satisfactory in its level of explanation. All other 
things being equal, preference is given to theories that make fewer assumptions. The 
fewer the working parts necessary to get the job done, the better the theoretical system. 
Third, while recognizing that theories are occasionally so novel that they upset the 
theoretical applecart, a theory should be consistent with other accepted theories that 
have achieved consensus among the scientific community; that is, it should be able to be 
integrated into existing bodies of theory.
A fourth desideratum is scope. Other things being equal, the greater the range of 
the theory (i.e., the more of “reality” that it encompasses), the better it may be. Though 
both Newton’s and Einstein’s theories of gravity enable us to understand a great many 
of the same things, the fact that Einstein’s theory enables us to understand much more 
makes it a more powerful and valuable theory. That said, there are times when narrow-
range theories tend to hold up better over time than broader-range theories. Also, as 
discussed in Chapter 4, scientific progress is often achieved by narrowing the focus of 
theories, not broadening them. Thus, this criterion is somewhat controversial among 
scientists and can be viewed as a two-edged sword.
Creativity or novelty is a fifth criterion sometimes suggested for evaluating a the-
ory. A theory that explains the obvious is generally not as highly valued by the sci-
entific community as one that provides a novel insight into an interesting phenom-
enon. Finally, many scientists suggest that a good theory is one that generates research 
activity—which often is a consequence of consensual validation of the theory. A theory 
that is rich in scope, explicit, interesting, and useful will probably generate a good deal 
of empirical research. Hence, a yardstick of a good theory is the amount of research it 
generates. Note, however, that some scientists (e.g., Skinner, 1957) have questioned this 
criterion, noting that many a theory has led investigators into research enterprises that 
have been a waste of time.
Brinberg and McGrath (1985) note that various theory desiderata sometimes con-
flict with each other. For example, parsimonious theories tend to be more limited in 
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scope. As such, theorists often must make tradeoffs as they construct theories to maxi-
mize what is valued by the scientific community.
SCIENCE AND OBJECTIVITY
It is often asserted that scientists are objective in their approach to understanding and 
that the hallmark of science is its objectivity. In some respects, science is anything but 
objective. Whether consciously or not, the scientist brings to any setting a prior schema 
(or set of thoughts, beliefs, and assumptions) that is used to filter, interpret, and analyze 
the world about him or her. This is an inevitable feature of human nature and human 
thinking. The scientist’s schema influences the selection and formulation of problems 
the scientist decides to study, the types of strategies the scientist uses to collect data 
(since such acts ultimately are determined by how a problem is formulated), and how 
data are interpreted so as to alter or fortify the scientist’s initial conceptualization.
If, at its very core, science has such subjective characteristics, from where does its 
reputation for objectivity come? The objectivity of science stems from the fact that the 
scientist’s conceptualization has a corresponding external representation that makes 
that conceptualization available to others so that they can scrutinize, evaluate, and 
repeat (or replicate) the work of the originating scientist. It is not necessary that other 
scientists agree on what the implications of these empirically verifiable facts mean. What 
is critical is that other scientists agree on their empirical existence and could, if they so 
desired, reproduce them. This characteristic of science has been termed intersubjectivity 
(Kaplan, 1964, pp. 127–128; Babbie, 1973, pp. 18–19). The enterprise of science is predi-
cated upon a foundation of intersubjectivity; in this sense, it is objective.
Although science is heavily influenced by the conceptual schemes the scientist brings 
to the table, there also are aspects of the scientific enterprise that are consistent with the 
spirit of objectivity. In the words of Blumer (1969), science attempts to yield perspectives 
on the obdurate character of our social and physical environment. In doing so, scientists 
subject their propositions to empirical tests to try to determine the validity and utility of 
their statements. They strive to do so in ways that do not bias or prejudge the outcomes 
of their empirical tests, though they may not always be successful in accomplishing this 
goal. They consider competing conceptual schemes that lead to opposite predictions and 
then give preference to the schemes whose predictions (and hence utility) follow from the 
empirical tests. Although pure objectivity is rarely achieved, it still represents a working 
goal for many scientists, the pursuit of which functions to help scientists choose between 
conceptual schemes in terms of their relative utility.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS
By themselves, individuals are limited in the amount of their environment with which 
they can cope and understand. Their power is increased many-fold when they incor-
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porate the efforts of others in this regard. To acquire such deeper levels of understand-
ing, the individual typically relies on shared conceptual systems. A number of different 
shared conceptual approaches exist, including religion, philosophy, law, music, art, and 
science. Despite their unique variations, all conceptual systems can only provide partial 
understanding. Each is capable of providing a unique perspective, which may reinforce 
or expand upon the understanding generated by the others.
Science is distinguished from all the other shared conceptual approaches by the 
strategy it favors for evaluating its conceptual systems. This strategy, known as system-
atic empirical confirmation, requires gathering (or, more accurately, generating) relevant 
information from external observations that are capable of being verified or disproved 
by observations made by others. In turn, systematic empirical confirmation is predi-
cated upon theorizing. Theorizing involves conceptualizing some phenomena in terms 
of a set of expressions, encompassing concepts and relationships among them, and then 
expressing these ideas via a symbol system, typically words and/or numbers. Scientists 
have described a range of criteria for evaluating theories, some of which are deemed 
essential whereas others are deemed desirable. The process of theorizing is a complex 
enterprise that is difficult to teach. The remainder of this book provides the reader with 
heuristics and conceptual systems that may prove useful in such endeavors.
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exercises
Exercises to Reinforce Concepts
 1. Explain how shared belief systems are useful in our attempt to understand the 
environment.
 2. Identify and explain the three fundamental commonalities of shared belief sys-
tems.
 3. Explain how science is similar to other belief systems. How does it differ?
 4. Distinguish between prescriptive and evaluative functions.
 5. Identify and explain different ways of evaluating the usefulness of conceptual-
izations. Which of these are emphasized by the scientific approach?
 6. Identify and define the two basic realms of science. Which is more important 
and why?
 7. What are the characteristics of a good theory?
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 8. “The strength of a chain is determined by its weakest link.” Explain how this 
concept applies to scientific research.
 9. Explain what is meant by the intersubjectivity of science.
Exercise to Apply Concepts
 1. From the literature of your choosing, find a theory and describe it. Evaluate 
that theory using the major criteria discussed in this chapter for evaluating 
theories. If you have difficulty applying one of the criteria, describe why. Iden-
tify other criteria, if any, you might use other than those discussed in this 
chapter.
Part II
CORE PROCESSES
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Creativity and the Generation of Ideas
The difficulty lies not in the new ideas, but in escaping the old ones.
—John Maynard Keynes (1936)
The Nobel Prize-winning scientist Murray Gell-Mann was asked by a prospective stu-
dent at the California Institute of Technology if the school taught the problem-solving 
methods used by the brilliant Nobel Prize-winning physicist Richard Feynman, also a 
faculty member at the university. Gell-Mann replied “no,” and when the student asked 
why not, he responded: “Here is Feynman’s method. First, you write down the problem.” 
Gell-Mann then squeezed his eyes closed and put his fists against his forehead. “Second, 
you think really hard.” Opening his eyes, he ended by saying: “Third, you write down 
the answer.”
Because Feynman’s method probably will not work well for you, the present chapter 
provides more concrete guidance for theory construction. Theory construction involves 
specifying relationships between concepts in ways that create new insights into the 
phenomena we are interested in understanding. As we seek to explain something, we 
do so by invoking concepts and processes that we think influence it or are the basis for 
it. For example, to explain why some children perform poorly in school, we might try 
to think about the characteristics that discriminate good performers from bad perform-
ers. When making a list of these characteristics, we will, in essence, identify constructs 
that are related to school performance. Or, we might want to explain why so many indi-
gent Mayan Indians living in the highlands of Western Guatemala are converting from 
Catholicism to Protestantism. Again, we might try to think about the characteristics 
that are unique to recent converts, and as we list these attributes, we will be identifying 
variables or constructs that are related to conversion.
A first step in theory construction often is one of generating ideas about new 
explanatory constructs and the relationships between them or generating ideas about 
the mechanisms underlying the phenomena that you are trying to explain, without ini-
tially being too critical about the merits of these ideas. The ideas generated are then sub-
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jected to more careful analytic scrutiny, with “bad ideas” being rejected and promising 
ideas being pursued further. As you choose the key constructs and relationships to focus 
upon, you need to refine them so that they meet the rigors of a formal scientific theory. 
Chapters 5 and 6 discuss strategies for refining and focusing concepts and relationships. 
The present chapter considers the initial process of idea generation.
There is no simple strategy for generating good ideas or good explanations. It is 
a creative process that is difficult to articulate, describe, and teach. In this chapter we 
briefly review research on creativity to give you perspectives on the mental and social 
processes involved in the creative process. Next, we describe issues to consider when 
choosing a topic or problem to study. We then describe concrete heuristics that may help 
you generate ideas. Finally, we describe creative strategies used by influential innovators 
in the social sciences. Chapters 7 through 11 build on the material in the present chapter 
in a more substantive way. The present chapter is just a start.
ONE SMALL STEP FOR SCIENCE
Name the first great scientist–theorist who comes to your mind. Perhaps it is Albert Ein-
stein. Perhaps it is Isaac Newton. Perhaps it is Sigmund Freud. All of these individuals 
had a monumental impact on their respective fields of study. Theoretical advances in the 
social sciences do not, of course, require revolutionizing the field in the way that these 
individuals did. There is ample room for the more typical yet useful small increments 
in knowledge that solid theoretical work and research offer (Kuhn, 1962). Indeed, the 
gradual building of knowledge is an essential aspect of the scientific endeavor. As they 
attempt to explain variation in behavior, some scientists chip away at answers with the 
scientific tools equivalent to a small hammer and chisel. Gradually, small bits of knowl-
edge cumulate into larger groupings of knowledge, and eventually we gain a sense of 
why some people behave one way and others behave another way.
On the other hand, thinking “big” should not be avoided. Instead of approaching 
explanation with a chisel and small hammer, some theorists prefer to use the scientific 
equivalent of a sledge hammer, knocking away large chunks of unexplained variation in 
behavior by focusing on fundamental, pervasive, and important processes. As we dis-
cuss below and in Chapter 13, there are forces operating in the scientific environment 
that reward and punish both approaches.
CREATIVITY
This section briefly reviews research on creativity to provide a sense of the processes 
that are involved when thinking creatively. After reviewing this research, we extract 
practical implications for constructing theories.
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The Creative Person
Sternberg and Lubart (1996) define creativity as the ability to produce work that is both 
novel (original or unexpected) and appropriate (useful or meets task constraints). Early 
studies of creativity focused on the concept of genius and the lives and minds of eminent 
artists, writers, and scientists. For instance, research in the 1950s and 1960s attempted 
to identify the personality characteristics of highly creative individuals in different 
fields, including science, mathematics, writing, architecture, and art. As one example 
of this, Frank Barron of the Institute for Personality Assessment and Research at the 
University of California at Berkeley used nomination techniques to identify outstand-
ing creative writers and invited them to participate in extensive testing and interview-
ing sessions. Some of the writers who participated were world renowned (e.g., Truman 
Capote, Norman Mailer, W. H. Auden). Barron found that the personalities of creative 
writers were characterized by independence and nonconformity, drive and resiliency, 
risk taking, ambition, a concern with philosophical matters, frankness, social activism, 
introversion, depression, empathy, intensity, a heightened sense of humor, and trust in 
intuition (Barron & Harrington, 1981).
Nakamura and Csikszentmihalyi (2001) conducted an intensive case study of Linus 
Pauling, the eminent scientist whose valence-bond theory had major implications for 
the science of chemistry. These authors used the life of Pauling to illustrate that creativ-
ity is not just a product of intrapsychic processes but that it fundamentally involves the 
incorporation of novelty into culture. Creative contributions are the interaction of three 
systems: (1) the innovating person, (2) the substantive domain in which the person 
works, and (3) the field of gatekeepers and practitioners who solicit, discourage, respond 
to, judge, and reward contributions. At the person level, Pauling had characteristics that 
increased the likelihood of creative contributions, including intense curiosity and a love 
of science, a quick, playful mind, and an incredible memory that enabled him to draw 
on vast knowledge bases. He was adept at imaging, which allowed him to analyze com-
plex dimensional structures more efficiently than the typical person. He also had strong 
mathematical skills that were needed for analyses in quantum physics. Pauling liked to 
think about the bigger picture. Importantly, he was gifted at explaining complex ideas 
in clear and simple terms. It was the latter qualities that helped him persuade the field 
to accept his ideas. As a student, he was receptive to guidance. He was motivated by the 
skepticism he encountered rather than being paralyzed by it. Nakamura and Csikszent-
mihalyi go on to describe the social conditions and the state of the field that helped the 
ideas of Linus Pauling be accepted into the “culture” of chemistry.
Research has examined how laypeople and experts view the creative person. For 
example, Sternberg (1985) found that people’s implicit theories of creativity contained 
such elements as “connects ideas,” “sees similarities and differences,” “has flexibility,” 
“has aesthetic taste,” “is unorthodox,” “is motivated,” “is inquisitive,” and “questions 
societal norms.” He found differences in such characterizations across disciplines. Pro-
fessors of art placed heavy emphasis on imagination, originality, and a willingness to try 
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out new ideas. Philosophy professors emphasized playing imaginatively with combina-
tions of ideas and creating classifications and systematizations of knowledge different 
from the conventional. Physics professors were focused on inventiveness, the ability 
to find order in chaos, and the ability to question basic principles. Business professors 
emphasized the ability to create and explore new ideas, especially as they related to 
novel business products or services.
Creative Ideas
Creative ideas provide novel perspectives on phenomena in ways that provide insights 
not previously recognized. Ideas differ in their degree of creativity, with some ideas 
being extremely creative while other ideas are only marginally so. Markedly creative 
ideas have been characterized by Sternberg as “crowd defying.” Sternberg comments on 
the use of one’s intellect to lead as opposed to “defy the crowd”:
Some people use their intelligence to please the crowd, others to defy it. The most tradition-
ally intelligent ones hope to lead the crowd not only by accepting the presuppositions of the 
crowd but also by analyzing next steps in thinking and by reaching those next steps before 
others do. (2002, p. 376)
By contrast, crowd-defying ideas eschew the presuppositions on which a body of knowl-
edge is based.
Just because an idea is “crowd defying” does not make it useful. Many of Linus 
Pauling’s ideas that were unrelated to his primary contribution were groundbreaking 
but proved to be wrong, such as the triple helix structure of DNA and the value of vita-
min C for fighting colds. Similarly, “crowd-defying” ideas can meet unexpected resis-
tance, as was the case with Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution and the resistance it 
engendered not from scientists but from religious groups. Thomas Young’s theory of 
light was so controversial in 1910 that it was viewed as a “negative contribution,” only 
later to be recognized as years ahead of its time. The politics of a creative theorizing are 
complex, and we delve into this subject in more detail in Chapter 13.
The Creative Process
Research on creativity has focused on the creative process itself. For example, Amabile 
(1983) characterized creativity as involving three core facets: (1) having high motiva-
tion to work on the task at hand, (2) having domain-relevant knowledge and abilities 
to address the task, and (3) having creativity-relevant skills. Creativity-relevant skills 
include cognitive styles that allow one to cope with complexities and to break one’s 
“mental set” during problem solving (i.e., to make shifts in one’s chain of thought); the 
use of heuristics for generating novel ideas; and a work style typified by concentrated 
effort, an ability to set aside problems, and high energy.
Sternberg and his colleagues (Sternberg, Grigorenko, & Singer, 2004) have devel-
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oped a theory that conceptualizes creativity as being a function of six resources: (1) 
intellectual abilities, (2) knowledge, (3) styles of thinking, (4) personality, (5) motiva-
tion, and (6) environment. With respect to intellectual abilities, Sternberg stresses the 
importance of the ability to see problems in new ways and to escape conventional think-
ing, the ability to discern which ideas are worth pursuing, and the ability to persuade 
others about one’s ideas. In terms of knowledge, Sternberg emphasizes the need to know 
enough about a field to move it forward, but warns that such knowledge also can result 
in closed and entrenched perspectives. This is one of the major challenges for creative 
thought—being knowledgeable about a field, but not letting that knowledge channel 
thinking too much.
With respect to thinking styles, Sternberg argues that creativity requires a prefer-
ence for thinking in novel ways as well as the ability to think both globally and locally. 
To invoke an old cliché, one must not only see the trees, but one must also be able to 
distinguish the forest from the trees. The personality traits that Sternberg emphasizes 
for creativity include a willingness to overcome obstacles, a willingness to take sensible 
risks, a willingness to tolerate ambiguity, and self-confidence and assurance. In terms of 
motivation, Sternberg emphasizes the importance of task-focused motivation. Numer-
ous studies suggest that people rarely are creative unless they really love what they 
are doing and focus on the work rather than the rewards that potentially derive from 
that work. Finally, Sternberg stresses the importance of a supportive environment that 
rewards creative ideas. Without some environmental support, creativity will be sup-
pressed rather than manifested.
Simonton (1988, 2004) has reviewed the literature on scientific genius and studied 
the lives of great scientists and concludes that creative ideas often happen randomly, 
spontaneously, and fortuitously. To be sure, for these chance events to have an impact, 
the individual also must have exceptional logic and intellect to recognize the underlying 
connections and take advantage of them. But Simonton’s thesis is that chance plays a far 
larger role in scientific creativity than is often recognized. Simonton also notes that cre-
ative events are more likely to occur for scientists who have a strong interest in scientific 
disciplines outside their chosen specialty and for those who tend to be “mavericks” and 
to think and do the unexpected.
Yet another perspective on creativity comes from the applied world of advertising. 
Full-service advertising agencies tend to have four principal departments: an account 
management department that interfaces with the client/advertiser, a creative depart-
ment responsible for developing the words and images used to attract our attention and 
motivate us to behave, a media department that determines where the finished advertis-
ing is placed, and a research department that provides various inputs along the way. The 
backbone of any advertising agency is its creative department.
As is the case in many applied arenas, when they have been successful, senior people 
in advertising tend to write books describing the approach they used to become success-
ful. One such influential book, Applied Imagination, was written by Alex Osborn (1963), 
the “O” in BBD&O, one of the foremost advertising agencies in the United States. In 
addition to coining the term brainstorming to describe a creative process used by small 
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groups, Osborn identified seven stages that he claims characterize the creative process 
of both groups and individuals: orientation, preparation, analysis, ideation, incubation, 
synthesis, and evaluation. At the first two stages, Osborn suggested that one should 
become familiar with the problem or phenomenon of interest, reading, researching, and 
learning about its essentials and complexity. In the third and fourth stages, Osborn 
advises that one should consider the problem or phenomenon from as many different 
perspectives as possible. In the process of doing so, one develops as many different 
potential solutions or ideas as possible.
Regardless of whether the idea-generation process takes hours, days, or weeks, at 
some point, the creative well will seem to run dry. At that point, Osborn encourages 
one to “sleep on it,” that is, to let the unconscious mind take over. Get away from the 
problem or phenomenon for a few hours, days, or (if you can) weeks. Let things incubate 
and percolate. It is during this period of incubation, often when one least expects it, that 
the ideas one has generated synthesize into one’s most creative insights. For scientists, 
Osborn’s last stage, evaluation, essentially translates into empirically testing one’s cre-
ative output.
Deciding to Be Creative
Sternberg (2002) emphasizes the importance of “making the decision to be creative.” 
For creativity to occur in science, it typically is preceded by a personal decision to try 
to think creatively. Sternberg suggests that social scientists should encourage their stu-
dents to “decide for creativity” and to inoculate them from the challenges and obstacles 
that come from making this decision. “Deciding for creativity” does not guarantee cre-
ativity, but without such a decision, there is lessened hope for creativity.
Practical Implications for Theory Construction
While there is a sizeable literature on creativity that we cannot comprehensively review 
here, our brief consideration of this literature drives home several points you should 
consider. Creative scientific thinking does not require that you revolutionize a field with 
every idea you generate. Creative ideas cover the gamut from small and incremental to 
large and revolutionary, with the former being much more typical. Creativity, no mat-
ter how big or small, means adding something new, and it typically involves “thinking 
outside the box.” Creative people redefine problems, analyze their ideas, and then try to 
persuade others of the value of their ideas. They take sensible risks and seek connections 
between ideas that others do not seek; at least at some level, they realize that existing 
knowledge can be as much a hindrance as it is a help in generating creative ideas. Cre-
ative contributions are the result of the interaction of many factors, only one of which 
is the act of generating the creative idea itself. If you can’t communicate those ideas and 
get people excited about them, the ideas probably will fall flat. Thus, you must consider 
communication strategies as well as idea-generation strategies.
In our experience, one of the first steps in generating creative ideas is to start with 
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the proper mindset. Decide to be creative and to think outside the box. Declare to your-
self that you are open to mixing the uncommon with the common. Commit to generat-
ing ideas without analyzing too much their merits and demerits. You can screen out bad 
ideas later. Your focus should be one of getting a range of ideas, no matter how odd they 
initially might seem. Adopt a mindset that you are willing to overcome obstacles, willing 
to take sensible risks, and willing to tolerate ambiguity. Most of all, be self-confident and 
have faith in your intellect. There will be features of your environment (including other 
people) that discourage creative thinking, and it may be difficult to convince others of 
the merit of your ideas. But we agree with Sternberg that a crucial first step is making 
the decision to be creative. Do not expect creativity to be a substitute for hard work. 
Creativity builds upon hard work.
CHOOSING WHAT TO THEORIZE ABOUT
The first step in building a theory is choosing a phenomenon to explain or a ques-
tion/problem to address. The reasons scientists choose one particular phenomenon or 
problem to study rather than another are diverse. Some scientists study a phenomenon 
because they are genuinely interested in it. For example, a scientist might study the 
mental processes involved in playing chess because he or she finds such phenomena 
to be intrinsically interesting. Other scientists study a given phenomenon because of 
its practical or social significance (e.g., reduction of headaches, poverty, globalization). 
Graduate students frequently study a phenomenon because their advisors study that 
phenomenon. Some scientists choose to work in areas for which grant funds are avail-
able. Other scientists study a phenomenon because people whom they respect also are 
studying that phenomenon. In many ways, the selection of a phenomenon to study is a 
personal matter involving the value system of the theorist. In this sense, science is not 
“value free.” Our values and social milieu dictate which phenomena we seek to under-
stand (see Brinberg & McGrath, 1985, for a more extended discussion of the role of 
values in science).
When thinking about a topic or problem to study or a question to answer, it is 
helpful to ask “What is interesting about that problem/question?” and “Why is that an 
important topic?” (Alford, 1998). Be careful about selecting areas that are too broad 
and abstract. For example, choosing to build a theory about “adolescent risk behav-
ior” involves a construct that is diverse and includes such topics as adolescent drug 
use, tobacco use, sexual risk taking, delinquency, and alcohol use, to name a few. The 
explanatory mechanisms might be quite different for these various instantiations of 
“adolescent risk behavior,” and it may be too big a task to tackle theorizing about ado-
lescent risk behavior in general. Literally thousands of studies have been conducted to 
understand each of the separate risk behaviors mentioned above. We do not want to 
discourage abstract thinking across instantiations of a construct, and indeed, for the 
present example several interesting “grand” theories of adolescent risk behavior in gen-
eral can be found in the literature (e.g., Jessor & Jessor, 1977; Jessor, 1994). However, 
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when choosing phenomena to study, it is advisable to exercise caution in delimiting the 
scope of a theory. We offer this advice with reservations, because some of the most pow-
erful theories in the social sciences are ones that operate at higher levels of abstraction 
and thus find applicability in multiple content domains. However, when working at the 
abstract level, the possibility of obscuring important details and lapsing into vagueness 
are challenges to confront. We return to this point later in this chapter and in Chapters 
11 and 12.
As you think about phenomena to study, you invariably also must think about the 
population of individuals about whom you will theorize. People differ on many facets, 
and there are an infinite number of ways in which you can delimit a population. Does 
the theory you will build apply to infants, toddlers, elementary-age schoolchildren, pre-
adolescents, adolescents, young adults, adults, and/or older adults? Across what dimen-
sions of the larger population do you want your theory to be applicable? At this point, 
you may not want to delve into the issue of generalizability (the ability to extend your 
findings to different populations) too much, but you do want a reasonable sense of who 
you are going to be theorizing about. The initial decision about who to focus on is not 
“set in stone” as the theory construction process unfolds. Sometimes in thinking more 
about your concepts and constructs, you will realize that they apply to a more restricted 
population of individuals than you initially thought. Or, you may realize that they apply 
to a wider population of individuals than you thought. But at the outset, it usually is best 
to have a specific population “in mind” as you begin your thoughtful endeavors.
Another strategy for identifying problem areas and questions to focus on is to use 
the framework of participatory action research (McIntyre, 2007; Reason & Bradbury, 
2001, 2007). Participatory action research takes many forms, but it generally involves 
working directly with entities (e.g., social groups, organizations, communities, towns, 
cities) to identify the problems with which they are faced, the research that must be 
conducted to address those problems, and then implementing that research and the 
solutions suggested by the research in conjunction with members of the entity in ques-
tion. Participatory action research is not an exotic variant of consultation; rather, it is 
designed as active coresearch by and for those who are to be helped (Wadsworth, 1998). 
Although one may decide not to pursue participatory action research in its entirety, cer-
tainly the process of interviewing and working with members of the target social enti-
ties to identify worthwhile problems on which to work is potentially useful.
It is one thing to try to solve an existing problem or answer an existing question, 
but creative scientists also identify new problems to solve or new questions to answer. 
Some of the most influential theorists in the social sciences are individuals who have 
identified new problem areas to study or who have reframed problems. As examples, in 
anthropology, John Cole and Eric Wolf (1974) framed issues and questions to define the 
new field of political ecology, which is the study of how political, economic, and social 
factors affect environmental issues (see also Enzensberger, 1974). Amos Tversky and the 
Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman changed the analysis of decision making by bringing 
to bear the concept of heuristics (i.e., simplified cognitive “rules of thumb”) and asking 
questions about the kinds of heuristics that people use when making decisions (Kahne-
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man & Tversky, 1973; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, 1974). This framework challenged 
traditional models of decision making that emphasized rational choice and subjective-
expected utility frameworks.
LITERATURE REVIEWS
Perhaps the most often recommended strategy for gaining perspectives on a phenom-
enon or question/problem is to consult the scientific literature already published on the 
topic. A comprehensive literature review may serve not only as a useful source of ideas, 
but is an essential prerequisite for scientific research. Having said this, it may surprise 
you to learn that some scientists do not always seek out the scientific literature when 
first theorizing about a topic (Glaser, 1978). The idea is that reading the literature may 
prematurely narrow your thinking and make it difficult to think “outside the box” in 
ways that are new and creative. To be sure, if the literature is not consulted initially, it 
always is consulted after the scientist has generated his or her initial ideas. But some 
scientists prefer to avoid becoming too immersed in a literature when initially thinking 
about a topic. This is not to say that the topic is approached with a blank slate relative 
to the existing literature. Usually, the academic training, past readings, and research of 
the scientist over the years provide him or her with perspectives and knowledge that 
can’t help but be brought to bear. But the intent is to rely more on heuristics and analytic 
strategies (described below) than on a formal literature review during the initial idea-
generation phase.
Having said that, the majority of scientists reject the “hold off reviewing the litera-
ture” strategy. Most scientists maintain that reading the literature stimulates ideas that 
might not otherwise come about. It also provides much-needed focus and clarity before 
embarking on the theory construction process, and it avoids the possibility of spending 
time inventing the wheel—only to later find out that someone else already invented that 
very same wheel. These scientists stress the importance of reading the literature thor-
oughly, critically, and creatively. In the final analysis, there is no one correct way to go 
about theory generation, and either approach to the extant literature might work well 
for you. However, the norm is to delve into the extant literature in depth before building 
your own theory.
HEURISTICS FOR GENERATING IDEAS
We now turn to specific strategies you can use to think about issues in creative and novel 
ways. These heuristics are ones that we or other scientists have found useful, but they 
may or may not resonate with you for the particular task on which you are working. We 
personally do not use every heuristic, and we find that some work better for some prob-
lems than for others. The heuristics are only a start to building the tools in your theory 
construction toolbox. In later chapters we develop additional ways of thinking that will 
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augment or complement the strategies described here. If you use these heuristics, they 
may help you think about a phenomenon in ways that are different from how you might 
otherwise proceed. But, if a simple list of heuristics was all it took to generate creative 
and innovative ideas, then creative ideas would abound in science. It is not simple!
Idea Generation and Grounded/Emergent Theorizing
As discussed in Chapter 10, some social scientists argue for the use of emergent meth-
odologies when constructing theories. The essence of these approaches is that theorists 
should set aside, as much as possible, their preconceptions when studying a phenom-
enon and let ideas about the concepts and the relationships between concepts emerge 
as they embed themselves in the surroundings and contexts of the groups under study. 
Theory is thereby “grounded in” and emerges from such data, with the data typically 
being qualitative in nature.
Some grounded theorists reject the idea of doing anything more in theory construc-
tion than letting concepts and relationships emerge in the context of careful observa-
tion in natural settings. To be sure, creativity and insight are involved in the framing 
of issues to be investigated and in recognizing subtleties in the world that might not 
be obvious to the casual observer. But the emphasis is on setting aside preconceptions, 
staying close to the data, and letting theory emerge “from the ground up.”
Other grounded theorists are more open to imposing novel ways of construing and 
thinking about observed events in their natural settings. These theorists try to think 
about their observations and their field notes in creative ways, such as by invoking meta-
phors, drawing analogies, relating observations to other constructs that form the bases 
of their own interpretive systems, and so on. For these grounded theorists, one or more 
of the heuristics discussed in this section may resonate as useful.
Twenty-Six Heuristics
This section presents 26 heuristics for thinking about phenomena or questions in a way 
that might give you new insights and ideas. It assumes you have already identified a 
phenomenon or problem area to study.
1. Analyze your own experiences. This strategy involves thinking about your own 
experiences and reflecting on what factors have influenced the outcome variable or the 
phenomenon you are trying to explain based on them. For example, if the outcome vari-
able is social anxiety, you might think about situations in which you have been nervous 
or anxious and identify the features of those situations relative to other situations that 
caused you to be nervous. You might think about situations where you overcame your 
social anxiety and reflect on how you did so. You might think about periods in your life 
when you tended to be more socially anxious and periods when you tended to be less 
socially anxious and reflect on what aspects of your life differentiate those periods. The 
idea is to carefully analyze your own experiences and see if this helps you think about 
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what you are trying to explain in new and creative ways. For grounded theorists, think-
ing about your field notes and observations relative to your own personal experiences 
might give you perspectives on how to frame arguments and propositions about the 
observations you have made.
2. Use case studies. This strategy for idea generation involves analyzing a single case 
(individual, family, group, or organization) in detail and generating ideas based on that 
case study. It might take the form of formally interviewing a person, family, group, or 
members of an organization in depth, and/or researching archival data and other exist-
ing data sources about the person, family, group, or organization. Case studies range 
from labor-intensive enterprises that take years to complete, to simpler gatherings of 
information about a single person or event. There is a substantial literature on methods 
for conducting case studies (Eisenhardt, 1989; Cosentino, 2007; Ellet, 2007), and read-
ers are encouraged to consult this literature to gain a better sense of the many forms of 
case studies. Sigmund Freud used this approach to develop facets of his highly influ-
ential psychoanalytic theory. Examples of case studies leading to important theoreti-
cal insights in the social sciences abound (see, e.g., Spatig, Parrott, Kusimo, Carter, & 
Keyes, 2001; Turner, 1970). You should consider the possibility of pursuing case studies 
as a method for idea generation.
3. Collect practitioners’ rules of thumb. This strategy involves interviewing or 
researching experts in an area who are actively dealing with the phenomenon you want 
to study (Mayo & LaFrance, 1980). For example, to formulate a theory of the best way 
to counsel children about grief-related experiences, you might interview professionals 
who do such counseling to obtain their perspectives on how best to do this. Or you 
might interview scientists who study such professionals and/or who conduct research 
on the matter. Personal interviews (in person, over the phone, through e-mails) with 
such experts often can yield a richer account of a phenomenon than what you would 
garner from reviewing the formal scientific literature on the topic. The collected rules 
of thumb might then serve as the basis for a more formal theory (see Hill, 2006; Kaplan, 
1964). In his work on social influence, Cialdini (2003) collected practitioners’ rules of 
thumb for exerting social influence by working in the professions of, and interviewing, 
insurance and car salespeople, charitable fundraisers, and a host of other professionals 
who worked in occupations that rely on social influence. Based, in part, on these col-
lected rules of thumb of influence, Cialdini formulated novel theoretical perspectives on 
persuasion and social influence.
4. Use role playing. This heuristic involves putting yourself in the place of another 
and anticipating how this person might think or behave with respect to the outcome 
variable. For example, put yourself in the place of another family member, a friend, or 
someone you know whose experiences might be relevant to the phenomenon you are 
trying to understand. Think about how they would approach matters. Put yourself in 
the place of another scientist who has different training from your own and imagine how 
he or she would conceptualize or think about the problem or explain the phenomenon. 
Role playing is widely used in organizational training and other applied contexts to fos-
ter new levels of understanding and insight (El-Shamy, 2005). Here we are suggesting a 
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technique of “mental role playing,” as you intellectually take the role of others and think 
about their reactions and perspectives. For grounded theorists, thinking about your field 
notes relative to the perspective you invoke by role playing relevant others might give 
you perspectives on how to conceptualize and frame arguments about the observations 
you have made.
5. Conduct a thought experiment. Another tool for generating ideas—one often used 
by Albert Einstein—is to conduct a thought experiment (Ackoff, 1991; Folger & Turillo, 
1999; Lave & March, 1975; Watzlawick, 1976). These are hypothetical experiments or 
studies that are conducted “in the mind,” as if you have collected data and then imagine 
the results. In this strategy, you think about relevant variables or scenarios and then 
think about the effects of different variations or manipulations of them, as if you were 
running an experiment—but instead doing all this in your head. You imagine the results 
and think about what implications they have for explaining your phenomenon. In other 
words, to understand fact, think fiction.
A substantial literature exists on thought experiments, primarily in philosophy, 
political science, economics, and physics. Sorensen (1998) examined thought experi-
ments as used by theorists in a variety of disciplines and concluded that they were 
central in the theory construction process (see also Nersessian, 2002). Tetlock and Bel-
kin (1996) explored the use of a particular type of thought experiment, namely the 
use of counterfactuals, to focus on “what-might-have-been” questions. More technically, 
counterfactuals are subjunctive conditionals in which the antecedents of an event are 
assumed to be known but for purposes of argument supposed to be false. For exam-
ple, you might ponder the counterfactual, “If the United States had not dropped atomic 
bombs on Japan, then the Japanese would have surrendered at about roughly the same 
time that they did.” Counterfactual thought experiments can sensitize us to theoreti-
cal possibilities we might otherwise have ignored, had we not pursued counterfactual 
thinking.
As an example in the social sciences, an investigator might be interested in the 
consequences of having an abortion for adolescents in the United States. A counter-
factual thought experiment would be to think about the implications of abortion for 
adolescents if abortions were illegal. Thinking through this counterfactual circum-
stance might suggest consequences of having an abortion that the theorist may not have 
thought of initially. The economist Richard Fogel used a counterfactual to explore the 
economic impact of the emerging railroads on American economic growth (Fogel, 1964). 
He explored the counterfactual of what the American economy would be like had there 
been no railroads. Interestingly, his detailed exploration of the counterfactual suggested 
that the railroads did not have a significant impact on the American economy and, more 
generally, that no single innovation was vital for economic growth in the 19th century.
Try to frame the phenomena with which you are working in terms of different 
thought experiments and counterfactuals. Chapter 6, on clarifying relationships, pro-
vides detailed applications of thought experiments for social science phenomena, so we 
defer further discussion of this technique to that chapter.
6. Engage in participant observation. Participant observation involves observing oth-
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ers in the situations you want to study while you actively participate in those situations. 
For example, you might live in the community and work with a group of factory workers 
to get a better idea of factors that influence worker attitudes toward labor unions. Like 
case studies, participant observation can range from labor-intensive efforts lasting years 
to more short-lived efforts (Hume & Mulcock, 2004; Reason & Bradbury, 2007). Partici-
pant observation is a component of many ethnographic analyses, a dominant approach 
for advancing theory in anthropology. It has been used to generate rich theoretical anal-
yses of a wide range of important phenomena. For example, the anthropologist Margaret 
Mead (2001) spent months in Samoa using participant observation to study the lives of 
teenagers as she explored cultural influences on adolescence. She dispelled the then-
common view that adolescence is a time of “stress and turmoil” as adolescents search 
for an adult identity. Participant observation is discussed in more detail in Chapter 10. 
There we see that some social scientists believe that pursuing theory construction with-
out such qualitative data is folly.
7. Analyze paradoxical incidents. Sometimes it is useful to isolate and analyze a 
paradoxical situation. For example, suppose you are interested in the occurrence of 
unintended pregnancies. As you reflect on this phenomenon, you recognize that some 
unmarried individuals who are sexually active, do not want to become pregnant, and 
have positive attitudes toward birth control nonetheless fail to use any form of contra-
ception. This appears to be paradoxical behavior. What could be operating to explain 
this paradox?
This particular paradox was explored in a qualitative study by Edin and Kefalas 
(2005), who studied low-income, inner-city young women, mostly Latinas and African 
Americans, living in the United States. Edin and Kefalas found that about two-thirds 
of the pregnancies in the women they studied were not planned. Rather, pregnancy 
occurred by chance, whenever a woman happened to stop using birth control. Contra-
ception often was used at the beginning of a relationship but was discontinued when a 
relationship “reached another level.” Edin and Kefalas report that both men and women 
in their study interpreted a woman wanting to have a baby by a man as a high form of 
social praise for that man. Thus, nonuse of birth control was linked to an expression of 
respect and social praise.
The women in the study tended to see children as giving meaning to a woman’s life. 
Women who placed careers over motherhood were seen as selfish. Childbearing and 
marriage were not seen as decisions that “go together.” This disconnection, however, did 
not reflect a disinterest in marriage. To the contrary, women held high standards for the 
men they would be willing to marry. They hoped that the fathers of their children would 
rise to the occasion and be worthy of being a life-long partner, but they did not count 
on it. Also, marriage, the women said, was reserved for those men and women who 
had “made it” economically and were worthy of it. Women thought that both partners 
should be economically “set” prior to marriage. Indeed, women expressed an aversion 
to economic dependence on a male. To be worthy of marriage, the women said, couples 
must have demonstrated relational maturity by withstanding hard times together. This 
can take years to attain. As a result of such dynamics, women were less likely to marry.
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The result of the work by Edin and Kefalas was to provide the beginnings of a 
theory of why many sexually active, unmarried, inner-city women paradoxically do not 
seek to become pregnant but fail to use birth control. The women are willing to leave 
having a baby to chance, and see the nonuse of birth control as the sign of a good rela-
tionship that can yield the positives associated with childbearing.
As with the other heuristics, analyzing paradoxical incidents can be pursued men-
tally using the strategies of imagined role playing, by analyzing your own experiences, 
by using thought experiments, or it can take the form of a qualitative study.
8. Engage in imaging. Most of the time, we think about problems in verbal terms. It 
is as if we have an internal conversation with ourselves. We subvocally think through 
our thoughts and ideas. The current heuristic involves setting aside linguistic-based 
thoughts in favor of visualizing relevant situations and behaviors. For example, in think-
ing about causes of social anxiety, try to imagine yourself at a party with few people you 
know. Try to visualize this situation as graphically as possible and in as much detail as 
possible. Visualize the setting and the people who are in that setting. Now start playing 
out the interactions you have with other people. But do not just verbally note these inter-
actions to yourself. Try to imagine them happening, as if you were watching a movie. 
The general idea is to draw upon imaging and the cues that imaging stimulates as you 
think about a phenomenon. This strategy tends to engage the right hemisphere of the 
brain, as opposed to linguistic thoughts, which engage the left hemisphere (Gregory, 
1997). New insights may result, accordingly.
Imagistic thinking and visualization have been found to be common in thought 
experiments conducted by creative scientists, as they explore in their minds the use of 
old schema in new situations outside their normal area of application, especially when 
spatial reasoning is required (Gooding, 1992; Nersessian, 2008). Visual intelligence has 
been the subject of considerable empirical research (Arnheim, 2004; Barry, 1997; Hoff-
man, 2000), and its role in the generation of scientific ideas is also being explored (e.g., 
Clement, 2006, 2008; Nersessian, 2008).
9. Use analogies and metaphors. This heuristic involves applying the logic of another 
problem area to the logic of the area of interest or drawing upon a metaphor. For exam-
ple, several theories of memory use the metaphor of a “storage bin,” where information 
is placed in long-term memory for later access (Bodenhausen & Lambert, 2003). Long-
term memory is seen as consisting of thousands of such bins, which are organized in a 
complex fashion. Pieces of information relevant to a bin are stacked on top of each other 
within a bin, with the most recently processed information at the top. Thus, the most 
recently placed information in a bin is more easily accessed when a person retrieves 
information from that bin. Of course, the physiology of the brain does not contain physi-
cal storage bins, but the metaphor promotes a way of thinking about memory and mak-
ing predictions about information retrieval processes. Metaphorical thinking thus pro-
vides a mechanism for building a theory of memory.
As another example, Randall (2007) used a compost heap as a metaphor for auto-
biographical memory, arguing that it comes closer than more commonly used computer 
analogies to capturing the dynamics of memory across the lifespan and how memory 
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changes with aging. Randall describes the parallels between composts and such mem-
ory-related concepts as encoding, storage, and retrieval and derives an organic model of 
memory to better understand the psychology of aging.
The process of using analogies can be complex. For example, Clement (2008) gave 
scientists challenging problems in their areas of study and collected think-aloud proto-
cols as they attempted to solve them. Clemens found that scientists tended to struggle 
with the analogies they generated, often resorting to “bridge analogies” to link the prob-
lem with the original analogy. Imagistic simulations and visualization also were often 
used to think through and explore the application of analogies. The scientists Clem-
ent studied engaged in cycles of analogical thought in which they generated, critiqued, 
and modified series of analogies. They showed great persistence in pursuing analogies. 
Charles Darwin is known to have worked through a single analogy over a period of 
years in developing his theory of evolution (Millman & Smith, 1997).
Clement (1988) described four processes scientists use to apply analogies to solve a 
problem. First, the scientist generates the analogy. Second, the scientist establishes the 
validity of the analogy in relation to the original problem. Third, the scientist seeks to 
understand the analogous case. Finally, the scientist applies the findings to the original 
problem. Clement (1988) identified three strategies that scientists use to generate analo-
gies at the first step. First, they might generate an analogy from a well-known principle. 
This step involves recognizing that the original problem situation is an example of a 
well-established principle. Second, the scientist might create an analogy by modify-
ing the original problem situation, thereby changing features of it that were assumed 
to be fixed. Finally, the scientist generates an analogy through association in memory, 
whereby the scientist is “reminded” of, or recalls, an analogous case in memory.
The use of metaphors in social science theories is common. For example, as noted 
above, metaphors and analogies are widely used in the analysis of memory and memory 
processes. In sociology, the classic work of Erving Goffman (1959, 1967) viewed every-
day interactions between people using an analogy of actors following scripts, imposing 
their own interpretations onto the scripts, and employing occasional ad libs. In manage-
ment, Cornelissen (2004) uses the metaphor of “organizations as theatre” to develop 
basic tenets of an organizational theory.
10. Reframe the problem in terms of the opposite. This heuristic involves reversing 
the focus of your thought to a focal opposite. If you are trying to understand the reasons 
why some people are highly loyal to a brand when purchasing a particular product, it 
might help instead to think about why people are not brand loyal. The work of William 
McGuire is a good example that combines the use of thinking about opposites in con-
junction with the metaphorical thinking discussed in the previous section (McGuire, 
1968). McGuire was a noted theorist in the field of attitude change who approached 
persuasion-related phenomena thinking not about how to influence people but instead 
about how to make people resistant to attitude change. McGuire used biological immu-
nization principles as a metaphor for inducing resistance to persuasive communica-
tions. He noted that people are inoculated against many diseases by introducing small 
amounts of a contaminating virus into the body. As a result, the body builds up antibod-
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ies to resist the virus, thus preventing the full-blown occurrence of the disease should 
higher levels of viral exposure be experienced later. To make people more resistant 
to attitude change, McGuire provided them with short, challenging, counterattitudinal 
messages that would make them think through their attitude in more detail and orga-
nize their defenses to counterarguments. These “immunization” challenges, McGuire 
reasoned, should not be compelling enough to change the attitude, but rather should 
be just strong enough to mobilize counterarguments and defense mechanisms to com-
bat future persuasive attempts. McGuire used the immunization analogy to effectively 
develop a complex theoretical framework for the analysis of persuasion.
11. Apply deviant case analysis. Sometimes a certain individual or group of indi-
viduals will stand out, with respect to a phenomenon, as being different from the rest of 
the crowd. This heuristic focuses on “deviant” cases in the attempt to explain why they 
are deviant. For example, although most adolescents who have good relationships with 
their parents do not use drugs, others who have good relationships with their parents do 
use drugs. Why? What can explain the behavior of these “deviant” cases?
An example of deviant case analysis is a research program that one of the authors 
developed (Jaccard) examining the relationship between perceived knowledge and actual 
knowledge in different knowledge domains (Jaccard, Dodge, & Guilamo-Ramos, 2005; 
Radecki & Jaccard, 1995). For instance, Jaccard and colleagues studied people’s percep-
tions of how knowledgeable they thought they were about nutrition and compared this 
with how knowledgeable they actually were about nutrition as assessed on knowledge 
tests. Jaccard observed a nontrivial number of people who significantly overestimated 
their knowledge levels; that is, they perceived themselves as being quite knowledgeable 
when the knowledge tests indicated they had very little knowledge about the topic at 
hand. Rather than ignore these “deviant cases” relative to the more typical case of those 
showing correspondence between perceived and actual knowledge, Jaccard explored 
why these individuals so overestimated their knowledge levels. In doing so, he was able 
to articulate and build on broader theories of the bases of perceived knowledge.
12. Change the scale. Mills (1959) suggests imagining extreme changes as a method 
of stimulating thinking: If something is small, imagine it to be enormous and ask “What 
difference might that make?” If something is pervasive, think about what things would 
be like if it were not. An example of this heuristic is the research on globalization in the 
fields of geography, anthropology, political science, and economics. Theorists in these 
disciplines think about how processes operating at the global level might be mirrored 
at the local level, as well as how processes operating at the local level might be general-
ized or altered if they are moved to the global level (Goldin, 2009; Robins, Pattison, & 
Woodstock, 2005). For example, if we think about the effects and challenges of union-
izing workers at the local level, what would happen if we tried to unionize workers at the 
global level? How might thinking in such terms alter our theories and thinking about 
unionization at the local level?
13. Focus on processes or focus on variables. The dominant tradition in the social 
sciences is to think in terms of variables. An alternative approach is to think in terms of 
processes—that is, sets of activities that unfold over time to produce change, to main-
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tain equilibrium in a system, or to get from event A to event B. Abbott and Alexan-
der (2004) describe the implications of thinking about crime and criminals in process 
terms. Instead of thinking about a criminal as someone who commits a crime, a process 
analysis views the act of becoming a criminal as consisting of the sequenced actions of 
getting caught, detained, held, charged, convicted, and sentenced. The often observed 
inverse relationship between social class and becoming a “criminal” might be due, in 
part, to the fact that lower-class individuals are more likely to make it through this pro-
cess-based sequence than middle- or upper-class individuals. Process-oriented models 
have existed in the social sciences for decades, but they are not as popular as variable-
centered approaches (Gilbert & Abbott, 2005; Cederman, 2005). If you tend to think 
primarily in terms of variables, try thinking in terms of dynamic processes. Conversely, 
if you tend to think primarily in terms of processes, try thinking in terms of variables.
One strategy for invoking process perspectives is to change nouns into verbs (Weick, 
1979). The use of this heuristic is most evident in the field of organizational studies, where 
process theories change such vocabulary as order to ordering (Cooper & Law, 1995), being 
to becoming (Chia & Tsoukas, 2002), and knowledge to knowing (Cook & Brown, 1999) 
so as to invoke process-oriented explanations. The premise of process-based analyses is 
that organizations are in continual flux and that variable-centered theories are limited 
because they ignore this flux, capturing only momentary “snapshots” of organizations at 
a single point in time (De Cock & Sharp, 2007; Sturdy & Grey, 2003).
Process-oriented perspectives are central to the field of processual anthropology, 
which was articulated by Turner (1967, 1970) in his temporal analyses of rituals. Turner 
argued that rites of passage are marked by a progression through three stages: (a) sepa-
ration, when a person becomes detached from a fixed point in the social structure; (b) 
marginality, when the person is in an ambiguous state, no longer in the old state but 
not yet having reached the new one; and (c) aggregation, when the person enters a 
new stable state with its own rights and obligations. Turner characterizes each stage as 
well as factors that influence and condition movement from one stage to another. This 
process-oriented view of phenomena contrasts with more structuralist interpretations 
of rituals.
For those who already think in terms of processes, a way of generating new ideas 
might be to think instead in terms of variables. Abbott (2004) recommends a heuristic 
of “stopping the clock.” The idea is to “freeze” the process at a given point in time and 
then describe the system in detail at the frozen moment. By “stopping the clock,” you 
broaden the context and apply other heuristics we have discussed to that particular 
point in the process.
Try analyzing your phenomenon as a dynamic process that fluctuates over time 
and that entails moving from event A to event B. How do entities get from one point 
to another? We describe process-oriented frameworks in more detail in Chapter 9 on 
simulations, Chapter 10 on grounded theory, and Chapter 11 in the context of broader 
systems of thought.
14. Consider abstractions or specific instances. Using instantiation principles dis-
cussed in Chapter 5, or the opposite of instantiation, abstraction, think about the 
56 CORE PROCESSES
phenomena at different levels of abstraction. For example, when thinking about what 
influences people’s attitudes toward a political candidate, think about what influences 
attitudes in general and then apply this to your analysis of attitudes toward political can-
didates. If you are thinking about what influences people’s attitudes in the abstract, then 
think about what influences a person’s attitude toward a political candidate (as well as 
other specific attitudes) and try to generalize from this position to attitudes in general.
Arie Kruglanski (2004), a noted social psychologist, emphasizes the importance of 
abstraction in theory construction. Kruglanski states that a key strategy for formulat-
ing abstract principles or constructs is to seek commonalities among phenomena and 
to be skeptical about distinctions. He argues that the surface manifestations of different 
instances of the same phenomena can be misleading and that different concrete phe-
nomena often are driven by the same underlying principle. The focus should be kept 
on isolating the gist of the phenomena and identifying what absolutely must be known 
about it. For example, attitude change, conformity, majority–minority influence, and 
social power all have a social influence component that may allow you to build a general 
theory of social influence by looking for communalities in each of these phenomena. 
Rather than focusing on domain-specific constructs or processes, strive to isolate under-
lying principles that generalize across domains. Having said that, Kruglanski also urges 
caution in the use of abstraction. When abstracting to more general levels, it is possible 
to obscure important distinctions that should be made. The key is to always ask yourself 
what is gained and what is lost by moving across different levels of abstraction.
The sociologist Robert Alford (1998), like Kruglanski, views the theory construc-
tion process as one of constantly moving back and forth between reflective musings 
about the implications of abstract concepts to concrete analyses of specific observations. 
Theory is developed by thinking about concrete instantiations of concepts and then 
abstracting upward to more general constructs that allow us to make theoretical propo-
sitions that generalize across many content domains.
15. Make the opposite assumption. Take an explicit assumption and recast it to its 
opposite. If a phenomenon is assumed to be stable, think of it as unstable. If two vari-
ables are assumed to be related, what would happen if they were unrelated? If two phe-
nomena coexist, what would happen if they could not coexist? If X is assumed to cause 
Y, consider the possibility that Y causes X. This heuristic is similar to the ones discussed 
earlier, on framing a problem in terms of its opposite and “changing the scale.” However, 
it is distinct in subtle ways.
As an example, self-esteem is often thought of as being a relatively stable construct 
in which some people have chronically low self-esteem and others have chronically 
high self-esteem. Suppose we think instead about self-esteem as being transitory rather 
than stable—that is, self-esteem fluctuates from one day to the next. This line of think-
ing might lead us to suggest a two-component theory of self-esteem. The first compo-
nent is relatively stable across time and reflects the overall level of self-esteem that an 
individual experiences across time. The second component is transitory in nature and 
reflects the daily variation in self-esteem in relation to the stable component. On some 
days, the individual’s self-esteem might be lower than what is typical for that person, 
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and on other days, the individual’s self-esteem might be higher than what is typical for 
that person. What factors impact the stable component of self-esteem, and what factors 
impact the transitory component of self-esteem? How might the two components differ-
entially affect important outcome variables, such as school performance or engaging in 
risk behaviors? How might one further develop this two-component conceptualization 
of self-esteem? By thinking about this stable construct in unstable terms, new insights 
result. Could the same type of stable–transitory analysis be invoked for other constructs 
that are assumed to be stable over time? For example, could ethnic identity be viewed as 
having the two components described above?
As another example, it is typically thought that the quality of parent–adolescent 
relationships influences drug use by adolescents, with better relationships being associ-
ated with lower probabilities of drug use. But what if we reverse the causal direction? 
Is it possible instead that an adolescent’s use of drugs negatively impacts the relation-
ship between the adolescent and his or her parents? As another example, it is com-
monly accepted that adolescents who are religious are less likely to engage in problem 
behaviors—that is, the religiosity has a protective function. Could it be instead that 
adolescents who start to engage in risk behaviors (e.g., alcohol or drug use) become less 
religious? Perhaps lowered religiosity is not a risk factor but instead is just a by-product 
of the adolescent’s engaging in problem behaviors and then rejecting his or her (reli-
gious) upbringing in the process. As a final example, it is often assumed that parental 
childrearing strategies impact child behavior, but it is just as plausible to assert that 
child behaviors influence parental childrearing strategies.
Abbott and Alexander (2004) provide several additional examples of this heuristic 
in their book on theory construction. For example, it is commonly assumed that college 
educates students. But suppose instead we think about all the ways in which college 
prevents education (e.g., boring classes, emphasizing rote memorization). As we make 
opposite assumptions and try to marshal support for them, we can gain new insights 
into the phenomena we study.
16. Apply the continual why and what. Given an outcome or dependent variable, 
ask yourself, “Why do some people do this but other people do not?” or “Why do some 
people have more of this but other people do not?” For each answer you give, repeat this 
question again. For example, if the outcome variable is school performance, you might 
ask, “Why do some people do well in school, whereas others do not?” The answer might 
be, “because some people are more intelligent and more motivated.” Then ask “Why are 
some people more intelligent?” and “Why are some people more motivated?” The answer 
to the former might be “because of the way they were raised.” This last answer is vague, 
so you might ask “What do you mean by that?” After clarifying this statement, you 
might ask yourself, “Why were they raised like that?” As you continually probe succes-
sive “why” questions for their answers and ask, “What do you mean by that?,” you might 
gain new insights into the original question you posed.
This strategy was used by Darryl Bem (1970) in his analysis of the psychological 
bases of beliefs. Bem focused his analysis on a belief that people might hold, such as 
“Smoking cigarettes causes cancer,” and asked people why they believed this to be the 
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case. When given an answer, he would ask them why they believed the answer was true. 
He would then pose the “Why do you think that is true?” question to the new answer 
that was given. As he continually pushed beliefs back to their origins, he found that all 
beliefs rested on one or both of two foundations, namely, (a) the belief that something is 
true because an authority figure or expert says it is true, and/or (b) the belief that some-
thing is true because it was directly experienced (or someone else directly experienced 
it) and “one’s senses do not lie.” How do you know, for example, that the sun is the center 
of the solar system? The answer probably is “because I was taught this in school by my 
science teacher”—which is invoking an authority figure. The continual “why” heuristic 
led Bem to derive an interesting theory of the bases of cognitions (see Bem, 1970).
17. Consult your grandmother—and prove her wrong. McGuire (1997) coined the term 
“bubba psychology” to refer to the idea that much of what social scientists “discover” 
in their research is so banal or obvious that it could have been told to them by their 
grandmother (“bubba”). Take the obvious and think about how it could be wrong. Try to 
turn bubba social science on its head. Or, as a variant, extend an obvious “bubba fact” to 
situations where you might be surprised by their implications. For example, the bubba 
fact that “being in a good mood increases your life satisfaction” might be extended to a 
subtler idea that “finding a dollar on the street increases life satisfaction.” If you find a 
dollar, doing so may put you in a good mood. If being in a good mood positively influ-
ences your current feelings of life satisfaction, then it follows that finding a dollar on the 
street should raise your life satisfaction (at least temporarily). People might find the idea 
that “coming upon a dollar on the street improves life satisfaction” to be more intriguing 
than the idea that “being in a good mood increases life satisfaction.” By extending the 
obvious to the nonobvious, an interesting theoretical point might be made.
18. Push an established finding to the extremes. Take a well-established relationship 
or finding and consider the extremes of it. For example, it is often held that more eye 
contact with a person will increase his or her liking of you. But what happens if you 
make constant eye contact? Too little or too much eye contact may be bad, but an inter-
mediate level of eye contact may be just right. Parents who are affectionate with their 
children tend to have happier children. But what if a parent is constantly affectionate? 
Some scientists have suggested that too much of anything eventually backfires or starts 
to produce opposite effects. What happens at the extremes of your phenomenon?  
19. Read biographies and literature, and be a well-rounded media consumer. Much of 
social science focuses on people, and an excellent resource for the lives of people is 
published biographies and autobiographies. These can be a rich source of ideas about 
many facets of human behavior. Fiction and nonfiction works are filled with insightful 
analyses, as are movies and other forms of media. The humanities and arts, even though 
they do not to rely on formal scientific methods, are an invaluable source of ideas and 
insights. Take advantage of the wealth of knowledge in these different areas.
One of the authors (Jaccard) attended the University of California at Berkeley as an 
undergraduate and recalls his first meeting in the office of the noted sociologist Erving 
Goffman. While waiting for Professor Goffman to finish a phone call, Jaccard casually 
noted the books on his shelves. They included the typical textbooks of a sociologi-
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cal academic, but they also included popular magazines typically seen at grocery store 
checkouts, cookbooks, books on fashion, popular self-help books, and other books rep-
resenting a wide swath of American culture. It was only after taking several courses 
from Professor Goffman that Jaccard came to appreciate that these resources were a core 
source of Goffman’s ideas about human interaction and American society.
20. Identify remote and shared/differentiating associates. Think about the phenom-
enon of interest to you and try to identify as many causes and consequences of it as 
you can. Be expansive, listing as many plausible ones as possible. The idea is to create a 
“free association” scenario, in which the list you generate includes “remote associates,” 
that is, things that are unlikely for people to think of and that might spark a creative 
insight. Relatedly, think of people you know or have heard of who perform the behavior 
or phenomenon you are trying to explain and people you know who do not perform the 
behavior or the phenomenon. Then make a list of the qualities, attributes, and charac-
teristics of each type of person. On what qualities and attributes do they differ and on 
which ones are they the same? What do the similarities and differences tell you about 
the phenomenon?
21. Shift the unit of analysis. When theorizing, we often do so by describing and 
explaining behavior at the level of individuals. For example, we may want to know 
why some people are wealthy but other people are poor. Or, we may want to know why 
some people can cope well with a debilitating disease but other people cannot. However, 
there also are theories that focus on “units of analysis” other than individuals, such as 
a couple, a family/household, a small group, an organization, or even countries within a 
world system. In such cases, the outcome variable is not the behavior of the individual 
but instead it is the behavior of the “unit.” For example, in the context of the HIV epi-
demic, we might focus on understanding why couples engage in unprotected intercourse 
rather than trying to explain why individuals engage in unprotected intercourse. Or, in 
the field of organizational studies, we might focus on understanding factors that influ-
ence the productivity of organizations rather than the productivity of individuals within 
organizations.
The noted sociologist James Coleman (1994) emphasized the importance of analyz-
ing the functioning of social systems rather than individuals. Note that this is not the 
same as studying the impact of social systems on individuals, as would be the case, for 
example, when exploring the impact of work environments on life satisfaction. Instead, 
the focus is on the behavior of the unit per se—that is, the particular social system in 
question. According to Coleman (1994), theories of the functioning of social systems 
can focus either on forces or explanatory constructs outside the system that impact 
and shape how the system of interest operates or, alternatively, on forces and processes 
within the system, that is, the component parts of the system, that impact or shape how 
that system operates. For example, the productivity of an organization may be impacted 
by the broader economy in which it functions as well as the internalization of an orga-
nizational “culture of productivity” on the part of the individuals who work within the 
organization.
If you tend to work with phenomena at the individual level, try shifting the “unit 
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of analysis,” if plausible, and consider the phenomena from this new “unit” level. As an 
example, research has explored the effects of alcohol on adolescent tendencies to engage 
in unprotected sex, and almost all of this research uses individuals as the unit of analy-
sis. However, unprotected sex is a couple behavior, so you could shift the analysis from 
the individual level to the couple level by focusing on factors that influence whether a 
given couple engages in unprotected sex. One way of analyzing couple behavior is to do 
so in terms of the different attitudes and characteristics that each couple member brings 
to the relationship. For example, for condom use, the male member has a behavioral ori-
entation toward using condoms, a set of beliefs about using condoms, certain risk-taking 
orientations, certain alcohol consumption patterns, and so on. This is also true of the 
female member of the couple. That is, she also brings to bear a behavioral orientation 
toward using condoms, a set of beliefs about condoms, certain risk orientations, and cer-
tain alcohol consumption patterns. The couple’s behavior is some function of the mesh-
ing of these two sets of variables, one set from the male and one set from the female.
Four relational models describe possible ways in which the attributes of each couple 
member combine to impact couple behavior. Consider the case of the effects of alcohol 
use on couple sexual behavior. The first model, termed the female influence model, states 
that alcohol use impacts the sexual behavior of a couple, but that the primary influence 
on such behavior is the level of alcohol consumption by the female member of the dyad 
as opposed to the male member of the dyad. That is, alcohol consumption by the male 
does not impact the couple behavior but female alcohol consumption does. The second 
model, termed the male influence model, occurs when male drinking behaviors, rather 
than female drinking behaviors, influence the couple’s sexual activity. The third model, 
termed the shared influence model, conceptualizes the drinking behaviors of both the 
male and female partners as being independent determinants of couple-based sexual 
risk behavior. The final model involves more complex couple dynamics and is termed 
the interactional influence model. This model is a variant of the shared influence model 
in that it accounts for risky sexual couple behavior using the drinking behaviors of both 
partners, but it allows for configural influence. In addition to the independent effects 
of the drinking behaviors of both couple members, the interactional influence model 
posits an interaction effect between couple member drinking behavior, such that as 
female drinking increases, male drinking behavior becomes more strongly related to 
risky sexual behavior.
This example frames the analysis around the “components” of the system. However, 
analyses also could be pursued using unit-level variables as well, such as couple inti-
macy, relationship length, couple communication, and couple bargaining/negotiation 
strategies. For interesting perspectives on couple-level analyses, see Kenny, Kashy, and 
Cook (2006) and the references cited therein. Note that by shifting the unit of analy-
sis from individuals to couples, very different perspectives on the effects of alcohol on 
unprotected sex have been gained.
Zaheer, Albert, and Zaheer (1999) extend the concept of units of analysis to tem-
poral dimensions. They suggest that thinking about process and change phenomena 
from the perspective of different units of time can yield new theoretical insights and 
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ideas. For example, if you are building a theory of the dynamics of life satisfaction, 
what concepts and variables might you focus on if you seek to understand changes in 
life satisfaction on a daily basis, on a monthly basis, on a yearly basis, or on the basis of 
decades? By thinking in these different units of time, new ideas and perspectives on life 
satisfaction may result.
22. Shift the level of analysis. Social scientists focus on explanations at different 
levels of analysis. One way of characterizing levels of analysis is in terms of proximal 
versus distal determinants. Proximal determinants are the more immediate determi-
nants of behavior, and distal determinants are variables that influence behavior but 
do so through the more immediate determinants. Some theorists explain phenomena 
using more proximal determinants, whereas others explain phenomena using more dis-
tal determinants. We often gain new insights into a phenomenon by shifting the level 
of analysis we are pursuing, either by moving from proximal to distal analysis or from 
distal to proximal analysis.
As an example, Jaccard (2009) has presented a framework for thinking about 
behavior at four different levels. At the first (proximal) level, the explanatory framework 
asserts a simple proposition: A person’s behavior is influenced by his or her intention to 
perform the behavior. If people intend to do something, they usually will do it, and if 
they do not intend to do something, they usually will not do it. For example, if a person 
intends to get tested for HIV, he or she probably will do so. If the person does not intend 
to get tested for HIV, he or she probably will not do so. In actuality, the relationship 
between behavioral intentions and behavior is complex—that is, people do not always 
do what they intend to do. The theory elaborates why this is the case. Factors that affect 
the intention–behavior relationship include environmental constraints that impede 
intended behavioral performance, lack of relevant knowledge and skills to perform the 
intended behavior, forgetting to perform the intended behavior, and the operation of 
habit and automatic processes, among others.
At the second level of analysis, the near-proximal level, the theory addresses why 
some people intend to perform a behavior and other people do not. Five classes of vari-
ables that impact a person’s intention or decision to perform a behavior are the focus of 
the theory: (a) what the person sees as the advantages and disadvantages of performing 
the behavior, (b) the normative pressures that the person experiences to perform the 
behavior, (c) the perceived social image implications of performing the behavior, (d) 
the person’s emotional and affective reactions to performing the behavior, and (e) the 
person’s self-perceived ability to successfully perform the behavior (i.e., perceptions of 
self-efficacy). For example, what does a person see as the advantages and disadvantages 
of being tested for HIV; what social pressures are operating for the person to be tested 
for HIV; how will being tested for HIV affect the person’s image he or she conveys to oth-
ers; what emotional reactions does the person have to being tested for HIV; and, what 
obstacles does the person see to being tested for HIV?
At the next level of explanation are near-distal determinants. These are more gen-
eral variables that do not reference the target behavior, per se, but can shape the proxi-
mal and near-proximal determinants of behavior. They include such constructs as (a) 
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personality variables; (b) general values, goals, aspirations, and attitudes; (c) mental-
health-related variables (e.g., depression, anxiety, stress); and (d) variables related to 
alcohol and drug use. For example, a person may miss a scheduled HIV test because he 
or she is depressed or hung over from drinking too much.
The most distal level of analysis focuses on the broader contexts in which behavior 
occurs: the family context, the peer context, the school context, the work context, the 
provider context, the religious context, the neighborhood context, the media context, 
the government/policy context, and the cultural context (for various ethnic groups).
Jaccard (2009) encourages theorists who seek to explain behavior to think about 
that behavior at the different levels of analysis. Do people intend to perform the behav-
ior in question, and if so, what factors get in the way of their carrying out their inten-
tions? Why do some people intend to perform the behavior whereas others do not? How 
do these people differ in their perceived advantages and disadvantages of performing the 
behavior, the normative pressures that are operating, the perceived image implications 
of performing the behavior, their emotional reactions to performing the behavior, and 
their perceived ability to perform the behavior? How are all these variables shaped by 
their personalities, their broader goals and aspirations, their general attitudes, and other 
such lifestyle variables? Finally, how is all this influenced by the broader contexts in 
which they live, including the family context, the peer context, the school context, the 
work context, the religious context, the neighborhood context, the media context, the 
government/policy context, and the cultural context?
Most social scientists tend to theorize at only one level of analysis, either at the level 
of the more proximal determinants of behavior or at the level of more distal determinants 
of behavior. This focus is perfectly reasonable. However, it might help to gain insights 
into the phenomenon you are studying by occasionally shifting your thought process to 
think about explanatory constructs either at more proximal levels or more distal levels. 
By thinking about phenomena at these different levels, insights might be gained into the 
kinds of variables you should focus on at the original level of analysis. For example, even 
though you might be interested in understanding the political ideologies of voters and 
how these influence voting choices, it might be helpful to shift to another level of analysis 
and ask how different contexts (e.g., the media, work, neighborhood) shape the political 
ideologies of individuals. Engaging in such an activity might suggest new dimensions of 
ideology you had not considered or new ways of thinking about ideology that might help 
you better explain the relationship between ideology and voting behavior.
23. Use both explanations rather than one or the other. In the area of impression for-
mation, a robust finding is the occurrence of primacy effects. Information about a person 
that is presented first tends to have a larger impact on impressions than information that 
is presented later (Anderson, 1965, 1991). One explanation for this focuses on “change-
in-meaning” processes, whereby the initial information is thought to color or change 
the meaning of the later information so that it is interpreted to be consistent with the 
initial information. A second explanation is that the initial information is remembered 
more easily than later information. More easily recalled information is more influential, 
hence the primacy effect. A third explanation is that people discount later information 
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that is contrary to the initial information they receive. Research has attempted to choose 
between these explanations (change in meaning vs. accessibility vs. discounting), with 
somewhat mixed success (Anderson & Hubert, 1963; Anderson, 1965, 1991). Instead 
of viewing explanations as mutually exclusive, consider instead the possibility that all 
of the explanations are operating. Thus, in the impression formation example, perhaps 
there is some change in meaning operating, perhaps there also is some differential recall 
operating, and perhaps there is some discounting operating, all converging to produce 
primacy effects. A theory might be devised whereby each of these processes has an 
“importance weight” reflecting the influence of the process in the formation of impres-
sions. We might then theorize about how the relative magnitude of these importance 
weights varies across different individuals and across different situations. This approach 
yields a different theoretical perspective from that of trying to choose the one “correct” 
explanation. (For an elaboration of this orientation, see Poole & Van de Ven, 1989.)
A variant of this heuristic is to invoke the operation of multiple processes rather 
than a single process when thinking about a phenomenon. Rather than viewing a phe-
nomenon as being influenced by one process or the other, allow both processes to oper-
ate. This strategy is well illustrated by the many “dual-process” theories that are popular 
in psychology. Dual-process models take many forms, but the idea is to specify two 
alternative or complementary processing modes and then build a theory around those 
processes. For example, Smith, Zarate, and Branscombe (1987) suggest a dual-process 
model for accessing attitudes: one process that calls a previously formed and previously 
stored attitude from memory and the other process that accesses a rule from memory 
to use to form an attitude toward an object to which one is newly exposed. Smith and 
DeCoster (2000) suggest that people possess two memory systems for storing cognitions: 
one system that slowly learns general regularities and the other system that forms quick 
representations of novel events or individual episodes. Petty and Cacioppo (1986) sug-
gest a dual-process model of persuasion based on the systematic processing of a persua-
sive message (i.e., thinking about the validity of the arguments contained in a message) 
and the heuristic processing of a persuasive message (i.e., thinking about the source of a 
message and the characteristics of the source, such as the source’s trustworthiness and 
credibility). Kowalski (2006) offers a dual-process model of thought involving intui-
tive thinking, which is automatic, effortless, and largely subconscious, and deliberative 
thinking, which is controlled, effortful, and mostly conscious. Sierra and Hyman (2006) 
offer a dual-process model of cheating intentions, one based on cognitive thought and 
the other based on anticipated emotions. Although dual-process models are most popu-
lar in the areas of decision making, memory, and information processing, they also 
appear in other areas of inquiry. Perhaps the phenomena you are thinking about can be 
conceptualized in the form of a dual-process framework.
24. Capitalize on methodological and technological innovations. Technology is chang-
ing rapidly, leading to new methodological tools for social scientists. These advances 
are opening up new areas for theoretical inquiry and insight. For example, in the past, 
linking neuroscience findings to human behavior was limited to the exploration of ani-
mals removed from their ecological contexts, to observations of patients who suffered 
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BOx 4.1. The Nacirema
A strategy for generating ideas used by anthropologists is the careful and sys-
tematic observation of others in their cultural contexts. By examining cultures in 
as objective and systematic a way as possible, insights into behavior become 
apparent that otherwise would remain hidden. This is illustrated nicely in the fol-
lowing edited account of the Nacirema and their body rituals, as described by 
the noted anthropologist Horace Miner (1956):
Professor Linton first brought the ritual of the Nacirema to the attention of anthropolo-
gists twenty years ago, but the culture of this people is still very poorly understood. 
They are a North American group living in the territory between the Canadian Cree, 
the Yaqui and Tarahumare of Mexico, and the Carib and Arawak of the Antilles. Little 
is known of their origin, although tradition states that they came from the east.
Nacirema culture is characterized by a highly developed market economy that 
has evolved in a rich natural habitat. While much of the people’s time is devoted to 
economic pursuits, a large part of the fruits of these labors and a considerable por-
tion of the day are spent in ritual activity. The focus of this activity is the human body, 
the appearance and health of which loom as a dominant concern in the ethos of the 
people. While such a concern is certainly not unusual, its ceremonial aspects and 
associated philosophy are unique.
The fundamental belief underlying the whole system appears to be that the human 
body is ugly and that its natural tendency is to debility and disease. Incarcerated in 
such a body, a person’s only hope is to avert these characteristics through the use of 
ritual and ceremony. Every household has one or more shrines devoted to this pur-
pose. The more powerful individuals in the society have several shrines in their houses 
and, in fact, the opulence of a house is often referred to in terms of the number of such 
ritual centers it possesses. Most houses are of wattle and daub construction, but the 
shrine rooms of the wealthier people are walled with stone. Poorer families imitate the 
rich by applying pottery plaques to their shrine walls.
While each family has at least one such shrine, the rituals associated with it are not 
family ceremonies but are private and secret. The rites are normally only discussed 
with children, and then only during the period when they are being initiated into 
these mysteries. I was able, however, to establish sufficient rapport with the natives 
to examine these shrines and to have the rituals described to me. The focal point of 
the shrine is a box or chest that is built into the wall. In this chest are kept the many 
charms and magical potions without which no native believes he or she could live. 
These preparations are secured from a variety of specialized practitioners. The most 
powerful of these are the medicine men, whose assistance must be rewarded with 
substantial gifts. However, the medicine men do not provide the curative potions for 
their clients, only decide what the ingredients should be and then write them down in 
an ancient and secret language. This writing is understood only by the medicine men 
and by the herbalists who, for another gift, provide the required charm.
The charm is not disposed of after it has served its purpose, but is placed in the 
charm box of the household shrine. As these magical materials are specific for cer-
tain ills and the real or imagined maladies of the people are many, the charm box is 
usually full to overflowing. The magical packets are so numerous that people forget 
cont.
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what their purposes were and fear to use them again. While the natives are very 
vague on this point, we can only assume that the idea in retaining all the old magical 
materials is that their presence in the charm box, before which the body rituals are 
conducted, will in some way protect the worshipper.
Beneath the charm box is a small font. Each day every member of the family, in suc-
cession, enters the shrine room, bows his or her head before the charm box, mingles 
different sorts of holy water in the font, and proceeds with a brief rite of ablution. The 
holy waters are secured from the water temple of the community, where the priests 
conduct elaborate ceremonies to make the liquid ritually pure.
In the hierarchy of magical practitioners, and below the medicine men in pres-
tige, are specialists whose designation is best translated as “holy-mouth-men.” The 
Nacirema have an almost pathological horror of, and fascination with, the mouth, 
the condition of which is believed to have a supernatural influence on all social rela-
tionships. Were it not for the rituals of the mouth, they believe that their teeth would 
fall out, their gums bleed, their jaws shrink, their friends desert them, and their lovers 
reject them. They also believe that a strong relationship exists between oral and moral 
characteristics. For example, there is a ritual ablution of the mouth for children that is 
supposed to improve their moral fiber. The daily body ritual performed by everyone 
includes a mouth rite. Despite the fact that these people are so punctilious about care 
of the mouth, this rite involves a practice that strikes the uninitiated stranger as revolt-
ing. It was reported to me that the ritual consists of inserting a small bundle of hog 
hairs into the mouth, along with certain magical powders, and then moving the bundle 
in a highly formalized series of gestures.
In addition to the private mouth rite, the people seek out a holy-mouth-man once or 
twice a year. These practitioners have an impressive set of paraphernalia, consisting 
of a variety of augers, awls, probes, and prods. The use of these items in the exor-
cism of the evils of the mouth involves almost unbelievable ritual torture of the client. 
The holy-mouth-man opens the client’s mouth and, using the above mentioned tools, 
enlarges any holes that decay may have created in the teeth. Magical materials are 
put into these holes. If there are no naturally occurring holes in the teeth, large sec-
tions of one or more teeth are gouged out so that the supernatural substance can be 
applied. In the client’s view, the purpose of these ministrations is to arrest decay and 
to draw friends. The extremely sacred and traditional character of the rite is evident in 
the fact that the natives return to the holy-mouth-men year after year, despite the fact 
that their teeth continue to decay.
Miner goes on to describe numerous other features of the Nacirema culture. 
Now, spell the name “Nacirema” backwards and reread Miner’s account of the 
Nacirema. Does it mean something different to you now? This exercise drives 
home the point that what can seem normal and everyday from one perspective 
can be seen as unusual, even bizarre, from another perspective. The tendency to 
see things from our own cultural viewpoint is called an ethnocentric perspective. It 
shapes our thinking in predetermined ways. Creative individuals can often break 
out of their ethnocentric constraints.
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trauma, to disorders of localized areas of the brain, and to postmortem examinations. 
Recent technological advances now permit measures of electrophysiological record-
ing, functional brain imaging, and neurochemical assessments during ongoing human 
behavior, permitting intriguing interfaces between social science and neuroscience. As 
an example, Steinberg (2008) suggests that the brain’s socioemotional system devel-
ops at a much faster rate than the cognitive control system, leading adolescents toward 
increased reward seeking at a time when control mechanisms are underdeveloped. He 
hypothesizes that this pattern of brain development accounts for risk-taking increases 
during adolescence followed by risk-taking declines during young adulthood, as brain 
development surrounding control processes “catches up”  with those surrounding emo-
tional responses. Steinberg is breaking new theoretical ground in developmental science 
by taking advantage of technology-based methodological advances in neuroscience.
As another example, Freud popularized the notion of the unconscious in psychol-
ogy, but it quickly fell into scientific disrepute when satisfactory measures of uncon-
scious phenomena failed to materialize. Without such measures, unconscious motives 
could be introduced post hoc to explain anything because there was no way of subject-
ing unconscious explanations to empirical tests. Recently, psychologists and sociolo-
gists have developed methods that purportedly allow for the measurement of uncon-
scious attitudes (Bassili & Brown, 2005; Blanton & Jaccard, 2008). These methods ask 
individuals to view stimuli on computer screens and to classify them as fast as they can 
into different categories. Based on how long it takes them to classify stimuli (measured 
in milliseconds), inferences are made about the attitudes they have toward the stimuli 
they are classifying. These methods have opened up new theoretical accounts of human 
behavior, as both conscious and unconscious phenomena are incorporated into concep-
tual frameworks.
Keeping abreast of new technologies and methodological innovations is a way of 
possibly defining new questions and bringing to bear new constructs to understand the 
phenomena you study.
25. Focus on your emotions. Emotions are seen by many as having no place in the-
ory development, but when studying human behavior, emotions might be tapped for 
purposes of generating ideas. It is a common practice in anthropology, for example, to 
record field notes either as an outside observer or in the context of participant observa-
tion. Field notes not only involve recording one’s observations, but they also involve 
recording notes about the emotions one is experiencing while making the observations. 
In traditional anthropology, such emotion notes were considered to be “warnings” about 
potential bias in one’s observations, such as when one’s perceptions of others might be 
colored by the relationships that had been formed with those others in the context of 
participant observation. However, more recently, some groups of anthropologists have 
viewed emotion notes as a source of meaning and interpretation in their own right that 
may help them formulate theory and gain perspectives on the phenomenon being stud-
ied (e.g., Kelinman & Copp, 1993; Cylwik, 2001). The anthropologist Rosaldo (1993) 
used his grief over the death of his wife as a way to understand the intensity of emotions 
experienced by a group of headhunters, the Ilongot of the Philippines, about headhunt-
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ing. Rosaldo argues that by attempting to eliminate personal emotions from observa-
tions, traditional ethnographies create distortions and misinterpretations of descrip-
tions, thereby undermining explanation.
26. What pushes your intellectual hot button? Items in the media or discussions with 
others may evoke in you a sense of disbelief or at least disagreement. Any time you find 
yourself saying “That can’t be right,” ask yourself if it is something worth pursuing. 
As a junior Assistant Professor discussing the value of advertising with a consumer 
advocate, one of the authors (Jacoby) found himself disagreeing with the advocate’s 
proposition that “if there is going to be advertising, it should be limited to providing 
as much concrete information to the prospective consumer as possible.” Incredulous, 
Jacoby contended that, if it were all attended to, too much information likely would 
discombobulate the consumer, making it more difficult to separate the wheat from the 
chaff, thereby leading to poorer decision making. The advocate scoffed at the idea. This 
led Jacoby to conduct research to test his hypothesis. After Jacoby published a series 
of studies that confirmed the hypothesis, advertisers and public policymakers began 
thinking differently about how information could best be communicated to consumers. 
As an example, instead of requiring cigarette manufacturers to list the complete set of 
18 health consequences it wanted on cigarette packages, the Federal Trade Commission, 
citing this stream of “information overload” research, called for cigarette manufacturers 
to list only three of these consequences at a time, periodically rotating the consequences 
to be listed. What have you heard or seen that elicits your disagreement and makes you 
say “That can’t be right”? Is it something worth studying?
Other heuristics could be mentioned, and we will develop more of them in subse-
quent chapters. The present list is simply a start. A compendium of other approaches to 
stimulating creativity can be found in the volumes by Stein (1974, 1975) and McGuire 
(e.g., 1997). Nersessian (2008) emphasizes the fact that scientists rarely rely on one heu-
ristic or one cognitive process for generating ideas, but rather notes that an idea might 
result from the complex interplay of multiple heuristics, such as mixing of the use of 
analogies, thought experiments, and imaging. Try thinking up some heuristics of your 
own. How can you start to “think differently?” How can you view things from perspec-
tives you are not accustomed to? How can you combine heuristics? Try creating your 
own list of ways for stimulating creativity.
When the Focus Is on Basic Mental or Biological Processes
Some social scientists focus their theorizing on core processes within the human mind, 
such as attention, perception, or comprehension, whereas others focus on basic biologi-
cal processes, such as neural correlates of thought or electrical activity in the brain that 
is associated with different emotions. Can the heuristics and categories of variables 
described above be used by such theorists? Yes. This is not to say that every heuristic or 
every class of variable will be of use, but if you make a sincere effort at thinking about 
phenomena from the perspective of one or more of the heuristics, there is a good chance 
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that new insights will emerge. The use of heuristics—such as interviewing experts, con-
ducting thought experiments, analyzing paradoxical incidents, imaging, using analo-
gies and metaphors, reframing problems in terms of their opposite, using deviant case 
analysis, focusing on processes, considering abstractions or specific instances, making 
the opposite assumption, applying the continual why and why not questions, pushing 
an established finding to the extremes, using remote associates, shifting the level of 
analysis, and using multiple rather than either–or explanations—all can be applied to 
the analysis of basic mental, biological, organizational, or sociological processes.
SCIENTISTS ON SCIENTIFIC THEORIZING
Articles have been written by leading social scientists on the strategies they use for con-
structing scientific theories. In this section we review some of these strategies, focusing 
on those that complement or augment the heuristics already discussed. One or more of 
these approaches may resonate with you as you think about your phenomena.
Robert Wyer is an influential social psychologist who studies the phenomenon of 
information processing. His theory of information processing emphasizes seven pro-
cessing stages or activities in which individuals engage when processing information: 
(1) attending to information when it is encountered, (2) interpreting and organizing 
the information relative to preexisting concepts that are stored in memory, (3) constru-
ing the implications of the information for already acquired knowledge about relevant 
people and events, (4) storing the information in memory, (5) retrieving the information 
from memory at later times, (6) integrating the retrieved information to make a subjec-
tive judgment, and (7) translating this judgment into an overt response. In building a 
scientific theory about information processing, Wyer (2004) notes that he often com-
partmentalizes these processes, building a mini-theory for each one separately. These 
mini-theories are then aggregated to construct his broader theory of information pro-
cessing. Compartmentalization thus can assist in building theories of complex phenom-
ena. In other words, take it one step at a time.
Wyer (2004) states that he always searches for alternative explanations of a phe-
nomenon. What different assumptions, suppositions, or perspectives might lead to the 
same phenomenon occurring? When presented with an explanation for a phenomenon, 
Wyer’s immediate reaction is to generate an alternative explanation for it. Then he care-
fully analyzes the different explanations, deciding either to integrate them or to com-
petitively test them against one another in an experiment.
Wyer emphasizes the importance of bringing fresh perspectives to theory construc-
tion. He expresses reservations about reading existing literature at the idea-generation 
phase. The writers of research reports, he notes, can be very effective at conveying their 
logic and thereby channel the reader’s thinking to that of the writers’ thinking. He states 
that he often reads the first few paragraphs of an article and then skips to the Method 
and Results section so that he can generate his own explanations of the findings. Then 
he goes back and reads what the authors have to say.
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Wyer notes that theories often are metaphorical in character, and he encourages the 
use of metaphors when theorizing. Wyer was one of the developers of the “bin” theory 
of memory described above, and his work is typified by the use of rich and creative 
metaphors.
John Cacioppo (2004) discussed the use of reductionism in his theorizing. Reduc-
tionism is the attempt by scientists to identify, break apart, or reduce nature into its natu-
ral constituents. Identifying the core ingredients of a phenomenon reveals insights into 
that phenomenon. Although some have criticized reductionism as making the simplistic 
assumption that “the whole is equal to the sum of its parts,” Cacioppo argues that it pro-
vides points of entry into complex systems. The idea is not just to describe the smaller 
parts but to develop a better understanding of the complex system. Reductionism is a 
strategy for doing so.
William McGuire (2004) argues for the importance of expressing theories using 
six different modalities: (1) verbal, (2) abstract symbolic, (3) pictorial (or graphic), (4) 
tabular, (5) descriptive statistical, and (6) inferential statistical. McGuire argues that 
expressing a theory via multiple modalities can help the theorist grasp the theory better 
and can increase the likelihood of noticing the implications of a theory and its similari-
ties to and differences from other formulations. As examples, Jacoby (2002) worked with 
the traditional stimulus–organism–response (S → O → R) model in psychology, which 
conceptualizes stimuli in the environment as impinging on a person (or, more generally, 
an organism), who then formulates a response to that stimulus. He asked, “What if the 
traditional S → O → R model is not depicted linearly but instead is conceptualized as an 
overlapping Venn diagram?” Representing the framework as a Venn diagram led Jacoby 
to propose new ways of representing how stimuli, responses, and organismic factors 
interact, with the result being a richer, seven-sector conceptualization of the traditional 
S → O → R model. In another realm, Langley (1999) describes several creative visual 
mapping strategies that can be used for characterizing process-oriented theories, and 
McGuire (2004) provides several additional examples of expressing theoretical proposi-
tions in each modality.
Howard Becker, an internationally recognized sociologist, wrote a book called Tricks 
of the Trade (2003) that is filled with heuristics for generating ideas. We describe some 
of them here, focusing mainly on those that augment the material already presented. 
One heuristic Becker describes is a next-step heuristic. Suppose a person performs a 
behavior. What are the next steps that are available to him or her? If you graduate from 
high school, what are the next steps you can take in your life? How does this action 
(graduating from high school) enhance or constrain the next steps that you can take? 
If you are late to work, what are your next steps? If you purchase a product (e.g., a car), 
what are your next steps? Becker argues that theory construction is analogous to a form 
of storytelling that is constrained by the demands of being logical and consistent with 
known facts. Stories lead the reader from one step to the next. What events lead up to 
your “primary event” (i.e., your outcome) and what events follow it? As you think about 
matters, keep applying a “next step” line of thinking: Every time you specify the next 
step, ask yourself what is the next step that can or should be taken after that.
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Another strategy Becker discusses is one of “building a machine to maintain the 
status quo.” Suppose you are interested in academic achievement. What would you need 
to do to keep the current levels of learning in schools exactly where they are at? What 
steps would you need to take to ensure that neither any improvements nor any decre-
ments were made in student performance? How could you prevent teachers from doing 
a better job without also making them do a worse job? How could you keep parents 
from doing a better job without also making them do a worse job with respect to their 
children and school? If you had to “build a machine” or “design a system” to maintain 
the status quo exactly as it is, what parts would the machine have, how would they func-
tion, and how would they interconnect? As you answer these questions, you may gain 
insights into how to improve academic achievement.
Social scientists generally try to specify why a person performs a particular behav-
ior. As another heuristic, Becker suggests shifting away from this traditional why ques-
tion to focus instead on where someone performs the behavior. Think through this strat-
egy in depth. If you interview someone for a case study analysis, probe in detail the 
question of where the behavior occurs. Such a shift will help you focus on settings and 
the importance of settings in influencing behavior. For example, someone may buy one 
brand of beer for personal consumption at home, but often select another brand of beer 
when drinking with his buddies. Another question shift is to ask how instead of why. 
Instead of asking why people smoke marijuana, ask how someone came to start smoking 
marijuana. What were the steps leading up to it? How did the smoker get to the circum-
stances he or she is in today? A final question shift can be to ask when does someone 
perform the behavior rather than why. By carefully thinking about “where,” “how,” and 
“when,” in addition to “why” people do what they do, more insights into the phenomena 
in which you are interested may result.
Yet another strategy that Becker suggests is to doubt everything that anyone in a 
position of authority or who supposedly is an expert tells you. By accepting nothing as 
a given, by being a doubter about everything, by looking for alternative interpretations, 
new ideas can suggest themselves.
Abbott and Alexander (2004) have written a useful book describing heuristics to 
stimulate thinking about social science phenomena, many of which we have already dis-
cussed. Additional heuristics they note include (1) questioning scientific propositions 
that others take as givens (similar to the suggestion of Becker, noted above); (2) recon-
ceptualizing an action or outcome as not being due to an actor but instead being due to a 
device or a circumstance, such as when Ralph Nader reconceptualized injuries from car 
accidents as the result of poorly designed cars that were inherently unsafe rather than 
speeding drivers; (3) setting conditions, whereby one specifies those conditions under 
which a relationship holds and those conditions under which the relationship does not 
hold (a topic we take up in detail in Chapter 6), such as stress having a larger negative 
impact on well-being for people with poor coping skills as opposed to people with good 
coping skills; (4) adding a dimension, which involves identifying conceptual confounds 
and controlling for them to see if a relationship still remains (e.g., for the proposition 
“Women are less likely to pursue mathematics than men”: Would this be true if one 
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controlled for or held constant parental encouragement? Would it be true if one held 
constant mathematical abilities?); (5) splitting, which involves making distinctions that 
one does not typically make (e.g., as in Epstein’s [1983] book Women in Law, in which the 
author argues that traditional studies and characterizations of lawyers apply to male but 
not female lawyers, or in Joseph Carlin’s (1962) book Lawyers on Their Own, in which 
he makes the same argument but for lawyers in small, solo practices); and (6) redefining 
constructs in novel ways, such as when West and Zimmerman (1987) defined gender 
not as a variable or as a role but instead as a set of social actions that included making 
certain gestures and invoking certain symbols in certain contexts, all with the intent of 
identifying oneself as being gendered.
Finally, Root-Bernstein and Root-Bernstein (1999) identified 13 core thinking tools 
that creative geniuses use as they approach the process of idea generation. They identi-
fied these tools based on a careful analysis of the writings and lives of highly creative 
individuals in a wide range of disciplines encompassing the arts, the sciences, and the 
humanities. The tools include (1) observing, (2) imaging, (3) recognizing patterns, (4) 
pattern forming, (5) analogizing, (6) abstracting, (7) body thinking, (8) empathizing, (9) 
dimensional thinking, (10) thought playing, (11) transforming, (12) synthesizing, and 
(13) modeling. Many of these strategies map onto the heuristics we have already dis-
cussed. Details of each are summarized in Root-Bernstein and Root-Bernstein (1999).
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS
In this chapter we have provided ways of thinking about phenomena that may help 
you think of new concepts or constructs or consider relationships between concepts 
and constructs in novel ways. This chapter is just a beginning; the chapters that follow 
will augment your theoretical toolbox in additional ways. It is not enough for you to 
passively read about the heuristics we have described in this chapter and then expect a 
major, creative idea to hit you over the head (unless you are an incarnation of Richard 
Feynman). Nor should you give a heuristic a superficial try and then reject it as being 
simplistic or irrelevant. Force yourself to explore each heuristic in depth—at different 
times and for different phenomena. Maybe you will ultimately decide it is not useful to 
pursue, but the idea is to stretch your thinking and to try new avenues of thought.
Theoretical advancements in the social sciences can range from the small and incre-
mental to the large and revolutionary, as we’ve noted. A central process in theory con-
struction is idea generation. When trying to explain something, we want to create new 
and novel ideas and perspectives that will build on existing knowledge. This is just as 
true for “small” ideas as it is for large, “revolutionary” ideas. The key to theory construc-
tion is to generate numerous ideas from different vantage points and then to screen 
those ideas in terms of which ones are worthwhile and which ones are not. Once an 
initial “cut” has been made, the ideas must be subjected to more rigorous explications 
and analysis, as described in Chapters 5 and 6.
Creative people tend to be independent nonconformists who have drive and resil-
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iency and are willing to take risks. They typically have a burning curiosity and tend to 
trust their intuition. The prototype of a creative person differs by profession. Creative 
ideas provide insights not previously recognized. Ideas differ in their degrees of creativ-
ity, with some ideas being extremely creative whereas others are only marginally so. As 
an emerging scientist, you need to “decide to be creative.”
As you approach theory construction, you will first identify and frame a problem or 
question to study and then use heuristics and ways of thinking that help you “think out-
side the box.” We presented numerous heuristics and ways of thinking, some of which 
may resonate better with you than others. These included:
Analyzing your own experiences•	
Conducting case studies•	
Collecting practitioners’ rules of thumb•	
Role playing•	
Conducting thought experiments•	
Using participant observation•	
Analyzing paradoxical incidents•	
Imaging•	
Using analogies and metaphors•	
Reframing problems in terms of their opposite•	
Using deviant case analysis•	
Changing the scale•	
Focusing on processes•	
Considering abstractions or specific instances•	
Making the opposite assumption•	
Applying the continual why and why not questions•	
Proving your grandmother wrong•	
Pushing an established finding to the extremes•	
Reading biographies and literature•	
Using remote associates•	
Shifting the unit of analysis•	
Shifting the level of analysis•	
Using multiple explanations rather than either–or explanations•	
Taking advantage of methodological and technological innovations•	
Focusing on your emotions•	
Relying on your intellectual “hot button”•	
In addition to these heuristics, you might develop some of your own. Given the decision 
to be creative, you now have some of the initial tools for theory construction.
The material covered in Chapters 5 and 6 will help you refine your concepts and 
ideas, and the material in Chapters 7 through 11 will help you organize and use the 
above in more systematic ways. The creative process does not follow a set progression, so 
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we must jump around a bit until you are exposed to all of the material in the remainder 
of the book. But the above is a start.
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ExERCISES
Exercises to Reinforce Concepts
 1. Discuss the role of idea generation and idea screening in theory construction.
 2. What are the key characteristics of the creative person?
 3. According to Nakamura and Csikszentmihalyi, what are the three system fac-
ets that influence the incorporation of novelty into scientific culture?
 4. What are the three core factors that Amabile says underlie creativity?
 5. What does it mean to “decide to be creative”?
 6. What issues and criteria should you consider when choosing a topic area to 
study? Elaborate on each of them.
 7. What are the advantages and disadvantages of doing a literature review before 
you start thinking about a phenomenon?
 8. What are the four processes that Clement describes as characterizing how sci-
entists apply analogies to solve a problem? Describe each.
 9. What are the four levels of analysis characterized by Jaccard? Describe each 
and give examples.
 10. Describe the heuristics for idea generation that most resonate with you and 
discuss why you find them to be the most useful.
Exercises to Apply Concepts
 1. Pick a phenomenon of interest and then generate a set of ideas about factors 
that influence it, how it functions, or how it influences other factors using one 
or more of the heuristics discussed in this chapter. Identify the heuristics you 
used.
 2. Create a heuristic for generating ideas that was not discussed in this chapter.
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5
Focusing Concepts
People see the world not as it is, but as they are.
—Albert Lee
When formulating a theory, researchers usually begin with some phenomenon that they 
want to understand. The phenomena can be diverse, ranging from overt, observable 
behaviors (e.g., smoking cigarettes, purchasing a product) to hypothetical concepts that 
are not directly observable (e.g., depression, suicidal ideation). The phenomena may 
focus on entities (schools), groups of individuals (females, Latinos), processes (auto-
matic processing of stimuli), systems (immune system responses to stress), or time 
(developmental changes), to name a few. We discussed in Chapter 4 (and discuss in 
later chapters) issues surrounding the choice of concepts to include in one’s theoretical 
system. Here, we focus on strategies for specifying and refining conceptual definitions 
for those concepts that one decides to include in the theoretical system.
We begin by describing the process of instantiation—a method for making abstract 
concepts more concrete—leading us to a formal characterization of the process of speci-
fying conceptual definitions. Next we consider the problem of surplus meaning, followed 
by a discussion of practical strategies for formulating clear definitions of constructs. We 
then discuss multidimensional approaches to constructs and, in turn, strategies that 
social scientists use to create taxonomies and variables for use in their theories. Finally, 
we conclude with a historical note on the concept of operationism as a means of defin-
ing constructs.
THE PROCESS OF INSTANTIATION
When formulating a theory, scientists frequently deal with abstract concepts. In fact, 
one way in which theories differ is in terms of the abstractness of the concepts used in 
the framework. For example, one theorist might develop a theory of how a person’s atti-
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tudes are related to his or her behavior. Such a theory contains two concepts, “attitudes” 
and “behavior,” which are quite abstract. A second theorist might develop a theory about 
how attitudes toward going to college are related to whether or not a high school stu-
dent attends college. In this case, the same basic concepts are involved (“attitude” and 
“behavior”), but they are more focused: The concepts now concern a specific type of 
attitude (the attitude toward going to college) and a specific type of behavior (going to 
college). In the process of theorizing, scientists usually try to strike a balance between 
being too specific (and hence, having a theory that is narrow in scope) and being too 
abstract (to the point where the concepts become “fuzzy” and unmanageable). The pro-
cess used to refine fuzzy concepts is that of instantiation. Instantiation is a deliberate 
process that involves specifying concrete instances of abstract concepts in order to help 
clarify their meaning. It is fundamental to science and a crucial process for refining 
initial theoretical ideas.
Instantiation plays another important role in science. In addition to clarifying con-
cepts at a theoretical level, instantiation is a bridge between the conceptual and the 
empirical realms where the validity of a theoretical expression is subjected to empirical 
testing. Instantiation helps ensure that a theory is testable. Given the theoretical expres-
sion “Attitudes toward college influences whether or not a person goes to college,” the 
scientist must devise a strategy for testing whether this statement has any value as a 
guide to understanding matters. To accomplish this, the scientist might decide to select 
a group of high school students, measure their attitudes toward attending college, and 
then later determine whether or not they go to college. Although this strategy may appear 
straightforward, the scientist pursuing this strategy would quickly be confronted with 
innumerable questions in the process of implementing it. Should the students be high 
school seniors only, or should juniors be included? When assessing attitudes, should 
one make distinctions between attitudes toward community colleges (i.e., 2-year col-
leges), 4-year colleges, and universities? What about trade schools? How long should the 
researcher wait to find out if the student has gone to college? One year? Two years? And 
so on. Each of these questions requires that the scientist focus the concepts, isolating 
specific instances of them, and then using these instances for testing the validity of the 
more general theoretical expression. The process of instantiation accomplishes this and 
is thus an important aspect of designing empirical tests of a theory.
Most scientists use the term hypothesis to refer to the specific empirically based 
instances that are used to test a more general theoretical expression. For example, based 
on the theory that “attitudes toward college influence college attendance,” a scientist 
might propose a hypothesis for a study that “the high school seniors in this study will 
be more likely to attend a 4-year university if they have positive attitudes toward attend-
ing college.” Although this hypothesis is more concrete, it is still somewhat ambiguous 
and, in practice, the scientist would have to be even more specific in the delineation of 
his or her “hypothesis.” Scientists are in disagreement about the exact meaning of the 
term hypothesis. We refer to the process of specifying a concrete instance of a theoreti-
cal expression for purposes of an empirical test as that of stating a hypothesis. Thus, 
a hypothesis is a statement that (1) is derived from a theoretical expression, (2) is more 
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concrete than the originating theoretical expression, and (3) is tied to the empirical 
realm in such a way as to permit a test of the originating expression. Like theoretical 
expressions, hypotheses also consist of concepts and relationships. However, the latter 
are more limited in scope, more specific, and expressed in testable (or near testable) 
form. A hypothesis is sometimes called a focal problem statement and is a direct result of 
the process of instantiation.
At some point, almost all theories must be subjected to the instantiation process, 
either to make the definition of “fuzzy” concepts clearer and more communicable or to 
derive a direct test of the theory. A theoretical expression usually contains a universe of 
potential meanings. If the universe of meanings is large, the theoretical expression runs 
the risk of being vague and ambiguous. Consider the following theoretical expression: 
“Older people are more knowledgeable than younger people.” This expression posits a 
relationship between two concepts: age and knowledgeability. But what do we mean by 
each of the two concepts? Does “age” refer to chronological age, developmental age (i.e., 
one’s level of maturation), or psychological age (“You’re as old as you feel”)? To simplify 
matters, let us assume that we are referring to chronological age. The concept of “knowl-
edgeability” also is ambiguous. A person could be knowledgeable about a myriad of 
different things, including music, films, television programs, local happenings, world 
events, geography, aircraft and aviation, his or her family, his or her job, cooking uten-
sils, restaurants, religious events, clothing, consumer products that are generally avail-
able, computers, celebrities, photography, and the breeding of tropical fish. It would take 
an encyclopedia just to list all the possibilities. We need to be more specific about the 
type of knowledge to which we are referring.
The Nature of Conceptual Definitions
Instantiation involves generating specific conceptual instances so as to make abstract 
concepts more concrete; it requires posing and answering questions designed to clarify 
and explicate the meanings of concepts. Nunnally (1967, p. 89) refers to this process 
as “outlining constructs” or “stating what one means by the use of particular words.” 
The outcomes of this process are termed conceptual definitions, which represent clear 
and concise definitions of one’s concepts. Not only do abstract constructs have to be 
defined as precisely as possible, but even seemingly obvious concepts frequently require 
explication. Consider a researcher specializing in the design of retail outlets who is 
responsible for conducting a study to determine where to erect a new shopping center. 
The researcher may begin by asking people in the target area what they want most in a 
shopping mall and learn that “convenience” is highly regarded. The researcher is not, 
however, quite sure what this means, since, in response to further probing, it is discov-
ered that the same word means many things to many people—including enough places 
to park one’s car, proximity of the shopping center to other places that the individual fre-
quents, and the distance from the individual’s home. The researcher decides to explore 
the issue of distance further. However, the question “How far away is the XYZ shopping 
center?” produces five different replies from five different people: two subway stops; 
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three traffic lights; 10 minutes; 3 miles; and quite far. Faced with such responses, a theo-
rist must think carefully about the essence of a concept and then clearly communicate 
that essence to other scientists.
SHARED MEANING, SURPLUS MEANING,  
AND NOMOLOGICAL NETWORKS
Researchers sometimes disagree as to what constitutes the essence of the phenomenon 
under question. Thus, various conceptual definitions may be provided for the same con-
cept. For example, Jacoby and Chestnut (1977) noted there were more than 50 defini-
tions of “brand loyalty” in the field of consumer behavior. Given that each investigator 
makes his or her conceptual definition explicit (by providing clearly articulated and 
precisely defined propositions), specific points of agreement and disagreement can be 
identified. The points of agreement may then be assumed to represent the essential (i.e., 
agreed-upon) core of the concept. Researchers refer to this as shared meaning, which 
can be contrasted with the remainder, which is termed surplus meaning. In science, it is 
better to have concepts that are dominated by shared meaning and that do not have too 
much surplus meaning.
Some examples will make explicit the relevant issues. Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) 
reviewed research on attitudes and found more than 500 definitions in the scientific liter-
ature. Even a cursory review of this literature made evident that quite different constructs 
were being invoked to represent “attitudes.” Fishbein and Ajzen argued that three distinct 
constructs were being called “attitude” and that lumping these constructs together under 
a common rubric was counterproductive to scientific advancement. Although all defini-
tions of attitude recognized that an attitude is directed toward an “object” (e.g., an atti-
tude toward “majoring in psychology,” an attitude toward “going to church,” an attitude 
toward “Republicans”), the definitions varied in other respects. One set of constructs 
used to represent attitudes were people’s perceived associations between the attitude 
object and some other attribute, characteristic, trait, or concept. For example, a person 
might believe (rightly or wrongly) that Republicans are conservative, that Republicans 
oppose abortion, that Republicans are from relatively wealthy families, and that Republi-
cans oppose big government. Fishbein and Ajzen referred to such perceived associations 
as “beliefs.” Another set of constructs used to represent attitudes were general feelings 
of favorableness–unfavorableness or how positive or negative one felt about the attitude 
object. Fishbein and Ajzen noted that such affective feelings were an element of most 
definitions of attitude and, further, that all the standard attitude scaling methods were 
designed to measure such affective feelings. Because this represented “shared meaning” 
among the many conceptions of attitude, Fishbein and Ajzen used the term “attitude” to 
refer to it. Thus, an attitude toward an “object” is defined as the positive or negative affect 
that one feels toward that object. The third set of constructs used to represent attitudes in 
the literature were people’s intentions to behave in certain ways with respect to the atti-
tude object. For example, some people intend to vote for Republicans, intend to donate 
money to Republicans, intend to campaign against Republicans, and so on. Fishbein and 
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Ajzen referred to these constructs as “behavioral intentions.” Fishbein and Ajzen offered 
an insightful analysis showing that the kinds of factors that influence beliefs are different 
from the kinds of factors that influence attitudes, which, in turn, are different from the 
kinds of factors that influence behavioral intentions. Hence, they argued, it makes scien-
tific sense to distinguish between beliefs, attitudes, and behavioral intentions instead of 
treating them interchangeably as reflecting the same construct.
As another example, there is controversy in sociology and anthropology about 
ways to define and conceptualize social class. Qualities or characteristics used in the 
many definitions of social class include occupation, education, income, wealth, land/
property ownership, control over means of production, political standing, prestige, 
reputation, associations with elites, honorary titles, and language, among others. Stra-
tum approaches to social class group people into different classes, including two-class 
models (powerful and weak), three-class models (lower, middle, and upper class), and 
multistratum models having as many as nine classifications (Fussell, 1983). The clas-
sic work of Karl Marx defines class in terms of the degree of control over the means of 
production (Marx, 1887). Marx also emphasized subjective class (class identity) versus 
objective class (actual relationship to the means of production). The sociologist Max 
Weber (1904) defined social class in terms of three components: economic consider-
ations (relative to control over means of production), prestige, and political position. 
The various characterizations of social class share the assumption that society is strati-
fied in terms of economic-related variables (representing shared meaning), but the many 
characterizations of social class tend to use additional attributes as a basis for classifica-
tion, depending on the theory (representing surplus meaning).
Which conceptualization of social class is optimal? The answer to this question is 
best viewed from the perspective of Meehl’s classic work on nomological networks (Cron-
bach & Meehl, 1955; MacCorquodale & Meehl, 1948). According to this framework, 
the meaning and utility of a concept emerges in the context of the broader theoretical 
network in which the concept is embedded. Thus, the “most appropriate” definition of 
social class depends on how the construct is used in the theory being advanced and how 
it fosters coherence in the overall theory. Of course, it is preferable if conceptual defini-
tions of a construct across different theoretical frameworks have shared as opposed to 
surplus meaning. But the meaning and worth of a construct ultimately depends on the 
broader nomological network in which it is embedded. This viewpoint is consistent with 
recent views of distributed meaning and situated cognition as ways of determining the 
meaning of constructs (e.g., Hannerz, 1993; Hutchins, 1996).
PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR SPECIFYING CONCEPTUAL 
DEFINITIONS
A reasonable first step for developing a conceptual definition of a construct is to exam-
ine the scientific literature to see how other scientists have done so. A comprehensive 
and careful literature review of previous research that has used the concept will often 
yield one or more conceptual definitions that other scientists have found to be useful. 
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Often, the difficult task of specifying an unambiguous definition will have already been 
performed. This is not to say that you should, by fiat, accept the conceptual defini-
tions offered in previous work. Perhaps, from your perspective, the definitions miss the 
essence of the concept or are flawed in one manner or another. However, reflecting on 
the definitions of others who have thought long and hard about the concept will often 
be fruitful.
Another useful source is a dictionary. You might be surprised at how often a clear 
and concise conceptual definition of a term can be found in a dictionary (or that might 
be suggested by looking up the term in a thesaurus). We make it a standard practice to 
look up any terms for constructs we plan to use in our conceptual system in two or three 
major dictionaries. To be sure, scientific definitions sometimes deviate from everyday 
definitions found in dictionaries, but consulting a dictionary may help you in the pro-
cess of specifying a definition with better clarity and insight.
Another strategy for devising a clear conceptual definition is to list the key proper-
ties of a concept. Properties are the identifiable characteristics of concepts and form the 
cornerstone for later measurement of the concept and empirical testing. Tables possess 
such properties as height, width, length, type of composition, and color. When describ-
ing a table, we do so in terms of these properties. In practice, most concepts can be 
described by using scores of different properties. The instantiation process serves both 
a select-in and a select-out function. It tells us what we must focus on when structuring 
definitions of our concepts, and, at the same time, it puts blinders on us with respect to 
the remaining aspects of the theoretical expression. Some properties are crucial for con-
veying the essence of the concept, whereas others may be of less importance. You might 
try to make a list of the core properties and then assign priorities to them.
As an example, behavioral prediction is central to many theories in the social sci-
ences. Many behaviors have four core elements or properties: (1) an action (e.g., talking 
about drugs), (2) an object or target toward which the action is directed (e.g., to your 
teenage daughter), (3) a setting (e.g., in your home, while sitting at the kitchen table), 
and (4) a time (e.g., on Monday night). When researchers measure or conceptualize a 
behavior, they implicitly, if not explicitly, commit to treating these behavioral elements 
at some level of specificity or abstraction. For example, the behavior “the number of 
alcoholic drinks a person has consumed in the past 30 days” ignores or collapses the 
settings in which the drinking occurs as well as specific times at which drinking occurs. 
A feature of time is invoked in this example by requiring that the drinking occur in the 
past 30 days. In addition, the object (alcoholic drinks) represents an abstract category 
that subsumes multiple instantiations of that category (e.g., drinking beer, wine, hard 
liquor). Research has affirmed the theoretical importance of being explicit about how 
each of the four elements of a behavior is treated because the relevant predictors and 
determinants of that behavior can vary depending on the level of abstraction of the 
elements (e.g., Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Jaccard, 1974). This, in turn, affects the nature 
of the theory you develop. Thus, providing a clear definition of an outcome behavior 
of interest involves addressing the four properties of action, target object, setting, and 
time.
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Another heuristic for delimiting the nature of concepts is to successively ask the 
question “What do you mean by that?” For example, for the concept of “attitude toward 
African Americans,” one might answer the question “What do you mean by that?” as 
follows: “It is a tendency to act in a consistently favorable or unfavorable manner toward 
African Americans.” One would then focus on key words within the answer, asking 
the same question: “What do you mean by that?” For example, we might ask, “What 
do you mean by ‘consistently’?” or “What do you mean by ‘African Americans’?” If in 
response to the latter question, the answer is “a person whose ancestry is predominantly 
Negroid,” you might further ask “What do you mean by ‘predominantly’?” and “what 
do you mean by ‘Negroid’?” And so on. This process could continue forever, eventually 
leading to a linguistic nightmare. The idea is to continue with this line of reasoning 
until you judge that all major ambiguities are clarified and that the meaning of the con-
struct can be clearly communicated.
Another strategy for specifying a concise conceptual definition is to play the role of 
a journalist who, in the context of an article for a magazine or newspaper, must explain 
the nature of the variable and its meaning to the public. Write the definition as if you 
were writing the article. Using this strategy can help you avoid jargon that may carry 
with it surplus meaning. Even when a conceptual definition is well understood by the 
scientific community, engaging in this exercise may prove to be useful to ensure that 
you can articulate all aspects of the definition in a meaningful fashion.
Yet another strategy that can be used to avoid ambiguous jargon is to place your-
self in the position of having to define and explain the concept to someone who is just 
learning the English language, thereby forcing yourself to use more simplified and com-
monplace terms.
Using a denotive definition strategy is another strategy for articulating a definition 
(McGuire, 1997). For example, if you want to provide a definition of “political conser-
vatism,” you might assign familiar political figures to different locations on the conser-
vatism dimension and then try to specify which characteristics of each politician made 
you place him or her where you did.
Creating precise conceptual definitions can also be achieved by articulating or writ-
ing out how the concept would be measured in an empirical investigation. Ambiguities 
in the construct often reveal themselves when the construct must be operationalized at 
such a concrete level. For example, if you are trying to define a personality trait such as 
dominance, how would you go about assessing or measuring it in people? Exactly what 
questions would you ask? As you formulate these questions, the meaning of the concept 
often will become clearer to you.
A final strategy for specifying a clear conceptual definition is to use the principles 
of grounded theory construction. We defer consideration of this strategy until Chapter 
10.
A common trap when offering conceptual definitions is to not provide a definition 
but, rather, to define the concept by providing examples of it. In general, this tactic 
should be avoided. To be sure, specifying exemplars can be a useful strategy to help you 
think through the key properties and characteristics of a concept and to help convey a 
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sense of the concept to others. However, such exemplars should not be a substitute for a 
carefully worded and clear conceptual definition.
MULTIDIMENSIONAL CONSTRUCTS
When defining concepts in a theory, it sometimes is useful to think of subdimensions 
or “subtypes” of the construct. Consider the case of intelligence, a widely used concept 
in the social sciences. Psychologists became actively interested in the scientific study 
of intelligence in the early 1900s. At that time, intelligence was conceptualized as a 
rather broad concept, usually in terms of the capacity to solve complex and abstract 
problems. Such a conceptualization quickly came under attack as being too abstract and 
theoretically limiting. Several lines of evidence were used to argue against the global 
conceptualization. The first was a phenomenon known as “savant syndrome”—that is, 
significantly developmentally disabled individuals with one or more highly developed 
skills. The most intensive study of this phenomenon, by Scheerer, Rothmann, and Gold-
stein (1945), documented the case of an 11-year-old boy who was healthy and showed no 
signs of neurological disturbance. He was unable to perform well in school, his general 
information was quite substandard, he knew the meaning of few words, and he showed 
virtually no abstract problem-solving skills. His IQ on the Stanford–Binet (a widely used 
intelligence test) was 50, a very low score. However, there also were some paradoxes. 
The boy could tell the day of the week for any given date between 1880 and 1950. He 
could correctly spell many words forward and backward, and he never forgot the spell-
ing of a word once he was told how to spell it. He could play by ear many complex musi-
cal compositions and could sing the opera Othello from beginning to end. The savant 
syndrome phenomenon suggested the need to recognize more specialized capacities in 
the context of the concept of intelligence.
A second perspective on the inadequacy of a general conceptualization of intelli-
gence was provided by a series of factor-analytic studies. These studies postulated dif-
ferent types of intelligence and demonstrated empirically the utility of separating intel-
ligence into different forms. One of the more popular conceptualizations is that of Leon 
Thurstone (1947), who postulates seven primary mental abilities: number, word flu-
ency, verbal meaning, memory, reasoning, spatial perception, and perceptual speed. The 
results of factor-analytic studies underscore the idea that general concepts frequently 
need to be made more specific, and that it is possible to use empirical strategies to help 
scientists reconceptualize their constructs.
Examples of multidimensional conceptualizations of constructs in the social sci-
ences abound. For instance, theories of risk taking have delineated four types of risk-
taking propensities of individuals: (1) physical risk taking (putting oneself in harm’s 
way, physically), (2) social risk taking (taking risks in social relationships), (3) monetary 
risk taking (taking risks with money), and (4) moral risk taking (taking risks involving 
the breaking of rules or laws). These “components” of risk taking derive from the propo-
sition that risk taking can occur in different settings and that risk tendencies can vary 
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BOx 5.1. Etic and Emic Constructs
In anthropology distinctions have been made between etic- and emic-based 
approaches to scientific analysis. The terms emic and etic were coined by the 
linguist Kenneth Pike and were popularized in anthropology by Marvin Har-
ris. The terms are applied in many different contexts, with somewhat different 
meanings depending on the subdiscipline. The essence of emic approaches is 
to understand a culture in the way that members of that culture understand it, to 
learn the concepts they use, and to try to see the world as they do. By contrast, 
the essence of etic approaches is to understand a culture in more abstract sci-
entific terms that apply across different cultures and that can be used to make 
cross-cultural comparisons. The concepts and theories in an etic approach derive 
from a comparative framework and can be meaningless to the members of the 
culture under study.
An emic construct is one that reflects the perceptions and understandings of 
the members of a culture. For example, the concept of “motherhood” would be 
defined emically by how members of a cultural group view that role. Etic con-
structs, by contrast, are defined by scientists in more abstract terms and apply 
across groups (Headland, Pike, & Harris, 1990). The focus is not on how a 
specific culture defines “motherhood” but rather on a conceptual definition of the 
concept of “motherhood” as used by the scientific community.
In social science research, a common orientation is to combine etic and emic 
approaches to theory and measurement. The idea is to build theories of the rela-
tionships between variables at an etic level, but to operationalize and measure 
those constructs at an emic level. For example, a scientist might be interested in 
the construct of “expectancies” and define them as the perceived advantages 
and disadvantages of performing a behavior. The actual content of expectan-
cies can vary from one group to another. For example, adolescent males might 
define “dating” somewhat differently than adolescent females and they might 
perceive different advantages and disadvantages of dating than females. The 
idea is to measure the constructs of dating and expectancies in such a way that 
these different perceptions and conceptions are respected, but to still apply the 
etic concept of expectancies to try to predict and understand the etic construct of 
dating behavior.
Examples abound of emic manifestations of etic concepts. For example, in 
some cultures it is appropriate to mourn individuals who have recently died by 
wearing black clothes, whereas in other cultures, one wears white clothes while 
mourning. When greeting one another, it is appropriate for two men to kiss on 
the cheek in some cultures, whereas such actions would be appalling in other 
cultures, where a greeting is confined to a simple handshake.
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as a function of setting. Another example: Theories of social support distinguish four 
types of support people receive: (1) tangible support (e.g., monetary loans, transporta-
tion to and from different places, help with child care), (2) emotional support (providing 
empathy and understanding for one’s feelings and emotions), (3) informational support 
(providing technical or practical information that a person needs to deal with a prob-
lem), and (4) companionship support (providing company for doing fun activities). How 
people cope with problems and stress is thought to be influenced by the four different 
types of support.
You can often make a theoretical network richer and concepts more precise and 
clearer by specifying subcomponents or dimensions of a higher-order construct.
CREATING CONSTRUCTS
Social scientists sometimes invent or create variables for the purposes of building new 
theories. For example, in the 1960s and 1970s, a personality variable was created and 
popularized by Friedman and Rosenman (1974), called the “Type A” and “Type B” per-
sonality syndromes. These syndromes were thought to be risk factors for coronary heart 
disease. Type A individuals were described as impatient, time conscious, competitive, 
and as having difficulty relaxing; they are workaholics who are deadline oriented and 
who internalize stress. Type B individuals were patient, relaxed, and easygoing. There 
also was a Type AB profile, consisting of people who cannot be clearly categorized into 
the two types. The Type A versus Type B personality syndromes became the subject of 
considerable research in the health domain (Friedman, 1996).
Another example is the concept of emotional intelligence (Goleman, 1995; Salovey 
& Mayer, 1990). As noted earlier, considerable research has been conducted on the con-
cept of intelligence and its ability to predict job and school performance. Intelligence 
tests are widely used to make placement decisions in schools and to make hiring deci-
sions in organizations. Salovey and Mayer (1990) argued that traditional intelligence 
tests measure cognitive and problem-solving abilities, but that an equally important 
ability for success is “emotional intelligence.” Emotional intelligence is the ability to 
monitor one’s own and others’ feelings and emotions, to discriminate among them, and 
to use this information to guide one’s thinking and actions (Salovey & Grewal, 2005). 
The core features of emotional intelligence have been subject to hundreds of studies in 
the social sciences for decades. Salovey and Mayer grouped together some core areas of 
emotion research, “repackaged” them into a coherent whole, and gave them a provoca-
tive label. The result was a noteworthy advance in theoretical and empirical perspectives 
on emotions (Salovey & Grewal, 2005).
Social scientists use a variety of strategies for “creating” variables. One strategy is 
to translate an individual-level variable into a contextual-level variable. Using ethnicity 
as an example, it is possible to characterize ethnicity (a characteristic of an individual) 
at higher contextual levels, such as the ethnic composition of a school that individuals 
attend, the ethnic composition of the neighborhood in which the schools are located, the 
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ethnic composition of the city in which the neighborhoods are located, and the ethnic 
composition of the state within which the cities are located. You then can examine how 
these multiple levels of context, characterized in terms of ethnicity, impact the behavior 
of individuals or some other outcome. For example, how are voting preferences of an 
individual influenced by the political composition of the neighborhood in which the 
person resides? As another example, you could assess a person’s attitude toward smok-
ing cigarettes, the average attitude toward smoking cigarettes of students in the school 
that a given student attends, the average attitude toward smoking cigarettes of people 
in the neighborhood where the schools are located, the average attitude toward smok-
ing cigarettes of people in the city where the neighborhoods are located, and the aver-
age attitude toward smoking of people in the state where the cities are located. You can 
then examine how these multiple levels of context impact the behavior of individuals. 
In short, you can describe a context in terms of an aggregation of any individual-level 
variable.
Another strategy sometimes used for creating variables is to reframe environmen-
tal or contextual variables to represent perceptions on the part of the individual. Thus, 
rather than studying the characteristics of the family environment within which an 
individual resides, you might study how individuals perceive the family environment. 
Or, instead of studying the characteristics of the organizational climate of a business, 
you might study how the individual perceives the organizational climate. Or, instead of 
working with someone’s actual social class, you might instead focus a theory on people’s 
perceived social class. Theories contrasting “perceived” versus “actual” states of affairs 
are a rich source of scientific theorizing. As an example, Dittus and Jaccard (2000) stud-
ied the effects of mothers’ disapproval of their child engaging in sexual intercourse on 
whether the child engaged in sexual intercourse in the next 12 months. Two variables 
were measured: the mother’s actual disapproval of the adolescent engaging in sexual 
intercourse (as measured on the mother) and the child’s perception of the mother’s 
disapproval (as measured on the child). Jaccard and Dittus found only a modest cor-
relation between perceived and actual maternal disapproval, suggesting that mothers 
were not doing a satisfactory job in conveying their expectations to their children. They 
also found that both variables were independently predictive of future sexual behavior, 
though the adolescent perceptions were a somewhat stronger predictor than the actual 
maternal attitudes.
As you build a theory, you might consider creating new constructs using the strate-
gies described above.
AN ExAMPLE OF SPECIFYING CONCEPTUAL DEFINITIONS
It may be useful to consider an example of defining variables that uses some of the 
principles discussed in this chapter. Suppose we posit a simple theoretical relationship 
between gender and adolescent alcohol use. We might assert that there are gender dif-
ferences in adolescent alcohol use, with males tending to drink more than females. The 
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first step in our analysis is to consider in more depth the two variables we have speci-
fied and to clarify what we mean by each. One construct is gender (male vs. female). We 
might decide that the meaning of this variable is so obvious to the scientific community 
that we do not need to provide a formal definition of it. The meaning of some variables 
is consensually accepted by all, and it is not necessary to define every term you use. 
Note, however, that what is consensual in some research areas will not be consensual 
in other research areas. For example, the concept of gender is a highly controversial one 
for the Olympic Games. In this context, determining if someone is a male or a female 
involves complicated issues about hormone levels and basic physiology. Several years 
ago, a struggling male professional tennis player underwent a sex-change operation and 
then joined the women’s professional tennis tour, to the loud objections of many that he 
was not really a female. For the purposes of our theory, however, we might assume that 
gender is a concept whose meaning has social consensus.
The variable of “adolescent alcohol use” is another matter. This is a somewhat 
abstract and fuzzy concept and we need to be more explicit about what we mean by it. 
We first need to be explicit about what we mean by adolescent and to which adolescents 
we are referring. We might decide that we want to restrict our statements to early ado-
lescents (middle-school-age youths) living in the United States. In terms of the behavior, 
we start by using the four behavioral elements identified earlier (action, target, setting, 
time) and analyze the variable in terms of each element. What is the precise action on 
which we want to focus? Do we want to focus on acquiring alcohol, consuming alcohol, 
or both? For the adolescent population about whom we are theorizing, it is illegal to 
purchase alcohol, so gaining access to alcohol is not a trivial matter. We might decide to 
focus on the act of consumption and ignore issues of acquisition since, in the final analy-
sis, it is consumption where our interest truly lies. In terms of the target of the behavior, 
the action is performed with respect to alcoholic beverages. Do we mean a specific type 
of alcoholic beverage—such as beer, wine, hard liquor, mixed drinks—or do we want to 
generalize across all forms of alcoholic beverages? We might decide to theorize about the 
latter. In terms of the setting, do we care about the particular setting in which alcohol 
consumption occurs (e.g., drinking alone or drinking with other people) or do we want 
to generalize or aggregate across settings? We might decide to pursue the latter. In terms 
of a time frame, over what period of time do we want to examine alcohol consumption? 
Should it be over the past day, during the past week, during the past month, during the 
past year, or during one’s lifetime? Suppose we decide to focus on “current” behavioral 
tendencies with respect to alcohol consumption and decide that alcohol use during the 
past 30 days provides us with a good sense of a person’s current drinking habits and ori-
entations. The decision to focus on a 30-day interval is not an arbitrary one, but instead 
is based on the existing literature on alcohol use, which we do not elaborate upon here.
As we think more about quantifying the alcohol variable, we realize there are actu-
ally two facets of it we can examine. First, people can differ in terms of the number of 
drinking episodes they have had in the last 30 days. Second, they can differ in how 
much alcohol they consume during a given episode. This might lead us to distinguish 
between three dimensions of alcohol use: (1) the frequency of drinking alcohol, (2) the 
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amount of alcohol consumed at each drinking episode, and (3) the total amount of alco-
hol consumed (obtained by weighting the number of episodes by the quantity consumed 
at each episode). We do not consider here the methodological challenges that confront 
researchers in measuring these different dimensions. We only note that they are theoret-
ically distinct constructs that represent somewhat different dimensions of alcohol use.
There is yet another dimension of alcohol use we might consider and that is get-
ting drunk. Some people consume alcohol but never get drunk because they drink in 
moderation. Others get drunk and, indeed, go out drinking with the explicit intention of 
getting drunk. The latter scenario is often referred to as “binge drinking” in the alcohol 
literature. So, instead of simply theorizing about drinking frequency and the quantity of 
drinks per episode, we might also decide to focus on the number of times that an indi-
vidual became drunk in the past 30 days.
Sometimes, even though they may get drunk, people drink without incident. At 
other times, people drink too much and get into trouble as a consequence. A person 
might engage in unprotected sex because he or she is drunk. A person might destroy 
property or commit vandalism while drunk. A student might skip a class the next day 
because of a hangover and miss an exam. Yet another possible dimension on which we 
could focus is that of the experience of negative problems as a result of drinking.
It is possible that gender differences exist with respect to all of these dimensions, 
or there may be gender differences on just some of them. Do males tend to drink more 
often than females? Do males tend to drink more on a given drinking episode than 
females? Across all episodes of drinking, do males drink more alcohol than females? 
Do males get drunk more often than females? Are males more likely to get into trouble 
because of their drinking than females? Our fairly simple theory about gender differ-
ences in alcohol use has become more elaborated as we refine and critically think about 
the construct of “alcohol use.” Note that we are not obligated to focus our theorizing on 
all these dimensions. We may choose to focus on all of them or only a subset of them. 
But it helps in the theory construction process to think through our constructs and then 
to consciously make choices about where to focus our efforts.  
OPERATIONISM
We close this chapter with an important historical note concerning a psychometric con-
troversy that existed in certain areas of the social sciences and that has implications for 
how we define concepts. Conceptual definitions specify what needs to be assessed in 
empirical science, but the matter of how they will be assessed is a distinct issue. This 
latter function is served by what scientists refer to as operational definitions, which are 
central to the design of empirical tests of a theory. The process of developing an opera-
tional definition begins with the consideration of the conceptual definition to which it 
is addressed. The investigator then devotes serious thought to the kinds of operations 
and procedures that might be employed to provide a satisfactory indication of the con-
cept in question. Consider the notion of “hunger.” Conceptually it can be defined as a 
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craving or need for food or a specific nutrient. In operationalizing “hunger,” psycholo-
gists have (1) asked people to respond to questionnaire items regarding their degree of 
perceived hunger; (2) deprived individuals of food for differing amounts of time so as 
to create more hunger in some than in others (e.g., people deprived for 24 hours must 
surely be hungrier than those deprived for only 2 hours); (3) measured the amount of 
food consumed from a standard portion given to each study participant (e.g., 2 pounds 
of spaghetti), under the assumption that the more a participant consumes (adjusted by 
body weight and metabolism), the hungrier he or she is; and (4) measured the amount of 
adversity the person will go through to obtain food. All of the above seem to be reason-
able procedures for measuring, that is, “operationalizing,” hunger.
Unlike conceptual definitions, which often prove difficult to pin down, operational 
definitions are more concrete and thereby suggest a greater degree of precision and rigor. 
For this reason, there was a period when many behavioral scientists felt we should aban-
don conceptual definitions and restrict science to observable operations. This approach 
was called operationism. As examples, some theorists argued that “intelligence tests 
were what measured intelligence, and intelligence was that which was being measured 
by intelligence tests” (Bohrnstedt, 1970, p. 84). As another example, instead of consider-
ing six purchases of Brand X in a row to be an indicator of brand loyalty in consumer 
psychology, investigators in marketing considered this to be brand loyalty itself. In this 
way, the concept has no identity separate from the instruments or procedures being 
used to measure it (Jacoby & Chestnut, 1978).
One frequently cited problem with operationism is that if the concept being mea-
sured is synonymous with the measurement procedures being used, then even minute 
changes in method would produce a new concept. The result would be a proliferation 
of definitions that would lead to confusion and an inability to communicate effectively 
regarding the concept. “When this occurs, generalizations involving the construct are 
impossible to make since there is really no single construct under investigation but, 
instead, a multitude of constructs” (Bohrnstedt, 1970, pp. 94–95). Strict adherence to 
operationalism “means that both the results of an [investigation] and the conclusions 
the investigators derived from it can never transcend the methodology employed” (Chap-
lin & Krawiec, 1960, p. 4). Thus, our ability to generalize beyond any investigation is 
completely abridged. As a consequence of such problems, the physical sciences long ago 
discarded the approach of defining phenomena strictly in terms of their operations, and 
the behavioral sciences have since followed suit.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The process of instantiation involves delimiting and more narrowly defining the concepts 
developed during theorization. This process of clarifying concepts removes ambiguities 
and clarifies what is meant by the construct in question. A major weakness occurs in a 
theory if it relies on concepts that are so abstract that it is hard to know what the theorist 
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truly means by them (e.g., a statement such as “personality influences behavior”). The 
hallmark of a good theory is one in which the concepts are clearly defined and where the 
theorist provides clear-cut examples of the constructs as he or she moves toward more 
precise instantiations of them.
Sometimes the same concept is defined differently in different theories. The extent 
to which conceptual definitions overlap is referred to as the shared meaning of a con-
struct; those portions of conceptual definitions that do not overlap across theories are 
referred to as surplus meaning. Although it is desirable for constructs to have shared 
versus surplus meaning, the worth and meaning of a construct ultimately are judged 
relative to the broader nomological network in which the construct is embedded.
Many strategies can be used to make abstract concepts more precise and to clarify 
the meaning of your concepts. These include consulting past literature, using a diction-
ary, specifying key properties, continually posing and answering the question “What 
do you mean by that?”, placing yourself in the role of a journalist to explain the nature 
of the variable to the public, placing yourself in the position of having to define and 
explain the concept to someone who is just learning the English language, and thinking 
about exactly how the construct in question would be measured in a scientific study. 
Another strategy is to define subcategories or subdimensions of a construct and then to 
clearly define and articulate those. It is not enough to simply provide an example of your 
concepts. Rather, you must clearly define them.
The present chapter has provided perspectives on how to focus and develop con-
ceptual definitions. The next chapter addresses how to focus and develop relationships 
between constructs using the tool of thought experiments.
SUGGESTED READINGS
Headland, T., Pike, K., & Harris, M. (1990). Emics and etics: The insider/outsider debate. 
Newbury Park: Sage.–A debate about, and discussion of, etic–emic approaches.
MacCorquodale, K., & Meehl, P. (1948). On a distinction between hypothetical constructs 
and intervening variables. Psychological Review, 55, 95–107.–A classic article on types 
of variables.
Nunnally, J., & Bernstein, I. (1994). Psychometric theory. New York: McGraw-Hill.—A classic 
on psychometrics, including a discussion of the importance of conceptual definitions.
Theory and Psychology, February 2001, Volume 11.—A special issue containing numerous 
articles debating operationism.
Wicker, J. (2004). A theory of formal conceptual definitions: Developing theory-building mea-
surement instruments. Journal of Operations Management, digital version. A discussion 
of the need for formal conceptual definitions and how to develop better measurement 
instruments for theory building through their specification. Available at www.elsevier.com/
wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/523929/description
90 CORE PROCESSES
KEY TERMS
instantiation (p. 75) surplus meaning (p. 78)
hypothesis (p. 76) properties of a concept (p. 80)
conceptual definition (p. 77) multidimensional concepts (p. 82)
focal problem statement (p. 77) operational definition (p. 87)
nomological network (p. 78) operationism (p. 88)
shared meaning (p. 78)
ExERCISES
Exercises to Reinforce Concepts
 1. What are the major functions of instantiation—that is, why do scientists use 
it?
 2. How is instantiation similar to stating a hypothesis or a focal problem state-
ment?
 3. What is the difference between shared meaning and surplus meaning?
 4. Describe the major strategies for making a fuzzy concept less fuzzy.
 5. What is the difference between an operational definition and a conceptual defi-
nition?
 6. What are the primary objections to operationism?
Exercises to Apply Concepts
 1. Choose a concept, provide a conceptual definition of it, and then describe the 
process you used to create the conceptual definition.
 2. Find an example in the research literature of a construct with a fuzzy concep-
tual definition and provide a clearer definition.
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6
Clarifying Relationships Using Thought 
Experiments
It is sometimes important for science to know how to forget the things she 
is surest of.
—Jean Rostand (1958)
Theories often involve relationships between concepts. For example, one might posit 
that there are gender differences in smoking, such that males tend to smoke more than 
females. This implies a relationship between “gender” and “smoking.” Or a theory might 
state that there is a relationship between intelligence and grade-point average in school, 
such that higher levels of intelligence are associated with higher grade-point averages.
The above examples identify relationships between variables—a common occur-
rence in theories. Even theoretical statements that do not seem to invoke variables often 
implicitly do so. For example, consider the statement “Males are tall.” This statement 
involves two concepts, gender and height. When we say “Males are tall,” the immediate 
question becomes “Tall relative to whom?” If you pursue the underlying logic with the 
theorist who makes the statement, he or she usually will say that males are tall relative 
to females, thereby formally invoking the variable of gender. And if you ask the person 
what he or she means by “tall,” he or she will invariably respond with a description 
of the variable of height. As another example, consider the statement “I dress for the 
weather.” This statement expresses a relationship between what the weather is and how 
a person dresses: When it is cold, the person wears clothing that keeps him or her warm, 
and when it is hot, the person wears clothing that maximizes coolness.
Just as concepts can be too abstract, fuzzy, or poorly defined, so can relationships. 
As you construct a theory that specifies relationships between variables or constructs, 
it is important to be clear about each relationship you posit. You need to think through 
the relationship carefully and be able to describe it to others, unambiguously. In this 
chapter we use thought experiments to help you clarify relationships in your theory. 
These thought experiments are conducted independent of actual data. They are con-
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ducted mentally, usually before data are collected, thereby serving as a heuristic device 
to clarify your a priori logic about relationships between constructs.
We begin by considering the use of thought experiments in grounded and emer-
gent theorizing and the variable-centered nature of the thought experiments as used 
in this chapter. Next, we make distinctions between different types of variables that 
are important for conducting the thought experiments. These include the distinction 
between categorical and quantitative variables. We then describe thought experiments 
for articulating the relationships between two variables, considering first the case of 
the relationship between two categorical variables, then the relationship between two 
quantitative variables, and then the relationship between a categorical and a quantita-
tive variable. Finally, we introduce the concept of moderated relationships and describe 
thought experiments for clarifying them. As we describe relationships through thought 
experiments, we often encourage you to think about two features of a relationship, 
namely, (1) the nature of the relationship and (2) the strength of the relationship. With 
the introduction of moderated relationships, we address yet a third facet of relation-
ships: the stability or generalizability of the relationship.
THOUGHT ExPERIMENTS FOR RELATIONSHIPS IN GROUNDED  
AND EMERGENT THEORY
The thought experiment strategies in this chapter emphasize variable-centered 
approaches to analyzing relationships. Some grounded theorists prefer process-oriented 
explanations, describing how individuals or entities get from point or event A to point 
or event B, such as the process or steps an organization goes through in moving from 
a small, fledging start-up company to a large, successful corporation. This is a differ-
ent mindset than describing relationships between variables. Although some social sci-
entists associate grounded and emergent theories with an exclusive focus on process-
 oriented explanations, the fact is that such theories tend to include both process-oriented 
and variable-oriented explanations. This is a strength, because the advantages of both 
approaches are exploited. By contrast, predominantly variable-oriented approaches tend 
to dominate many areas of the social sciences. As discussed in Chapter 4, we believe 
such approaches could benefit from adopting process-oriented perspectives as well.
The blending of the approaches is evident, for example, in analyses of expert deci-
sion making by government officials overseeing enforcement of environmental regu-
lations. A process-oriented approach might describe the decision process as moving 
from the initial stage of problem recognition, where the official realizes that a specific 
environmental problem needs to be addressed, to the final stage of solution implementa-
tion. In between, decision makers move through a series of steps, phases, or activities, 
such as identifying their goals, defining the possible solutions to the problem, gathering 
information about the possible solutions, evaluating the different solutions in terms of 
their strengths and weaknesses, making a choice as to which solution to implement, and 
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then implementing the chosen solution. Some officials proceed through these activi-
ties in the sequence just described, whereas others intermingle them in complex ways. 
A process-oriented theory might pursue detailed analyses of the activity patterns of 
various officials when making decisions and factors that impact on movement from one 
activity to another.
Variable-centered orientations come into play as theorists realize that at a given 
stage of the process, there are variations in how officials behave. For example, some 
officials recognize a problem that needs attention and immediately jump into action to 
address it, whereas other managers realize that there is a problem to address but they 
procrastinate before addressing it. The theorist wonders why this is the case. What 
makes some officials procrastinate but other officials not? Perhaps it is because some 
officials are preoccupied with other problems. This latter question and plausible answers 
to it fall in the realm of variable-oriented explanations, but it is every bit as interesting to 
an emergent theorist as the broader process analysis that is organizing the research.
Whether theorists identify their approaches as emergent or confirmatory, use 
methods that are qualitative or quantitative, write their theoretical prose in narrative 
or mathematical form, or identify their primary orientation to explanation as process- 
or variable-centered, the fact is that most theories inevitably engage in some degree of 
variable-oriented analysis of relationships. As such, the thought experiments described 
in this chapter can be helpful to all theorists as they seek to clarify in their minds rela-
tionships between variables. We return to process-oriented approaches in future chap-
ters, especially in Chapter 10.
The thought experiments can be conducted at any time during the theory construc-
tion process. For example, they could be conducted before data are collected to clarify 
your a priori thoughts, or they could be conducted as you are analyzing data, to clarify 
your thinking about what is tentatively emerging. Sometimes relationships will be so 
straightforward that you will not need to apply a thought experiment. Indeed, some of 
the examples in this chapter are of this character, but we chose them to better illustrate 
the logic of structuring a thought experiment.
DESCRIBING RELATIONSHIPS WITH DIFFERENT TYPES OF VARIABLES
The way a theorist characterizes a relationship between two variables in a thought 
experiment differs depending on the type of variables involved. An important distinc-
tion is whether a variable is categorical or quantitative. A categorical variable has differ-
ent “levels,” “values,” or “categories,” but there is no special ordering to the categories 
along an underlying dimension. For example, gender is a categorical variable that has 
two values or levels, “male” and “female.” Religious affiliation is a categorical variable 
that has the categories “Catholic,” “Protestant,” “Jewish,” “Muslim,” and so on. The cat-
egories are merely labels that differentiate one group from another. Other terms used to 
refer to a categorical variable are qualitative variable and nominal variable.
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In contrast, a quantitative variable in social science research is one in which indi-
viduals are assigned numerical values to place them into different categories, and the 
numerical values have meaning in that they imply more or less of an underlying dimen-
sion that is of theoretical interest. For example, married couples can be classified into 
the number of children they have, with some couples having a score of 0, some a score 
of 1, some a score of 2, and so on. There are different types of quantitative variables (e.g., 
discrete vs. continuous) and measures of them (e.g., ordinal vs. interval), but the distinc-
tions between them are not critical for our purposes.
It is not necessary to adopt causal thinking to describe relationships, but it is easier 
for us to explain the heuristics if we do. For this reason, this chapter is built around 
causal theories, that is, conceptualizations where one variable in the theory, X, is thought 
to influence another variable, Y.
THOUGHT ExPERIMENTS FOR RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN 
CATEGORICAL VARIABLES
Categorical Variables with Two Levels
Consider gender and political party identification, where gender has the values “male” 
and “female” and political party identification has the values “Democrat” and “Repub-
lican.” Suppose that as a theorist, you want to argue that gender impacts political 
party identification such that females are more likely than males to be Democrats and 
males are more likely than females to be Republicans. We can translate this presumed 
 relationship into a thought experiment to help us articulate it in more depth. The 
thought experiment requires that you construct a two-way table of frequencies, also 
called a contingency table. Conceptualize a hypothetical group of 100 females and 100 
males and create a hypothetical contingency table for the two variables that looks like 
this:
Democrat Republican Total
Females 100
Males 100
The “cause” (in this example, gender) is written as rows and the “effect” (political party 
identification) is written as columns. In this case, a person’s gender is assumed to influ-
ence the political party with which he or she identifies. Next, fill in the blank cells of the 
table with frequencies that you think reflect the relationship you posit. That is, make up 
numbers and write them in the table so that they conform to your theoretical proposi-
tion. To illustrate, suppose we filled in the table as follows:
  Using Thought Experiments 95
Democrat Republican Total
Females 70 30 100
Males 30 70 100
Look at the row for females. It shows that 70 of the 100 females are Democrats and 30 of 
them are Republicans. Note that this is the same as saying that 70% of the females are 
Democrats and 30% of the females are Republican because the total number of females 
equals 100; 70 out of 100 is 70% and 30 out of 100 is 30%. Now examine the row for the 
males. Here 30% of the males are Democrats and 70% are Republicans. The table reveals 
the trend put forth in the theoretical statement: Females are more likely than males to 
be Democrats (because 70% of females are Democrats, but only 30% of the males are), 
and males are more likely than females to be Republicans (because 70% of the males are 
Republican, but only 30% of the females are). The hypothetical contingency table in this 
thought experiment makes the theoretical statement concrete.
Note that, instead of the 70% and 30% figures, we could have captured the same 
dynamic with a different set of numbers:
Democrat Republican Total
Females 51 49 100
Males 49 51 100
It is still the case in this table that females are more likely than males to be Democrats 
(51% vs. 49%) and that males are more likely than females to be Republicans (51% vs. 
49%). However, now the relationship between gender and political party identification 
is much weaker than before.
Yet another set of numbers that accurately captures the theoretical statement is this 
one:
Democrat Republican Total
Females 95  5 100
Males  5 95 100
For this table, the effect of gender on political party identification is extremely strong, 
because virtually all females are Democrats and virtually no males are Democrats, and 
vice versa, for Republicans. In terms of what you theorize, does this sound reasonable 
to you?
When developing a theory that posits a relationship between two categorical vari-
ables, we believe it is instructive to pursue thought experiments with hypothetical con-
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tingency tables of the form described above and to insert your best guesses as to how 
you think the percentages would pattern themselves down and across the columns and 
rows. This will force you to be explicit about your thinking as you try to derive mean-
ingful numbers. It also will give you a sense of how strong you expect your relationship 
to be. We realize that the numbers that you insert will be somewhat arbitrary and that, 
at times, you will have little basis for positing a small effect, a medium effect, or a large 
effect. But we have found it useful at this stage of theory construction to fill out the table 
and commit to some tentative numbers in order to force ourselves to think through the 
relationship. As you generate numbers and try to justify them to yourself, it may stimu-
late you to think of things you might not otherwise have thought about. We emphasize 
that this is just a heuristic device to be used in the early stages of theory construction as 
a way of helping to focus your thoughts and make sure you are clear about the relation-
ship you are specifying. When formally describing your theory to other scientists, you 
typically will not present the hypothetical contingency table that helped clarify your 
thinking.
To formalize this exercise somewhat, here are the steps we suggest you use when 
using a thought experiment to clarify the presumed relationship between two categori-
cal variables:
1. Create a contingency table, listing the values of the “cause” as rows and the val-
ues of the “effect” as columns.
2. Think of 100 hypothetical people for each row of the table; that is, set the mar-
ginal frequency of each row to equal 100.
3. Of these 100 people, specify how many you think will fall into each column 
category; this represents the percentage of people in each category.
As you complete the numbers in a hypothetical contingency table, always try to 
verbalize the rationale for your numerical assignments. Doing so will help you defend 
your theoretical proposition and explicate its underlying logic.
When you embark on the theory construction process, you may have an intuitive 
sense that two categorical variables are related, but you may not be sure how to articu-
late that relationship. In such cases, it might help to construct the hypothetical contin-
gency table and fill in the numbers based on your intuition. After doing so, the numbers 
in the table will make the relationship you have intuitively considered more explicit. 
With the filled-in contingency table in hand, try to better verbalize the rationale for 
the relationship and the bases for the numbers you provided. Below we discuss how to 
derive formal theoretical propositions from a completed hypothetical contingency table. 
This principle applies to all of the thought experiments described in this chapter.
On the other hand, you may have a well thought-out proposition before you con-
struct the hypothetical contingency table. In this case, you can still use thought experi-
ments to generate numbers, because doing so will (1) force you to think through the 
proposition in more detailed ways, and (2) force you to think about the strength of the 
relationship.
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Categorical Variables with More Than Two Levels
Sometimes the categorical variables with which you work, either the “cause” or the 
“effect,” have more than two levels. You still approach this situation using the hypo-
thetical contingency table, but now the description of the theory becomes more com-
plicated. As an example, consider the relationship between religious affiliation and 
political party identification in which each variable has three levels. Here is the rel-
evant table:
Democrat Republican Independent Total
Catholic 100
Protestant 100
Jewish 100
And here are numerical entries we might generate:
Democrat Republican Independent Total
Catholic 50 25 25 100
Protestant 25 50 25 100
Jewish 50 25 25 100
From this table, we derive the following theoretical propositions:
Proposition 1: Catholics, Protestants, and Jews are equally likely to be Indepen-
dents
Proposition 2: Protestants are more likely to be Republicans than either Catholics 
or Jews; Catholics and Jews are equally likely to be Republicans.
Proposition 3: Catholics and Jews both are more likely than Protestants to be 
Democrats; Catholics and Jews are equally likely to be Democrats.
The strategy we used for stating the propositions was to focus on each column of the 
contingency table separately, then state what trends were apparent in the numbers we 
assigned within that column across the different row categories. For example, Proposi-
tion 1 focuses on the column for Independents, Proposition 2 focuses on the column 
for Republicans, and Proposition 3 focuses on the column for Democrats. Reread the 
propositions more carefully and take note of how we are making statements about row 
differences within each column. This is a useful strategy for deriving theoretical propo-
sitions from contingency tables.
In sum, a heuristic for clarifying a relationship between two categorical variables 
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is to conduct a thought experiment in which you construct a hypothetical contingency 
table and then to complete cell frequencies using the proscribed methods. In doing so, 
articulate the rationale behind the numerical assignments.
THOUGHT ExPERIMENTS FOR RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN 
QUANTITATIVE VARIABLES
Instead of two categorical variables, the theoretical relationship you want to clarify 
might involve two quantitative variables. When this is the case, the thought experiment 
is pursued using a different graphical device, called a hypothetical scatterplot.
Scatterplots
A scatterplot is a graph that plots scores or values on one variable, Y, as a function of 
scores or values on the other variable, X. In this section we first provide a sense of what 
a scatterplot is and then we show how to use it in a thought experiment to help clarify a 
relationship. We also develop the idea of a linear relationship between variables.
Figure 6.1 presents a scatterplot using a simplistic but pedagogically convenient 
example relating the number of hours individuals work in a week to the amount of 
money they earn in that week. In this example, there are five individuals, each paid $5 
an hour. Here are the data:
FIGURE 6.1. Scatterplot for earnings as a function of hours worked.
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Individual Hours worked Amount earned
1 20 $100
2 22 $110
3 25 $125
4 23 $115
5 27 $135
The X values (the cause) are always plotted on the horizontal axis and the Y values (the 
effect) are always plotted on the vertical axis. Consider the first individual. We locate 
that individual’s score on X (20) on the X axis and then we also locate the individual’s 
score on Y (100) on the Y axis. We draw an imaginary line up from the located point on 
the X axis and across from the located point on the Y axis (as illustrated in Figure 6.2). 
We then draw a dot where the two lines intersect. We repeat this procedure for each 
individual, until the pairs of scores for all individuals have been plotted with dots. The 
completed scatterplot is presented in Figure 6.1.
Note that there is a systematic relationship between the two variables: The more 
hours that someone works, the more money the person earns. If we connect the dots that 
demarcate each individual’s pair of scores, we see a straight line, as in Figure 6.3. This is 
an example of what is called a linear relationship.
It is rare in the social sciences for two variables to have a perfect linear relationship, 
but sometimes they approximate linear relationships. Figure 6.4 presents a scatterplot 
showing height and weight for 15 individuals. You can see that the data approximate a 
FIGURE 6.2. Scatterplot with dotted lines for earnings as a function of hours worked.
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FIGURE 6.3. Scatterplot with dots connected for earnings as a function of fours worked.
FIGURE 6.4. Scatterplot between height and weight.
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linear relationship. We have drawn a line through the data on the scatterplot to empha-
size this trend. If there was a perfect linear relationship between the variables, all the 
points would fall on a straight line. They do not in this case, but there is enough of an 
approximation that we can reasonably talk about the relationship as if it were linear. 
The deviations from linearity appear to reflect random “error.” (We consider the case of 
systematic nonlinear relationships later.)
Characteristics of Linear Relationships
Linear relationships can be of three types. First, there is a direct linear relationship where 
higher scores on X imply higher scores on Y. This is the case in Figures 6.1 and 6.4. Sec-
ond, there is an inverse linear relationship, where higher scores on X imply lower scores 
on Y. This case is illustrated in Figure 6.5, which represents the relationship between 
people’s satisfaction with their job and how many days of work they miss (not count-
ing vacations and holidays) over a period of 12 months. The greater the degree of job 
satisfaction, the fewer the number of days missed. Another example of an inverse rela-
tionship is one between amount of exercise people get and the probability that they will 
have an early heart attack. The more people exercise, the lower the probability that they 
will have an early heart attack. A zero-slope linear relationship is characterized by a flat 
line. It means that as X increases, Y is predicted to remain at the same value. Figure 6.6 
provides an example of such a relationship. It plots the age of toddlers and how much 
their mothers say they love them, as rated on a scale from 1 to 5, with higher numbers 
FIGURE 6.5. Example of an inverse linear relationship.
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indicating more love. No matter the age of the toddler, the mother’s reported love does 
not differ.
When describing a relationship between two quantitative variables, theorists often 
do so with reference to a direct linear relationship, an inverse linear relationship, or a 
zero-slope relationship. Although we recognize that data seldom are perfectly linear in 
form, a shorthand heuristic for visualizing the relationship between two variables is to 
draw a line on a scatterplot that reflects either a direct linear relationship, an inverse 
linear relationship, or a zero-slope linear relationship, as has been done in Figures 6.7a, 
b, and c. The values of X and Y are not written on the axes; instead scores are indicated as 
going from “low” to “high” on each axis (again, this is just a shorthand heuristic device). 
When drawing lines, the steeper you draw the slope of the line, the larger the effect of X 
on Y, everything else being equal. Figure 6.8 shows a case of two lines on the same graph 
that have different slopes, with line A reflecting a stronger effect than line B (assuming 
the scales for the two lines are on a common metric). A change in X for line A produces 
a greater change in Y than a comparable change in X for line B. These are examples of 
shorthand hypothetical scatterplots.
Nonlinear Relationships
Not all relationships between quantitative variables are linear; some are nonlinear. Con-
sider the shorthand scatterplot in Figure 6.9. This is an example of a nonlinear relation-
ship, called an inverted-U-shaped relationship (because it looks like a U drawn upside 
down). Some quantitative relationships between variables take this form. For example, 
levels of anxiety about taking a test and performance on that test are often characterized 
FIGURE 6.6. Example of a zero-slope relationship.
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FIGURE 6.7. Examples of hypothetical scatterplots. (a) Direct linear relationship; (b) inverse 
linear relationship; (c) zero-slope relationship.
a
b
c
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FIGURE 6.8. Example of lines with different slopes.
FIGURE 6.9. Example of inverted-U function.
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by an inverted-U function. The idea is that increasing anxiety at low levels of anxiety is 
good and facilitates test performance by increasing the person’s attention and arousal. 
However, at some point, higher levels of anxiety get in the way and start causing the 
person to worry needlessly and become distracted from the task at hand. This response, 
in turn, degrades test performance. The result is an inverted-U relationship between test 
anxiety and test performance.
Figure 6.10 illustrates another common nonlinear relationship, sometimes referred 
to as an S-shaped relationship. At low levels of X, there is a floor effect such that changes 
in X have no impact on Y. Then at some point, increases in X begin to lead to increases 
in Y. This continues up to a point, when a ceiling effect kicks in, and further changes in 
X have no subsequent effect on Y. This type of curve probably better typifies the rela-
tionship between job satisfaction and the number of days of work missed rather than 
the simple linear relationship shown earlier. At very high levels of satisfaction, days 
of attendance probably “max out” and people simply cannot attend work more, even 
if they became more satisfied with their jobs. At very low levels of satisfaction, there 
probably is a point where the dissatisfied worker has missed as many days as he or she 
can miss without being fired, so yet lower levels of satisfaction probably “bottom out” at 
this point. Whereas a linear model assumes that changes in satisfaction always lead to 
changes in the number of days missed, the S-shaped relationship recognizes that floor 
and ceiling effects operate.
In addition to an S-shaped relationship, variables can reflect an inverse-S-shaped 
relationship, which is illustrated in Figure 6.11. This might characterize, for example, 
the relationship between age in the elderly and the ability to recall a list of words. Elderly 
FIGURE 6.10. S-shaped function.
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people who are on the younger side are more likely to recall the list perfectly. As people 
get older, their ability to recall the list may start to decline until they reach an age where 
none of them can recall much of the list. Just as linear relationships can be direct or 
inverse, so can many forms of nonlinear relationships.
When Nonlinear Relationships Are Linear Relationships
Social scientists typically think in terms of linear relationships and posit and test their 
theories in ways that reflect this type of relationship. There are several reasons for this 
preference, some of which are defensible and others of which are not.
One dubious reason is that a family of statistical techniques that assumes linear 
relationships, known as linear regression and correlation, enjoys widespread use by 
social scientists. Thus, theorists tend to think in terms of linear relationships because 
their statistical tools focus on linear relationships. Granted, linear regression methods 
can be adapted to focus on nonlinear relationships (see Chapter 9), but, by far the most 
common use of regression methods is to test for, and impose, linear relationships on 
data. Theorists have become too accustomed to thinking in these terms, and perhaps 
some nonlinear thinking is necessary.
A second reason that theorists tend to ignore nonlinear relationships stems from a 
general preference for parsimony. The idea is that even though the true function between 
X and Y might be nonlinear, the departures from linearity are not sufficient enough to 
care about, and it is easier and more parsimonious to describe relationships in linear 
terms. Examine, for example, the S-shaped relationship in Figure 6.12, onto which a lin-
FIGURE 6.11. Inverse-S-shaped function.
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ear relationship has been superimposed. Note that for both relationships, low scores on 
X are associated with low scores on Y, moderate scores on X are associated with moder-
ate scores on Y, and high scores on X are associated with high scores on Y. Granted there 
are floor and ceiling effects operating, but, the argument goes, these are of minor con-
sequence in terms of the bigger trends characterizing the relationship. This argument 
has some validity as long as the departures from linearity truly are inconsequential. If, 
however, one’s theory focuses on the very low or very high values of X, then it may be 
critical to take the nonlinearity into account. For example, suppose there is an S-shaped 
relationship between self-esteem (X) and the depressive symptom of lethargy (Y). An 
intervention might be developed to raise the self-esteem of people with low self-esteem 
on the assumption that such changes will reduce lethargy. But, it might be found instead 
that changes in self-esteem at the very low end of X have no effect on lethargy, given the 
S-shaped relationship. Because you assumed a linear relationship, you operated under 
the false impression that changes in self-esteem will have a positive effect on the expres-
sion of lethargy, even for those with very low self-esteem. The result would be a waste of 
resources and people receiving an ineffective treatment.
A third reason that theorists ignore nonlinear relationships is based on population 
partitioning. Suppose that the true relationship between X and Y is S-shaped but that the 
theorist is focused only on a population whose X scores occur between the dotted lines 
in Figure 6.13. For these individuals, the relationship between X and Y is indeed linear. 
So it makes sense to theorize accordingly, as long as the theorist does not generalize 
beyond the particular X values studied.
FIGURE 6.12. Linear and S-shaped functions.
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A Thought Experiment with Hypothetical Scatterplots
Whenever you posit a relationship between two quantitative variables, you should 
“clarify the relationship” by drawing a shorthand hypothetical scatterplot for the two 
variables in the context of a thought experiment. Use linear functions if you think the 
relationship is linear and nonlinear functions if you think the relationship is nonlinear. 
Indicate the size of the effect by how steeply you draw your slope. Common nonlin-
ear relationships to consider include the U-shaped relationship, the inverted-U-shaped 
relationship, the J-shaped relationship, the inverted-J-shaped relationship, the S-shaped 
relationship, the inverted-S-shaped relationship, a threshold function (where scores on 
Y are unchanged as X increases at low levels until a threshold point is reached and then 
a dramatic change in Y occurs at that threshold point), and various forms of logarithmic 
relationships (see Chapter 9). Figure 6.14 illustrates some of these relationships, empha-
sizing ones that we have not already graphed or that may not be obvious. We consider 
nonlinear relationships in more detail in Chapter 9.
As you think about and ultimately choose the “shape” of the curve describing the 
relationship between your quantitative variables, be sure that you can articulate the 
logic underlying why you think that particular function, and not others, operates. Some-
times you won’t be sure about the curve that is most reasonable to posit. You may be able 
to narrow it to a few possible curves (e.g., direct linear or an S-shaped relationship), but 
you might not be able to choose between them on conceptual grounds. In this case, it is 
fine to use one of them as a “working assumption” and then develop your theory around 
it. But you also should explicitly recognize that other functions may be operating. The 
FIGURE 6.13. Focus on part of an S-shaped function.
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FIGURE 6.14. Additional examples of nonlinear functions. (a) J-shaped function; (b) threshold 
function; (c) logarithmic function.
a
b
c
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default “working assumption” usually is a linear function because of its parsimony and 
familiarity.
When you describe your theory to others, you will need to describe the relation-
ship you are positing. As with the hypothetical contingency table, typically you will not 
 present the hypothetical scatterplot you used to focus the relationship. Again, it is a heu-
ristic used in a thought experiment to help you think through and focus your presumed 
relationships. It is rare for social science theories to state the mathematical function they 
are assuming in the way we have done here. Rather, they simply state relationships in 
somewhat loose terms, such as “higher scores on intelligence are associated with higher 
grade-point averages.” We think you should set your standards higher. To the extent 
possible, be explicit about the function, such as “higher scores on intelligence have a 
direct linear relationship with grade-point average.”
In sum, when clarifying the relationship between two quantitative variables, you 
can do so by conducting a thought experiment that draws a shorthand hypothetical scat-
terplot. After drawing the scatterplot, state the relationship in formal, narrative terms 
and then articulate your underlying logic. Doing so will help you clearly explicate the 
form of the relationship. Again, try to articulate the logic behind the particular curve 
you draw.
THOUGHT ExPERIMENTS FOR RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN 
CATEGORICAL AND QUANTITATIVE VARIABLES
When one of the variables is categorical and the other is quantitative, we suggest two dif-
ferent thought experiments to help focus the relationship: one using hypothetical means 
and the other using shorthand hypothetical scatterplots. The former is used when the 
“cause” is categorical and the “effect” is quantitative. The latter is used when the “cause” 
is quantitative and the “effect” is categorical. We consider each approach in turn.
Thought Experiments for a Categorical Cause and a Quantitative 
Effect: The Use of Hypothetical Means
When the categorical variable is the cause and the quantitative variable is the effect, the 
thought experiment we recommend uses hypothetical arithmetic means. We use a sim-
ple example to illustrate the method. Consider, as an example, the proposition that high 
school teachers at private schools have larger annual salaries than high school teachers 
at public schools. This leads us to generate the following table of hypothetical means
Mean annual income
Private 45,000
Public 40,000
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whereby the “cause” is listed as rows and the mean scores appear in the column. The 
relationship is clear: Teachers in private schools, on average, are thought to be paid more 
than teachers in public schools. This example is mundane, and you probably do not 
need to resort to a formal thought experiment to generate and/or clarify the theoretical 
proposition. Having said that, performing the exercise provides you with a sense of the 
size of the effect you expect, and as you think about this, it could generate ideas and 
clarify your logic. We consider more complex applications of hypothetical means later 
in this chapter.
As another example, consider a three-level categorical variable. For this example, 
the presumed cause is religious affiliation and the presumed effect is parental attitudes 
toward parental notification policies about adolescents seeking an abortion. This is a 
controversial policy. Some states have passed laws stating that if an adolescent under 
the age of 18 seeks an abortion, then the clinic or hospital that is to perform the abor-
tion must notify a parent or legal guardian. Some people support this policy whereas 
others oppose it. The attitude is a quantitative variable that ranges from unfavorable to 
favorable, but it has no natural metric. Whereas “annual salary” in our previous exam-
ple could naturally be considered in units of dollars, what are the natural units for an 
attitude? The answer is that there are none. To deal with this problem, we create arbi-
trary units ranging from 0 to 10, with 5 being a middle, neutral, or “moderate” attitude, 
numbers lower than 5 representing increasingly more negative attitudes, and numbers 
greater than 5 representing increasingly more positive attitudes. If your research uses a 
measure whose metric is well known, then you use that metric. However, in the absence 
of a natural or widely accepted metric, you can use an arbitrary scale from 0 to 10 or 
some other range.
Here is the table we create:
Attitude
Catholics 7.0
Protestants 5.0
Jews 4.0
The theoretical proposition that derives from this table is as follows:
Proposition 1: Religious affiliation is associated with the attitude toward parental 
notification such that Catholics have, on average, more positive attitudes than 
Protestants who, in turn, have more positive attitudes, on average, than Jews.
As with the hypothetical contingency table method, the theoretical proposition is 
specified by focusing on the column of hypothetical means and then stating the trends 
in the assigned numbers across the different row categories.
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Thought Experiments for a Quantitative Cause and Categorical 
Effect: The Use of Hypothetical Probabilities
Consider the theoretical proposition that the degree to which a person is liberal affects 
his or her political party identification. Political party identification is a categorical vari-
able (e.g., Democrat vs. Republican), whereas liberalness is a quantitative variable that 
varies from low to high on an underlying continuum. In such cases, two different types 
of thought experiments can be used to clarify the relationship. One thought experi-
ment uses an extension of the hypothetical contingency table strategy for categorical 
variables; it is presented in Appendix 6A at the end of this chapter. The second thought 
experiment uses a combination of the hypothetical contingency table and the hypotheti-
cal scatterplot to clarify the relationship. We consider this strategy here, although you 
might find the thought experiment in the appendix to be more to your liking. We begin 
by examining the case of a two-level categorical variable and then we consider categori-
cal variables with three or more levels.
For this thought experiment, we must turn the categorical variable into a quan-
titative representation so that we can draw a scatterplot between two “quantitative” 
variables. The X axis of the scatterplot describes values of the “cause” or, in this case, 
liberalness. On the Y axis, we will plot the probability that people with a given liberal-
ness score are Democrats. To make this relationship concrete, we begin by arbitrarily 
creating a metric for the liberalness dimension ranging from 1 to 5, where individuals 
with a score of 5 are thought to be extremely liberal, individuals with a score of 4 are 
quite liberal, individuals with a score of 3 are moderately liberal, individuals with a 
score of 2 are slightly liberal, and individuals with a score of 1 are not at all liberal. We 
then create a hypothetical contingency table using the “cause” as rows and the “effect” 
as columns, much like our previous case with two categorical variables:
Democrat Republican Total
Liberalness = 5 100
Liberalness = 4 100
Liberalness = 3 100
Liberalness = 2 100
Liberalness = 1 100
Next, we fill in the numbers that we think capture the relationship, just as we did in the 
contingency table method. For example, we might fill in the following numbers:
Democrat Republican Total
Liberalness = 5 70 30 100
Liberalness = 4 60 40 100
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Liberalness = 3 50 50 100
Liberalness = 2 40 60 100
Liberalness = 1 30 70 100
A cell entry reflects the percentage of people with a given liberalness score whom we 
think will be Democrats or Republicans. We can convert these percentages to probabili-
ties by dividing entries by 100:
Democrat Republican
Liberalness = 5 .70 .30
Liberalness = 4 .60 .40
Liberalness = 3 .50 .50
Liberalness = 2 .40 .60
Liberalness = 1 .30 .70
We now arbitrarily select one column on which to focus, and it will be the Democrats 
(the choice is arbitrary because the probability for Democrats is the mirror image of the 
probability for Republicans). We now construct a scatterplot of the relationship (see Fig-
ure 6.15) between the liberalness scores and the probability of being a Democrat (using 
the entries in the Democrat column). Note that the relationship is direct linear in form. 
FIGURE 6.15. Liberalness example.
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But perhaps instead of direct linear, the relationship between liberalness and the prob-
ability of being a Democrat is S-shaped. Indeed, any of the nonlinear relationships we 
discussed for two quantitative variables could be used. What we are suggesting is apply-
ing the shorthand hypothetical scatterplot method to two variables: (1) the quantitative 
cause (X) and (2) the probability of being in a given category of the categorical variable 
(in this case, being a Democrat). For the scatterplot in Figure 6.15, the theoretical propo-
sition that results is
Proposition 1: The probability of being a Democrat is a direct linear function of 
liberalness such that as liberalness increases, the probability of being a Democrat 
increases.
To use this heuristic, you need not generate the probabilities that we used in con-
structing Figure 6.15. We did this for pedagogical reasons. All you need to do is create a 
shorthand scatterplot that draws the function that you think relates the X variable to the 
“probability of being in category y” for the Y or outcome variable. Articulate your logic 
as you do this. When there are more than two categories for Y, you will need to describe 
the X and “probability of y” function for each Y category separately, because it is only in 
the two-category case that the one set of probabilities (e.g., for Democrats) is the mirror 
image of the other set of probabilities (e.g., for Republicans).
In sum, another tool that you can use for clarifying the relationship between a 
quantitative cause and a categorical effect is a shorthand scatterplot wherein the cat-
egorical variable is recast in the form of probability values (but see also the thought 
experiment in Appendix 6A as an alternative).
THOUGHT ExPERIMENTS FOR MODERATED RELATIONSHIPS
Thus far we have considered methods for clarifying bivariate relationships. There is 
another type of relationship that is important in theory construction, called a moderated 
relationship. Moderated relationships involve three variables and focus on cases where 
the strength or nature of a relationship between two variables changes depending on 
the value of a third variable. For example, we might theorize that inflation has a bigger 
influence on economies in underdeveloped countries as opposed to developed countries. 
Or we might theorize that higher levels of education are more likely to translate into 
job opportunities for whites as opposed to blacks. This section articulates the nature of 
moderated relationships and thought experiments for clarifying them.
Thought Experiments Using Hypothetical Factorial Design
To clarify a moderated causal relationship, we use a heuristic device called a hypothetical 
factorial design. Begin the task by identifying the cause, the effect, and the moderator 
variable. To make this concrete, consider the case wherein we examine how satisfied 
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adolescents are with their relationships with their mothers as a function of gender. The 
outcome variable is the adolescent’s relationship satisfaction with his or her mother (Y), 
and the presumed cause is gender (X). We introduce new terminology by referring to the 
presumed cause (gender) as the focal independent variable, a term that is typically used 
in the literature on moderated relationships.
We offer the theoretical proposition that girls will be more satisfied with their rela-
tionships with their mothers than boys, because girls have more in common with their 
mothers and can more easily identify with them. However, we also expect this gender 
difference to vary as a function of the age of the adolescent (Z). More specifically, we 
conjecture that adolescents start to grow apart from their mothers as they become older, 
and that this process is truer for boys than girls. We reason that as boys and girls go 
through the pubertal and physical changes with age, girls become more like their moth-
ers physically and their interests probably begin to converge with those of their mothers 
as well (e.g., in clothes, shopping, and the like). By contrast, as boys become physi-
cally more mature, they separate more from their mothers, weakening the relationship 
between them. These dynamics should produce a greater gender difference in relation-
ship satisfaction as adolescents grow older.
In this example, age of the adolescent is represented by his or her grade in school. 
To simplify matters, we use only two grade levels, seventh and eighth grades. Grade is 
a moderator variable: It is thought to moderate the strength of the relationship between 
gender and relationship satisfaction with the mother. At earlier grades, when adoles-
cents are younger, we expect the gender difference in relationship satisfaction to be 
weaker than at later grades, when adolescents are older.
To focus and clarify the relationship, we construct a factorial table in which we list 
the levels of the moderator variable as columns and the levels of the focal independent 
variable as rows. Here is the table:
Grade 7 Grade 8
Female
Male
Next we fill in hypothetical mean scores for the outcome variable to reflect the theoretical 
dynamics we believe operate (using the same logic as the hypothetical mean approach, 
discussed earlier). Because satisfaction has an arbitrary metric, we use a “scale” ranging 
from 0 to 10, with higher scores indicating higher levels of satisfaction. Here is the table 
with the numerical entries we made up:
Grade 7 Grade 8
Female 6.0 6.0
Male 5.0 4.0
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Let’s examine this table more closely. The gender difference for seventh graders is rep-
resented by the mean difference between females and males in the first column. This 
difference is
 MF7 – MM7 = 6.0 – 5.0 = 1.0
where MF7 is the hypothetical mean for females in grade 7 and MM7 is the hypothetical 
mean for males in grade 7. We can calculate a similar gender difference for eighth grad-
ers:
 MF8 – MM8 = 6.0 – 4.0 = 2.0
If the gender differences are the same at both grade levels, then the value for the first dif-
ference should be identical to the value of the second difference. But this is not the case, 
as seen by differencing the two differences:
 IC = (MF7 – MM7) – (MF7 – MM7) 
  = (6.0 – 5.0) – (6.0 – 4.0) 
  = 1.0 – 2.0 = –1.0
where IC stands for an interaction contrast. We use the term interaction contrast 
because a moderated relationship maps onto an interaction effect in factorial designs. 
An interaction contrast in a factorial design is the comparison of the effect of a focal 
independent variable at one level of the moderator variable with the effect of the focal 
independent variable at another level of the moderator variable. The above table yields 
a nonzero interaction contrast, so a moderated relationship is implied by the numeri-
cal entries.
To recap, to clarify a moderated relationship:
1. Create a factorial table with the moderator variable as columns and the focal 
independent variable as rows.
2. Fill in plausible hypothetical mean values on the outcome variable for each cell 
of the table.
3. Calculate the effect of the focal independent variable at each level of the modera-
tor variable and then calculate the interaction contrast to determine if there is a 
moderated relationship.
The following theoretical proposition results from the above table:
Proposition 1: Gender differences in adolescent relationship satisfaction during 
grade 8 are larger than gender differences in grade 7.
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This proposition describes in words the “results” of the interaction contrast of hypo-
thetical means. Of course, you need to be able to articulate the logic and reasons why 
you expect this proposition to be true, as we did at the outset of this example. You would 
think about this carefully as you assign your hypothetical mean scores in each cell of 
the factorial table.
A simple way of capturing the numerical computations for an interaction contrast 
in a factorial table with two rows and two columns (called a 2 × 2 table) is to label the 
cells as follows:
Grade 7 Grade 8
Female a c
Male b d
Then calculate (a – b) – (c – d) to obtain the value of the interaction contrast. If this value 
is nonzero, then a moderated relationship is present. If the value is zero, then there is no 
moderated relationship.
Hypothetical Factorial Designs with More Than Two Levels
Sometimes your variables may have more than two levels. For example, suppose that 
instead of grades 7 and 8, we had grades 7, 8, and 9 in our population, yielding the fol-
lowing table:
Grade 7 Grade 8 Grade 9
Female
Male
Here is the table with hypothetical means filled in by the theorist:
Grade 7 Grade 8 Grade 9
Female 6.0 6.0 6.0
Male 5.0 4.0 4.0
To elucidate the moderated relationship, we need to compare the gender difference at all 
possible pairs of levels of the moderator variable. The easiest way to do this is to con-
struct all possible 2 × 2 subtables from the larger design. In this case, there are three of 
them. Here they are with the value of the 2 × 2 interaction contrast computed beneath 
each:
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Grade 7 Grade 8 Grade 7 Grade 9 Grade 8 Grade 9
Female 6.0 6.0 Female 6.0 6.0 Female 6.0 6.0
Male 5.0 4.0 Male 5.0 4.0 Male 4.0 4.0
(6 – 5) – (6 – 4) = –1 (6 – 5) – (6 – 4) = –1 (6 – 4) – (6 – 4) = 0
If any of the 2 × 2 tables has a nonzero interaction contrast, then a moderated relation-
ship exists. In this example, grade moderates the effect of gender on satisfaction, but the 
description of the theoretical relationship is more complex than in the two-level case. 
Here are the theoretical propositions we derive from the tables:
Proposition 1: Gender differences in adolescent relationship satisfaction during 
grade 8 are larger than gender differences in grade 7.
Proposition 2: Gender differences in adolescent relationship satisfaction during 
grade 9 are larger than gender differences in grade 7.
Proposition 3: Gender differences in adolescent relationship satisfaction during 
grades 8 and 9 are the same.
These propositions describe in words the “results” of the interaction contrasts in each of 
the three 2 × 2 subtables. Again, you need to be able to articulate the conceptual mecha-
nisms underlying the numbers you assign in the table.
As another example with more than two levels, consider the case where the focal 
independent variable has more than two levels, as in the following table:
Male Female
Divorced
Separated
Married
In this example, the outcome variable is again relationship satisfaction (Y), the modera-
tor variable is gender (Z), and the focal independent variable is the marital status of the 
adolescent’s mother (X). The theorist conjectures that the effect of marital status on 
relationship satisfaction varies as a function of gender. For boys, the satisfaction with 
the maternal relationship is thought to be unaffected by the marital status of the mother. 
For girls, relationship satisfaction is thought to be lower when there is no father figure 
in the home (separated and divorced) as opposed to when there is (married). The idea is 
that the presence of a father provides more resources for the family so that the mother 
can spend more free time with the daughter than would otherwise be the case. This, in 
turn, creates a closer bond between mother and daughter. Here is the table with hypo-
thetical means inserted:
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Male Female
Divorced 4.0 4.0
Separated 4.0 5.0
Married 4.0 6.0
We again form all possible 2 × 2 tables. They are:
Male Female Male Female Male Female
Divorced 4.0 4.0 Divorced 4.0 4.0 Separated 4.0 5.0
Separated 4.0 5.0 Married 4.0 6.0 Married 4.0 6.0
(4 – 4) – (4 – 5) = 1 (4 – 4) – (4 – 6) = 2 (4 – 4) – (5 – 6) = 1
If all of the interaction contrasts in the 2 × 2 subtables equal zero, then there is no 
moderated relationship. In this case, some of the contrasts are nonzero, so a moderated 
relationship exists. Specifically, the mean difference between adolescents with divorced 
versus separated mothers is larger for females than it is for males. Also, the mean dif-
ference between adolescents with divorced versus married mothers is larger for females 
than it is for males. Finally, the mean difference between adolescents with separated 
versus married mothers is larger for females than it is for males. Here are the theoretical 
propositions that emerge from the tables:
Proposition 1: The effect of being divorced versus separated is stronger for females 
than for males.
Proposition 2: The effect of being divorced versus married is stronger for females 
than for males.
Proposition 3: The effect of being separated versus married is stronger for females 
than for males.
Note that each proposition focuses on a different 2 × 2 subtable and its corresponding 
interaction contrast. As always, you need to be able to articulate the mechanisms that 
justify the numerical assignments you make.
Hypothetical Factorial Designs with Quantitative Variables
To focus a moderated relationship in which a quantitative variable is involved as either 
the focal independent variable or the moderator variable, you still form a factorial table 
of hypothetical means, but now you group the values of the quantitative variable into 
“high,” “medium,” and “low” categories.1 As an example, consider the case where the 
moderator variable is gender of the adolescent (Z), the focal independent variable is how 
much time a mother spends with her child (X), and the outcome variable is relationship 
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satisfaction with the mother (Y). The theorist conjectures that the time spent with boys 
will not impact relationship satisfaction, but it will do so for girls. The presumed mecha-
nism is that for girls, the more time the mother and daughter spend together, the more 
the daughter will identify with the mother, leading to a closer relationship. By contrast, 
boys will not identify with the mother as much, even with increased time together. The 
factorial table with the hypothetical means might appear as follows:
Male Female
High 3.0 4.0
Medium 3.0 5.0
Low 3.0 6.0
You calculate all possible 2 × 2 subtables, as before. They are:
Male Female Male Female Male Female
High 3.0 4.0 High 3.0 4.0 Medium 3.0 5.0
Medium 3.0 5.0 Low 3.0 6.0 Low 3.0 6.0
(3 – 3) – (4 – 5) = 1 (3 – 3) – (4 – 6) = 2 (3 – 3) – (5 – 6) = 1
These tables lead to the following theoretical propositions:
Proposition 1: The effect of spending relatively large amounts of time together ver-
sus more moderate amounts of time together on relationship satisfaction is stron-
ger for females than for males.
Proposition 2: The effect of spending relatively large amounts of time together 
versus small amounts of time together on relationship satisfaction is stronger for 
females than for males.
Proposition 3: The effect of spending relatively moderate amounts of time together 
versus small amounts of time together on relationship satisfaction is stronger for 
females than for males.
Each proposition describes in words the “results” of the interaction contrasts for each 2 × 2 
subtable. As before, you would elaborate the mechanisms underlying each proposition.
Hypothetical Scatterplots and Quantitative Variables
There is a different way of conceptualizing the above moderated relationship that takes 
advantage of the fact that both X and Y are quantitative variables. Because each is quan-
1Although we group quantitative variables for theory construction heuristics in hypothetical factorial 
designs, this by no means suggests we would do so when analyzing data. This is a bad practice for purposes 
of data analysis.
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titative in nature, we can draw a hypothetical scatterplot between them at selected levels 
of the moderator variable—in this case, one slope for males and one for females. This 
has been done in Figure 6.16. Note that although both relationships are linear, the line 
is steeper for females than it is for males, suggesting the relationship between X and Y 
differs for the two groups. A way of characterizing this in terms of a theoretical proposi-
tion is as follows:
Proposition 1: The direct linear relationship between time spent together and rela-
tionship satisfaction is stronger for females than males.
In this case, the focus is on describing the differences in the slopes of the two scatter-
plots. As before, you must be able to articulate the mechanisms that underlie these slope 
differences.
FIGURE 6.16. Hypothetical scatterplots for moderated relationship. (a) Males; (b) females.
a
b
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Summary for Moderated Relationships
Moderated relationships are a part of some theories, and it is important to be clear about 
the nature of a moderated relationship. Moderated relationships involve scenarios where 
the strength or nature of a relationship between two variables is thought to vary as a 
function of a third (moderator) variable. Moderated relationships can be incorporated 
into a theory by asking questions about whether the effect of X on Y will be equally 
strong in all circumstances or whether the effect of X on Y will be equally strong for 
all individuals—that is, using what we call the stronger-than heuristic. This heuristic 
involves asking if the effect of X on Y will be stronger in some circumstances than in oth-
ers or stronger for some individuals than for others. If the answer is yes, then a moder-
ated relationship is suggested. A useful strategy for clarifying a moderated relationship 
is a thought experiment with a hypothetical factorial design. More complex moderated 
relationships can be offered in a theory, an example of which is described in Appendix 
6B. We discuss moderated relationships in more detail in Chapter 7.
BROADER USES OF HYPOTHETICAL FACTORIAL DESIGNS IN 
THOUGHT ExPERIMENTS
Sometimes you will embark on the theory construction process with only a rough, intui-
tive sense about the relationship of two different “causes” to an effect. You may not be 
able to articulate your logic well. In such cases, it might help to construct a factorial 
table of hypothetical means and fill in the numbers based on your intuition. After doing 
so, the numbers in the table can be used to make the relationships you have intuitively 
generated more explicit. For example, suppose we examine the effects of religion (Cath-
olic vs. Protestant) and religiosity on attitudes toward the complete legalization of abor-
tion. Because religiosity is a continuous variable, we group it into the three categories 
of low, medium, and high. Because there is no natural metric for attitudes toward legal-
izing abortion, we use a 0–10 scale for it, with higher scores indicating a more favorable 
attitude. We create the following table
Religiosity
Low Medium High
Catholic
Protestant
and then fill in hypothetical means:
Religiosity
Low Medium High
Catholic 7.0 5.0 3.0
Protestant 7.0 5.0 6.0
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Three classes of relationships can be derived from this table: one based on main 
effects, one based on simple main effects, and one based on interaction contrasts. To 
illustrate them, we revise the table by adding marginal means to it, as follows:
Religiosity
Low Medium High
Catholic 7.0 5.0 3.0 5.0
Protestant 7.0 5.0 6.0 6.0
7.0 5.0 4.5
A marginal mean is the average of numbers in the respective row or column associated 
with that marginal mean. The marginal mean for low religiosity is (7.0 + 7.0)/2 = 7.0. The 
marginal mean for medium religiosity is (5.0 + 5.0)/2 = 5.0. The marginal mean for high 
religiosity is (3.0 + 6.0)/2 = 4.5. The marginal mean for Catholics is (7.0 + 5.0 + 3.0)/3 = 
5.0. The marginal mean for Protestants is (7.0 + 5.0 + 6.0)/3 = 6.0.
Relationships Characterized by Main Effects
The main effects in the factorial table of hypothetical means focus on the marginal 
means for a given variable. For example, the main effect of religiosity focuses on the 
marginal means for religiosity. Looking at these means, it can be seen that we posit 
that higher scores on religiosity are associated with less positive attitudes toward abor-
tion (low religiosity = 7.0, medium religiosity = 5.0, and high religiosity = 4.5). Thus, 
the relationship is inverse. However, note that we have posited a nonlinear relationship 
with the numbers we assigned. This is because the difference between low religiosity 
and medium religiosity (7.0 – 5.0 = 2.0) is larger than the difference between medium 
religiosity and high religiosity (5.0 – 4.5 = 0.5). Shifts in religiosity at the lower end of 
the construct (from low to medium) have larger effects on attitudes toward abortion 
than comparable shifts (from medium to high) at the upper end of the construct. As 
we think through the logic of this “finding,” we might change our minds about the 
cell entries we have made and revise them so that this relationship is linear. For this 
example, we will leave them as is and posit a nonlinear relationship, leading to the 
following proposition:
Proposition 1: Religiosity is inversely related to attitudes toward abortion such 
that higher scores on religiosity tend to be associated with more negative attitudes 
toward abortion. However, the relationship is nonlinear, with greater shifts in atti-
tudes as a function of religiosity at the low levels of religiosity as compared to high 
levels of religiosity.
As we reflect on this proposition and the numbers we have entered, we try to articu-
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late the logic that might justify it. It is not enough to just state a proposition. Rather, there 
must be some underlying logic that convinces the reader that it is viable. In this case, we 
might argue that both Catholicism and Protestantism formally discourage abortion, so 
that individuals who identify with or embrace those religions (as reflected by religios-
ity) should be more likely to oppose the complete legalization of abortion. The effect of 
increased identification with these religions, however, has its limits, and there comes a 
point where increased religiosity has diminishing incremental effects on opposition to 
abortion—hence the nonlinear relationship.
We repeat this process examining the main effect for the second variable, in this 
case, religion. The marginal mean for Catholics is 5.0 and the marginal mean for Protes-
tants is 6.0. This leads to our second proposition:
Proposition 2: Catholics, on average, have more negative attitudes toward abortion 
than Protestants.
Again, we want to try to articulate the logic for this proposition, perhaps by trying to 
build a case that the formal teachings of Catholicism about abortion are more extreme 
or more salient to individuals than those of Protestantism.
Relationships Characterized by Simple Main Effects
The second class of relationships focuses on what is called simple main effects. The best 
way to conceptualize these types of effects is to assign one of the variables the role of 
the focal independent variable and the other the role of the moderator variable. This 
choice is arbitrary and depends on how we want to frame our theory, a point we return 
to shortly. For this example, we declare religion to be our focal independent variable and 
religiosity to be our moderator variable.
A simple main effect refers to the effect of the focal independent variable at a given 
level of the moderator variable. For example, looking at the factorial table, we see that at 
low levels of religiosity, there is no difference, on average, in attitudes toward abortions 
for Catholics and Protestants: (MCL – MPL) = 7 – 7 = 0. This also is true at medium levels 
of religiosity: (MCM – MPM) = 5 – 5 = 0. However, at high levels of religiosity, there is a 
difference between Catholics and Protestants, (MCH – MPH) = 3 – 6 = –3, with Catholics 
being more negative toward abortion than Protestants. These characterizations, called 
simple main effects, reflect the effect of a focal independent variable at a given level of 
the moderator variable. In this case, the three simple main effects lead to the following 
propositions:
Proposition 3: When religiosity is low, attitudes toward abortion for Catholics will 
be the same as attitudes toward abortion for Protestants, on average.
Proposition 4: When religiosity is moderate, attitudes toward abortion for Catho-
lics will be the same as attitudes toward abortion for Protestants, on average.
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Proposition 5: When religiosity is high, attitudes toward abortion for Catholics 
will be less favorable than attitudes toward abortion for Protestants, on average.
The theorist would then articulate the logic underlying each of these propositions.
Relationships Characterized by Interaction Contrasts
Finally, we can specify the interaction contrasts, which compare the effects of the focal 
independent variable at one level of the moderator variable with the effects of that focal 
independent variable at another level of the moderator variable. This process is best cap-
tured by calculating all possible 2 × 2 subtables, as before. They are:
Low Medium Low High Medium High
Catholic 7.0 5.0 Catholic 7.0 3.0 Catholic 5.0 3.0
Protestant 7.0 5.0 Protestant 7.0 6.0 Protestant 5.0 6.0
(7 – 7) – (5 – 5) = 0 (7 – 7) – (3 – 6) = –3 (5 – 5) – (3 – 6) = –3
These tables lead to the following theoretical propositions (focusing on each subtable):
Proposition 6: Catholic–Protestant differences in attitudes toward abortion are the 
same at low levels of religiosity as they are at medium levels of religiosity.
Proposition 7: Catholic–Protestant differences in attitudes toward abortion are 
smaller at low levels of religiosity than they are at high levels of religiosity.
Proposition 8: Catholic–Protestant differences in attitudes toward abortion are 
smaller at medium levels of religiosity than they are at high levels of religiosity.
This thought experiment, using intuitive entries in the factorial table of hypotheti-
cal means, generates many interesting theoretical propositions. As you work through 
each proposition, you should think about the logic that underlies it and whether the 
relationship in question is logically defensible. Articulate that logic. As you pursue this 
process, you might revise your entries to better conform to the logic that emerges from 
your thought experiment. The process is one of “back-and-forth” revisions between the 
table entries and theory, until you settle upon a pattern of entries and a set of theoretical 
propositions that are coherent and logical.
Sometimes you might be able to generate reasonable logic for several patterns of 
entries. This is of particular interest because then you have specified competing theo-
ries. One set of logical thoughts suggests that the entries should pattern themselves one 
way and another set of logical thoughts suggests that the entries should pattern them-
selves a different way. Which pattern of results occurs in practice? The best way to find 
this out is to conduct a formal study (not a thought experiment) and explore the matter 
empirically.
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Choice of the Moderator Variable
When two variables, X and Z, form a moderated relationship to impact Y, the designation 
of which variable takes the role of moderator is often straightforward. For example, sup-
pose you want to determine if the effectiveness of a clinical treatment for depression is 
more effective or less effective for males as compared with females. It is clear in this case 
that gender is the moderator variable and the presence or absence of the treatment is the 
focal independent variable. On the other hand, there are situations in which one theo-
rist’s moderator variable might be another theorist’s focal independent variable, and vice 
versa. For example, a consumer psychologist who studies product quality and choice 
might be interested in the effect of product quality on brand preference and how this is 
moderated by pricing structure. In contrast, a marketing researcher might be interested 
in the effect of pricing structure on brand preference and how this is moderated by 
product quality. In both cases, the designation of the moderator variable follows directly 
from the theoretical orientation of the researcher. Neither specification is better than 
the other. The two designations simply represent different perspectives on the same 
phenomenon. You choose a variable to take the role of the moderator based on how you 
want to frame your theory. In the example in the previous sections, we chose to frame 
the theory in terms of how religiosity moderates the effect of religious denomination on 
attitudes toward abortion.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS
When constructing a theory, in addition to clearly articulating the constructs in that 
theory, you must clearly articulate the (expected) relationships between constructs. 
Whereas Chapter 5 presented heuristics for focusing concepts, this chapter presented 
strategies for clarifying theoretical relationships in the form of thought experiments. 
These included the use of hypothetical contingency tables, hypothetical mean tables, 
shorthand hypothetical scatterplots, hypothetical probability scatterplots, and hypo-
thetical factorial designs. The approaches we discussed are not exhaustive, and we illus-
trate others in later chapters. However, if you carefully scrutinize every relationship in 
your theory using thought experiments, and try to articulate the logic and reasoning 
underlying the proposed relationships, you will be that much further along in the pro-
cess to conceiving a well-thought-out theoretical framework.
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exercises
Exercises to Reinforce Concepts
 1. What is the difference between a categorical and a quantitative variable?
 2. Describe the hypothetical contingency table approach to focusing the relation-
ship between two categorical variables. Include in your discussion how you 
would derive theoretical propositions from the table.
 3. Describe a scatterplot.
 4. Describe the hypothetical scatterplot heuristic for focusing a relationship 
between quantitative variables.
 5. Draw a scatterplot that shows a positive direct linear relationship; draw one 
that shows an inverse linear relationship.
 6. Draw a graph with two linear relationships on it, but one with a stronger effect 
as reflected by the slopes.
 7. Describe how two variables that are nonlinearly related can exhibit a linear 
relationship.
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BOx 6.1. Simpson’s Paradox
Scientists have discovered an interesting phenomenon with respect to relation-
ships between variables, called Simpson’s paradox. Simpson’s paradox refers 
to the reversal of the direction of an association when data from several groups 
are combined to form a single group. It is a surprising finding that shows that we 
must be careful when aggregating results across populations or studies to char-
acterize relationships. Consider the following three scenarios, each of which 
illustrates the paradox:
Scenario 1
A study examined death rates from tuberculosis in two cities, Richmond, Virginia, 
and New York City, in 1910. They found the following:
1. The death rate for African Americans was lower in Richmond than in New 
York City.
2. The death rate for European Americans was lower in Richmond than in 
New York City.
3. Even though the death rate was lower for African Americans and for Euro-
pean Americans in Richmond than in New York City, the death rate for the 
combined population of African Americans and European Americans was 
higher in Richmond than in New York City.
Scenario 2
Psychological researchers test two treatments for a mental illness in two separate 
clinical trials.
1. In trial number 1, treatment A cures 20% of its cases (40 out of 200) and 
treatment B cures 15% of its cases (30 out of 200). So, treatment B is infe-
rior to treatment A, because its cure rate is lower than treatment A’s.
2. In trial number 2, treatment A cures 85% of its cases (85 out of 100) and 
treatment B cures 75% of its cases (300 out of 400). So, treatment B is 
inferior to treatment A, because its cure rate is lower than treatment A’s.
3. Pooling data across the two trials, treatment A cured 125 out of 300 cases 
(or 45%) and treatment B cured 330 out of 600 cases (or 55%). So, treat-
ment B is superior to treatment A, because its cure rate is higher than treat-
ment B’s.
Scenario 3
Suppose that a university is trying to discriminate in favor of women when hiring 
faculty to atone for past hiring bias. It advertises positions in Department A and 
in Department B and only in those departments.
1. Five men apply for the positions in Department A and one is hired. Eight 
women apply and two are hired. The hiring rate for men is 20% and 
cont.
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for women it is 25%. Department A thus has favored hiring women over 
men.
2. For Department B, eight men apply and six are hired, and five women 
apply and four are hired. The hiring rate for men is 75% and for women it 
is 80%. Department B also has favored hiring women over men.
3. If we pool the data across the university as a whole, 13 men and 13 women 
applied for jobs, and 7 men and 6 women were hired. The hiring rate for 
men is higher than the hiring rate for women.
Why does Simpson’s paradox occur? Does it have something to do with the 
unequal sample sizes in the scenarios? The answer is, not really. For example, 
in Scenario 3, there were 13 male and 13 female applicants, namely, equal 
sample sizes for both genders. Department A had 13 applicants, as did Depart-
ment B, again yielding equal sample sizes. How about the fact that the sample 
sizes were small? This also is not the source of the paradox. If you multiply all the 
numbers by 1,000 in Scenario 3, for example, the paradox still exists.
Simpson’s paradox has a mathematical explanation. For eight whole num-
bers, represented by the letters a, b, c, d, A, B, C, D, it is possible to have the 
following relationships
a/b < A/B 
c/d < C/D 
and (a + c)/(b + d) > (A + C)/(B + D )
which is what occurs in Simpson’s paradox. For example:
1/5 < 2/8 
6/8 < 4/5 
yet, 7/13 > 6/13
Simpson’s paradox emerges in the three scenarios because a subtle bias is 
operating, which we explicate using the hiring example in Scenario 3. In this 
example, more women are applying for jobs that are harder to get and more 
men are applying for jobs that are easier to get. For example, it is harder to be 
hired in Department A than in Department B, and more women are applying to 
Department A than to Department B. Simpson’s paradox occurs between either 
of the two following extremes: (1) when slightly more women are applying for 
jobs that are much harder to get, and (2) when many more women are applying 
for jobs that are slightly harder to get.
When social scientists aggregate across groups of people, they must be 
careful about the causal inferences they make, as Simpson’s paradox illustrates. 
Simpson’s paradox has implications for commonly used methods of research 
synthesis that aggregate findings across studies, such as the quantitative method 
of meta-analysis.
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 8. What are some of the reasons why a theorist might prefer working with linear 
rather than nonlinear relationships?
 9. Give an example of a moderated relationship.
Exercises to Apply Concepts
 1. Conduct a thought experiment that describes a relationship between two quan-
titative variables of your choice. Derive relevant theoretical propositions from 
this experiment.
 2. Conduct a thought experiment that describes a relationship between two qual-
itative variables of your choice. Derive relevant theoretical propositions from 
this experiment.
 3. Conduct a thought experiment that describes a relationship between a quali-
tative and a quantitative variable of your choice, using the hypothetical mean 
approach. Derive relevant theoretical propositions from this experiment.
 4. Conduct a thought experiment that describes a relationship between a qualita-
tive and a quantitative variable of your choice, using hypothetical probabilities. 
Derive relevant theoretical propositions from this experiment.
 5. Conduct a thought experiment using a factorial table of hypothetical means 
with variables of your choice. Derive the full set of theoretical propositions 
corresponding to main effects, simple main effects, and interaction contrasts.
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Appendix 6A
Thought Experiments for a Quantitative Cause  
and Categorical Effect
A Hypothetical Contingency Table Method
This appendix describes a thought experiment using hypothetical contingency tables to clarify the 
relationship between a quantitative cause and a categorical effect. It is simpler to apply than the 
thought experiment described in the main text, though a bit less rigorous. Consider the theoretical 
proposition that the degree to which a person is liberal affects his or her political party identifica-
tion. Political party identification is a categorical variable, but liberalness is a quantitative variable 
that varies from low to high on an underlying continuum. To think through and focus this relation-
ship, we create three categories on the continuum of liberalness: “low,” “medium,” and “high.” We 
then form a hypothetical contingency table, per the procedures discussed in the main text:
Democrat Republican Independent Total
High in Liberalness 100
Moderate in Liberalness 100
Low in Liberalness 100
Next we fill in values for each row that we think approximate the real-world state of affairs:
Democrat Republican Independent Total
High in Liberalness 50 15 35 100
Moderate in Liberalness 25 25 50 100
Low in Liberalness 15 50 35 100
Finally, we translate the variation in numbers within each column into a set of theoretical proposi-
tions, using the same principles as discussed for two categorical variables:
Proposition 1: Individuals who are moderate in liberalness are more likely to be Indepen-
dents than individuals who are low or high in liberalness. Individuals who are low or high 
in liberalness are equally likely to be Independents.
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Proposition 2: Individuals who are low in liberalness are more likely to be Republicans 
than individuals who are moderate or high in liberalness. Similarly, those who are mod-
erate in liberalness are more likely to be Republican than individuals who are high in 
liberalness.
Proposition 3: Individuals who are high in liberalness are more likely to be Democrats 
than individuals who are moderate or low in liberalness. Similarly, those who are moder-
ate in liberalness are more likely to be Democrats than individuals who are low in liberal-
ness.
As always, you should be able to articulate the logic and reasoning underlying your propositions 
and the entries on the contingency table.
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Appendix 6B
Thought Experiments for Moderated Moderation
An interesting but more complex form of moderation analysis is the case where there are two 
moderator variables, not one, that form what is known in the statistical literature as a three-way 
interaction. This appendix describes how to conduct a thought experiment for the case of a three-
way interaction, often called moderated moderation. We give special labels to the four variables 
involved. As is conventional, X is the focal independent variable, Y is the dependent variable or 
outcome variable, Z is a first-order moderator variable, and Q is a second-order moderator variable. 
The first-order moderator is the variable that is conceptualized as directly moderating the effect 
of X on Y. The second-order moderator moderates this moderating effect. An example will make 
this clear.
Let us return to our example where we examined gender differences (X) in relationship qual-
ity between mothers and their adolescent child (Y) as moderated by grade (Z) to illustrate moder-
ated moderation. The theory was that gender differences in relationship quality would be stronger 
for eighth graders than for seventh graders. The following table of hypothetical means was gener-
ated:
Grade 7 Grade 8
Female 6.0 6.0
Male 5.0 4.0
IC1 = (6 – 5) – (6 – 4) = –1
The gender difference is indeed larger for eighth graders, as reflected in the interaction contrast 
value of –1. Suppose that the above table is based solely upon European Americans living in the 
United States. For Latinos, the table of hypothetical means might look as follows:
Grade 7 Grade 8
Female 6.0 6.0
Male 6.0 6.0
IC2 = (6 – 6) – (6 – 6) = 1
For Latinos, the interaction contrast indicates that the gender difference does not vary as a func-
tion of grade. Thus, it appears that the moderating effects of grade depend on the ethnicity of the 
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family. For European American families, grade moderates the effect of gender on relationship qual-
ity, whereas this is not true for Latino families. We can formalize this finding by computing the 
difference between the two interaction contrasts
TWIC = IC1 – IC2 = –1 – 0 = –1
where TWIC stands for three-way interaction contrast, IC1 is the interaction contrast value for level 
1 of Q (European Americans), and IC2 is the interaction contrast value for level 2 of Q (Latinos). 
We use the term “three-way interaction contrast” because the comparison maps onto a three-way 
interaction in traditional analysis of variance.
The important point is that, theoretically, we are suggesting that the qualifying effects of 
grade on gender differences in relationship satisfaction differ depending on ethnicity. Note that 
one could, in principle, suggest a third-order moderator variable in which the qualifying effects of 
Q are moderated by yet another variable, W. For example, the above dynamics may occur for low-
socioeconomic-status families but not for high-socioeconomic-status families. This finding would 
map onto a four-way interaction in traditional analysis of variance models (see Jaccard, 1998, for 
more details on how to interpret such higher-order interactions).
Part III
FRAMEWORKS FOR 
THEORY CONSTRUCTION
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7
Causal Models
Take away the cause, and the effect ceases.
—Miguel Cervantes (1612)
Causal thinking, and the causal modeling that often goes with it, is probably the most 
prominent approach to theory construction in the social sciences.1 In this framework, 
people (or other entities, e.g., families or organizations) are conceptualized as varying 
on some construct. Theorists are interested in understanding what causes this variation. 
For example, people differ in how smart they are. The question is, “Why is this?” What 
causes variability in intelligence? People differ in how much money they make. Why 
is this? What causes variability in income? People differ in what they buy, how much 
they eat, for whom they vote, the organizations they join, and how much of themselves 
they devote to work. Why is this? What causes this variability? Causal thinking tries to 
explain variability by identifying its causes.
If something causes variability, then that something also varies. People differ in 
how smart they are, in part, because they are raised differently by their parents. In this 
case, variability in intelligence is due to variability in childrearing activities. People 
differ in how much money they make because they differ in how much education they 
have. Variability in income is due, in part, to variability in achieved education. Causal 
analysis involves identifying relationships between variables, with the idea that varia-
tion in one variable produces or causes variation in the other variable.
In addition to identifying causes of variables, causal analysis also involves specify-
1We use the term model instead of theory because model is typically used in the scientific literature when 
referring to causal thinking.
138 FRAMEWORKS FOR THEORY CONSTRUCTION
ing “effects” of variables. Thus, a theorist might be interested in the consequences of 
being rich versus poor or the consequences of being stressed versus relaxed. Causal 
analysis takes many forms, but the essence of causal modeling is the focus on cause–
effect relationships.
In this chapter we provide a detailed strategy for building a causal model. We begin 
by identifying two types of relationships: predictive or associational relationships that 
are unconcerned with causality, and causal relationships. We then discuss the nature of 
causality in general as well as the role of the concept of causality in grounded/emergent 
theories. Six types of relationships are identified that form the core of causal models in 
the social sciences. These include direct causes, indirect causes, moderated relation-
ships, reciprocal causality, spurious effects, and unanalyzed relationships. Each of these 
relationships is then elaborated upon in the context of a 10-step approach to construct-
ing a causal model.
TWO TYPES OF RELATIONSHIPS: PREDICTIVE AND CAUSAL
Predictive Relationships
Predictive relationships focus on the question “Is variability in A related to variability in 
B?” Note that, at this level, the focus is on mere association; there need be no presump-
tion or implication of causation, only that variations in A are related to variations in 
B. If we can identify and verify such a relationship, then we can use our knowledge of 
variation in A to predict variation in B, without any need to explain why the association 
occurs or what causes variability in B. For example, one branch of personnel selection is 
concerned with predicting potential success of job applicants. The goal of this research 
is to identify variables that will predict this success. In essence, the scientist does not 
care whether a causal relationship exists between the variables used to predict suc-
cess and actual success; he or she is only interested in predicting job success. In similar 
fashion, marketing brand managers may be less interested in research that lets them 
understand what causes consumer purchase behavior and more interested in research 
that will enable them to predict how much their product will be purchased next month. 
In instances where the focus is on prediction rather than causation, the terminology 
associated with the two variables are predictor variable and criterion variable.
An interesting example of a purely predictive orientation is the method used to 
develop the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, also called the MMPI, a widely 
used test of maladaptive psychological orientations. When the test was constructed, dif-
ferent groups of individuals who had been diagnosed with specific psychological prob-
lems were administered a large number of questionnaire items and asked to agree or 
disagree with each. For example, individuals who had been diagnosed as hypochondri-
acs indicated their agreement or disagreement with hundreds of items. The same items 
were completed by a group of “normal” adults, and the responses were then compared 
for the two groups. Any item that had an agreement pattern that differentiated the two 
  Causal Models 139
groups became a candidate for inclusion in the final scale, no matter how unusual the 
item seemed. The result was a subset of 20 or so items to which people with hypochon-
driasis showed a unique response pattern relative to “normals.” If an individual in the 
general population, when given the MMPI, showed the same response pattern across 
the items as the hypochondriasis group, then they were declared as likely having hypo-
chondriasis. The MMPI contains some truly bizarre items in terms of content, leading 
many laypeople who take the test to wonder what exactly is going on. But the test has 
been carefully developed to have predictive utility, and it often does a reasonable job in 
correctly diagnosing individuals.
Causal Relationships
Distinct from predictive–associational relationships are causal relationships. These 
relationships invoke the notion of causality, with the idea that one of the variables in 
the relationship, X, influences the other variable in the relationship, Y. The nature of 
causality has been debated extensively by philosophers of science (e.g., Bunge, 1961; 
Cartwright, 2007; Frank, 1961; Morgan & Winship, 2007; Pearl, 2000; Rubin, 1974, 
1978; Russell, 1931; Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002), and most agree that causality 
is an elusive concept that is fraught with ambiguities. In fact, the famous philosopher 
Bertrand Russell (1931) was so flabbergasted by the difficulties with the concept that he 
suggested the word causality be expunged from the English language.
Scientists generally think of causality in terms of change. Variable X is said to be a 
cause of Y if changes in X produce changes in Y. Hume (1777/1975) pointed out that it is 
impossible to ever demonstrate that changes in one variable produce changes in another. 
At best, we can only observe changes in one variable, followed at a later time by changes 
in another variable. Such coexistent change, he notes, does not necessarily imply cau-
sality. For example, an alarm clock going off every morning just before sunrise cannot 
be said to be the cause of the sun rising, even though the two events are intimately 
linked.
Russell (1931) argued that causality can be established unambiguously only in a 
completely isolated system. If one assumes no other variables are present or operating, 
then changes in X that are followed by changes in Y are indeed indicative of a causal 
relation. When contaminating variables are present, however, it is possible for a true 
causal relationship to exist even though observations show that X and Y are completely 
unrelated to each other. Similarly, a causal relationship may not exist, even though X 
and Y are found to be related. Having shown this using formal logic, Russell turned to 
the problem of how one could ever know that one is operating in a completely isolated 
system, such as in a highly controlled laboratory setting. The only way one can be con-
fident that the system is isolated, he argued, is if changes in X unambiguously produce 
changes in Y in that system. But at the same time that we want to assert the existence 
of an isolated system because changes in X produce changes in Y, we also want to assert 
that the reason X produces a change in Y is because we are operating in an isolated sys-
tem. Such reasoning, Russell argued, is tautological.
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As you might imagine, the underlying issues for conceptualizing causality and 
for how one establishes causal relationships are complex. They have been debated by 
extremely bright philosophers of science and scientists for decades. It is beyond the 
scope of this book to delve into these issues in depth. After reading the relevant litera-
ture carefully and giving the matter much thought, it is our belief that, in a strict sense, 
causality of the type that traditional social scientists seek to infer can rarely, if ever, 
be demonstrated unequivocally. Strong adherents to experimental methods may take 
exception to this view, and we respect that. However, we personally find the arguments 
of Blalock (1964), Bunge (1961), Hume (1777/1975), Russell (1931), and others, taken as 
a whole, to be convincing (though any single treatise has some flaws).
If causality is so difficult to demonstrate, then why is the concept dominant in 
social scientific theories? Our answer is that the concept of causality is a heuristic that 
helps us to think about our environment, organize our thoughts, predict future events, 
and even change future events. By thinking in causal terms, we are able to identify 
systematic relationships between variables and manipulate those variables so as to pro-
duce changes in phenomena that are scientifically or socially desirable to change. For 
example, through causal thinking, we might derive a certain type of therapy designed to 
reduce the severity of migraine headaches. Although technically we may never be able to 
establish a causal link between the therapy and the reduction of headache severity, the 
fact of the matter is that applying the treatment accomplishes the socially desirable goal 
of headache reduction. If causal thinking aids in the development of such programs, 
then the causal theory that leads to this state of affairs is useful.
Stated another way, we may never be able to unambiguously demonstrate causality 
between variables, but we certainly can have differing degrees of confidence that a causal 
relationship (of the form that “changes in X produce changes in Y”) exists between vari-
ables. Scientific research is conducted to establish strong, moderate, or weak levels of 
confidence in theoretical statements that propose causal relationships.
There are some common features of the construct of causality upon which most 
social scientists agree. First, as noted, if X causes Y, then changes in X are thought to 
produce changes in Y (however, see Sowa, 2000, and Lewis, 2000, for alternative con-
ceptualizations). Second, a cause always must precede an effect in time. Third, the time 
that it takes for a change in X to produce a change in Y can vary, ranging from virtually 
instantaneous change to years, decades, centuries, or millennia. Fourth, the nature and/
or strength of the effect of X on Y can vary depending on context. X may influence Y in 
one context but not another context. Finally, cause and effect must be in some form of 
spatial contact or must be connected by a chain of intermediate events. We return to 
each of these points in later sections of this chapter.
Not all scientific theories rely on the concept of causality. In fact, certain areas of 
physics did not progress until the notion of causality was deemphasized or virtually 
abandoned (see Sowa, 2000). Nevertheless, causality remains the dominant system of 
thought in the social sciences.
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CAUSALITY AND GROUNDED/EMERGENT THEORY
Causal explanation has been the subject of controversy among some grounded/emer-
gent theorists (Maxwell, 2004), especially as it is typically treated in the philosophy of 
science. There is a vocal group of grounded theorists who have challenged traditional 
views of causality and who offer perspectives that are more consistent with qualita-
tive methods and process-oriented explanations. Among the alternative frameworks are 
causal realism (Salmon, 1984, 1989, 1998), constructive empiricism (van Fraassen, 1980, 
1989), and ordinary language philosophy (Achinstein, 1983), to name a few. One of the 
more popular alternatives, causal realism, argues for a real though not “objectively” 
knowable world. Causal realism holds that phenomena within the objective world are 
so intertwined and so dependent on one another in such complex ways that simple 
variable-centered notions of causal regularities are inadequate. There are several vari-
ants of causal realism, but we do not digress into these here. Our focus in this chapter is 
on the more dominant variable-centered approaches to causal explanation that concep-
tualize causality as described earlier. We consider the other approaches to explanation 
in Chapter 10. Even if theorists are committed to process-oriented perspectives or other 
explanatory frameworks, we believe it is helpful to temporarily “think outside the box” 
by thinking about direct relationships, indirect relationships, moderated relations, spu-
rious relationships, reciprocal causes, and feedback loops. Doing so might provide fresh 
insights into eventually framing theory in the particular way one wants to frame it.
TYPES OF CAUSAL RELATIONSHIPS
When two variables have a causal relationship, the presumed cause is sometimes called 
the independent variable or the determinant. The presumed effect is called the dependent 
variable or outcome variable. Causal models have one or more of six types of “causal” 
relationships in them. The six relationships capture the universe of relationship types 
used in causal modeling. In this section we briefly characterize these six types of rela-
tionships to provide you with an overview of them. Then, we delve into each type of 
relationship in detail. The six relationships—(1) direct causal, (2) indirect causal, (3) 
spurious, (4) moderated causal, (5) bidirectional causal, and (6) unanalyzed—are shown 
in Figure 7.1. In this figure a variable is indicated by a box and a causal influence is rep-
resented by a straight arrow emanating from the cause and pointing to the effect. We 
discuss the curved arrow later. This type of figure is called a path diagram.
A direct causal relationship is one in which a given cause is assumed to have a direct 
causal impact on some outcome variable. For example, frustration is assumed to influ-
ence aggression. As another example, the quality of the relationship between a mother 
and her adolescent child is assumed to influence whether the child uses drugs, with 
poor relationships being associated with higher levels of drug use. Figure 7.2a illustrates 
this latter relationship.
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An indirect causal relationship is one in which a variable influences another variable 
indirectly through its impact on an intermediary variable (see Figure 7.1). For example, 
failing to accomplish a goal may lead to frustration, which, in turn, causes someone 
to aggress against another. In this case, failure to obtain a goal is an indirect cause of 
aggression. It only influences aggression through its impact on frustration. Frustration 
is formally called a mediating variable, or more informally, a mediator, because other 
variables “work through” it to influence the outcome. Indirect relationships are some-
times called mediated relationships.
Figure 7.2b illustrates an indirect relationship between the quality of the relation-
ship between a mother and her child and adolescent drug use. The quality of the rela-
tionship is assumed to impact how much the adolescent orients toward working hard in 
school, with better relationships leading to working harder. Students who work hard in 
school, in turn, are assumed to be less likely to use drugs. Figures 7.2a and 7.2b illus-
trate an important point: What is a direct relationship in one theory can be an indirect 
relationship in another theory. We comment more on this point later.
A spurious relationship is one in which two variables are related because they share a 
FIGURE 7.1. Relationships in causal models.
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common cause, but not because either causes the other (see Figure 7.1). As an example, 
if we select a random sample of all people in the United States and calculate the correla-
tion between shoe size and verbal ability, we would find a moderate relationship between 
the two variables: People with bigger feet have more verbal ability. Does this mean that 
a causal relationship exists between these variables? Of course not. The reason they are 
correlated is because they share a common cause: age. A random sample of people in 
the United States will include large numbers of children. When children are young, they 
have small feet and they can’t talk very well. As they get older, their feet grow and their 
verbal ability increases. The common cause of age produces a correlation between shoe 
size and verbal ability, but it is completely spurious.
A moderated causal relationship, like spurious and indirect relationships, involves at 
least three variables (see Figure 7.1). In this case, the causal relationship between two 
variables, X and Y, differs depending on the value of a third variable, Z. For example, 
it might be found that a given type of psychotherapy (X) is effective for reducing head-
aches (Y) for males but not for females. In this case, the causal relationship between psy-
chotherapy and headache reduction is moderated by gender. When gender has the value 
“male,” X impacts Y. However, when gender has the value “female,” X does not impact Y. 
Gender is called a moderator variable because the relationship between the presence or 
absence of psychotherapy (X) and headache reduction (Y) changes as a function of (or is 
“moderated by”) the levels of gender.
A bidirectional or reciprocal causal relationship exists when two variables are concep-
tualized as influencing each other (see Figure 7.1). For example, in the area of reproduc-
tive health, a theorist might posit a bidirectional influence between a woman’s belief that 
the rhythm method is effective at preventing pregnancy (X) and her attitude toward the 
rhythm method (Y). A woman may have a positive attitude toward the rhythm method 
because she believes it is effective. Simultaneously, she may believe it is effective, in part, 
because she has a positive attitude toward it, via a mechanism that involves rationaliza-
tion of behavior.
The final type of relationship is an unanalyzed relationship. In Figure 7.1 the two 
variables for this type of relationship are connected by a double-headed curved arrow. 
This arrow signifies that the two variables are correlated, but that the theorist is not 
going to specify why they are correlated. The correlation may be spurious or it may be 
FIGURE 7.2. Examples of direct and indirect relationships. (a) Direct relationship; (b) indirect 
relationship.
a
b
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due to a causal connection of some kind. The theorist wants to recognize the correla-
tion between the variables, but trying to explain it is beyond the scope of the theoretical 
effort. Examples of this approach are illustrated later in this chapter.
Most causal models have more than one of these six types of relationships in them. 
We provide an example of a multivariate causal model in Figure 7.3. In this model there 
are several direct relationships. How hard an adolescent works in school is assumed to 
be a direct cause of drug use. The quality of the relationship between the mother and 
child is assumed to be a direct cause of how hard the adolescent works in school. The 
quality of the relationship between the mother and child has an indirect causal relation-
ship with drug use that is mediated by how hard the child works in school. The amount 
of time that a mother spends with her child is assumed to have a direct influence on 
the quality of the relationship between the parent and child. Gender of the adolescent 
is assumed to have a direct impact on the amount of time that a mother spends with 
her child, with mothers spending more time with girls than boys. Gender also has a 
direct influence on the quality of the relationship between mothers and their children, 
with mothers having better relationships with girls than boys. Note that because gender 
influences both the amount of time spent with the child and the quality of the relation-
ship between mother and child, it is a common cause for these variables. Hence, some of 
the association between time spent together and relationship quality is spurious. How-
ever, the straight causal arrow between the time spent together and relationship qual-
ity indicates that the theorist believes some of the association is not spurious. Rather, 
there also is some true causal influence operating. In this case, the association between 
the two variables is thought to have two components: (1) a causal component and (2) a 
spurious component.
 Note also in this model that the amount of time a mother spends with her adoles-
cent is an indirect cause of drug use. The indirect effect works through two sequential 
mediators: (1) the quality of the relationship with the child and, in turn, (2) how hard 
the child works in school. There are several other more distal indirect relationships in 
this model. Try to identify them.
There are no moderated relationships, nor are there any unanalyzed relationships 
FIGURE 7.3. Multivariate causal model.
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in this model. It is not necessary for a theory to contain all six types of relationships we 
described earlier.
A common distinction in causal theories is between exogenous and endogenous 
variables. An endogenous variable has at least one causal arrow pointing to it. An exog-
enous variable does not have a causal arrow pointing to it. In Figure 7.3, for example, 
gender is an exogenous variable, and all other variables in the system are endogenous 
variables. We occasionally use this terminology.
CONSTRUCTING THEORIES WITH CAUSAL RELATIONSHIPS
We now discuss a process for constructing causal models. We draw on the heuristics 
discussed in Chapter 4 while explicating in more depth the six types of relationships in 
Figure 7.1. It is not possible to convey this material in a straightforward, linear fashion, 
so be prepared for digressions. The approach we describe is not the only way to develop 
a causal theory. It represents one approach that we find useful, but we often deviate from 
it ourselves in our own theory construction efforts.
IDENTIFYING OUTCOME VARIABLES
The approach we describe involves first identifying an outcome variable and then speci-
fying some causes of that variable. Thus, the first step is choosing an outcome vari-
able that you want to explain. Perhaps you are interested in understanding why some 
people are Republicans but other people are Democrats. Or you might be interested in 
understanding why some people become alcoholics but others do not. In Chapter 4 we 
discussed strategies for choosing outcome variables. Choose one now.
Some researchers approach theory construction using a reverse process; that is, 
they specify a variable of interest and then ask what are the consequences or “effects” of 
it. For example, a theorist might be interested in self-esteem and what the consequences 
are of having low versus high self-esteem. Or a theorist might be interested in poverty 
and want to explore the effects of poverty on people’s lives. There is more than one way 
to go about theory construction. If you prefer the latter approach, then the concepts and 
strategies we discuss below are still applicable, but will have to be adapted somewhat. 
We specify when such adaptations are required.
Some researchers decide to build a theory of the effects of an intervention on an 
outcome. For example, an educational researcher might develop a program to improve 
reading skills and plan to build a theory around its effects on reading. He or she plans to 
conduct a study in which an experimental group receives the intervention and a control 
group receives the standard reading curriculum. In this case, you already have a des-
ignated “cause” or independent variable (the intervention group vs. the control group), 
and you also have identified an outcome variable or “effect,” reading ability.
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IDENTIFYING DIRECT CAUSES
We start the theory construction process by specifying two or three variables that are 
direct causes of the outcome variable. We do not specify more than two or three direct 
causes at this initial step because we ultimately will subject each direct cause to consid-
erable elaboration. The theory might become overwhelming at later stages if we work 
with too many variables initially. Additional direct causes always can be added at a later 
point.
Use the heuristics and strategies discussed in Chapter 4 to identify your initial set of 
direct causes, and use the strategies discussed in Chapter 5 to ensure that the concepts 
with which you are working are appropriately focused. You also can apply the thought 
experiments described in Chapter 6 to clarify the relationships. When specifying a direct 
cause, remember that your goal is to explain why there is variation in the outcome vari-
able you have chosen. If the outcome variable is popularity, for example, then you want 
to know what causes people to differ in their popularity. What makes some people more 
popular than others? What factors influence popularity? If the outcome variable is teacher 
apathy in schools, then you want to know why some teachers are apathetic and other 
teachers are not. When specifying your direct causes, keep this focus in mind.
If you adopt the strategy of choosing an initial variable but want to treat it as a cause 
rather than an effect, then identify two or three variables that the variable is thought 
to impact. For example, if the primary variable of interest is Latino acculturation to 
U.S. culture, you might use drug use as one “effect” (under the tentative presupposition 
that increased acculturation increases drug use) and performance in school as another 
“effect” (under the tentative presupposition that increased acculturation increases per-
formance in school). Whichever approach is used, you should now have a theory with 
two to three direct effects in it. Be sure that you can articulate the logic underlying each 
direct effect in your model.
Finally, if you are building a theory of the effects of an intervention, you already speci-
fied (from the previous section) a direct effect of the intervention (intervention vs. control) on 
the outcome (e.g., reading ability). In this case, we will work with this single direct cause.
To make the next tasks manageable, we recommend that you draw your theory 
using a path diagram, which is a pictorial representation of a theory, using boxes and 
arrows as in Figures 7.1–7.3. By the end of this chapter, your path diagram will be com-
plex, but at this stage, it should be simple, consisting of a few direct causes, in the spirit 
of a direct effect in Figure 7.1. As you complete each step that follows, continually update 
your path diagram. The steps will add complexity to your theory, and you will need to 
use the path diagram as an aid to avoid being overwhelmed by what is to come.
INDIRECT CAUSAL RELATIONSHIPS
Turning Direct Relationships into Indirect Relationships
Once you have identified a few direct causes, the next step is to try to turn the direct 
causes into indirect causes. That is, we identify variables that mediate the direct rela-
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tionships and then insert these variables into the theoretical system. For example, sup-
pose that our outcome variable is drug use in adolescents and one of the direct causes we 
identified is the quality of the relationship with the mother of the adolescent. We expect 
that adolescents with better relationships with their mothers will be less likely to use 
drugs. If we ask ourselves the question “Why do you think that quality of the relation-
ship impacts drug use?” we might answer that adolescents who have a good relationship 
with their mothers work harder in school in order to please them, and this increased 
focus on school is why adolescents are less likely to use drugs. Contained in this answer 
is a mediator variable, namely, the increased focus on school. What was a direct rela-
tionship now can be turned into an indirect relationship: Quality of the relationship 
impacts the adolescent’s focus on school, which, in turn, impacts drug use. We refer to 
this strategy as the why heuristic.
We can take this a step further and attempt to turn the newly established direct 
relationship between “school focus” and “drug use” into an indirect relationship. We 
ask ourselves “Why do you think working hard and focusing on school impacts drug 
use?” We might answer “because then adolescents have less time for after-school activi-
ties that expose them to drug use.” We now have a new mediator, namely, avoidance of 
risk situations. It can be used to turn the direct relationship between “school focus” and 
“drug use” into an indirect relationship using “avoidance of risk situations” as a media-
tor. This new variable is somewhat vague, and we need to apply the focusing strategies 
discussed in Chapter 5 to clarify it. But that is not the point here. The main idea is that 
you can expand a theoretical framework that has direct causes by turning direct causal 
relationships into indirect causal relationships through the specification of mediators. 
You continue to do this until you reach a point where you just don’t want to further 
explicate mediators. That is, you reach a point where you want to close this aspect of the 
theoretical system and move onto other features of the theory.
In sum, to turn a direct causal relationship into an indirect causal relationship, 
ask yourself the question “Why is it that X influences (i.e., reduces or increases) Y?” As 
you articulate your answer to this question (substituting the actual variables names for 
X and Y), therein will lie a potential mediator variable. Why is it that higher levels of 
education lead to higher levels of income? Your answer to this question is a potential 
mediator. Why is it that boys drink more alcohol than girls? Your answer to this ques-
tion is a potential mediator.
Partial versus Complete Mediation
Once you have specified a mediator and added it to your path diagram, you are con-
fronted with a new issue. Examine Figure 7.4a, which shows an indirect relationship 
where the impact of X on Y is mediated by Z. According to this model, the only way 
in which X influences Y is through Z. Stated another way, Z completely mediates any 
impact X has on Y. Therefore, Z is a complete mediator.
But another possibility exists. Maybe Z only partially mediates the effects of X on Y. 
Perhaps in addition to the mediated effects of X on Y through Z, X also has an indepen-
dent effect on Y that can’t be accounted for by Z. This scenario is illustrated in Figure 
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7.4b. In this case, Z is said to be a partial mediator of the effect of X on Y. As an example, 
in Figure 7.2b, the quality of the relationship with the mother impacts the adolescent’s 
work ethic in school, which, in turn, influences the adolescent’s drug use. Perhaps in 
addition to these effects, the quality of the relationship with the mother has an indepen-
dent effect on drug use, over and above its effect through the adolescent work ethic. If 
so, this represents partial mediation: The adolescent’s school work ethic mediates some 
of the impact of quality of the maternal relationship on drug use—but not all of it.
In any causal system, once you introduce a mediator, you must next decide if the 
mediator is a complete or partial mediator. After inserting the mediators into your path 
diagram, you must further adjust the theory either by drawing arrows to represent par-
tial mediation or excluding arrows to reflect complete mediation, as per Figure 7.4.
What if you are not sure which to specify, complete or partial mediation? Here is 
the approach we use in such cases. For partial mediation, you are essentially stating 
that there is some mechanism other than Z by which X influences Y. What is that other 
mechanism? If you can articulate it, then partial mediation is called for; if you cannot 
articulate it, then complete mediation is the answer. In essence, we take the direct effect 
between X and Y in Figure 7.4b and try turning it into an indirect effect by identifying 
a second mediator, Q. This is illustrated in Figure 7.4c. If we can identify Q, then partial 
mediation in the model is called for; if we can’t think of Q, then complete mediation is 
the answer. Continuing with our drug use example, we might conjecture that in addi-
tion to adolescents’ schoolwork ethic, the quality of the mother–adolescent relationship 
also impacts how much adolescents are willing to allow their mothers to keep track of 
FIGURE 7.4. Complete and partial mediation. (a) Complete mediation; (b) partial mediation; 
(c) complete mediation with two mediators; (d) partial mediation with two mediators.
a
b
c
d
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their activities on weekends: If the relationship between the mother and adolescent is 
poor, then the adolescent will resist attempts by the mother to keep track of or moni-
tor him or her. If the relationship is good, then the adolescent may not resist as much. 
Thus, the quality of the mother–adolescent relationship (X) impacts not only the ado-
lescent’s schoolwork ethic (Z) but also parental monitoring (Q), and both of these vari-
ables (X and Q) are thought to impact adolescent drug use. In this case, we are justified 
in hypothesizing partial mediation, as per Figure 7.4b, because we are able to specify a 
reasonable mechanism for it.
If we specify Q, then why not just incorporate it into the theory? Of course, we 
could very well do this, but then the issue becomes whether the two mediators, Z and 
Q, considered together, are complete or partial mediators of the causal effect of X on Y. 
That is, perhaps now the model should appear as in Figure 7.4d instead of Figure 7.4c. 
To add the direct path from X to Y over and above Q and Z, we would need to be able to 
articulate yet a third mediator. At some point, you decide to close out the system and 
just let a direct path between X and Y stand so as to reflect partial mediation without 
formally bringing additional mediators into the model. If pressed, you could articulate 
one, but you simply do not want to complicate the theory further.
An Alternative Strategy for Turning Direct Effects 
into Indirect Effects
There is another way to bring indirect causal relationships into the theory. Pick one of 
your direct causes, X, and now treat it as an outcome variable. Then use the heuristics 
discussed in Chapter 4 to identify causes of this cause. Identify a few such causes and 
add them to your path diagram. You will now have indirect relationships between these 
new causes and the original outcome variable that are mediated by your initial direct 
cause. The variable that originally took the role of a direct cause now takes on the addi-
tional role of mediator. We call this strategy a cause of a cause heuristic.
Figure 7.5 illustrates this dynamic for the drug use example. The initial direct cause 
was the quality of the relationship between the mother and the adolescent (see Figure 
7.5a). We then treat the quality of the relationship as an outcome variable and ask what 
factors influence it. We might conjecture that the gender of the child impacts the quality 
of the relationship and then add this to the theory (see Figure 7.5b). Now the original 
direct cause is a mediator. Note that at any point in the process, we can try to turn a 
direct cause into an indirect cause using our first strategy of answering the question of 
“why.” For example, “Why is it that the gender of the adolescent influences the quality 
of the relationship between the mother and the adolescent?” Our answer to this ques-
tion might be “because mothers spend more time with girls than boys,” which yields a 
mediator. This causal dynamic is illustrated in Figure 7.5c, which further augments the 
theoretical system. Also, any time we create a mediator, we also must make decisions 
about complete or partial mediation. In Figure 7.5c, we have assumed complete media-
tion.
Of course, there will be some causes, such as gender or race, where it does not make 
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sense to treat them as an outcome variable and where this strategy is inappropriate. This 
will also be true when the “cause” is an intervention.
Summary of Mediation
In sum, there are two heuristics for creating indirect effects in your model. First, the why 
heuristic involves focusing on a direct causal relationship between X and Y and asking 
“Why does X influence Y?” The answer to this question contains the mediator. Second, 
the cause of a cause heuristic treats one of your direct causes as an outcome and identi-
fies causes of it. Once you add a mediator, you must decide about partial or complete 
mediation with respect to it. Complete mediation is called for if you are unable to articu-
late any mechanism other than Z by which X impacts Y. Partial mediation is called for if 
you can specify such a mechanism. Apply these two heuristics to the direct relationships 
in your model and draw the mediated relationships you have identified into your path 
diagram. Add partial mediation causal arrows (direct effects), if appropriate.
MODERATED CAUSAL RELATIONSHIPS
The next step in the theory construction process is to consider the addition of moder-
ated causal relationships. As discussed in Chapter 6, a moderated causal relationship 
involves three variables, a cause (X), an effect (Y), and a moderator variable (Z). The 
essence of a moderated relationship is that the strength or nature of the effect of X on 
Y varies as a function of Z. Examine every direct relationship that is in your theory as 
drawn in your path diagram. For each relationship, ask yourself, “Are there some cir-
cumstances where the impact of X on Y will be stronger than in other circumstances?” 
If the answer is “yes,” try to articulate those circumstances and identify their defining 
FIGURE 7.5. Example of making the cause an outcome. (a) Direct relationship; (b) quality of 
relationship becomes an outcome; (c) inserting a mediator.
a
b
c
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characteristics. As you do so, you will be describing your moderator variable. In other 
words, carefully examine the circumstances you generate and try to abstract a variable 
that captures or represents them. Use the methods in Chapter 5 to focus this variable 
and then use the methods in Chapter 6 to clarify the moderated relationship.
As another approach, for every direct cause in your theory, ask yourself if the impact 
of X on Y will be stronger for some individuals than other individuals. If the answer is 
“yes,” try to describe the defining characteristics of the individuals for whom it will be 
stronger. As you do so, you will be describing your moderator variable.
Of course, you may not want to pursue this strategy for every direct cause in your 
theory, but the potential for doing so exists. Draw the moderated relationships you have 
identified into your path diagram. Your theory now should include direct causal rela-
tionships, indirect causal relationships with either partial or complete mediation, and 
moderated relationships.
Mediated Moderation
Next, you should consider the possibility of adding a mediated moderator relationship. 
This type of relationship combines an indirect and moderated relationship; it is dia-
grammed in Figure 7.6a. Note that Z is a traditional moderator variable that impacts the 
strength of the effect of X on Y. However, we have inserted a mediator of the moderat-
ing effect, Q, into the model. For example, suppose we find that gender (Z) moderates 
the impact of a multisession psychotherapeutic treatment (X) on depression (Y), such 
that the treatment is more effective for females than males. Asking “Why is the treat-
ment more effective for females than males?”, we might conjecture that females are more 
likely than males to attend all of the therapy sessions. By answering the question why 
the moderation occurs, we identify a mediator (Q) of that moderation, which in this case 
is session attendance. In other words, we use the why heuristic to generate a mediator. 
Draw any mediated moderators into your model that you care to add now.
As before, any time you add a mediator, there is the possibility of complete or par-
tial mediation. The same is true for mediated moderation. It may be that the mediator 
accounts for only some of the moderating effects of Z on the effect of X on Y. Figure 7.6b 
illustrates a case of partial mediated moderation. Now determine for your theory if you 
want to assume complete or partial mediated moderation.
Moderated Mediation
Next, consider the possibility of adding a moderated mediated relationship. Moderated 
mediation occurs when the strength of a path signifying mediation varies as a function 
of some variable, Q (see Figure 7.6c). For example, for females, Z might be a complete 
mediator of the effect of X on Y, whereas for males, Z may be only a partial mediator of 
the effect of X on Y. In this case, the mediational properties of Z depend on the value of 
the moderator variable, Q. Moderation can occur at any or all of the paths involved in 
mediation. In Figure 7.6c, moderation operates at the level of two of the paths involved 
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in mediation, but not the third path. Use the above heuristics to identify relevant mod-
erator variables. Be sure that you can articulate the logic underlying the modifications 
you make to the theory.
Moderated Moderation
A final possibility to consider is a moderator of a moderated relationship. This is dia-
grammed in Figure 7.6d, where Q moderates the moderating qualities of Z. We give 
special labels to X, Z, and Q. Y is the outcome variable, X is the focal independent vari-
FIGURE 7.6. Mediated moderation, moderated mediation, and moderated moderation. (a) 
Mediated moderation; (b) partial mediated moderation; (c) moderated mediation; (d) moderated 
moderation.
a
b
c
d
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able, Z is a first-order moderator variable, and Q is a second-order moderator variable. The 
first-order moderator is conceptualized as directly moderating the effect of X on Y. The 
second-order moderator moderates this moderating effect. See Appendix 6B of Chapter 
6 for details and an example. Consider if you want to include moderated moderation in 
your theory.
Summary of Moderated Relationships
Moderated relationships can be incorporated into a theory by asking questions about 
whether the effect of X on Y will be equally strong in all circumstances or whether the 
effect of X on Y will be equally strong for all individuals—that is, using the stronger-than 
heuristic. As noted in Chapter 6, this heuristic involves asking if the effect of X on Y will 
be stronger in some circumstances than in others or stronger for some individuals than 
for others. The possibility of a moderated relationship can be considered for all direct 
causes in the theory as well as for mediated relationships in the form of moderated 
mediation. If you add a moderator variable, then you should consider the possibility of 
adding mediated moderation, either partial or complete. You also can consider moder-
ated moderation. Draw these dynamics into your path diagram, as appropriate. Articu-
late the logic of each path that you add and focus the concepts and relationships using 
the methods described in Chapters 5 and 6.
RECIPROCAL OR BIDIRECTIONAL CAUSALITY
There Is No Such Thing as Simultaneous Reciprocal Causality
Reciprocal or bidirectional causal relationships occur when a variable, X, influences 
another variable, Y, and Y also influences X (see Figure 7.1). Strictly speaking, there can 
never be simultaneous reciprocal causation because there always must be a time inter-
val, no matter how infinitesimally small, between the cause and the effect that follows 
from that cause. If we observed the causal dynamics within the appropriate time frames, 
the true dynamic underlying a reciprocal causal relationship would appear as follows
Xt1 → Yt2 → Xt3 → Yt4
where Xt1 is variable X at time 1, Yt2 is variable Y at time 2, Xt3 is variable X at time 3, and 
Yt4 is variable Y at time 4. It is only when we are unable to capture the appropriate time 
intervals, and must instead work with coarser time intervals, that the dynamic of the 
reciprocal causal relationship, as illustrated in Figure 7.1, applies. Essentially, by work-
ing with coarser time units, the more fine-grained temporal causal dynamics already 
have played themselves out (which is known in the causal modeling literature as the 
equilibrium assumption). Conceptually, we are working with variables that now reflect 
the alternating causal dynamics that operated across the more fine-grained time interval 
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in the past. There is nothing inherently wrong with theorizing at the level of coarser 
time units, as long as we appreciate the underlying logic.
As an example, consider performance in school as measured by grade-point average 
and drug use by adolescents. It is likely that performing poorly in school puts adoles-
cents at risk for drug use, as their interests drift away from doing well in school. At the 
same time, school performance is probably adversely affected by drug use, interfering 
with students’ ability to complete their homework as well as adversely affecting their 
concentration on tests. A causal chain that describes this dynamic is
SPt1 → DUt2 → SPt3 → DUt4
where SP represents school performance at time t, DU represents drug use at time t, and 
the numerical subscript attached to t represents more distant time intervals as the num-
bers increase in value. If one is unable to assess these processes at the finer-grained time 
intervals where the causal dynamics are operating, and if these processes have already 
played themselves out when the assessments of drug use and school performance are 
made, then the resulting causal representation that captures what has transpired is this:
This representation reflects a summary of the sequential dynamics that have already 
transpired at a given cross-section in time.
As a next step in the theory construction process, consider introducing reciprocal 
causality into the system. This should not be done in too cavalier a fashion in the inter-
est of parsimony and the difficulties that reciprocal causation can create for empirical 
tests of the theory. But if you believe a reciprocal relationship is called for and that it is 
theoretically important, then include it.
Feedback Loops: Adding Mediators to Reciprocal Causation
Theories sometimes include feedback loops, an example of which is shown in Figure 
7.7a. Variable X influences variable Z, which, in turn, influences variable Y, which, in 
turn, “feed backs” to influence variable X. For example, how satisfied supervisors are 
with their workers (X) may impact how satisfied employees are with their jobs (Z)—that 
is, workers like their job better if their boss is happy with them. Employee job satisfac-
tion may, in turn, impact the productivity of employees (Y), with more satisfied workers 
being more productive. The productivity of employees, in turn, may “feed back” and 
impact how satisfied supervisors are with their workers (X). Such feedback loops are 
merely a reciprocal causal relationship with a mediator variable inserted into the causal 
chain. This is evident if we redraw Figure 7.7a in the format of Figure 7.7b.
Add any mediators to your reciprocal causal relationships using the why heuristic 
we discussed earlier. You can add mediators to either one or both causal paths in the 
reciprocal relationship. We illustrate the latter case in Figure 7.7c.
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Moderated Reciprocal Causation
Reciprocal dynamics may operate in some situations but not others or for some indi-
viduals but not others. This point suggests that moderator variables can be added to 
one or both of the reciprocal causal paths. Figure 7.8a illustrates the case of a moderator 
variable associated with one causal path in the reciprocal causal relationship, and Figure 
7.8b illustrates the case of two moderator variables, one associated with each causal path. 
Figure 7.8c illustrates the case of a single moderator variable associated with both causal 
paths. Of course, you can add multiple moderators, mediated moderators, or moderated 
moderators when introducing moderator variables at this juncture. Your “theoretical 
toolbox” allows you a great many possibilities. Moderators can be identified using the 
stronger-than heuristic. Make additions to your path diagram accordingly and articulate 
the underlying logic for these modifications.
SPURIOUS RELATIONSHIPS
In the theory construction process we are elaborating, we typically do not set out to 
create spurious relationships within the theory. Rather, spurious relationships naturally 
emerge as we work through the other facets of theory construction. The next steps we 
recommend often create spurious effects within a theory. Before describing these steps, 
we must emphasize that spurious effects are not inherently bad, nor are they something 
to be avoided. In empirical research that tests theories, critics often question a theo-
retical test by claiming that an observed relationship in the data used to assert a direct 
causal relationship may, alternatively, represent a spurious relationship. It is one thing 
to criticize a scientist for conducting a flawed empirical test of a proposed causal link, 
FIGURE 7.7. Feedback loops as reciprocal causation. (a) Traditional feedback path diagram; 
(b) redrawn feedback loop; (c) feedback loop with two mediators.
a
b
c
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but this is not the same as recognizing that many phenomena have common causes in 
the real world. For example, a fear of contracting AIDS might simultaneously influence 
one’s use of condoms, the number of sexual partners one has, and how frequently one 
engages in sex. The latter three variables should exhibit some correlation with each 
other because they share the common cause of fear of AIDS. These correlations are not 
artifactual. They reflect the operation of a meaningful common cause in real life, and 
social scientists should embrace them conceptually.
We now discuss three additional steps to consider when building your theory, each 
of which can create spurious relationships in the theory.
Adding Additional Outcomes
First, consider adding more outcome variables to your theory. Recall that the first step in 
the theory construction process was to identify a single outcome variable that you were 
interested in explaining. Consider other such outcome variables at this time, variables 
that are conceptually related to your initial outcome variable. For example, if your ini-
tial outcome variable was use of condoms, perhaps you might add the number of sexual 
partners and frequency of sexual intercourse as outcomes. Maybe it would be of interest 
to map the effects of the direct causes you initially specified for condom use onto these 
variables as well. On the other hand, you may choose not to add other outcomes, decid-
FIGURE 7.8. Moderated reciprocal causation. (a) One-moderator variable model; (b) two-
moderator variable model; (c) one moderator variable, two moderated relationships.
a
b
c
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ing that the system is appropriately focused on the one outcome you initially chose. If 
you add new outcome variables, then you must specify how all of the variables currently 
in your theory are related to them by adding appropriate causal paths.
Adding Effects of Effects
Another strategy for expanding your theory is to think of the original outcome variable 
that you started with and treat it as a cause of some new variable. In other words, make 
your effect a cause. What variables might your original outcome variable influence? 
Add these variables to the theory and draw causal arrows from your outcome variable 
to them. Note that in doing so, you have turned your original outcome variable into a 
mediator variable that mediates the effects of your original direct causes on your new 
outcome variables. With the “new” mediator, you must take a position on partial or com-
plete mediation. Also consider the possibility of adding a moderator variable to the new 
direct effect as well as mediated moderation, moderated mediation, and/or moderated 
moderation to it. As always, be sure you can articulate the underlying logic of every path 
in your model. Update your path diagram accordingly.
Specifying Causal Relationships between Existing Variables
Finally, for all of the variables in your theory at this time, map out the causal pathways 
between them. As an example, Figure 7.9a represents how your theory may have looked 
FIGURE 7.9. Mapping causal relationships among all variables. (a) Original specification; 
(b) mapped specification.
a
b
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after the step of identifying an outcome variable, Y, and then adding a few direct causes, 
X, Z, and Q. At this stage, you had made no statements about the causal relationships 
between X, Z, and Q. Now is the time to consider them. Could X influence Q or Z? Could 
Z influence Q or X? Could Q influence X or Z? Figure 7.9b shows one example of causal 
relationships you might impose on the existing variables. As you create new direct 
or indirect effects, consider elaborating them using all of the tools we have described 
before (e.g., mediation, partial mediation, moderators, moderated mediation, mediated 
moderation, and moderated moderation).
Summary of Additional Steps That May Create Spuriousness
To further expand your theory, you will want to consider the strategies of (1) adding 
additional outcome variables, (2) treating your outcomes as causes and specifying their 
effects, and (3) mapping out the causal relations among all variables within the theory. 
The results of these steps may create some spuriousness in the system, but the spurious-
ness should be of theoretical interest.
UNANALYZED RELATIONSHIPS
In causal models it is typically the case that one is uninterested in causal relationships 
between the exogenous variables. Causal relationships might exist between them, but 
you must close out the theoretical system at some point, and elaborating these casual 
relations is of secondary importance. Hence, you choose to ignore these causal dynamics, 
but you need to recognize that the exogenous variables are correlated. For this reason, 
it is traditional to create unanalyzed relationships between all the exogenous variables 
in a causal model, unless there is a strong theoretical reason for saying there is a zero 
correlation between them. Figure 7.10a shows a model without the unanalyzed relation-
ships indicated, whereas Figure 7.10b shows the same model with the unanalyzed rela-
tionships indicated by the curved, double-headed arrows. Note in this model that there 
are no curved arrows connecting endogenous variables. For example, variables D and 
E are expected to be correlated because they share common causes (variables A and B), 
but there is no curved arrow between them. The arrow is omitted because a correlation 
between D and E is implied by the causal structure, and it would be redundant to draw 
the curved two-headed arrow between them. Similarly, there is no curved two-headed 
arrow drawn between variables A and D because a correlation is implied by the fact that 
A is a cause of D. To reduce the clutter of path diagrams, such redundancies are omit-
ted.
At this point, you should draw the curved two-headed arrows among all of your 
exogenous variables or, if it makes your path diagram too cluttered, omit them but put 
a note at the bottom of the drawing stating that all exogenous variables are assumed to 
be correlated.
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ExPANDING THE THEORY FURTHER
Although we are almost ready to close out the theoretical system, there are some remain-
ing details you should consider. These include temporal dynamics, disturbance terms, 
incorporation of a measurement theory, revisiting the existing literature, considering 
sign reversals, and sharing ideas with colleagues.
Temporal Dynamics
Three Types of Temporal Effects
Thus far we have assumed that the theory you have developed does not involve longi-
tudinal features. But almost any set of variables can be examined at two points in time, 
three points in time, or multiple points in time. Thus, another facet you can consider 
adding to your theory is that of temporal dynamics. This addition can magnify the 
complexity of the theory considerably. To illustrate, consider a theory that consists of 
just one outcome and one direct cause at the same point in time. Let the cause, X, be the 
number of friends a child has in sixth grade and the effect, Y, be depression. The pro-
posed theoretical relationship is that children with fewer friends are more likely to be 
depressed. Suppose we add a second time point, the start of seventh grade, and add the 
same variables to the theory at this additional point. Figure 7.11 presents a causal struc-
ture that illustrates three types of causal paths in the longitudinal model that results.
FIGURE 7.10. Examples of exogenous and endogenous variables. (a) Three exogenous and 
three endogenous variables; (b) unanalyzed relationships between exogenous variables.
a
b
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First, paths a and b reflect the contemporaneous effects of the number of friends on 
depression. These causal paths are the effect of X on Y within a given time period. Sec-
ond, paths c and d reflect autoregressive effects; that is, where a variable at one point in 
time is assumed to influence a person’s standing on that same variable at a later point 
in time. For example, depression in grade 6 may impact depression in grade 7, and the 
number of friends children have in grade 6 may influence the number of friends they 
have in grade 7. Finally, paths e and f reflect lagged effects. These are effects of a vari-
able at time 1 on the other variable at time 2, independent of the contemporaneous and 
autoregressive effects that are operating. For example, the number of friends that chil-
dren have in grade 6 may impact child depression in grade 7. Similarly, a child’s depres-
sion in grade 6 may impact the number of friends he or she has in grade 7.
It is interesting to trace the effects of one variable on the other through the direct 
and indirect causal paths in this model. For example, the number of friends that the 
child has in grade 6 influences depression in grade 7 in four ways: (1) it impacts the 
number of friends the child has in grade 7, which, in turn, impacts depression in grade 7 
(paths d and b); (2) it impacts depression in grade 6, which, in turn, impacts depression 
in grade 7 (paths a and c); (3) it impacts depression in grade 6, which, in turn, impacts 
the number of friends in grade 7, which, in turn, impacts depression in grade 7 (paths a, 
e, and b); and (4) it directly impacts depression at grade 7 independent of all these other 
effects (path f).
When you add a longitudinal component to your theory, you should consider mod-
eling contemporaneous effects, autoregressive effects, and/or lagged effects between the 
variables. You do not need to add each of these effects. You add them only if there is a 
conceptual justification for doing so, and you can articulate the logic underlying them. 
Each of these effects can be elaborated upon using all the heuristics we have described 
previously.
Figure 7.12 presents a theory with three time points, grade 6, grade 7, and grade 8. 
This theory does not include all of the possible contemporaneous, autoregressive, and 
FIGURE 7.11. Models with temporal dynamics: Theory with two time points.
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lagged effects. Nevertheless, we present it to illustrate the additional complexities with 
multiwave longitudinal models. For example, path a reflects lagged effects from a time 
1 variable to a time 3 variable. Thus, one must consider not only the possible effects of 
variables at time t – 1 on variables at time t, but also the independent effects of variables 
at time t – 2 on variables at time t.
Choice of Time Intervals
In the preceding example we theorized about temporal dynamics using a 1-year interval 
between points. Why 1 year? Why not 6 months or 18 months? In longitudinal models, 
the choice of a time interval can be important. As an example, suppose a treatment to 
reduce child depression targets the parents of the child and teaches them more effec-
tive parenting skills for dealing with their child. The effect of the newly acquired skills 
on child depression will not be instantaneous. It will take time for the parents to apply 
them, for the child to notice a difference, and for the relationship between the parent and 
child to change to a positive enough state that the child starts to become less depressed. 
Suppose it takes a minimum of 3 months for the intervention to have its effect. Suppose 
further that an investigator chooses to evaluate the effects of the intervention 2 months 
after treatment. It will seem as if there is no treatment effect, even if the treatment has 
done what it was intended to do. If the researcher had waited 1 more month, an entirely 
different conclusion would result.
When working with longitudinal models, the choice of time intervals can influ-
ence the kinds of causal paths you include. You must carefully think through the time 
intervals you select to theorize about and have a rationale for the intervals upon which 
you ultimately settle. You should think about how long it takes for effects to manifest 
themselves in every longitudinal link in your theory.
FIGURE 7.12. Three-wave theory.
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Disturbance Terms
There is a subtler facet of theory construction that you can consider pursuing, although 
most theorists leave this to researchers who perform empirical tests of their theories. 
Our own preference is to be thorough and to provide researchers with a well-developed 
theoretical roadmap for purposes of theoretical tests, so we generally undertake this 
next step. But, do not expect to see it often at the level of theory description.
Consider the simple theory in Figure 7.13a. This theory has two direct causes, 
wherein variables X and Z are assumed to influence variable Y. A fourth “variable,” d, is 
represented by a circle. This variable represents all unspecified variables that influence 
Y other than X and Z. This is called a disturbance term, and its presence explicitly recog-
nizes that not all causal influences on a variable have been specified. Only endogenous 
variables have disturbance terms. Traditionally, each endogenous variable in a theory 
has a disturbance term associated with it.
FIGURE 7.13. Examples of disturbance terms. (a) Theory with disturbance term; (b) smoking 
and drug example with uncorrelated disturbance terms; (c) smoking and drug example with 
correlated disturbance terms
a
b
c
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Consider another example in Figure 7.13b. There are two endogenous variables and 
they share a common cause. One of the endogenous variables is adolescent tobacco use 
and the other is adolescent drug use. The common cause is gender. The theory posits 
that boys are more likely than girls to smoke cigarettes and that boys also are more likely 
than girls to use drugs. There is a disturbance term for each of the endogenous variables 
to acknowledge that many factors other than gender impact tobacco and drug use.
But there is a problem with this theory. According to the theory, the only reason that 
smoking cigarettes and drug use in adolescence are correlated is because they share the 
common cause of gender. In reality, there are many other common causes of these two 
constructs. For example, social class impacts both tobacco and drug use during ado-
lescence, with more economically disadvantaged youths having an increased tendency 
to smoke cigarettes and to use drugs. Essentially, social class resides within the distur-
bance term for smoking cigarettes and for drug use. If the same unspecified cause is in 
each disturbance term, you would expect the two disturbance terms to be correlated. 
Figure 7.13c presents a more plausible theory that includes this correlation between 
disturbances. According to this theory, there are two reasons why adolescent cigarette 
smoking and adolescent drug use are correlated. One reason is because they share the 
common cause of gender. Another reason is that they share other common causes that 
are unspecified by the theory and that reside in both disturbance terms, as reflected by 
the presence of correlated disturbances.
A well-developed theory provides explicit statements about which disturbance 
terms in the framework are correlated and which disturbance terms are not. The lazy 
way out for a theorist is to simply assume all disturbance terms are correlated. But this is 
not satisfactory, and it can create considerable difficulties for testing the theory empiri-
cally. A better approach is to carefully consider every pair of disturbance terms and try 
to articulate a common cause that resides in each. If you can articulate such a variable, 
then it makes sense to posit correlated disturbances. If you cannot articulate any such 
variable, or if its effects are thought to be trivial, then you should not posit correlated 
disturbances.
For models with a longitudinal component, many theorists have a “knee-jerk” reac-
tion that disturbances at two points in time must be correlated. Figure 7.14 illustrates a 
direct cause at two time points with correlated disturbances. We object to such mind-
less theorizing. Again, if one can articulate a compelling rationale for correlated distur-
bances, then by all means, correlated disturbances should be incorporated into the the-
ory. Otherwise, correlated disturbances should be viewed with theoretical skepticism.
If you are able to articulate a variable that resides in two disturbance terms to create 
correlated disturbances, why not just explicitly incorporate the variable into the theo-
retical system? For example, for the cigarette and drug use example in Figure 7.13, why 
not explicitly bring social class into the theoretical system? This, of course, is the desir-
able route. But as in the identification of mediators, at some point we want to close out 
the theoretical system and work only with the variables we have specified. By including 
disturbance terms and correlated disturbances, we are explicitly recognizing the opera-
tion of other variables, but we choose not to give them central focus in our theory.
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For your path diagram, add disturbance terms to each of your endogenous variables 
and then think through if correlated disturbances should be added for each pair of dis-
turbance terms.
Latent Variables, Structural Theory, and Incorporation of a 
Measurement Theory
Some theorists take matters yet a step further by incorporating a measurement theory 
into their conceptual frameworks. This step goes beyond the province of theory con-
struction, but we mention the general ideas here, as you may encounter them in your 
scientific readings. Any empirical test of a theory necessarily requires researchers to 
develop and use measures of the theoretical constructs. Just as one can build a theory 
linking one concept to another concept, so too can one build a theory linking a con-
struct to a measure of that construct. Some theorists combine both types of theories into 
a single overarching framework.
A measurement theory makes a distinction between a latent variable and an 
observed measure of that variable. The latent variable is the true construct that you 
are interested in making statements about—for example, depression. Although we can 
see the symptoms and overt manifestations of depression, we can’t directly observe the 
seat of depression in a person’s mind. Instead, we rely on some observable response(s) 
to assess the latent variable, such as a multi-item inventory of depression that a person 
might complete. Figure 7.15a contains one representation of a measurement model. The 
latent variable of depression is contained in a circle, and the observed measure thought 
to reflect depression is contained in a square (the label AR stands for adolescent report 
of depression). A causal path is drawn from the latent variable to the observed measure, 
FIGURE 7.14. Example of correlated disturbances in a longitudinal model.
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under the assumption that how depressed a person is influences how he or she responds 
to the questions on the inventory. There also is an error term, (e), that reflects measure-
ment error; that is, there are factors other than depression that influence a person’s 
responses on the inventory. Ideally, measurement error is minimal, but it is a fact of 
life for many research endeavors. The relationship between the latent construct and the 
observed indicator is usually assumed to be linear, but it could also be nonlinear.
Sometimes we obtain multiple indicators of a construct. For example, a researcher 
might obtain a self-report of depression from an adolescent as well as a report from the 
adolescent’s mother about how depressed the child is (MR). A measurement model for 
this scenario is presented in Figure 7.15b. The latent variable of depression is assumed 
to influence both of the observed measures, and each measure is assumed to have some 
measurement error as reflected by the presence of error terms. The errors are assumed 
to be uncorrelated because we cannot articulate any viable reason why we would expect 
FIGURE 7.15. Measurement models. (a) Single indicator; (b) multiple indicators.
a
b
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them to be correlated. However, one can introduce correlated measurement error, if 
appropriate.
Figure 7.16 presents an example of a more elaborate theoretical framework that 
incorporates a theory about the relationship between constructs as well as a mea-
surement theory. Although it appears somewhat intimidating, it is a straightforward 
model. There are five latent constructs, and the main substantive theory is focused 
on them. The portion of the diagram focused on the causal relations among the latent 
variables is called the structural model. The primary outcome variable in this model is 
the birthweight of a newborn. Birthweight is thought to be influenced by two factors: 
how much alcohol the mother consumes during her pregnancy and how much she 
smokes during her pregnancy. Both of these variables are thought to be influenced by 
two other variables. The first determinant is the extent of support the mother receives 
from friends and relatives who can help her quit smoking and drinking. The second is 
the mother’s locus of control. Locus of control refers to the extent to which the mother 
believes that what happens to her is beyond her control. The theory is that the more a 
mother thinks that what happens is not under her control, then more likely she will be 
to keep smoking and drinking during pregnancy. These two latent exogenous variables 
are assumed to be correlated. Each of the three latent endogenous variables has a dis-
FIGURE 7.16. Example of integrated structural and measurement model.
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turbance term, indicated by a circle with a d inside of it. The disturbances are assumed 
to be correlated for alcohol use and smoking.
The portion of the diagram with arrows from the latent constructs to the observed 
measures constitutes the measurement model. Each of the latent variables has multiple 
indicators; that is, the researcher obtains three measures of each construct, except 
birthweight, which is measured using two different indicators. In the interest of space, 
we do not describe these measures, but note that each is assumed to be fallible, that 
is, subject to some measurement error (see the circles ranging from e1 to e14). The 
 measurement errors are assumed to be uncorrelated. All of the relationships in the 
model are assumed by the theorist to be linear in form. Figure 7.16 provides an explicit 
roadmap for a researcher to test the combined structural theory and measurement 
theory.
We will not ask you to incorporate a theory of measurement into your path dia-
gram, as this goes beyond the scope of this book.
Revisiting Your Literature Review
Before closing out the theoretical system, you want to revisit all of the relevant scientific 
literature on your outcome variable and the other variables included in your system that 
you read before embarking on the theory construction enterprise. In relation to this lit-
erature, which variables have you included in your theory that the literature has failed to 
include? These represent innovations on your part. What relationships have you eluci-
dated that the literature has failed to elucidate? These also represent potential for a new 
contribution to scientific knowledge. What variables has the literature suggested that are 
omitted from your theory? You should consider bringing these into your theory. What 
relationships has the literature established that you have not or that contradict what you 
have theorized? Note these and make adjustments to your theory accordingly.
Some Final Steps
There are two additional steps we recommend you pursue. First, take every direct rela-
tionship you have specified and try reversing its sign. That is, if the relationship is 
positive, try making it inverse and see if you can articulate a logic that would justify 
this reversal. If the relationship is inverse, try making it positive and see if you can 
articulate a logic that would justify this reversal. If you are able to articulate compelling 
logic for both a direct and an inverse relationship, then you essentially have articulated 
competing theories that lead to opposite predictions. It is then an empirical question as 
to which theory is correct. As you consider relationship sign reversals, new mediators 
or moderators might come to mind, and you may want to alter your theory accordingly.
As a final step, show your theory to friends and colleagues and discuss it with them. 
Ask them what they think about it. Do they agree or disagree with it? Can they suggest 
variables you have left out or variables you should drop? Pursue input from diverse 
sources. When this is done, close out the theoretical system.
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BOx 7.1. Finding Sources for a Literature Review
A major strategy for developing ideas about causal models is reading about 
research that has been conducted in the area in which you are working. There 
are several methods for locating relevant literature. One procedure involves the 
use of computer searches of scientific journals and books, which are available in 
most college libraries (e.g., PsycINFO, Medline). In this procedure, you specify 
a set of “keywords” to search. For example, if you are studying attitudes toward 
abortion, you might do separate searches on the keywords abortion, attitudes 
toward abortion, or pregnancy resolution. The computer then scans the titles 
and abstracts of a large number of scientific journals, and a list of the titles and 
abstracts of all relevant articles that contain the keywords is provided. Check 
with your librarian for details about accessing these databases and conducting 
an electronic search.
In our experience, a computer search is only as good as one’s ability to gen-
erate a good list of keywords. The results of such a search may miss important 
articles because the author of an article did not use one of your keywords in the 
abstract or title. Also the search can include a good number of irrelevant articles. 
We often search first on an obvious keyword and then scan the abstracts of the 
“hits” to get ideas for additional keywords. We then follow up the initial search 
with more searches based on these new keywords.
A second approach to identifying relevant literature is called the “grandfa-
ther method.” In this approach, you first identify scientific journals where relevant 
articles are likely to have been published (this list can frequently be generated 
with the help of a professor or some other “expert,” as well as the above com-
puter search strategy). You then go to the Table of Contents of each issue of each 
journal for the past 5 years and identify articles that seem relevant based on 
their titles and abstracts. If an article is deemed relevant, you secure a copy of 
it, read it, and then examine its reference section for additional relevant articles, 
based on what you read. Then you locate these cited articles and repeat the 
process for each of them. The result will be a set of articles that appeared in 
the major journals and articles that were cited by these articles. The key to this 
method is to examine the bibliography of every article you locate, to further 
identify relevant research.
Another approach for identifying relevant literature is to use the Science Cita-
tion Index and/or the Social Science Citation Index. These are reference books 
or databases contained in most college libraries; they list, for a given author of 
a given paper, all of the articles published by other individuals who have cited 
the paper (an online version of both indices also exists). If you are aware of the 
author of a major article in the area in which you are working, then the citation 
index can be a useful way of identifying other researchers who have cited that 
article in the context of their published research. The relevant publications of 
cont.
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PERSPECTIVES ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF CAUSAL THEORIES
Path Diagrams as Theoretical Propositions
What started as a fairly simple theory and path diagram have probably now blossomed 
into a fairly elaborate theoretical network. An invaluable aid to developing the theory has 
been the path diagram that we continually updated, elaborated, and expanded. Many 
theories in the social sciences are simple three- or four-variable systems consisting only 
of direct causal relationships. Such theories are straightforward to describe using nar-
ratives, and it is easy to keep in mind the overall framework the theorist is elaborating. 
However, as theories grow in complexity, readers may need some type of pedagogical 
device to help them see the broader framework in a unified way. Path diagrams are 
useful in this regard. A path diagram summarizes many theoretical propositions that, 
if expressed verbally, would constitute a long list. Every causal path in a path diagram 
represents a theoretical proposition, and the absence of causal paths also can reflect 
theoretical propositions, such as propositions about complete mediation as opposed to 
partial mediation. To illustrate, consider the structural model in Figure 7.16. Here are 
the major theoretical propositions that derive from this path diagram:
Proposition 1: The birthweight of a newborn is influenced by how much a mother 
smokes during pregnancy. The more a mother smokes during the pregnancy, the 
lower the birthweight of the newborn. This relationship is assumed to be linear.
Proposition 2: The birthweight of a newborn is influenced by how much alcohol 
a mother consumes during pregnancy. The more alcohol a mother consumes dur-
ing the pregnancy, the lower the birthweight of the newborn. This relationship is 
assumed to be linear.
these other researchers can then be identified by information provided in the 
citation index.
Another strategy that can augment the above is to use the Internet to locate 
the websites of scientists who have published in the area in which you are work-
ing. Many professors and applied scientists maintain websites, on which they 
post their most recent research papers for downloading, some of which have not 
yet been published.
A final strategy is to use Google Scholar, a specialized search tool developed 
by the website Google for identifying papers and articles that have cited other 
papers and articles (see the Google website for details at www.google.com).
Once you have identified the relevant literature, read it! Don’t simply look at 
summaries of the research.
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Proposition 3: The amount a mother smokes during her pregnancy is influenced 
by the extent of her support network for quitting smoking. The more support the 
mother has to quit smoking, the less she will smoke during her pregnancy. This 
relationship is assumed to be linear.
Proposition 4: The amount a mother smokes during her pregnancy is influenced 
by her locus of control. The higher the locus of control, the less she will smoke 
during her pregnancy. This relationship is assumed to be linear.
Proposition 5: The amount of alcohol a mother consumes during her pregnancy is 
influenced by the extent of her support network for quitting drinking. The more 
support the mother has to quit drinking, the less she will drink during her preg-
nancy. This relationship is assumed to be linear.
Proposition 6: The amount of alcohol a mother consumes during her pregnancy 
is influenced by her locus of control. The higher the locus of control, the less she 
will drink during her pregnancy. This relationship is assumed to be linear.
Proposition 7: The effects of locus of control on birthweight are completely medi-
ated by how much a mother drinks and how much a mother smokes.
Proposition 8: The effects of the support network on birthweight are completely 
mediated by how much a mother drinks and how much a mother smokes.
Proposition 9: The correlation between how much a mother drinks and how much 
she smokes during pregnancy is a function of the common causes of locus of con-
trol and the extent of support network.
These propositions omit statements about correlated errors and the measurement 
model.
Years ago, when submitting grant proposals to secure funding to conduct research, 
it was common practice to list the specific aims and formal hypotheses early in the pro-
posal and then to coordinate discussion of the literature, elaboration of measures, and 
specification of data collection and data analysis around the three or four theoretical 
propositions stated in the aims section. This also was a common practice in scientific 
reports, where the introduction of the report would culminate in the formal statement 
of three or four hypotheses. However, as theory becomes multivariate and complex, 
which is more often the case in modern-day social science, these traditions become 
inefficient and detract from effective communication. Path diagrams can be a useful tool 
for summarizing theoretical propositions efficiently. Each path in the diagram can be 
labeled with a + or a – to indicate if the presumed relationship is assumed to be positive 
or inverse. Nonlinear relationships can be described in the text, either verbally or math-
ematically (using principles discussed in Chapter 9).
Unfortunately, some scientists fail to appreciate that path diagrams are the essence 
of multiple hypotheses and theoretical propositions. Thus, you may receive criticism in 
a grant proposal or a research report for not formally stating specific hypotheses, despite 
the fact that you have presented a clear and explicit path diagram.
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Another potential problem with the use of path diagrams comes from the opposite 
end of the spectrum. Some reviewers of proposals and reports do not believe you have a 
theory unless you have presented a path diagram. We have served on numerous review 
panels and have observed instances where a research project is said to “lack theory,” 
only to see a similar project move forward uncriticized simply because it had a diagram 
with boxes and arrows. The variables in the path diagram were abstract and fuzzy, the 
posited relationships were not well thought out or articulated, and crucial variables were 
omitted, but because there were boxes and arrows, the research was deemed as having 
a viable theoretical base.
We raise these issues so that you will not get discouraged if you are criticized for 
not specifying hypotheses after having presented a path diagram and so you will not be 
lackadaisical and think you can get by with any path diagram. If you use the heuristics 
we have described in this chapter and previous ones, if you carefully focus your con-
cepts and relationships, and if you can articulate the logic underlying every path in your 
path diagram, you should be on sound theoretical footing.
A Note on Research Design and Statistical Analysis
Theories of the form we have developed in this chapter often are associated with a 
method of statistical analysis called structural equation modeling (SEM). SEM tends to 
be used with research designs that are correlational or observational in nature rather 
than experimental, though SEM is also readily applied to experimental data. The theory 
construction strategies described in this chapter are useful independent of the type of 
research one uses to test theories or how one chooses to analyze data. If you think in 
terms of cause and effect, then the ideas presented in this chapter are relevant.
As an example, many areas of the social sciences develop and evaluate interven-
tions designed to impact healthy or unhealthy behavior. Research on interventions 
typically includes a treatment group that receives the intervention and a control group 
that does not. In such cases, the outcome variable (e.g., social anxiety, exercise, drug 
use) is the “effect,” and the “cause” is the presence or absence of the intervention 
(where the treatment group represents “the presence of the intervention” and the 
control group represents “the absence of the intervention”). In trying to understand 
the effects of the intervention, the social scientist builds a theory of the relationship 
between these two variables. Usually, the social scientist begins by assuming a direct 
causal relationship between them. From this juncture, he or she then starts the theory 
construction process of specifying mediators and moderators, as described throughout 
this chapter.
Elaborating the Logic Underlying Each Path
Just as grounded and emergent theorists need to build an effective case for each conclu-
sion or thesis they present, so too must the theorist who posits causal mechanisms using 
the approach described in this chapter do so. Each path in a path diagram is a “thesis” 
or a “potential conclusion,” and the theorist needs to build as strong as case as possible 
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for the underlying a priori logic. In Chapter 10 we describe theories of argumentation 
and rhetoric to provide perspectives that grounded and emergent theorists consider in 
describing the bases for their theses and conclusions. These same techniques can be 
used when building a case for a given path in a causal theory.
The Use of Causal Analysis in Grounded/Emergent Theorizing
The development of theory using the methods described in this chapter has emphasized 
an a priori approach to theory construction. However, there is no reason why the con-
cepts that we have developed cannot be applied to grounded and emergent theory con-
struction as well. Specifically, the grounded/emergent theorist can approach the analy-
sis and interpretation of qualitative data by constructing a path diagram that captures 
conceptually the causal relations among variables that have been judged to emerge from 
the data. In framing and thinking about the data, the theorist can think about direct 
causes, indirect causes, partial and complete mediation, moderated relationships, bidi-
rectional relationships, and spurious relationships; he or she can think about mediated 
mediation, moderated mediation, mediated moderation, and moderated moderation. In 
short, the causal framework can be used as a blueprint for the types of relationships that 
grounded/emergent theorists think about as they approach the theory construction pro-
cess from qualitative data. Indeed, most computer software for the analysis of qualitative 
data and for the development of grounded theory contains features for drawing path 
diagrams that capture the presumed causal dynamics in the qualitative data, though not 
in the detail represented in this chapter.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS
We conclude by listing the sequence of steps you might pursue in constructing your 
theory if you adopt a causal framework:
Step 1: Identify the outcome variable in which you are interested.•	
Step 2: Using heuristics from throughout this book, identify two or three direct •	
causes of the outcome.
(Note. The above two steps could instead be (1) specify a variable in which you are 
interested and (2) identify two or three consequences or outcomes associated with 
that variable. Or specify a single direct cause consisting of an intervention and an 
outcome. Whatever the sequence, you want to have at least one direct effect in your 
theory at this juncture.)
Step 3: Turn the direct causes into mediated effects using either the •	 why heuristic 
or the cause of a cause heuristic.
Step 3a: For each mediator, specify complete or partial mediation.•	
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Step 4: For every direct effect in the model, consider adding a moderator variable. •	
Focus each moderated relationship using a hypothetical mean factorial table (per 
Chapter 6).
Step 5: Expand and refine the mediated and moderated portions of the model.•	
Step 5a: For every mediated effect in the model, consider adding moderated medi-•	
ation.
Step 5b: For every moderated effect in the model, consider adding mediated mod-•	
eration.
Step 5c: For every moderated effect in the model, consider adding moderated •	
moderation.
Step 6: For every direct effect in the model, consider adding reciprocal causation.•	
Step 6a: For every reciprocal causal effect in the model, consider adding moder-•	
ated reciprocal causation.
Step 6b: For every moderated reciprocal causation effect, think about adding •	
moderated moderation.
Step 6c: Consider turning a reciprocal causal effect into a feedback loop by add-•	
ing mediators.
Step 6d: If feedback loops are added with mediators, consider the issue of partial •	
versus complete mediation.
Step 7: Consider adding new outcome variables to the system.•	
Step 8: Consider adding effects of effects in order to turn outcomes into media-•	
tors. Specify partial or complete mediation for new “mediators” and consider add-
ing mediated moderation, moderated mediation, and moderated moderation to this 
part of the system.
Step 9: Consider adding temporal dynamics to the model, including contemporane-•	
ous effects, autoregressive effects, and lagged effects.
Step 10: Fine-tune the relationships and logic of your model.•	
Step 10a: Allow all exogenous variables to be correlated.•	
Step 10b: Add disturbance terms for all endogenous variables and consider the •	
need to add correlated disturbances.
Step 10c: Focus all concepts and all relationships using strategies from Chapters •	
5 and 6.
Step 10d: Revisit your initial review of the literature and make changes to the •	
theory, as appropriate. Flag innovations in your theory.
Step 10e: Consider sign reversals for all direct relationships in your theory.•	
Step 10f: Get feedback from colleagues.•	
The 10-step sequence may make little sense for the grounded theorist. Rather, the 
different components of the causal model are pieced together through systematic analy-
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sis of the qualitative data and field notes. We return to this issue for grounded theorists 
in Chapter 10.
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ExERCISES
Exercises to Reinforce Concepts
 1. Distinguish between causal and predictive relationships.
 2. What are the five common features of the construct of causality upon which 
most social scientists agree?
 3. Identify and define the six basic types of relationships in causal models and 
give an example of each.
 4. What is the essence of a causal relationship? Why have some philosophers 
objected to the notion of causality?
 5. If causality can never be proven, why is the concept still useful in science?
 6. What is a path diagram?
 7. What strategies or heuristics can you use to turn a direct relationship into an 
indirect relationship? Create an example using them.
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 8. What is the difference between partial and complete mediation?
 9. What heuristics do you use to identify moderated relationships?
 10. What is the difference between mediated moderation, moderated mediation, 
and moderated moderation?
 11. How are feedback loops indirect effects?
 12. Why is there no such thing as an instantaneous reciprocal causal relation-
ship?
 13. What heuristics might lead to the addition of spurious effects in a theory?
 14. Are spurious effects always bad? Why or why not?
 15. What is the difference between an exogenous and an endogenous variable?
 16. What are the three types of relationships that incorporate temporal dynamics 
into them?
 17. How is the time frame important for analyzing mediation?
 18. Under what conditions do you specify correlated error?
 19. What is the difference between a structural model and a measurement model?
Exercises to Apply Concepts
 1. Find a study in the literature and describe the theory it tests using a causal 
framework. Draw a path diagram of the theory. Provide conceptual definitions 
of each construct and be explicit about the nature of each relationship in the 
theory.
 2. Using the principles discussed in this chapter, construct a causal theory. 
Include a path diagram of it and an accompanying narrative describing it. Give 
precise and clear conceptual definitions of each variable, using the strategies 
in Chapter 5. Clarify the relationships, as necessary, using the thought experi-
ment strategies in Chapter 6.
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Mathematical Modeling
Even if there is only one possible unified theory, it is just a set of rules and 
equations.
—Stephen W. Hawking (1988)
This chapter describes an approach to theory construction called mathematical mod-
eling. Like causal modeling, the approach involves describing relationships between 
variables, but the emphasis is on describing those relationships using mathematical 
concepts. Mathematical models can be used in conjunction with causal thinking, as we 
demonstrate in a later section of this chapter, but social scientists who use mathemati-
cal modeling tend not to think in terms of indirect causes, mediated relationships, and 
moderated relationships in the way that we outlined in Chapter 7. Instead, they focus on 
thinking about functions and describing relationships mathematically based on func-
tions. They more often than not use nonlinear relationships. Our focus here is not on 
integrating causal and mathematical modeling as approaches to theory construction. 
Rather, we merely wish to provide you with an additional tool for your theory construc-
tion toolbox, mathematical modeling, as you strive to gain insights into the phenomena 
you want to study.
Constructing mathematical models can involve complex mathematics that go well 
beyond the background of many readers of this book. Entire books have been written 
on mathematical modeling that assume years of study of calculus and formal mathemat-
ics. Our treatment must, accordingly, be limited, and we provide only a general sense 
of building mathematical models and thinking as a math modeler would. However, the 
chapter should be a good starting point for delving into this approach in more depth 
vis-à-vis the suggested readings at the end of the chapter.
Mathematical modeling is common in the physical sciences, but it is used less 
often in the social sciences. Our goal is to provide you with a sense of mathematical 
modeling as it is pursued in the social sciences. In this chapter we first expose you to 
basic concepts and terms you will encounter as you read about math models or pursue 
mathematical modeling. More specifically, we distinguish between categorical, discrete, 
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and continuous variables; differentiate axioms and theorems; introduce the notion of 
a function; use linear functions to identify key features of functions; and describe the 
difference between deterministic and stochastic models. We also provide an intuitive 
overview of derivatives, differentiation, integrals, and integration in calculus, as well 
key notions of model identification and metrics. We next describe five commonly used 
functions in math models: logarithmic functions, exponential functions, power func-
tions, polynomial functions, and trigonomic functions, as well as functions for categori-
cal variables. We conclude our background section by considering ways of transforming 
and combining functions and building functions for multiple variable scenarios.
Following the presentation of these key concepts, we describe the phases of build-
ing a mathematical model and then provide four examples of such models in the social 
sciences. We then briefly characterize chaos theory and catastrophe theory as influential 
mathematical models in the social sciences. Our initial discussion may seem a bit frac-
tured as we develop one mathematical concept after another. Be patient. Later sections 
will pull it all together.
TYPES OF VARIABLES: CATEGORICAL, DISCRETE, AND CONTINUOUS
In Chapter 6 we distinguished between categorical and quantitative variables. A cat-
egorical variable has different “levels,” “values,” or “categories,” and there is no special 
ordering to the categories along an underlying dimension. The categories are merely 
labels that differentiate one group from another (e.g., “male” or “female” for the variable 
of gender). In contrast, a quantitative variable is one in which individuals (in the social 
sciences) are assigned numerical values to place them into different categories, and the 
numerical values have meaning in that they imply more or less of an underlying dimen-
sion that is of theoretical interest.
Mathematical modelers make distinctions between discrete quantitative variables 
and continuous quantitative variables. A discrete variable is one in which there are a 
finite number of values between two values. For example, for the number of children in 
a family, there is a finite number of values, say, between 1 child and 4 children, namely 
the values of 2 children and 3 children. We do not think of there being 1.5 children or 
1.7 children in a family. For a continuous variable, however, there is an infinite number of 
values between any two values. Reaction time to a stimulus is an example of a continu-
ous variable. Even between the values of 1 and 2 seconds, an infinite number of values 
could occur (e.g., 1.001 seconds, 1.873 seconds, 1.874 seconds).
Whether a variable is classified as discrete or continuous depends on the nature of 
the underlying theoretical dimension and not on the scale used to measure that dimen-
sion. Tests that measure intelligence, for example, yield scores that are whole numbers 
(e.g., 101, 102); hence the scores are discrete. Nevertheless, intelligence is continuous 
in nature because it involves a dimension that permits an infinite number of values to 
occur, even though existing measuring devices are not sensitive enough to make such 
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fine distinctions. In the reaction time example, the measurement of time can be very 
precise with modern equipment, but there even is a limit to the precision possible with 
measures of time. Such limits in the precision of measurement do not make the underly-
ing dimension discrete. Reaction time is continuous in character.
Even though social scientists often must rely on discrete measures of continuous 
constructs, they build models with those measures as if they were continuous. As long 
as the measures are comprised of many values, this practice usually is not problematic. 
It is only when the number of values in the measure of a continuous variable is few 
that problems can arise and special considerations in the modeling effort need to be 
made.
The distinction between discrete and continuous variables is important because 
the strategies used to construct a mathematical model differ depending on whether the 
quantitative variables are discrete or continuous. We devote most of our attention to the 
case in which the theorist is working with continuous variables, but we occasionally 
consider qualitative and discrete variables as well.
AxIOMS AND THEOREMS
The term axiom is used in many ways in the social sciences, but in mathematics, an 
axiom is a mathematical statement that serves as a starting point from which other 
mathematical statements are logically derived. Axioms are “given.” They are not derived 
through deduction, nor are they the subject of mathematical proofs. They are starting 
points. By contrast, a theorem is a statement that can be logically derived from, or is 
proven by, one or more axioms or previous statements. The use of these terms and many 
variants of them (e.g., a proposition, a lemma, a corollary, a claim, an identity, a rule, a 
law, a postulate, a principle) vary somewhat depending on the branch of mathematics, 
but the above characterization captures the essence of axioms and theorems as used in 
mathematical models in the social sciences.
FUNCTIONS
Functions are central to mathematical modeling. A simple analogy for thinking about 
functions is to think of a machine that you put something into and get something back, 
based on what you input. For example, you might press a key that inputs the number 3 
into a machine and out comes the number 9. You might press another key that inputs 
the number 5 into the machine and out comes the number 15. The machine in this case 
represents the function “take the input value and triple it.” Functions in math typically 
involve numbers as inputs and outputs.
Suppose we decide to name our machine Jack. We can write the function that the 
machine performs as follows:
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 Jack(X) = 3X
This equation states that whatever the value of X, the value of “Jack of X” will be triple 
it. The traditional notation is to name the machine f (for “function”) and write it as fol-
lows:
 f(X) = 3X
All functions have what are called a domain and a range. The domain is the set of 
possible input values, and the range is the set of possible output values. The domain 
and range often are stated mathematically rather than listed as individual numbers. For 
example, for the function
 f(X) = 3X −
the domain or possible input values is any number greater than or equal to 3 (because 
you can not calculate the square root of a negative number), and the range or possible 
output values is any value greater than or equal to 0.1 The domain is any number that 
produces a “meaningful output” and that will not cause the machine to malfunction 
(e.g., the number 2, which would require us to calculate the square root of –1). A short-
hand way that mathematical modelers use to express the domain is “the domain is {X|X 
≥ 3},” where the symbol “|” is read as “given that.” This expression states that the domain 
is equal to X, given that X is greater than or equal to 3. This may seem a bit cryptic, but 
it is an efficient way of stating a domain or a range. For example, I might have a function 
where the domain is {X|X > 0} and the range is {Y|Y > 0}.
Functions can apply to more than a single input. For example, the function f(X,Z) 
= X – Z has two inputs, X and Z, and an output that is the difference between them. For 
example, if X = 5 and Z = 2, the function f(X,Z) yields the output 3.
Functions are the foundation of mathematical models. When one “maps” a func-
tion between Y and X, one attempts to specify what function applied to values on X will 
produce the values of Y. A central task in mathematical modeling is that of mapping 
functions.
LINEAR FUNCTIONS
One of the most commonly used functions in the social sciences is the linear function. 
In this section we describe the nature of linear functions and then use them to illustrate 
1For pedagogical reasons, we restrict all examples in this chapter to real numbers.
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basic issues in building mathematical models. In later sections we consider other func-
tions.
The Slope and Intercept
The Slope
Consider the two-variable example we used in Chapter 6 to develop the general idea 
of a linear relationship, namely, the number of hours an employee worked, X, and the 
amount of money paid to the employee, Y. Assume a scenario where each of four indi-
viduals works at a rate of $1 per hour. Their scores are:
     X Y 
 Individual  (hours worked) (dollars paid) 
  1    1 1 
  2    4 4 
  3    3 3 
  4    2 2
The relationship between X and Y is illustrated in Figure 8.1, which uses a scatterplot 
with connected dots. As indicated by the straight line on the scatterplot, there is a linear 
relationship between X and Y. This relationship can be stated mathematically as
 Y = X
FIGURE 8.1. Linear relationship with slope = 1.
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In other words, the number of dollars paid equals the number of hours worked.
Suppose the individuals were not paid $1 per hour, but instead were paid $2 per 
hour. The scores on X and Y would be as follows:
     X Y 
 Individual  (hours worked) (dollars paid) 
  1    1 2 
  2    4 8 
  3    3 6 
  4    2 4
In this case, the relationship between X and Y can be stated as
 Y = 2.00X
In other words, the number of dollars paid equals 2 times the number of hours worked. 
Figure 8.2 presents a scatterplot of these data (line B) as well as the data from Figure 8.1 
(line A). (Line C is explained on p. 184.) Notice that we still have a straight line (and, 
hence, a linear relationship) but, in the case of $2 per hour, the line rises faster than 
with $1 per hour; that is, the slope of the line is now steeper. Technically, the slope of 
a line indicates the number of units that variable Y changes when variable X increases 
by 1 unit. It is the rate of change in Y given a 1-unit increase in X. When the wage is $2 
per hour, a person who works 1 hour is paid $2, a person who works 2 hours is paid $4, 
FIGURE 8.2. Example of linear relationships with different slopes or intercepts.
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and so on. When X increases by 1 unit (e.g., from 1 to 2 hours), Y increases by 2 units 
(e.g., from $2 to $4). The slope that describes this linear relationship is therefore 2. In 
contrast, the slope that describes the linear relationship Y = X is 1.0, meaning that as X 
increases by 1 unit, so does Y. One way in which linear relationships differ is in terms 
of the slopes that describe them.
The slope that describes a linear relationship can be determined from a simple 
algebraic formula. This formula involves first selecting the X and Y values of any two 
individuals. The slope is computed by dividing the difference between the two Y scores 
by the difference between the two X scores; in other words, the change in Y scores is 
divided by the change in X scores. Algebraically,
 b = (Y2 – Y1)/(X2 – X1) (8.1)
where b represents the slope, X1 and Y1 are the X and Y scores for any one individual, 
and X2 and Y2 are the X and Y scores for any other individual. In our example, inserting 
the scores for individuals 1 (X = 1, Y = 2) and 2 (X = 4, Y = 8) into Equation 8.1, we find 
that the slope for line B is
 b = (2 – 8)/(1 – 4) = 2.00
This is consistent with what was stated previously.
The value of a slope can be positive, negative, or 0. Consider the following scores:
 Individual   X Y 
  1    2 3 
  2    1 4 
  3    4 1 
  4    3 2
Inserting the scores for individuals 2 and 4 into Equation 8.1, we find that the slope is
 b = (4 – 2)/(1 – 3) = –1.00
Figure 8.3 presents a scatterplot of the data for this relationship. The relationship is still 
linear, but now the line moves downward as we move from left to right on the X axis. 
This downward direction characterizes a negative slope, whereas an upward direction 
characterizes a positive slope. A slope of 0 is represented by a horizontal line because 
the value of Y is constant for values of X.
In sum, a positive slope indicates a positive or direct linear relationship between X 
and Y, whereas a negative slope indicates a negative or inverse linear relationship between 
X and Y. In the case of a positive relationship, as scores on X increase, scores on Y 
also increase. In the case of a negative relationship, as scores on X increase, scores on Y 
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decrease. For instance, the slope in Figure 8.3 is –1.00, meaning that for every unit X 
increases, Y decreases by one unit.
The Intercept
Let us return to the example where individuals are paid $2 per hour worked. Suppose 
that in addition to this wage, each individual is given a tip of $1.50. Now the relationship 
between X and Y is
 Y = 1.50 + 2.00X (8.2)
Line C of Figure 8.2 plots this relationship for the four individuals. If we compute the 
slope of this line, we find it is 2.00, as before. Notice that lines C and B are parallel but 
that line C is higher up on the Y axis than line B. The amount of separation between 
these two lines can be measured at the Y axis, where X = 0. When X = 0, the Y value is 
1.50 for line C and 0 for line B. Thus, line C is raised 1.50 units above line B.
The point at which a line intersects the Y axis when X = 0 is called the intercept, and 
its value is denoted by the letter a. Another way of thinking about the intercept is that it 
is the value of Y when X is zero.
Linear relationships can differ in the values of their intercepts as well as the values 
of their slopes. The general form of a linear equation is
 Y = a + bX (8.3)
FIGURE 8.3. Example of a negative slope.
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Stated more formally, the linear function is
 f(X) = a + bX
where a and b are constants representing an intercept and slope and X is a variable. A 
variable, Y, is described by this function if Y = f(X), that is, Y = a + bX. Equation 8.3 is 
called a linear equation.
DETERMINISTIC VERSUS STOCHASTIC MODELS
Any linear relationship can be represented by Equation 8.3. A slope and intercept always 
describe the linear relationship between two variables. Given values of the slope and 
intercept, we can substitute scores on X into the linear equation to determine the cor-
responding scores on Y. For example, the linear equation Y = 1.50 + 2.00X tells us that 
an individual who works for 2 hours is paid $5.50 because the Y score associated with 
an X score of 2 is
 Y = 1.50 + 2.00X = 1.50 + (2.00)(2) = $5.50
An individual who works for 3 hours is paid Y = 1.50 + (2.00)(3) = $7.50, and an indi-
vidual who works for 4 hours is paid Y = 1.50 + (2.00)(4) = $9.50.
When one variable is a linear function of another, all the data points on a scatterplot 
will fall on a straight line. However, rarely in the social sciences will we encounter such 
situations. When two variables only approximate a linear relationship, we need to add a 
term to the linear equation to accommodate random disparities from linearity. The term 
is called a disturbance or error term, yielding the equation
 Y = a + bX + e
where e is the difference between the observed Y score and the predicted score based 
on the linear function. The errors are assumed to be random rather than systematic 
because if the errors were systematic, then some meaningful form of nonlinearity would 
be suggested and would need to be modeled. It is important to keep in mind that e is an 
unmeasured variable that reflects the disparity between scores predicted by the model 
and observed scores.
Formal mathematical models do not include an error term when specified at the 
theoretical level. In this sense, they are deterministic rather than probabilistic. However, 
when testing mathematical models empirically, it is common for researchers to include 
an error term because there usually is some random “noise” that creates disparities from 
model predictions. A common practice is to identify the function that seems appropri-
ate for predicting and understanding a phenomenon and then, in data-based tests of the 
model, to add an error term to accommodate the hopefully small but random discrep-
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ancies that seem inevitable. A model is better if the discrepancies from predictions are 
trivial and have no practical consequence.
In the world of mathematical models, you will encounter distinctions between 
deterministic and probabilistic models. A deterministic model is one in which there is no 
random error operating. The model performs the same way for any given set of condi-
tions. In contrast, a probabilistic model is one in which some degree of randomness is 
present. Probabilistic models are also sometimes referred to as stochastic models.
MODEL PARAMETERS
Adjustable Parameters and Parameter Estimation
Mathematical models typically include variables that are measured as well as constants 
whose values can be derived logically or estimated from data. For example, in the linear 
function
 f(X) = a + bX
there is a variable, X, and two model constants that need to be specified, the intercept, 
a, and the slope, b. Constants such as the intercept and the slope are called adjustable 
parameters or adjustable constants, because their values can be set by the theorist to dif-
ferent values so as to affect the output of the function. For example, we might state that 
annual income is a function of the number of years of education, where the function is 
defined as f(X) = 1,000 + 5,000X. If the number of years of education is 2, then output of 
the function is 1,000 + (5,000)(2) = 11,000. By contrast, we might state that the function 
is f(X) = 2,000 + 4,000X. If the number of years of education is 2, then the output of the 
function is 2,000 + (4,000)(2) = 10,000. The slope and intercept are adjustable constants 
that affect the output value of the function as different values of X are substituted into 
the function.
When one is unsure what the value of the adjustable constants should be, then 
strategies can be used to estimate their values empirically based on data. For example, 
in a linear model where the relationship between Y and X is linear, except for the pres-
ence of random noise (i.e., Y = a + bX + e), a researcher might obtain data for the values 
of Y and the values of X for a group of individuals and then use traditional least-squares 
regression methods to estimate the values of the intercept and slope.
Mathematical models differ in the number of adjustable constants they include and 
in the number of constants that must be estimated from data. Models with many param-
eter values that must be estimated are less parsimonious and often present greater chal-
lenges for testing than models with fewer estimated parameters. When the value of an 
adjustable parameter is specified a priori by the theorist and not estimated, it is said to 
be fixed. When the value of the adjustable parameter is estimated from data, it is said to 
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be estimated. Thus, you will hear reference to fixed parameters and estimated parameters 
in math models.
RATES AND CHANGE: DERIVATIVES AND DIFFERENTIATION
Parameters in a mathematical model often are subject to meaningful interpretation. In 
the linear model, Y = a + bX, the slope reflects the predicted change in Y given a 1-unit 
change in X. It is calculated using Equation 8.1, which we repeat here:
 b = (Y2 – Y1)/(X2 – X1)
The slope is meaningful because it provides a sense of how much change in Y we can 
expect, given a change in X. Note that in the linear model, it does not matter where the 
change occurs on the X continuum. A 1-unit change on X, at the low end of the X con-
tinuum, will produce the same amount of change in Y as a 1-unit change in X at the high 
end of the X continuum. The value of the slope tells us how much change this is.
The slope is, in essence, a rate of change in Y, given a unit change in X. More gener-
ally, if we describe the change in Y between any two points as
 ∆Y = Y2 – Y1
and the change in X between those same two points as
 ∆X = X2 – X1
then the rate of change in Y relative to the change in X is the ratio of these
 Rate of change = 2 1
2 1
Y Y Y
X X X
∆ −=
∆ −
which, in this case, is the value of the slope. If ∆Y = 4 and ∆X = 2, then the rate of change 
of Y relative to a unit change in X is 4/2 = 2.
The property of equal amounts of change at all points on the X continuum does not 
apply to nonlinear relationships. Consider the nonlinear relationship between Y and X 
shown in Figure 8.4. At low values of X, small changes in X result in no change in Y, 
whereas at high values of X, small changes in X result in large changes in Y. The impact 
of a 1-unit change in X differs depending on the part of the X continuum at which the 
change occurs.
When analyzing change, two fundamental concepts from calculus are helpful: 
derivatives and differentiation. Derivatives refer to the concept of instantaneous change, 
and differentiation refers to algebraic methods for calculating the amount of instanta-
neous change that occurs. Let us explore these concepts in more depth.
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Instantaneous Change
Suppose we want to measure the speed of a car driving between two towns, Town A and 
Town B, that are 120 miles apart. Let Y be the distance traveled by the car. When the car 
is in Town A and just about to begin its journey, the car has traveled 0 miles, so we set 
Y1 = 0. When the car reaches Town B, it has traveled 120 miles, so we set Y2 = 120. Now 
let X be the amount of time the car spends traveling. Before the car leaves Town A, X1 = 
0 hours. Suppose when the car finally reaches Town B, the car has been on the road for 
2 hours. This means that X2 = 2 hours. Using the logic from above, the rate of change in 
Y as a function of X is
 Rate of change = 2 1
2 1
( ) (120 0)
60
( ) (2 0)
Y Y Y
X X X
− ∆ −= = =
− ∆ −
 (8.4)
or 60 miles per hour. A 1-unit change in time (X, as measured in hours) is associated 
with a 60-unit change in distance (Y, as measures in miles).
The value of 60 miles per hour represents the average speed of the car during the 
entire trip. But it is probably the case that the car did not travel at a speed of exactly 60 
miles per hour during the entire trip. At times, it probably was driven faster and at other 
times, slower. Suppose we wanted to know how fast the car was going 15 minutes into 
the trip. One way of determining this number is to define values for X1 and Y1 at 14 min-
utes and 59 seconds into the trip and then to define X2 and Y2 values at 15 minutes and 
1 second into trip. We could then apply Equation 8.4 to this more narrowly defined time 
frame. Although the result would give us a sense of how fast the car was being driven 15 
FIGURE 8.4. Nonlinear relationship for derivative example.
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minutes into the trip, it would not tell us how fast the car was being driven at exactly 15 
minutes into the trip. We want to know at the very instant of 15 minutes into the trip, 
how fast the car was going, that is, what its rate of change was at that particular instant. 
It is this concept of instantaneous change to which a derivative refers. The velocity that 
the car is traveling at an exact point in time maps onto the notion of a derivative.
For a nonlinear relationship such as that in Figure 8.4, it is possible to use differ-
entiation to calculate the instantaneous rate of change in Y at any given value of X. The 
derivative is the (instantaneous) slope of Y on X at that given point of X. It is analogous 
to specifying the speed at which a car is being driven at a specific point in time. For 
some modeling problems, calculating a derivative by the process of differentiation is 
straightforward. For other problems, it can be quite complex. Methods of differentiation 
are taught in calculus and need not concern us here. The main point we want to convey 
is that in many forms of mathematical modeling, rates of change in Y as a function of 
changes in X are described using the language of derivatives, and it is important that you 
have a sense of that language.
For linear models, the instantaneous rate of change in Y at some point on the X con-
tinuum is the same as the instantaneous rate of change in Y at any other point on the X 
continuum. By contrast, for the nonlinear relationship in Figure 8.4, the instantaneous 
rate of change depends on where on the X continuum the change is occurring. In Figure 
8.4 the derivative (i.e., instantaneous rate of change) when X = 1 is 0.04, whereas when 
X = 4, the derivative is 1.98. We calculated these values using calculus. A common nota-
tion for signifying a derivative is dY/dX. A common phrase for describing derivatives is 
to state “the value of the derivative at X = 4 is 1.98.” If the derivative has the same value 
at all points on X (as is the case for a linear relationship), then one refers simply to “the 
derivative” without specifying the value of X at which the derivative is calculated.
You also may encounter a derivative expressed as a rate of change (∆Y and ∆X), but 
invoking what is called a limit, perhaps as follows:
 
ä

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The left-hand part of this expression contains the abbreviation lim (for the word limit), 
and the entire expression describes symbolically the idea of instantaneous change. Spe-
cifically, this expression is read as “the change in Y relative to the change in X as the 
change in X approaches its lower limit of zero” (analogous to the case where we calcu-
lated speed at exactly 15 minutes into the trip). The expression is just a way of referring 
to a derivative in a more formal way.
Second and Third Derivatives
In calculus some functions have higher-order derivatives, such as a second derivative or a 
third derivative. We will not use second or third derivatives in the mathematical models 
considered in this chapter, but it will help to have some appreciation for these concepts. 
As noted above, a derivative refers to a rate of change of one variable (∆Y) relative to the 
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rate of change of another variable (∆X) in the context of instantaneous change. In our 
driving example, the first derivative refers to the speed or velocity with which a car is 
driven at any given point in time. Suppose the car is driving along and the driver decides 
to speed up. The result of pressing harder on the accelerator is that the car’s velocity (i.e., 
the first derivative) increases. A second derivative in this case refers to the change in the 
first derivative that occurred at any given instant. It is analogous to what we commonly 
call acceleration. When you press the accelerator pedal, you “change” your speed. How 
much your speed changes at a given instant is the idea of a second derivative. If, in turn, 
your rate of acceleration changes (e.g., you “let off” the pedal and decelerate), then this 
maps onto the idea of a third derivative.
In a linear function the value of the second derivative is zero, because there is never 
a change in the value of the first derivative at different points of X. For nonlinear rela-
tionships, the value of the second derivative is nonzero at different points on X. When 
reading about mathematical models, in addition to the concept of first derivatives, you 
may encounter the concepts of second or third derivatives.
In sum, derivatives are useful concepts for describing rates of change in Y as a func-
tion of X. For nonlinear functions, the rate of change in Y will differ depending on where 
on the X continuum the change is occurring. A derivative is an index of instantaneous 
change at a given X value. It is a slope, but a special one, namely an “instantaneous” 
slope. First derivatives are fairly straightforward. Second and third derivatives are a bit 
more abstract. For those readers familiar with interaction effects in statistics, a second-
order derivative is roughly analogous to a two-way interaction and a third order deriva-
tive is roughly analogous to a three-way interaction.
DESCRIBING ACCUMULATION: INTEGRALS AND INTEGRATION
When describing mathematical models, many theorists emphasize derivatives, that is, 
rates of change. There is another concept in calculus that is sometimes emphasized in 
mathematical models: the integral. This concept reflects the amount of something. The 
process of calculating an integral is called integration. To gain a sense of what an integral 
is, consider the well-known function in statistics of the probability density function for 
a standard normal distribution. This function, often presented in statistics texts, is the 
basis for calculating the “area under the curve” in a normal distribution. Figure 8.5 pres-
ents a graphical representation of this function, as it often appears in statistics books. 
The various X values on the horizontal axis are standard scores, with a mean of zero 
and a standard deviation of 1. One can specify any two points in this distribution, say, 
a value of 0 and a value of 1, and then calculate the area under the curve between these 
two points. If one scales the total area under the curve to equal a value of 1.00, then the 
area under the curve between two X scores is the proportion of the total area that falls 
between the two points. For example, the area under the curve between the X values 
of 0 and 1 is 0.3413 (see Figure 8.5). Between the X values of 1 and 2, the area under 
the curve is 0.1359. Between X values of –1 and 1, the area under the curve is 0.6826. 
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Graphically, an integral is the area under the curve between two points. The integral for 
the values 0 and 1 in Figure 8.5 is 0.3413. The integral for the values 1 and 2 is 0.1359. 
Because it focuses on the area under the curve, one can see that, roughly speaking, an 
integral refers to “the amount of something.”
A common use of integrals in mathematical models is to characterize accumula-
tions, that is, how much of something has accumulated. Many phenomena accumulate. 
We accumulate money in savings accounts. Frustration accumulates with each stress-
ful event experienced within a short time span. Although the mathematical details 
of integration are well beyond the scope of this book, when one uses the concept of 
integrals, one often does so in the context of building models of phenomena that accu-
mulate.
JUST-IDENTIFIED, OVERIDENTIFIED, AND UNDERIDENTIFIED MODELS
Mathematical models vary in their identification status. Model identification refers to 
cases where the values of model parameters must be estimated from data. A just- identified 
model is one for which there is a unique solution (i.e., one and only one solution) for 
the value of each estimated parameter in the model. Consider an analogy from algebra, 
where we might be given two equations with two unknowns of the following form:
  23 = 2X + 3Z 
  9 = X + Z
FIGURE 8.5. Area under the curve for a standardized normal distribution.
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For these two equations, there is a unique solution for X and Z: X = 4 and Z = 5.
An underidentified model is one for which there is an infinite number of solutions 
for one or more of the model parameters. In the equation
 10 = X + Z
there is an infinite number of solutions for X and Z (e.g., X = 10 and Z = 0 is one solution; 
X = 9 and Z = 1 is another solution). Models that have one or more parameters that are 
underidentified are often problematic.
An overidentified model is one for which there is a unique solution for the model 
parameters, and there is more than one feature of the model that can be used to inde-
pendently estimate the parameter values. Using the algebraic analogy, consider the fol-
lowing three equations:
   10 = X + Z 
   18 = 2X + Z 
   12 = X + 2Z
There are three equations with a total of two unknowns, and any given pair of equa-
tions, no matter which pair, can be used independently to solve for the unknowns. In 
models for which parameter values must be estimated and the function fit is not perfect 
(i.e., there is an error term such that the model is stochastic), model parameters that 
have overidentified status are desirable because one can obtain independent estimates 
of those parameter values.
In sum, when reading math models, you may encounter references to a model as 
being just-identified, underidentified, or overidentified. Models that are underidentified 
are unsatisfactory.
METRICS
When developing mathematical models, theorists give careful consideration to the met-
ric on which the variables in the model are measured, especially when nonlinear mod-
eling is involved. This is because the accuracy of a mathematical model and the infer-
ences one makes can be (but are not always) influenced by the metric of the variables. 
Depending on the variable metric, a theorist might resort to different functions in the 
mathematical model to describe the relationships between variables. For example, for 
the variable time, the model form and parameters introduced into the model might vary 
depending on whether time is measured in milliseconds, seconds, days, weeks, or years. 
The nature of metrics poses difficulty for some constructs in the social sciences because 
the metric used to measure them is arbitrary. For example, when a researcher uses a 
10-item agree–disagree scale to measure peoples’ attitudes toward religion, the metric 
might be scored from –5 to +5, or from 0 to 9, or from 1 to 10. In some mathematical 
  Mathematical Modeling 193
models, the choice of scoring matters a great deal, so an arbitrary metric can create 
modeling difficulties.
TYPES OF NONLINEARITY
Thus far we have considered a simple mathematical model—the linear model—to intro-
duce several concepts in mathematical modeling. The linear model has two adjustable 
parameters, a slope and an intercept, that typically are estimated rather than fixed by 
the theorist. In this section we introduce other functions that are nonlinear in form and 
that can be used in mathematical models. There are many classes of functions, and we 
cannot begin to describe them all. Here we focus on describing five major classes of 
functions (the linear function makes six classes). The idea is to give you a sense of some 
of the nonlinear functions that can be used to build a math model. After presenting the 
functions, we describe strategies for modifying and combining them to build even more 
intricate mathematical representations. As we describe the different functions and the 
modifications to them that can be made, you will see the wide range of tools available to 
a math modeler when characterizing relationships between variables.2
To describe functions, we often use three concepts: (1) concavity, (2) proportional-
ity, and (3) scaling constants. Concavity refers to whether the rate of change on a curve 
(the first derivative) is increasing or decreasing. A curve that is concave upward has an 
increasing first derivative, and a curve that is concave downward has a decreasing first 
derivative. In terms of proportionality, two variables are proportional to one another 
when one variable is a multiple of the other. More formally, Y is proportional to X if 
Y = cX, where c is a constant. The value c is called the constant of proportionality. For 
proportionality, doubling X doubles Y, tripling X triples Y, and halving X halves Y. Two 
variables are said to be inversely proportional when there is some constant c for which 
Y = c/X. In this case, doubling X halves Y, tripling X cuts Y by one-third, and halving 
X doubles Y. Scaling constants refer to adjustable parameters in a model that have no 
substantive meaning but are included to shift a variable from one metric to another. 
For example, to change meters to centimeters, we multiply the meters by the constant 
100, which shifts the metric of length to centimeters. As we describe different functions 
below, we occasionally do so in terms of the concepts of concavity, proportionality, or 
scaling constants.
Logarithmic Functions
The logarithmic function (often referred to as the log function) has the general form 
f(X) = loga(X), where a is a constant indicating the base of the logarithm. Logs can be 
calculated for different bases, such as the base 10, the base 2, or the base 8.
2Our discussion of functions and the graphic representations of them draws on concepts described by 
W. Mueller (see www.wmueller.com/precalculus/index.html).
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The log base 10 of the number 100 is written as log10(100), where the subscript is 
the base and the number in parentheses is the number for which you are calculating the 
log. If n stands for the number for which you are calculating the log, and a is the base 
of the log, then the log is the solution for b in the equation n = ab. For log10(100), we 
solve for b in the equation 100 = 10b, so the log base 10 of the number 100 is 2 (because 
102 = 100). The value of log5(25) is 2 because 5
2 = 25. Sometimes you will encounter a 
log expression with no base, such as log(1,000). When this happens, the log is assumed 
to have a base of 10. So log(1,000) = 3 (because 103 = 1,000).
There is a special logarithm, called the natural log, that uses a constant called e 
as its base. The number e appears in many mathematical theories. Its value is approxi-
mately 2.71828. The number e was studied in depth by Leonhard Euler in the 1720s, 
although it was first studied by John Napier, the inventor of logarithms, in 1614. It has 
some remarkable mathematical properties (which we will not elaborate on here) and is 
referred to as Napier’s constant. The natural log of a number is signified by the expres-
sion ln(n). For example, the natural log of 10 is signified by ln(10). It equals approxi-
mately log2.71828(10) = 2.302585.
Figure 8.6 presents sample graphs of log functions. When expressing the relation-
ship between two variables, rather than using a linear function, one might use a log func-
tion. Log functions are sometimes used to model growth or change when the change is 
rapid at first and then slows down to a gradual and eventually almost nonexistent pace 
(see Figure 8.6a).
Log functions share many common features: (1) The logarithm is undefined for 
negative values of X (where X is the number for which you are calculating the log); (2) 
the value of the log can be positive or negative; (3) as the value of X approaches zero, 
the value of the log approaches negative infinity; (4) when X = 1, the value of the log is 
0; and (5) as X approaches infinity, the log of X also approaches infinity. For the func-
tion loga(X), the function output increases with increasing X if a > 1 and decreases with 
increasing X if a is between 0 and 1.
Exponential Functions
The exponential function has the general form f(X) = aX. The function yields output that 
increases in value with increasing X if a > 1 and decreases in value with increasing X 
if a is between 0 and 1. Figure 8.7 presents examples of common exponential curves. 
These curves are often used to refer to growth, such as when people say a population is 
“growing exponentially.” With exponential growth or change, the larger a population 
gets, the faster it grows. For decreasing exponential growth or change, the smaller the 
population gets, the more slowly it decreases in size. As it turns out, exponential func-
tions are simply the inverse of log functions, so the two functions mirror image each 
other’s properties. For exponential functions, if a is between –1 and 0, then the output 
value is a damped oscillation as X increases, and if a is < –1, it is an undamped oscilla-
tion as X increases (see the later section on trigonometric functions for a discussion of 
oscillation).
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Social scientists often modify the exponential function to create functions that 
reflect growth or change with certain properties. For example, using the fact that any 
number raised to the power of 0 is equal to 1, the following equation can be used to 
describe exponential growth over time
FIGURE 8.6. Graphs of log functions for loga(X) with X ranging from 1 to 100. (a) a > 1; 
(b) 0 < a < 1.
a
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b
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 Y = s0e
(kX)
where Y is the population size at a given point in time, X is the duration in time since a 
predetermined start time, and s0, e, and k are constants. In this case, e is Napier’s con-
FIGURE 8.7. Graphs of exponential functions for aX with X ranging from 1 to 5. (a) a > 1; 
(b) 0 < a < 1.
a
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b
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stant. The value of s0 is fixed at a value equal to the population size at the predetermined 
start time. Note that when X = 0, the population size will equal the population size at 
the start time (because any number raised to the power of zero is 1.0). For this function, 
Y increases geometrically with a doubling time equal to 0.6932/k. A graph illustrating 
this function appears in Figure 8.8, where the starting size of a population is s0 = 5,000, 
where k = 0.333 (yielding a doubling time of just over 2 years), and where X ranges from 
0 to 5 years. When expressing the relationship between two variables, rather than using 
a linear or log function, one might use an exponential function, such as that illustrated 
in Figure 8.8.
Power Functions
Power functions have the general form f(X) = Xa where a is an adjustable constant. For 
positive values of X greater than 1, when a > 1, the curve will be concave upward, and 
when a is between 0 and 1, the curve will be concave downward.
Power functions often have a similar shape to exponential and logarithmic func-
tions, with the differences between the functions sometimes being subtle. When the 
difference is small, it does not matter which function is used to create the model. But 
differences can exist. Exponential functions increase by multiples over constant input 
intervals. Logarithms increase by constant intervals over input multiples. Power func-
tions do not follow either of these patterns. Power curves eventually outgrow a loga-
rithm and undergrow an exponential as X increases. A practical example of the function 
differences is the modeling of the spread of HIV, the virus that causes AIDS. During the 
FIGURE 8.8. Exponential growth for Y = s0 e(kX).
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early stages of the epidemic, it was thought that the number of HIV cases was growing 
exponentially, but in later analyses, the function was found to be better mapped by a 
power function. An exponential model yielded overestimates of the number of cases 
forecast in future years, which in turn led to overestimates of the required resources to 
deal with the epidemic (e.g., hospital space, medications; see Mueller, 2006).
Figure 8.9 presents some examples of power functions, and Figure 8.10 plots a 
power function and an exponential function on the same graph to illustrate some of 
these properties. When expressing the relationship between two variables, rather than 
using a linear, log, or exponential function, one might use a power function instead.
Polynomial Functions
Polynomial functions are simply the sum of power functions. The general form of a 
polynomial function is
 f(X) = a + bX1 + cX2 + dX3 + . . .
where X continues to be raised to the next highest integer value, and each term has a 
potentially unique adjustable constant. Polynomials can model data with many “wiggles 
and turns,” but the more wiggles and turns there are, the greater the number of power 
terms that are required to model it. Notice that when only a single term for X is used 
with a power of 1, the polynomial model reduces to a linear model. The adjustable con-
stant a is typically viewed as a scaling constant. Adding one term to the linear model 
(i.e., adding the term cX2) allows the model to accommodate a curve with one bend. A 
polynomial model with three terms (a + bX1 + cX2 + dX3) will accommodate a curve with 
two bends. A polynomial model with four terms will accommodate a curve with three 
bends. In general, to accommodate k bends, you need k + 1 terms.
The most popular polynomial functions in the social sciences are the quadratic and 
cubic functions. They are defined as
 Quadratic: f(X) = a + bX + cX2 
 Cubic:     f(X) = a + bX + cX2 + dX3
Figures 8.11 and 8.12 provide an example of each type of curve, and Figure 8.13 
provides an example of a polynomial function with eight terms. The quadratic model 
is effective for modeling U-shaped and inverted-U-shaped relationships as well as 
J-shaped and inverted-J-shaped relationships. The cubic function is effective for model-
ing S-shaped curves. In Figure 8.12b we manipulated the scaling constant, a, to create 
separation between curves so that you can better see the trends. Figure 8.13 illustrates 
how diverse a “curve” that large polynomials can create. When expressing the relation-
ship between two variables, rather than using a linear, log, exponential, or power func-
tion, one might use a polynomial function instead.
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FIGURE 8.9. Graphs of power functions for Xa with X ranging from 1 to 5. (a) a > 1; 
(b) 0 < a < 1; (c) a < 0.
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Trigonomic Functions
Trigonometric functions are typically used to model cyclical phenomena. The two most 
common functions are the sine function and the cosine function, which have the form 
f(X) = sin(aX) and f(X) = cos(aX), where a is a constant, sin is the sine, and cos is the 
cosine. The sine and the cosine functions repeat the values of their outputs at regular 
intervals as X increases. Simple transformations of the sine and cosine functions can 
reproduce many forms of periodic behavior. For example, some people have suggested 
that rhythmic cycles, called biorhythms, reflect active and passive phases in the physi-
cal aspects of everyday life. The phases of biorhythms are modeled using a sine function 
of the form f(X) = sin(.224*X), where X is the number of days since a baseline index is 
taken. Output values range from 1 to –1, with positive values indicating increasingly 
high energy and negative values indicating increasingly low energy. Figure 8.14 plots the 
output values for 120 days, starting at day 0. As noted earlier, certain types of cyclical 
phenomena also can be modeled using exponential functions with negative values of a 
in the expression f(X) = aX.
Choosing a Function
In sum, there are a wide range of functions available to the math modeler for describ-
ing the relationship between variables, including linear functions, logarithmic func-
tions, exponential functions, power functions, polynomial functions, and trigonometric 
functions, to name a few. We have only scratched the surface of the many strategies a 
FIGURE 8.10. Example of power and exponential functions.
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mathematical modeler can use. As you become familiar with functions and the curves 
they imply, you should be able to make informed choices about modeling relationships 
between variables. Mathematical modelers sometimes select functions for their models 
a priori, based on logic, and other times they make decisions about appropriate model 
FIGURE 8.11. Quadratic functions. (a) Function a + bX + cX2, with a = 0, b = .5; (b) function 
a + bX + cX2, with a = 0, b = –1.
a
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functions after collecting data and scrutinizing scatterplots. In the latter case, the model 
chosen and the values of the adjustable parameters are still subjected to future empiri-
cal tests, even though preliminary data are used to gain perspectives on appropriate 
functional forms. You can gain perspectives on the curves implied by different functions 
FIGURE 8.12. Cubic functions. (a) Function for a + bX + cX2 + dX3; (b) additional functions 
for a + bX + cX2 + dX3.
a
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b
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by creating hypothetical data and applying the different functions to them. We provide 
information on how to do this using the statistical package SPSS in Appendix 8A to this 
chapter, and also provide information about other graphics software.
FUNCTIONS FOR CATEGORICAL VARIABLES
Thus far we have considered only functions involving quantitative variables, but func-
tions also can be specified for categorical variables. Consider as a simple example the 
relationship between whether or not someone uses an umbrella as a function of whether 
or not it is raining. The relationship between these two categorical variables is expressed 
as follows
 
( )f x
= 

umbrella,            if x = raining 
               no umbrella,       if x = not raining
where one uses an umbrella if it is raining and one does not use an umbrella if it is not 
raining.
Sometimes mathematical modelers create quantitative representations of categorical 
variables and then analyze the quantitative translations using the quantitative functions 
described earlier. For example, one could specify a mathematical function relating the 
probability of carrying an umbrella to the probability of it raining, with both variables 
FIGURE 8.13. Polynomial function with seven terms.
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differing on a probability continuum of 0 to 1.0. The function might then be expressed 
as an exponential function, as in Figure 8.7a.
In some cases, functions involving categorical and quantitative variables are stated 
in terms of a table of values rather than symbolically. For example, suppose we specify 
whether someone is a Democrat or Republican as a function of scores on a 7-point index 
(e.g., response to a rating scale) of how conservative or liberal he or she is. The scale 
consists of integers ranging from –3 to +3, with increasingly negative scores signifying 
more conservativeness, increasingly positive scores signifying more liberalness, and the 
score of zero representing a neutral point. The function Y = f(X) might be stated as
X Y
–3 Republican
–2 Republican
–1 Republican
0 Democrat
1 Democrat
2 Democrat
3 Democrat
In this representation, the person is said to be a Republican if he or she has a value of –1, 
–2, or –3. Otherwise, the person is a Democrat.
FIGURE 8.14. Sine function.
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Another approach to representing a function with a categorical variable is to use a 
graph. For example, the liberal–conservative and party identification function might be 
expressed as in Figure 8.15.
ADVANCED TOPICS: MANIPULATING AND COMBINING FUNCTIONS
One creative aspect of mathematical modeling is deriving new functions from old func-
tions so as to create models that are better suited to describing the relationship between 
variables. We saw hints of this for polynomial functions (which combine power func-
tions). Another class of functions, which we did not discuss, divides one polynomial 
function by a second polynomial function rather than summing polynomials. These are 
called rational functions. We provide illustrations of manipulating and combining func-
tions here to show the flexibility available to the math modeler.
Function Transformations
One way of modifying functions is to add adjustable parameters to them. Given a func-
tion f(x), one can add or subtract an adjustable parameter, a, after the rule described by 
f(X) is applied: that is, f(X) ± a. This has the effect of shifting the output values upward 
(in the case of addition) or downward (in the case of subtraction). These transforma-
tions are called vertical shifts. The output of a function also can be multiplied by the 
parameter a after the rule described by f(X) is applied, that is, a × f(X). This transforma-
tion vertically stretches (when a > 1) or squeezes (when a < 1) the graph of the function. 
Such transformations are called vertical stretches or vertical crunches. Another possibil-
ity is to add or subtract a from f(X) before the rule described by f(X) is applied: that is, 
f(X + a) or f(X – a). These transformations typically move the graph of the function left 
when adding a positive value of a or right when subtracting a positive value of a. Such 
transformations are called horizontal shifts. Finally, one can multiply X before the rule 
described by f(X) is applied; that is, f(aX). These transformations horizontally stretch 
(when a < 1) or squeeze (when a > 1) the graph of the function. Such transformations are 
FIGURE 8.15. Graphical representation of a function with a qualitative variable.
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called horizontal stretches or horizontal crunches. Coupled with the possibility of form-
ing inverses for many functions, mathematical modelers have considerable flexibility 
in manipulating traditional functions with the use of vertical shifts, horizontal shifts, 
vertical stretches, vertical crunches, horizontal stretches, and horizontal crunches. If 
you begin your modeling efforts with a traditional function that is approximately cor-
rect in form, then transformations such as the above allow you to fine-tune the form of 
the curve to your problem. An example of this is the classic bounded exponential model, 
which we now consider.
Recall that the exponential function is f(X) = aX. A simple set of modifications to 
this function produces what is called a bounded exponential model. This has the form
 Y = a + (b – ce–X)
where a, b, and c are adjustable constants and e is Napier’s constant. The term ce–X is 
essentially an exponential function where a = e and the exponent is multiplied by an 
adjustable constant, c. This creates a decaying exponential curve, which is then sub-
tracted from a fixed upper bound or limit reflected by the value of b. As the decaying 
exponential dies out, the difference from b rises up to the bound. The parameter a is 
a scaling constant. This kind of function models growth that is limited by some fixed 
capacity. Figure 8.16 presents an example of this curve, as well as a traditional expo-
nential curve.
Combining Functions
Another strategy that math modelers use is to combine functions. A popular function 
in the social sciences is the logistic function. It has the general form f(X) = c/(1 + ae–bX) 
where a, b, and c are adjustable constants and e is Napier’s constant. A logistic function 
is a combination of the exponential growth and bounded exponential growth func-
tions that were illustrated in Figure 8.16. In the logistic function, exponential growth 
occurs when the function outputs for X are small in value. However, this turns into 
bounded exponential growth as the function outputs approach their upper bound. A 
logistic function is plotted in Figure 8.17. Note the shapes of the curve to the right 
and left of the broken line in Figure 8.17 and compare these with the curve shapes in 
Figure 8.16. The result of combining the exponential growth and the bounded expo-
nential growth functions is an S-shaped curve. The logistic function is a special case 
of a broader function known as the sigmoid function, which generates curves having 
an S shape.
Combining multiple functions using processes such as those described for the 
logistic function is another tool available to math modelers. It is not uncommon for a 
theorist to break the overall relationship into a series of smaller component segments, 
specify a function to reflect each segment, and then assemble the component functions 
into a larger whole in one way or another.
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In sum, functions can be manipulated with adjustable constants in a variety of ways 
and subjected to vertical and horizontal stretching and crunching. Functions also can be 
combined to form even more complex functions (as in the case of the logistic function), 
and both quantitative and qualitative variables can be modeled. Traditional mathemati-
cal modeling opens up a wide range of tools for describing relationships for the theorist 
to consider.
FIGURE 8.16. Exponential and bounded exponential model. (a) Exponential function; 
(b) bounded exponential function.
a
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b
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MULTIPLE VARIABLE FUNCTIONS
All of the functions we have described use a single input variable. However, functions 
can involve more than one input variable, and the multiple variables can be combined 
in a wide variety of ways to yield output. For example, the traditional linear function for 
a single variable can be extended to include multiple variables (e.g., X and Z) using the 
following functional form
 f(X, Z) = a + bX + cZ
where a, b, and c are adjustable constants. As another example, a multiplicative function 
might take the form
 f(X, Z) = a + bXZ (8.5)
where a and b are adjustable constants. Multiplicative models often are used to represent 
moderated relationships between quantitative variables, as discussed in Chapter 6 (see 
Jaccard & Turrisi, 2003).
Another example of a multiple variable function that we will make use of later is an 
averaging function. It takes the general form
 f(X, Z) = [a/(a + b)]X + [b/(a + b)]Z
FIGURE 8.17. Logistic function.
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where a and b are adjustable constants. This model represents function output as a 
weighted average of X and Z. To see that the function captures a simple arithmetic aver-
age, set the values of a and b to 1. This produces
 f(X, Z) = [1/(1 + 1)]X + [1/(1 + 1)]Z 
  = (1/2)X + (1/2)Z 
  = (X + Z)/2
By allowing a and b to take on nonequal values (e.g., a = 1 and b = 4), one obtains a 
“weighted” average rather than a simple arithmetic average, such that the Z will contrib-
ute more to the average than X. We will take advantage of this property later when we 
apply math modeling to a substantive area.
PHASES IN BUILDING A MATHEMATICAL MODEL
Math modelers typically use four phases to construct a mathematical model. First, the 
modeler identifies the variables that will be included in the model and identifies the 
metrics on which the variables are measured. Textbooks on mathematical modeling 
tend to view the variables and metrics as givens and devote little attention to how the 
variables and metrics are selected. Of course, this is a nontrivial issue, and how one 
chooses the variables to include is the subject of much of this book. Second, the modeler 
thinks carefully about the variables, the metrics, and the relationships between the vari-
ables, and poses a few candidate functions that might capture the underlying dynamics. 
He or she might think about the implications of the functions and what predictions to 
make at both moderate and extreme input values. Eventually, a working function is 
settled upon, typically a function that includes several adjustable constants. Sometimes 
the values of the adjustable constants are logically determined, and the modeler fixes the 
constants at those values. More often than not, the values of the adjustable constants are 
estimated from data. Third, the modeler collects empirical data, estimates values of the 
adjustable constants from the data if necessary, and examines the degree of fit between 
the output values of the function and the values observed in the real world. At this 
point, if performance of the model is unsatisfactory, a new function might be tried or 
the original function might be modified to accommodate the disparities. Fourth, given 
revisions of the function, the model is applied to a new set of data to determine how well 
the revised model performs. If the model does a good job of reproducing observations in 
the real world and if the model makes conceptual sense, it will be selected as the model 
of choice.
This, of course, is an oversimplification of the process that unfolds in building math 
models, and there are many variants of it that depend on the parameters of the task at 
hand. Our main point is that building math models is usually a dynamic process that 
involves much more than simply specifying a function.
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AN EXAMPLE USING PERFORMANCE, ABILITY, AND MOTIVATION
Educational researchers have long argued that performance in school is a function of 
two factors: a student’s motivation to perform well and his or her ability to perform well. 
This relationship is often expressed in the form of a multiplicative model, as follows:
 Performance = Ability × Motivation (8.6)
The basic idea is that if a student lacks the cognitive skills and capacity to learn, then it 
does not matter how motivated he or she is; school performance will be poor. Similarly, 
a student can have very high levels of cognitive skills and the ability to learn, but if the 
motivation to work and attend to the tasks that school demands is low, then perfor-
mance will be poor. The multiplicative relationship reflects this dynamic because, for 
example, if motivation is zero, then it does not matter what a person’s score on ability 
is—his or her performance will always equal zero. Similarly, if ability has a score of 
zero, it does not matter what a person’s motivation score is—his or her performance will 
always equal zero. Although this makes intuitive sense, the dynamics might be different 
from those implied by Equation 8.6, as we will now illustrate.
Our first step is to specify the metrics of the variables involved, since they do not 
have natural metrics. Performance in school might be indexed for individuals using the 
familiar grade-point average metric that ranges from 1.0 (all F’s) to 4.0 (all A’s), with 
decimals rounded to the nearest tenth (e.g., 2.1, 3.5). Ability might be indexed using a 
standard intelligence test that has a mean of 100 and a standard deviation of 15. Motiva-
tion might be indexed using a 10-item scale that asks students to agree or disagree with 
statements such as “I try hard in school” and “Doing my best in school is very important 
to me.” A 5-point agree–disagree rating scale (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = moderately dis-
agree, 3 = neither agree nor disagree, 4 = moderately agree, and 5 = strongly agree) pro-
vides the range of possible responses. The responses to each item are summed to yield an 
overall score from 10 to 50, with higher scores indicating higher levels of motivation.
Note that neither of these metrics takes on a value of zero. Hence, the dynamic 
of having “zero” ability or “zero” motivation discussed above cannot occur. Indeed, 
one might question whether there is such a thing as “zero” intelligence (i.e., a complete 
absence of intelligence). Is a psychological zero point on this dimension even possible? 
Suppose we decide that although a complete absence of intelligence is not theoretically 
plausible, a complete absence of motivation to do well in school is plausible. One way of 
creating a motivation metric with a zero point is to subtract a score of 10 from the original 
motivation metric. Before this operation, the motivation metric ranged from 10 to 50. By 
subtracting 10 from the metric, it now ranges from 0 to 40, which includes a zero point.
However, there is a problem with this strategy. Just because we can mathematically 
create a zero score on the motivation scale by subtracting 10 from it, this does not mean 
that the score of zero on the transformed scale reflects a complete absence of motiva-
tion on the underlying dimension of motivation. What evidence do we have that this is 
indeed the case? Perhaps a score of zero on the new metric actually reflects a somewhat 
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low level of motivation but not a complete absence of it. The issue of mapping scores on 
a metric onto their location on the underlying dimension they represent is complex, and 
consideration of how to accomplish this is beyond the scope of this book. We will work 
with the original metric of 10–50 and not make explicit assumptions about where on 
the underlying motivation dimension these scores locate individuals. We suspect that, 
based on the content of the items, students who score near 50 are very highly motivated 
to perform well, and students who score near 10 are very low in (but not completely 
devoid of) motivation to perform well. But a separate research program is required to 
establish such assertions (Blanton & Jaccard, 2006a).
Suppose that a student has a score of 100 on the IQ test and a score of 30 on the 
motivation test. Using Equation 8.6, multiplying the ability score by the motivation 
score, we obtain 100 × 30 = 3,000, and we would predict a GPA of 3,000! Of course, 
this is impossible because a student’s GPA can range only from 1.0 to 4.0. We need to 
introduce one or more adjustable constants to Equation 8.6 to accommodate the metric 
differences and to make it so that a predicted GPA score falls within the 1.0–4.0 range. 
For example, if we let P stand for performance, A for ability, and M for motivation, then 
we can allow for the subtraction of a constant from the product to make an adjustment 
in metric differences, modifying Equation 8.6 as follows
 P = (A)(M) + a
where a is an adjustable constant whose value is estimated from data. Note, for example, 
if a = –2,997, then this is the same as subtracting 2,997 from the product of A and M. But 
perhaps subtracting a constant is not enough to account for the metric differences. For 
example, a score of 120 on the IQ test coupled with a score of 50 on the motivation test 
would yield a product value of 6,000, and subtracting a value of 2,997 from it would still 
produce a nonsensical GPA. A second scalar adjustment we might use is to multiply the 
product term by a fractional adjustable constant, which yields the general equation
 P = b(A)(M) + a
where b is a second adjustable constant (in this case, b would be a fraction) designed to 
deal further with the metric differences. Its value also is estimated from data. The terms 
on the right-hand side of this equation can be rearranged to yield
 P = a + b(A)(M) (8.7)
If you compare Equation 8.7 with Equation 8.3, you will note that Equation 8.7 is simply 
a linear function, so performance is assumed to be a linear function of the product of 
(A)(M). Not only do the constants a and b take into account the different metrics, but 
the value of b also provides substantive information as well; namely, it indicates how 
much change in performance (GPA) one expects given a 1-unit increase in the value of 
the product term (A)(M).
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Figure 8.18 plots the relationship between performance and motivation at three 
different levels of ability based on Equation 8.7, where values of a and b have been 
empirically determined from data collected for a sample of 90 students. In this exam-
ple, a = –2.0 and b = .0015. The slope of P on M for any given value of A is bA. There 
are several features of this plot worth noting. First, note that the effect of motivation 
on performance is more pronounced as ability increases. This is evident in the steeper 
slope (bA = .165) for the two variables when the ability score is 110 as compared with 
the slope when the ability score is 100 (bA = .150), and, in turn, as compared to the 
slope when the ability score is 90 (bA = .135). These differences in slope may seem 
small but they are probably substantial. For example, when the ability score is 110, a 
10-unit change in motivation is predicted to yield a (.165)(10) = 1.65-unit change in 
GPA; when the ability score is 100, a 10-unit change in motivation is predicted to yield 
a (.150)(10) = 1.50-unit change in GPA; when the ability score is 90, a 10-unit change 
in motivation is predicted to yield a (.135)(10) = 1.35-unit change in GPA.
Second, note that at each of the different levels of ability (90, 100, and 110), the 
relationship between motivation and performance is assumed to be linear. Is this a rea-
sonable assumption? Perhaps not. Perhaps the relationship between performance and 
motivation at a given ability level is better captured by an exponential function in the 
form of one of the curves in Figure 8.7a. For example, when motivation is on the low 
end of the motivation metric, increasing it somewhat may not have much impact on 
performance—it will still be too low to make a difference on performance. But at higher 
levels of the motivation metric, increasing it will have an impact on performance. This 
dynamic is captured by the exponential functional forms illustrated in Figure 8.7a. Or 
FIGURE 8.18. Example for Performance = Ability × Motivation.
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perhaps a power function in the form of one of the curves in Figure 8.9a is applicable. 
Power functions have the same dynamic as the exponential function in Figure 8.7a, but 
they “grow” a bit more slowly. Or perhaps an S-shaped function in the form of the curve 
in Figure 8.17 applies, with floor and ceiling effects on performance occurring at the low 
and high ends of motivation, respectively.
The multiplicative model specified by Equation 8.6 assumes what is called a bilin-
ear interaction between the predictor variables; that is, it assumes that the relationship 
between the outcome and one of the predictors (in this case, motivation) is always linear 
no matter what the value is of the other predictor (in this case, ability). To be sure, the 
value of the slope for the linear relationship between P and M differs depending on the 
value of A (as noted earlier), but the function form is assumed to be linear. One can mod-
ify the model to allow for a nonlinear relationship between performance and motivation 
at different levels of ability, say, in accord with a power function, as follows
 P = a + b(A)(Mc) (8.8)
where c is an adjustable constant whose value is estimated from data. This model allows 
for the possibility of a function form like those of Figure 8.9a.
Another notable feature of Figure 8.18 is that at the lowest value of motivation, 
there is a small degree of separation between the three different lines. The amount of 
separation between the lines reflects the differences in the effect of ability (at values of 
90 vs. 100 vs. 110) on performance when motivation is held constant at the same value. 
But perhaps the amount of separation should be a bit more or a bit less than what is mod-
eled in Figure 8.18. Equation 8.9 can be further modified to allow for a different amount 
of separation between the lines than what Equation 8.8 implies, as follows:
 P = a + b(A)(Mc) + dA (8.9)
where d is an adjustable constant whose value is estimated by data. The logic of adding 
this term is developed in Appendix 8B and is not central to our discussion here. The 
main points we want to emphasize are the following:
1. The rather simple theoretical representation in Equation 8.6 has nontrivial con-
ceptual ramifications by specifying that the relationship between performance 
and the predictor variables is captured by the dynamics of a bilinear interaction 
when, in fact, the interaction may have a different functional form.
2. When building a mathematical model, the metrics of the variables usually have 
to be addressed (although our next example illustrates a case where this is not 
necessary).
3. There may be multiple features of the model (e.g., the separation between curves 
at different levels of one of the component terms as well as the shape of these 
curves) that must be specified that are not always apparent in simple representa-
tions such as Equation 8.6.
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The fact is that the often presented model of Performance = Ability × Motivation is 
poorly specified, and applying principles of mathematical modeling helps to produce 
a better-specified theory that makes implicit assumptions explicit and highlights com-
plexities that should be taken into account. Appendix 8B develops modeling strategies 
for this example in more detail and illustrates a substitution principle for building math-
ematical models. For more discussion of the assumptions of bilinear interactions, see 
Jaccard and Turrisi (2003).
AN ExAMPLE USING COGNITIVE ALGEBRA
Another example of using mathematical models to represent social phenomena involves 
models of cognitive algebra. This example illustrates how the implications of a math-
ematical representation can be pursued without recourse to such things as adjustable 
constants and complex modeling of data.
Suppose we describe the personal qualities of a political candidate to a person that 
he or she has not heard of by providing the person with three pieces of information. 
Suppose that the three pieces of information are all quite positive (e.g., the candidate 
is said to be honest, smart, and empathic). For purposes of developing this example, 
suppose we can characterize how positive each piece of information is considered to be 
using a metric that ranges from 0 to 10, with higher numbers reflecting higher degrees 
of positivity. We refer to the positivity of a piece of information as Pk, where k indicates 
the specific piece of information to which we are referring: P1 refers to the perceived 
positivity of the first piece of information, P2 refers to the perceived positivity of the 
second piece of information, and P3 refers to the perceived positivity of the third piece 
of information. Suppose we want to predict how favorable a person will feel toward 
the candidate based on these three pieces of information. If we let F refer to a person’s 
overall feeling of favorability toward the candidate, with higher values indicating higher 
levels of favorability, then one model that describes the impact of the information is the 
following:
 F = P1 + P2 + P3 (8.10)
This model is a simple summative function that specifies that the overall feeling of 
favorability toward the candidate is the sum of the judged positivity of each individual 
piece of information (we ignore, for the moment, the metric of F and the issue of adjust-
ing for metric differences). Equation 8.10 can be stated in more general form using sum-
mation notation as follows:
 
1
k
i
i
F P
=
= ∑
where k is the number of pieces of information, in this case 3.
Now suppose that instead of a summative function, an averaging function is operat-
  Mathematical Modeling 215
ing. That is, the overall feeling of favorability is the average of the positivity of the infor-
mation presented rather than the sum of it. In this case, Equation 8.11 becomes
 F = (P1 + P2 + P3)/3 (8.11)
and this can be represented more generally in summation notation as
 
1
k
i
i
F P k
=
 
=  
 
∑  (8.12)
What are the implications of specifying the function as being summative versus 
averaging in form? It turns out, they are considerable. Let’s explore the summation 
model first. Suppose a person judges the positivity values of the three pieces of informa-
tion as 8, 8, and 8, respectively. The overall feeling of favorability toward the candidate 
will be 8 + 8 + 8 = 24. Now suppose we describe a second candidate to this person using 
the same three pieces of information but we add a fourth descriptor to them (cunning), 
that is judged to have a positivity value of 4. According to the summation model, the 
overall feeling of favorability toward this new candidate will be 8 + 8 + 8 + 4 = 28, and 
the person will prefer the second candidate to the first candidate. Psychologically, it is 
as if the second candidate brings all the same qualities as the first candidate (i.e., P1, P2, 
and P3) and then “as a bonus,” you get a fourth positive attribute as well (P4). Hence, the 
person prefers the second candidate to the first candidate.
Now consider instead the averaging function. The overall feeling toward the first 
candidate is predicted to be (8 + 8 + 8)/3 = 8.0 and the overall feeling toward the second 
candidate is said to be (8 + 8 + 8 + 4)/4 = 7.0. In the averaging model, exactly the reverse 
prediction is made in terms of candidate preference; namely, the person now will prefer 
the first candidate to the second candidate. Psychologically, the first candidate has noth-
ing but very positive qualities, whereas the second candidate has very positive qualities 
but also some qualities that are only somewhat positive. The person prefers the first 
candidate, who has nothing but very positive qualities, to the second candidate, who has 
very positive qualities but also moderately positive qualities.
Which function better accounts for the impressions people form? It turns out 
that this can be evaluated in a simple experiment in which two candidates would be 
described, one with three very positive qualities (Candidate A) and a second with three 
very positive qualities and a fourth moderately positive quality (Candidate B). Partici-
pants would then be asked to indicate which of the two candidates they prefer. The 
summation model predicts that participants should prefer Candidate B to Candidate A, 
whereas the averaging model predicts that participants should prefer Candidate A to 
Candidate B. One can differentiate the two models empirically by conducting the above 
experiment and determining which candidate tends to be preferred. This is a simple 
experiment without complex modeling. If the results showed that people tend to prefer 
Candidate A to Candidate B, then this would be consistent with (but not proof of) a 
summative process rather than an averaging process. If the results showed that people 
tended to prefer Candidate B to Candidate A, then this would be consistent with (but not 
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proof of) an averaging process rather than a summative process. Which process oper-
ates has implications for the design of political campaigns and advertising strategies to 
sell products. For example, if an advertising campaign adds to a person’s cognitions a 
moderately positive piece of information about a product that is already quite positively 
evaluated, in the case of the averaging model, the advertisement should backfire and 
lower evaluations of the target product, thereby adversely affecting sales.
The literature on impression formation has extended these simple models of “cog-
nitive algebra” to more complex model forms. For example, it is almost certainly the 
case that some information is more important to people in forming impressions than 
other information. As such, it makes sense to weight each piece of information by its 
importance to the individual. Equation 8.10 can be modified to include such weights, 
as follows:
 F = w1P1 + w2P2 + w3P3 (8.13)
where wi is the importance of information i to the individual. Note that Equation 8.10 
is a special case of Equation 8.13, namely the case where w1 = w2 = w3 = 1. Expressed in 
summation notation, Equation 8.13 can be represented as
 
1
k
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i
F w P
=
= ∑  (8.14)
For the averaging model, introducing importance weights yields the following:
 F = (w1P1 + w2P2 + w3P3)/(w1 + w2 + w3) (8.15)
Note that Equation 8.11 is a special case of Equation 8.15, namely the case where 
w1 = w2 = w3 = 1. Equation 8.15 can be restated using summation notation as
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(8.16)
By extending the logic of algebraic models to the domain of “cognitive algebra” (which 
uses the premise that mental operations can be modeled by simple algebra), a great many 
insights into human information processing have been gained. Some of this research 
has involved simple experiments that pit competing predictions of different algebraic 
models against one another, whereas other research has taken the path of more complex 
math modeling with adjustable constants, error terms, and the like.
Parenthetically, the research literature finds support for both the summation and 
averaging models. In some contexts, people average the implications of information, 
whereas in other contexts, they sum it. There also are individual differences in these 
tendencies, with some people tending to average information in general whereas others 
tend to sum it in general. There are contexts for which simple summation or averaging 
models do not hold, and more complex combinatorial models are required to capture the 
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integration dynamics. Interested readers are referred to Anderson (1981) and Fishbein 
and Ajzen (1975).
AN ExAMPLE USING ATTITUDE CHANGE
As a third example of a mathematical model, we consider a model of attitude change 
from the communication literature that was developed by Fishbein and Ajzen (1975). 
The model concerns the case where a source is trying to persuade the recipient of a per-
suasive message to change his or her belief in something. A belief is conceptualized as a 
subjective probability that ranges from 0 to 1.00, much like a probability in mathemat-
ics. For example, people might believe with a probability of 0.20 that they will contract 
lung cancer if they smokes cigarettes. Or people might believe with a probability of 0.30 
that a particular brand of toothpaste is the best for fighting tooth decay. In the model 
there are three probabilities that are of interest: (1) the subjective probability that the 
recipient holds prior to receiving the persuasive message, P0, (2) the position that the 
recipient perceives the source takes in his or her persuasive message, also reflected by a 
subjective probability, PS, and (3), the subjective probability of the recipient after hear-
ing the persuasive message, P1. For example, the recipient might have an initial belief 
corresponding to a subjective probability of 0.20, perceive the source as arguing that the 
target belief should have a subjective probability of 0.70, and after hearing the arguments 
of the source, the recipient revises his or her subjective probability to be 0.60. These 
three variables, P0, PS, and P1, are measured variables in the theoretical system.
The amount of belief change that occurs is the difference in subjective probabilities 
before and after the message, or P1 – P0. It is the central outcome variable. Fishbein and 
Ajzen were interested in understanding factors that impact how much belief change 
occurs, so they constructed a mathematical model to reflect the underlying dynamics. 
Let BC represent belief change and be formally defined as P1 – P0. Fishbein and Ajzen 
begin by assuming that the amount of belief change that occurs is a function of the 
discrepancy between the recipient’s initial position and the perceived position of the 
source—that is, PS – P0. If a source argues in favor of the exact same position of the 
recipient, then PS – P0 = 0, and no belief change will occur. It is only when the source 
takes a position that is discrepant from the recipient’s that belief change can occur. 
The more discrepant the position taken by the source relative to the recipient’s initial 
position, the greater the potential for belief change. We thus begin with a simple model 
based on a difference function:
 BC = (PS – P0) (8.17)
Not everyone will accept the arguments in a persuasive message. People differ in the 
likelihood that they will accept a message, with some people having a low probability 
of message acceptance, others having a moderate probability of message acceptance, 
and still others having a high probability of message acceptance. Fishbein and Ajzen 
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introduced a parameter into the model to reflect the probability that a recipient would 
accept the arguments of a message; this parameter is signified by PA. Equation 8.17 thus 
becomes
 BC = PA(PS – P0) (8.18)
with the constraint that PA must range from 0 to 1.0 to reflect a probability metric. If a 
person completely accepts the message, then PA = 1.00 and the amount of belief change 
will equal the discrepancy between the recipient’s initial position and the position the 
recipient perceives the source as taking. If a person completely rejects the message, 
then PA = 0.00 and there is no belief change. If the person is somewhat accepting of the 
source’s message (i.e., PA is somewhere between 0.00 and 1.00) then the amount of belief 
change is proportional to PA.
Next, Fishbein and Ajzen address factors that impact the probability of acceptance 
of a message. One important factor is how discrepant the message is from the recipient’s 
initial position. In general, people are more likely to accept messages that argue in favor 
of their existing beliefs as opposed to messages that argue against their existing beliefs. 
If we let D represent the absolute discrepancy between the recipient’s initial position and 
the perceived position of the source (i.e., D = 0SP P− ), then the probability of accep-
tance can be modeled as
 PA = (1 – D) (8.19)
Note that when D = 0, the source is arguing the same position that the recipient already 
believes and the probability of acceptance is 1.00. As the source’s message becomes 
increasingly discrepant from the recipient’s initial position, the probability of accep-
tance decreases to a minimum of 0.00.
Fishbein and Ajzen recognized that there are factors that can facilitate the accep-
tance of a message independent of message discrepancy. For example, if the source is 
a trustworthy and credible person, the exact same message may be more likely to be 
accepted than if the source is untrustworthy or lacks credibility. Fishbein and Ajzen 
introduced an adjustable constant to reflect these facilitating conditions, which they 
labeled f. Equation 8.19 was modified to appear as
 1(1 ) fAP D= −  (8.20)
with the constraint that f be greater than 0. Fishbein and Ajzen thus use a power func-
tion to capture the underlying dynamics, where 1/f is an adjustable constant. Figure 8.19 
presents sample curves for the probability of acceptance as a function of D at different 
values of f. Note that when f = 1, the relationship between the probability of acceptance 
and message discrepancy is linear with an intercept of 0 and a slope of 1. As f exceeds 
1, the probability of acceptance increases rapidly at lower levels of discrepancy and 
remains high even as message discrepancy increases. As f decreases in value from 1, the 
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probability of message acceptance decreases rapidly at lower levels of discrepancy and 
remains low as message discrepancy increases.
Equations 8.18 and 8.20 can be combined to yield a single equation. Starting with 
Equation 8.19, we have
 BC = PA(PS – P0)
Since PA = (1 – D)1/f, we can substitute the right-hand side of Equation 8.20 for PA, which 
yields
 BC = 1(1 ) fAP D− (PS – P0)
and since D = |PS – P0|, further substitution yields
 BC = (1 – (|PS – P0|))
1/f (PS – P0)
The belief that a person has after hearing a persuasive message can be further specified 
by recognizing that BC = (P1 – P0), so that if we subtract P0 from both sides of the equa-
tion, we obtain
 P1 = 
1
0 0 0[(1 ( ) ( )]
f
S SBC P P P P P− − − −  (8.21)
Equation 8.21 is a mathematical model that predicts the belief that someone holds 
FIGURE 8.19. Fishbein and Ajzen model for probability of acceptance.
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after hearing a persuasive message. Although it may appear a bit intimidating to the 
mathematically uninitiated, it is based on reasonable communication principles and is 
reasonably precise in the functional forms it posits. The model makes use of observed 
measures as well as adjustable constants and incorporates a power function. In empirical 
applications, P0, P1, and PS are measured variables and f is an adjustable constant whose 
value is estimated from data. The value of f is expected to vary across contexts where 
factors that facilitate message acceptance vary. For further discussion of this model and 
its implications, see Fishbein and Ajzen (1975).
AN EXAMPLE USING A TRADITIONAL CAUSAL MODEL
Another example of mathematical modeling in the social sciences is captured by an 
approach called structural equation modeling (SEM). Although some scientists do not 
think of structural equation models as mathematical models, they have all the char-
acteristics of mathematical models as described in this chapter. To be sure, they are 
stochastic rather than deterministic, but their essence is mathematical in nature. The 
causal model we represent mathematically is presented in the path diagram in Figure 
8.20. The model includes disturbance terms (because it is stochastic). We use generic 
labels for the variables for ease of notation. For this example, we assume that all of the 
relationships are linear, which is a typical assumption in SEM applications. Each endog-
enous variable is assumed to be a linear function of all variables that have an arrow 
FIGURE 8.20. Causal model.
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going directly to it. The model can be expressed as a set of linear equations that are as 
follows:
 Y = a1 + b1T + b2R + b3S + e5 
 T = a2 + b4Q + e4 
 Q = a3 + b5X + e3 
 R = a4 + b6X + e2 
 S = a5 + b7X + e1
where a1 through a5 are adjustable constants representing intercepts, b1 through b7 are 
adjustable constants representing slopes, and e1 through e5 are error (or disturbance) 
terms. The equations yield a model that is overidentified, although constraints must be 
introduced for estimating the parameters in the presence of the error terms, and other 
ancillary modeling details must be attended to as well (see Bollen, 1989).
The adjustable constants for the slopes in this model reflect the predicted change in 
the outcome variable given a 1-unit change in the variable associated with the constant. 
The one qualification to this statement is for the equation with multiple variables in the 
linear function. For this equation (where the outcome variable is Y), the slope adjustable 
constant associated with a given variable in the function is the predicted change in the 
outcome variable (Y) given a 1-unit change in the variable holding constant all other vari-
ables in the linear function. In practice, data on each of the variables would be collected 
and the model would be fit to the data to determine if it could account for the observed 
data. The data would be used to estimate the values of the adjustable constants so as to 
FIGURE 8.21. Chaos theory example.
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maximize model fit. If the fit is reasonable, then values of the adjustable constants are 
subjected to meaningful interpretation.
This example illustrates another strategy in mathematical modeling when dealing 
with multiple variables: the modeler creates a systems of equations rather than a single 
equation to represent the multivariate dynamics.
CHAOS THEORY
An area of mathematical modeling that is receiving increased attention in the social sci-
ences is that of chaos theory. In normal parlance, chaos refers to disarray. In the field of 
chaos theory, this also is true but something systematic is thought to underlie the chaos; 
what appears chaotic actually has a systematic function generating it. The task of the 
theorist is to map this function.
Chaos theory is typically applied to changes in systems over time, with the state of 
a system at time t + 1 being impacted by the state of the system at some previous time, t. 
As an example, consider the simple function
 21 1.9t tX X+ = −  (8.22)
where t + 1 refers to the time period following time t. For example, perhaps the time 
interval in question is a week and suppose that the value of X at time t is 1. Then apply-
ing Equation 8.22, the value of X 1 week later (i.e., at time t + 1) should be 1.9 – 12 = 0.9. 
At week 2, this input value is substituted into the right-hand side of Equation 8.22 and 
the result is the predicted value of X at week number 3. It is 1.9 – .92 = 1.09. To predict 
the value at week 4, the previous value is again substituted into the right-hand side of 
Equation 8.22 and the result is 1.9 – 1.092 = 0.712. And so on. The pattern of data is plot-
ted in Figure 8.21, which plots the value of X at each week in a series of weeks. The pat-
tern appears to be unsystematic and chaotic with large swings in values. But note that 
the underlying process is anything but haphazard. The data were the result of a clearly 
specified and simple function (Equation 8.22). There was no random error in the system. 
Rather, the “disarray” was systematically generated. The task of the chaos theorist is to 
identify patterns that appear to be chaotic and to find the function that generates that 
“chaos.”
In math modeling the term difference equation refers to the case where a variable at 
time t is a function of a variable at time t - 1. If the variable at time t is a function of the 
immediately preceding point in time, it is called a first-order difference equation. If it is 
predicted from time t – 2, it is called a second-order difference equation. If it is predicted 
from time t – 3, it is a third-order difference equation. And so on.
Chaotic modeling tends to require precise measurement, and results can be dra-
matically influenced by the slightest “noise” or measurement error in the system. Cur-
rent analytic methods for chaos models tend to require large numbers of observations. 
Although chaos theory is typically applied to the analysis of systems across time, the 
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BOx 8.1. Reading Mathematical Models
When reading mathematical models, social scientists with more limited math-
ematical backgrounds sometimes feel intimidated by the presence of equations. 
Because equations make clear and unambiguous statements about the presumed 
relationships between variables, you should embrace equations, not avoid them. 
When confronted with an equation that seems complex, here are some things 
you can do to help work your way through it. First, make a list of the variables 
in the equation and a list of the adjustable constants. Make sure that each of the 
variables in your list is clearly defined and that the metrics of the variables are 
specified. Second, determine if the equation contains any of the major functions 
we discussed. For example, is a power function present? Is an exponential func-
tion present? Is a logistic function present? Once you recognize a familiar func-
tion form and you have a sense of the family of curves associated with it, then the 
substantive implications of the equation should start to become apparent. Remem-
ber, the fundamental form of the function can be altered using transformations, 
so be sensitive to the presence of a function that has a transformation imposed 
on it. Sometimes the function is “disguised” by the adjustable constants attached 
to it. Third, for each adjustable constant, think about what it is accomplishing 
and why it was included in the equation. Is it just a scaling factor, or does it have 
substantive interpretation, like a slope in a linear relationship? Finally, you can 
use your favorite statistical package (e.g., SPSS) or graphics software to apply 
the equation to hypothetical data you generate and then examine the curve 
graphically and see what happens to it as you change values of the adjustable 
constants or change the hypothetical data used to generate it in systematic ways. 
Also, keep in mind the conditional nature that multiplicative functions imply; that 
is, when you see the multiplication of two variables in an equation, then the size 
of the derivative (i.e., the size of the effect) of one of the variables in the product 
term is dependent on the value of the other variable in the product term.
If you encounter mathematical symbols with which you are not familiar, 
then you can usually find their meaning on the Internet. Below are some com-
monly encountered symbols. A useful website for learning about many areas of 
mathematics at many different levels is called “Ask Dr. Math”: mathforum.org/
dr.math.
Common Symbols That Reflect Important Numbers
π = the ratio of the circumference to the diameter of a circle, the number 
3.1415926535 . . .
e = the natural logarithm base, the number 2.718281828459 . . .
γ = the Euler–Mascheroni constant, the number 0.577215664901 . . .
φ = the golden ratio, the number 1.618033988749 . . .
∞ = infinity
cont.
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Symbols for Binary Relations
= means “is the same as”
≠ means “is not equal to”
< means “is less than”
≤ means “is less than or equal to”
> means “is greater than”
≥ means “is greater than or equal to”
± means “plus or minus”
≅ means “is congruent to”
≈ means “is approximately equal to”
 means “is similar to”
 means “is nearly equal to”
∝ means “is proportional to”
≡ means “absolute equality”
Symbols from Mathematical Logic
∴ means “therefore”
 means “because”
∋  means “under the condition that”
⇒  means “logically implies that”
⇔  means “if and only if”
∀  means “for all”
∃  means “there exists”
Symbols Used in Set Theory
⊂ means “this set is a subset of” 
⊃ means “this set has as a subset”
∪ is the union of two sets and means “take the elements that are in either set”
∩ is the intersection of two sets and means “take the elements that are in 
either set”
∅ refers to the empty set or null set and means “the set without any elements 
in it” 
∈  means “is an element of”
∉  means “is not an element of” 
Symbols for Operations
n! means “the factorial of”
∑ means “the sum of”
∏  means “the product of” 
^ means “to the power of”
∫  means “the integral of”
cont.
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properties of space and distance can be used in place of time. Thus, theorists often dis-
tinguish between temporal chaos and spatial chaos. Temporal chaos models that focus 
on discrete time intervals (e.g., every 10 years; at 3-, 6-, and 12-month intervals) are 
called discrete time models, and those that use time continuously are called continuous 
time models.
A wide range of phenomena is potentially chaotic in nature, including epidemics, 
economic changes, the stock market, and the mental state of depression, to name a few. 
However, it is controversial as to whether a truly chaotic system can be isolated in the 
real world, in the sense described in this chapter (i.e., with a stable, generating function 
underlying the chaos).
Variants of chaos theory include, among other things, attempts to identify limits of 
predictable versus unpredictable patterns of data. For example, air flow over the wing of 
an airplane might be smooth and predictable when the wing is placed at low angles fac-
ing the wind. However, the air flow becomes chaotic and unpredictable at larger angles. 
One could attempt to determine the largest angle that permits smooth air flow, thereby 
yielding some understanding of this “chaotic system.”
The technical aspects of chaos theory are well beyond the scope of this book. How-
ever, the theory represents an interesting application of mathematical modeling that 
promises to have impact in the social sciences in the future.
CATASTROPHE THEORY
Catastrophe theory is another area of mathematical modeling that is receiving atten-
tion in the social sciences. A catastrophic event is one where a large and rapid change 
in a system output occurs even though the system inputs are smooth and continuous. 
A simple example that captures the idea of catastrophic events is that of increasing 
the load on a bridge. One can keep adding weight to a bridge and see how the bridge 
deforms in response to that weight. The deforming of the bridge proceeds in a relatively 
uniform manner, showing increasing levels of bending. At some critical point, however, 
additional weight causes the bridge to collapse completely. Phenomena that might be 
analyzed using catastrophe theory include the occurrence of a nervous breakdown, drug 
Additional Notations
Greek letters are used to refer to population parameters, Roman, usually italic, 
letters are used to refer to sample statistics.
A number raised to .5 or to ½ is the same as the square root of the number. A 
number raised to the power of –1 is the same as the inverse of the number.
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relapse, divorce, a revolution occurring in a society, a demonstration turning into mob 
violence, or movement from one developmental stage to another in the context of a stage 
theory of development.
Catastrophe theory, developed by Rene Thom (1975), postulates seven fundamen-
tal mathematical equations to describe discontinuous behavior. Catastrophe theory 
relates outcome variables to what are called control variables, which essentially are 
explanatory variables. The relationships between the variables are expressed math-
ematically using nonlinear, dynamic systems that rely on different forms of polyno-
mial functions. The spirit of catastrophe theory can be captured intuitively in a model 
of aggression in dogs as developed by Zeeman (1976). The behavioral outcome ranges 
from flight to attack, and the response on this dimension is thought to be a function of 
two emotions that represent control variables: fear and anger. When fear and anger are 
at their neutral points, then simple increases in either fear or anger lead to a continu-
ous increase in flight or attack responses, respectively. However, if anger is increased 
in an already fearful dog, then the potential for a sudden jump from flight to attack 
can occur. Similarly, if fear is increased in an already angry dog, a sudden jump from 
attack to flight can occur. The mathematical models developed by Thom and expanded 
by other mathematicians are designed to model such dynamics. Catastrophe theory 
represents another area of mathematical modeling that is starting to receive attention 
from the social sciences.
ADDITIONAL ExAMPLES OF MATHEMATICAL MODELS IN THE 
SOCIAL SCIENCES
Mathematical models exist in all of the major subdisciplines of the social sciences. Most 
of the subdisciplines have journals that are devoted exclusively to mathematical model-
ing (e.g., Journal of Mathematical Psychology, Journal of Mathematical Sociology, Journal of 
Quantitative Anthropology, Marketing Science). Mathematical models also appear in more 
mainstream journals, but with less frequency. It is impossible to describe the many 
areas in which mathematical models have been developed, but in this section, we pro-
vide a brief sampling to highlight the diversity of applications.
One area where mathematical models have been prominent is in the analysis of 
human decision making. This endeavor has involved applications of expected-utility 
theory, linear regression models, Bayesian probability models, and information theory 
models, to name a few. The models use mathematics to document both the strengths and 
limitations of humans as information processors when making decisions. Mathematical 
models also are prominent in theories of memory, learning, language, bargaining, and 
signal detectability. Mathematical models have been used extensively in the analysis 
of social networks involving units such as institutions, communities, elites, friendship 
systems, kinship systems, and trade networks. Mathematical models of political behav-
ior have explored such issues as voting and fairness. Behavior genetics relies heavily on 
mathematical decompositions of the effects of unique environmental influences, shared 
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environmental influences, and genetic influences on human behavior in the context 
of twin studies. Spatial models are used to analyze residential and neighborhood pat-
terning and the effects of this patterning on a wide range of phenomena. Geostatistical 
techniques explore spatial autocorrelation structures and then use mathematical mod-
els to estimate values of variables across regions. Our list could go on, but hopefully, 
this provides you with a sense of the diverse areas to which mathematical models have 
been applied.
EMERGENT THEORY CONSTRUCTION AND MATHEMATICAL MODELS
It may seem heretical to use the terms “grounded/emergent theory” and “mathemati-
cal modeling” in the same sentence, but there is no reason why some of the concepts 
developed in this chapter could not be used within emergent theory frameworks. For 
example, as one thinks about the conceptual relationships that emerge from qualitative 
data, are these relationships linear or nonlinear in form? If nonlinear, might they be 
described by logarithmic functions, exponential functions, power functions, polyno-
mial functions, sine functions, or cosine functions? Could some systematic combination 
of variables underlie what seems to be chaos? Is their anything to be gained by think-
ing about qualitative data in terms of the logic of multiplicative modeling or cognitive 
algebra? And so on.
We noted earlier that mathematical modelers usually give short shrift to how the 
variables they decide to include in their models are chosen. Certainly an emergent 
theoretical framework might help them select their variables in informed and creative 
ways.
We think it would be interesting to have a mathematical modeler and a grounded/
emergent theorist work as a multidisciplinary team on a common problem, with the 
instructions to develop an integrated finished product that they both would “sign off” 
on. Such a collaboration would undoubtedly yield nontraditional perspectives on mat-
ters.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Mathematical modeling is an elegant framework for constructing theories. The empha-
sis of mathematical modeling is thinking in terms of functions and how to describe 
relationships between variables in mathematical terms. Functions specify how input 
variables should be operated upon mathematically to produce outputs. One of the most 
commonly used functions in the social sciences is the linear function, which has two 
adjustable constants, a slope and an intercept. The intercept is the output value of the 
function when the input X equals zero, and the slope is the change in the output given a 
1-unit increase in X. Rarely do data conform to a perfect linear function. Model dispari-
ties are accommodated through the addition of disturbance or error terms to models. 
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Errors are assumed to be random and inconsequential for the purposes at hand. Models 
without errors are deterministic, and models with errors are stochastic.
Mathematical models vary in their number of adjustable constants and the mean-
ing of those constants/parameters. Some parameters reflect rates of change in function 
output per unit change in function input. These rates are best captured using the con-
cepts of derivatives and differentiation from calculus. Derivatives refer to the concept of 
instantaneous change, and differentiation refers to mathematical methods for calculat-
ing the amount of instantaneous change that occurs. Integrals focus on “areas under 
the curve” or accumulation, and integration refers to the methods used to calculate 
integrals.
Mathematical models also differ in their identification status, with some models 
being underidentified, some being just-identified, and others being overidentified. A 
just-identified model is one for which there is a unique solution for each estimated 
parameter. In an underidentified model there are an infinite number of solutions for 
one or more of the model parameters. In an overidentified model there is a unique solu-
tion for the model parameters and there also is more than one feature that can be used 
to independently estimate a parameter value. Finally, mathematical models vary in the 
metrics upon which they rely upon for the input variables. The metrics of variables can 
affect the type of functions used to describe the relationships between variables and how 
the parameter variables are interpreted.
Although the assumption of linear relationships is ubiquitous in the social sciences, 
nonlinear relationships could very well be more common. Five major classes of nonlin-
ear functions are logarithmic functions, exponential functions, power functions, poly-
nomial functions, and trigonometric functions. Logarithms are used to model growth 
or change, where the change is rapid at first and then slows to a gradual and eventually 
almost nonexistent pace. Logarithmic models reflect rates of increase that are inversely 
proportional to the output value of the function. Exponential functions are the inverse of 
log functions, with the two functions mirroring each other’s properties. Power functions 
have a similar shape to exponential and logarithmic functions, but differ at higher val-
ues of the input X. Power curves eventually outgrow a logarithmic function and under-
grow an exponential function. Polynomial functions are the sum of power functions 
and can accommodate phenomena with “wiggles and turns.” The more bends there are 
in a curve, the greater the number of polynomial terms that are needed to reflect those 
bends. Trigonometric functions are used to model cyclical phenomena, with the most 
common functions being the sine and cosine functions.
Functions can be manipulated through transformations and can be combined to 
form new functions. For example, the often used logistic function is a combination of a 
bounded exponential function and an increasing exponential function. Combining and 
manipulating functions is a key ingredient to building effective mathematical models. 
A typical theory construction process involves breaking up the overall process into a 
series of smaller component processes, specifying a function to reflect each component, 
and then assembling the component functions into a larger whole.
When functions involve more than one input variable, additional levels of flexibility 
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and complexity are introduced, as the input variables are combined additively or multi-
plicatively. With multiple input variables, the theorist often thinks of the function relat-
ing each individual input variable to the output variable and then combines the differ-
ent variables and their functions, while taking into account the synergistic interaction 
between the input variables. When choosing functions to use in a model, it is advisable 
not to overparameterize the model or to add parameters that are not subject to meaning-
ful substantive interpretation.
Mathematical modeling represents a sophisticated way of thinking about relation-
ships between variables. The approach is underutilized in the social sciences, and we 
believe that theory construction efforts can benefit from thinking about phenomena 
from this perspective.
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ExERCISES 
Exercises to Reinforce Concepts
 1. What is the difference between an axiom and a theorem?
 2. What is a function?
 3. How do you interpret the value of a slope and intercept in a linear relation-
ship?
 4. How do you calculate a slope in a linear relationship? How do you calculate the 
intercept?
 5. Why would you add an error term to a model? How does this relate to the terms 
stochastic and deterministic modeling?
 6. What is the difference between a derivative and differentiation?
 7. What is the difference between a first and second derivative?
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 8. What is integration?
 9. Why are metrics important to consider when constructing a mathematical 
model?
 10. Briefly describe the major types of nonlinear functions.
 11. What are the major types of transformations to functions, and what effects do 
they have?
 12. What criteria are used in choosing a function?
 13. Briefly characterize chaos theory.
 14. Briefly characterize catastrophe theory.
Exercises to Apply Concepts
 1. Find an example of a mathematical model in the literature and write a sum-
mary of it. Discuss each of the key parameters in the model and what those 
parameters represent. Develop the model’s conceptual and substantive implica-
tions.
 2. Develop a mathematical model for a phenomenon of interest to you. Begin 
by identifying your outcome variable and then variables that you believe are 
related to it. Specify the functions relating the variables and add relevant con-
stants to the equations, as appropriate. Justify conceptually each function and 
each constant. Decide if the model should be deterministic or stochastic. Start 
simple and then build complexity into the model, accordingly.
 3. Pick a phenomenon of interest to you and try to apply either chaos theory or 
catastrophe theory to it. Describe the new theory as completely as you can.
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Appendix 8A
SPSS Code for Exploring Distribution Properties
This appendix presents syntax from SPSS that can be used to examine curves produced by differ-
ent functions.
First, open SPSS with the data field blank. We will use the syntax editor. The first step is to 
create a variable with a large number of cases, say 100,000. This is accomplished with the follow-
ing syntax:
INPUT PROGRAM. 
LOOP #I = 1 TO 100000. 
END CASE. 
END LOOP. 
END FILE. 
END INPUT PROGRAM. 
COMPUTE X = $CASENUM. 
EXECUTE.
The last entry in the LOOP command (100000) specifies the number of cases to generate. Num-
bers are generated in a variable called X, and these numbers range from 1 to the number of cases 
generated. These can be transformed to take on any metric you wish. For example, to have them 
range from 0 to 1, multiply X by .00001. To have them range from –5 to +5, multiply by .00001, 
subtract 0.5, and then multiply the result by 10. And so on.
Next, we compute the function we are interested in graphing. Suppose it is a log to the base 
10. SPSS offers numerous built-in functions, and in this case, we use the syntax
COMPUTE XX=LG10(X). 
GRAPH 
/HISTOGRAM=XX.
The last two lines construct a histogram of the data, and the shape of the function will be evident 
from this. You can add adjustable constants and perform various transformations discussed in the 
chapter, as desired.
The major function commands available in SPSS are arsin, artan, cos, exp, lg10, ln, sin, and 
sqrt. These are defined in the help menu in SPSS. One also can work with a wide range of statisti-
cal functions, including the logistic function. Note that it is possible to calculate a log to any base 
from the natural log. The logarithm base a of any number is the natural logarithm of the number 
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divided by the natural logarithm of the base. For example, to calculate log2(100), evaluate the 
expression ln(100)/ln(2).
There are a host of graphic software programs (for both PC and Mac) designed for scientists 
that allow them to graph a wide range of functions easily and quickly. These include CoPlot, DPlot, 
Sigma Plot, and Grapher. We are fond of DPlot. Other statistical software programs that have good 
graphics packages are S Plus, R, and Statistica.
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Appendix 8B
Additional Modeling Issues for the Performance, 
Motivation, and Ability Example
This appendix describes details for the example modeling the effects of ability and motivation on 
performance, where the relationship between performance and motivation is nonlinear instead 
of linear at a given level of ability. We assume the reader is versed in standard statistical methods 
and psychometric theory. We illustrate the case first where motivation is assumed to impact per-
formance in accord with a power function, with the shape of the power function changing as a 
function of ability. Then we mention the case where the relationship between performance and 
motivation is assumed to be S-shaped, with the form of the S varying as a function of ability.
We build the power function model by first positing that performance is a power function of 
motivation,
 P = a + bMc (A.1)
where a and b are adjustable constants to accommodate metrics and c is an adjustable constant to 
isolate the relevant power curve in light of a and b. According to the broader theory, the effect of 
motivation on performance varies depending on ability (e.g., when ability is low, increases in moti-
vation will have negligible effects on performance, but when ability is moderate to high, increases 
in motivation will have a more substantial impact on performance). Stated another way, the shape 
of the power curve will differ depending on the level of ability of students, such that the value of 
c is some function of A. In addition, it is likely the case that the adjustable constants a and b vary 
as a function of A. To simplify matters and to develop the underlying logic, we will assume that c 
is a linear function of A, that a is a linear function of A, and that b is a linear function of A. This 
yields the equations
   c = d + fA 
   a = g + hA 
   b = i + jA
where c, d, f, g, h, i, and j are adjustable constants that conform to the respective linear models. 
Using substitution principles, we can substitute the right-hand side of these equations into A.1, 
which yields
 P = (g + hA) + (i + jA)(M)(d + fA)
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Expanding, we obtain
 P = (g + hA) + iM(d + fA) + jAM(d + fA)
We can rewrite this equation using the more familiar symbols of a and b for adjustable constants 
in regression analysis:
 Î { Î {­ ® ­ ®£ Ó x
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This model can be fit to data and the values of the adjustable constants estimated using nonlinear 
regression algorithms in SPSS or some other statistical package. The adjustable constants are ame-
nable to interpretation, but we forgo explication of this here. Additional interpretative complica-
tions present themselves if the metrics involved are arbitrary, but we do not pursue such matters 
here either (see Blanton & Jaccard, 2006a, 2006b).
One intuitive way of seeing the implications of the function once the values of the adjustable 
constants are estimated is to calculate predicted scores that vary M by 1 unit at select values of A. 
These can be graphed and then subjected to interpretation.
An alternative approach to modeling the data that uses methods that are more familiar to 
social scientists is to use polynomial regression. In this approach, performance is assumed to be 
a quadratic function of motivation. Although the full quadratic curve most certainly is not appli-
cable (because it is U-shaped), the part of the curve that forms the right half of the “U” could 
apply. The model includes adjustable constants to isolate this portion. We begin by writing a model 
where performance is a quadratic function of motivation
 P = a1 + b1M + b2M
2 (A.2)
and the adjustable constants in this equation (the intercept and the regression coefficients) are 
modeled as being a linear function of ability (we could use a nonlinear function, but for the sake 
of pedagogy, we assume a linear function), yielding
   a1 = a2 + b3A 
   b1 = a3 + b4A 
   b2 = a4 + b5A
Using the substitution principle, we substitute the right-hand sides of these equations for their 
respective terms in Equation A.2, which produces
 P = (a2 + b3A) + (a3 + b4A)M + (a4 + b5A)M
2
Expanding this yields
 P = a2 + b3A + a3M + b4AM + a4M
2 + b5AM
2
Rearranging and relabeling the constants to conform to more traditional notation yields the 
 model
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 P = a + b1A + b2M + b3AM + b4M
2 + b5AM
2
This model can be fit using standard least squares regression.
To model an S-shaped function, one can stay with polynomial regression but extend the logic 
to a cubic function. The basic idea is to express performance as a cubic function of motivation
 P = a1 + b1M + b2M
2 + b3M
3
and then to model the adjustable constants as a function of A. Finally, use the substitution method 
to derive the more complex generating function.
Alternatively, one can use a logistic function to capture the S shape and then model the adjust-
able constants within it as a function of A. This approach requires the use of nonlinear algorithms 
in estimating the adjustable constants.
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Simulation as a Theory Development 
Method
In theory, there is no difference between theory and practice. But in 
practice, there is.
—A Computer sCientist
To this point we have examined how causal thinking and mathematical modeling pro-
vide frameworks for theory construction. Another approach that can help in the theory 
construction process is the use of simulations, particularly when the phenomenon being 
studied is a complex and dynamic process. Simulations can be used to generate theory 
in their own right or they can be used as a complement to causal and mathematical 
modeling.
Most readers likely are aware of the simulations used for training airline pilots 
and sharpening their ability to handle unanticipated and infrequently occurring con-
tingencies. These devices are gyroscopically controlled rooms constructed so that their 
interior looks, feels, and operates like the criterion aircraft cockpit to a pilot during 
the actual in-flight operation of that aircraft. Another familiar form of simulation is the 
business games and management simulations used by industrial organizations and busi-
ness schools to train managers and students. Less well known, however, are the large 
number of simulations that are being pursued by economists, political scientists, psy-
chologists, and sociologists, among others, to gain perspectives on theories of complex 
social systems.
For example, in 2008, the economy of the United States dropped precipitously into a 
recession with the collapse of several large banks, insurance companies, and investment 
firms. The swings in the stock market and the economic responses of investors con-
founded traditional economic theory that embraced the notion of equilibrium. Equilib-
rium theory views markets as the product of a balance of forces that respond primarily 
to new information about, for example, problems a company is having or changes in the 
housing supply (Farmer & Geanakoplos, 2002). However, the volatility of the markets 
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made clear that something more was at work. Many economists felt that the volatility 
reflected, in part, the complex dynamics operating between thousands of traders who 
compete, interact, and trade with one another on a daily basis. Thus, it is not enough to 
apply the principle of equilibrium. One also must take into account these thousands of 
relationships to better appreciate market volatility. Economists developed simulations 
where thousands of artificially intelligent “agents,” represented on a computer, were 
programmed to have different investing orientations, habits, and social and business 
networks with other traders. The simulations set the agents about their way to interact 
and transact their business and observations on a daily basis over an extended period 
of time, the equivalent of, say, several weeks. Observations were then made about how 
the simulated market behaved across this more extended time period, especially as the 
researcher introduced new information into the system. The results of such agent-based 
simulations provided new perspectives on traditional economic theories of equilibrium 
as well as the effects of other policy-based innovations on aspects of market volatil-
ity (Farmer & Geanakoplos, 2002; Westerhoff, 2008). The level of complexity of these 
simulations, with the hundreds of thousands of interactions between agents that are 
captured over extended time periods, could not possibly be addressed by traditional 
methods. By using such agent-based simulations, economists were able to evaluate the 
effects of changes introduced into the system or the effects of changing one or more 
underlying assumption about, for example, agent orientations or about agent networks, 
on higher-level system outputs. This was then used to generate new theories of market 
volatility.
In this chapter we consider how simulations can be used to develop theory. We 
begin by defining simulation strategies and then discuss some of the uses of research-
based simulations. After describing different types of simulations, we consider the 
core activity of analyzing criterion systems for purposes of designing simulations. It 
is at this stage where new ideas and theory clarification often occur. We then discuss 
the strategies of virtual experiments and agent-based modeling as theory construc-
tion strategies and conclude by identifying resources that will facilitate the conduct of 
simulations.
DEFINING SIMULATIONS
According to Webster’s dictionary, a simulation is defined as “the imitative representa-
tion of the functioning of one system or process by means of the functioning of another.” 
The original system that one seeks to simulate is called the criterion system, and the 
imitative representation of that system is called the simulation. The criterion system is 
generally more complex, whereas the simulation is a simpler representation that incor-
porates only selected characteristics of the criterion system. Different simulations of the 
same criterion system may thus assume different layers of complexity, depending upon 
how many and just which features are incorporated. The criterion systems may be vir-
tually anything, including physical entities, social entities, corporate or organizational 
entities, economic systems, mental processes, and military maneuvers. Moreover, the 
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simulation system can attempt to represent the characteristics of the criterion system 
using a variety of forms, including physical, pictorial, verbal, mathematical, and logi-
cal approaches. Our attention is confined to simulations developed for studying some 
aspect of human systems at either the individual or group level.
A distinction can be made between pedagogical and research simulations. The former 
are developed primarily to be used as training aids. In contrast, the principal function 
of research simulations is as a strategy for developing, testing, and extending concep-
tualizations. Because pedagogical simulations often can be used as research tools, the 
difference between pedagogical and research simulations generally is one of emphasis. 
Suppose engineers in the process of designing a new aircraft wanted to determine which 
of several different instrument panel configurations would generate optimal speed and 
accuracy of a pilot’s response. By installing these configurations in a simulator and using 
an appropriate sample of test pilots, they could conduct research to answer this ques-
tion.
THE USES OF RESEARCH SIMULATIONS
Research-related simulations serve two basic functions: (1) to build and clarify theo-
ries, and (2) to test theories. Our emphasis in this chapter is on the former. Develop-
ing simulations generally requires the theorist to think about the criterion system in 
comprehensive terms. Doing so can force confrontation with the inadequacies of one’s 
original conceptualization, thereby revealing the need for more detailed explication of 
the conceptualization. This, in turn, often results in the expansion or clarification of the 
original theory. Thus, apart from the data that may be generated when conducting the 
simulation at some later point in time, the sheer act of developing a research simulation 
can be viewed as an aid to theory generation and clarification.
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SIMULATIONS AND LABORATORY 
ExPERIMENTS
Although simulation and experimentation can be integrated in a single study, when not 
integrated, the characteristics of the typical simulation contrast sharply with those of 
experimentation. Whereas fully experimental designs involve “tight” investigator con-
trol over both the presentation of the stimuli and the sequence of events, simulation 
allows a tendency for events, their sequence (the “information flow”), and perhaps even 
the consequences to be determined by the research “participants.” Whereas experimen-
tation usually reflects an effort either to eliminate nonfocal factors and/or hold them con-
stant, simulations generally permit these factors to vary freely. Whereas experimentation 
generally concentrates on a limited number of independent and dependent variables, 
simulations generally include a greater number of variables, particularly potential causes 
of the variable of interest. Whereas to achieve their goals, experiments “tie” and “untie” 
variables (and levels of variables) in ways that may divorce them from everyday reality, 
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BOx 9.1. Simulations Go Public: 
The Sims and Virtual Environments
One of the most popular computer games of all time is The Sims, a life simulation 
computer exercise. The program, developed by Will Wright, is a simulation of 
the day-to-day activities of avatars, generically called the “Sims” as a play on 
the word simulation. The user creates a virtual neighborhood, with different fami-
lies inhabiting different houses, and then observes the avatars as they interact 
and go about their daily duties. The user controls the personality of the individual 
avatars, the composition of the families, the daily activities of each individual, 
the consumable goods that are in each household, and a variety of other fea-
tures of the virtual environment. There is a degree of unpredictability built into 
the program, as events happen outside the control of the user. The game has no 
goal or purpose—you do not win. Rather, you simply specify the nature of the 
environment and the people within it and then watch life play itself out. The user 
structures the daily activities of the avatars to help them achieve their personal 
goals. The user makes decisions about how much time the avatars engage in 
exercise, reading, personal hygiene, eating, what they do for fun, how they deal 
with depression, their financial dealings, and so on. In newer versions of the 
game, children age and grow up.
cont.
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simulations strive to keep these factors “tied” in a manner that is consonant with the 
way in which they are associated in the everyday world criterion system. The presence of 
more background variables coupled with more complex representations of independent 
variables produces a “richer” environment out of which sometimes emerge unexpected, 
or “serendipitous” findings that serve to extend the researcher’s conceptualization. 
Whereas experiments are admirably suited for evaluating the input(s) and outcome(s) of 
a process, simulations tend to place greater emphasis on the process itself.
Many research simulations are developed and used because they are amenable to 
manipulations that would be impossible, impractical, or too costly to perform with the 
criterion system itself. In this sense, they are a form of experimentation and comparable 
to a laboratory experiment. Simulations are particularly useful when the phenomenon 
of interest is enmeshed in a complex, dynamic system, and the researcher’s intent is to 
extrapolate from the findings to what is probable under real-world conditions.
BASIC SIMULATION VARIETIES
Simulations can be described in terms of a number of features, and any specific simula-
tion can be identified as possessing some features and not others.
  The user can direct an avatar to interact with another avatar. The Sims speak 
a language called Simlish. Informal Internet groups have formed to analyze and 
decipher the linguistic structure of Simlish. The game has spawned a large num-
ber of expansion packs, including Livin’ Large (which adds more events, Sims, 
careers, and the ability to establish multiple neighborhoods), House Party (which 
adds party-related content), Hot Date (which allows Sims to meet or pick up other 
Sims for romantic encounters in a city environment), Vacation (which allows the 
player to take Sims to various vacation destinations), Unleashed (which gives 
Sims the ability to train pets and grow crops), and Superstar (which allows Sims 
to visit a Hollywood-like town).
The screen shot from The Sims displays a family interacting in their house. A 
diamond is over the head of the avatar sitting with crossed legs on the couch; the 
diamond indicates that he is the character of focus. At the bottom of the screen is 
a summary of statistics about the focal character, summarizing his need states.
The Sims is in over 50 million households worldwide as of 2008. In many 
ways, it captures and illustrates some of the issues with which social scientists 
will grapple as they create virtual environments and virtual interactions between 
avatars and humans, and it illustrates the basic idea of programming and then 
watching the programmed principles play themselves out over time.
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All-Machine versus Person–Machine Simulations
One important distinction is between all-machine and person–machine simulations. 
Person–machine simulations involve one or more human participants as an integral 
part of the operation of the simulation. In contrast, all-machine simulations simulate 
human behavior and/or mental functioning in the absence of any direct interaction with 
a human participant. There are two major subvarieties: physical analogue simulations, 
which use some sort of physical model to simulate human dynamics, and mathematical 
simulations, which rely entirely on mathematics and computer programs. Artificial intel-
ligence exemplifies a behavioral science domain where the emphasis is on developing 
computer programs that resemble some form of intelligent thought.
Descriptive versus Analytic Simulations
A distinction is sometimes made between descriptive and analytic simulations. The for-
mer emphasize structure, the latter emphasize process. The object of a descriptive simu-
lation is to reproduce the physical structure of the criterion system in as much detail as 
possible, usually on a smaller scale. In contrast, an analytic simulation seeks to repro-
duce the process of the criterion system. Whether the simulation reproduces the physi-
cal appearance of the criterion system is of little importance. “The important factor is 
that the components and variables being investigated respond in a manner comparable 
to that of the behavior of the real system” (Dawson, 1963, p. 223). Most research simula-
tions are analytic—that is, the criterion system is dynamic, containing characteristics 
that operate in sequence and over time—and the simulation attempts to represent this 
process.
Real-Time versus Compressed-Time versus Expanded-Time 
Simulations
The focus on process raises another distinction. In real-time simulations, the process 
under study takes the same amount of time as it takes in the criterion system. Com-
pressed-time simulations focus on phenomena that are extended in time in the crite-
rion system (e.g., interaction patterns between groups over a 2-year period) and enable 
these patterns to be studied in a much shorter time period, say, 15 minutes. In contrast, 
expanded-time simulations slow down rapid processes so that they can be more carefully 
studied.
Deterministic versus Nondeterministic Simulations
Another common distinction is between deterministic and nondeterministic simula-
tions. In deterministic simulations the precise outcome is determined by the initial input, 
whereas in nondeterministic simulations, the outcome is determined by some combina-
tion of the initial input with the “chance” events that occur during operation of the sim-
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ulation. In other words, deterministic simulations do not build “noise” into the system, 
whereas nondeterministic simulations do.
Free versus Experimental Simulations
A related distinction is between free and experimental simulations. The defining char-
acteristic of a free simulation is that events that occur during the simulation are shaped, 
in part or entirely, by the behavior of the participants themselves. In contrast, all infor-
mation that reaches the participant in an experimental simulation is preprogrammed by 
the researcher. Although participants in the experimental simulation believe that they 
control their own fate (at least to some degree), in point of fact, they do not. This defin-
ing characteristic renders the experimental simulation more like the standard labora-
tory experiment than like the free simulation because the independent variables remain 
under complete control of the experimenter (Fromkin & Streufert, 1976, p. 425).
Macro- versus Microsimulations
Other ways of describing simulations involve distinguishing them in terms of their 
scope. Macrosimulations involve large-scale criterion systems that include many people 
and/or variables. An example would be an attempt to simulate the gold-trading system 
of the free world. Microsimulations involve few people and/or variables. At one extreme, 
a microsimulation would refer to a single type of process (e.g., acquiring information 
from the outside world as a basis for reaching a decision) going on in the mind of a single 
individual.
Content-Oriented Simulation
Simulations are often categorized in terms of the specific domain of content they 
address. Some of the more popular content-oriented simulations in the behavioral sci-
ences include international simulations (Guetzkow, Akger, Brody, Noel, & Snyder, 1963; 
Silverman & Bryden, 2007), economic system simulations (e.g., Schubert, 1960; Wester-
hoff, 2008), small group/social process simulations (e.g., McGrath & Altman, 1966; 
Suleiman, Troitzsch, & Gilbert, 2000), interpersonal bargaining–negotiation simula-
tions (Deutsch & Krauss, 1960; Luce & Raiffa, 1957), organizational simulations (Lomi 
& Larsen, 2001), and cognitive process simulations (Jacoby, Jaccard, Kuss, Troutman, & 
Mazursky, 1987; Newell & Simon, 1972; Sun, 2006), to name a few.
THE ANALYSIS OF CRITERION SYSTEMS AS A BASIS FOR THEORY 
CONSTRUCTION
When developing a research simulation, one begins by developing a conceptualization 
(essentially, a theory) as to what constitute the essential features of the criterion system 
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that need to be represented in the simulation. Next, one strives to build a simulation 
that corresponds to the essential features of that conceptualization. Decisions must be 
made about which features of the criterion system to include and which features to 
omit. Once designed, the simulation can be used to test a variety of theoretical proposi-
tions and to provide feedback on them. In practice, the first two activities go through 
several iterations, being refined and extended at each iteration. In part, this is because 
certain features of the criterion system may be so pervasive that, like water to the deep 
sea dweller, their importance initially goes unrecognized, becoming apparent only after 
one tries to implement the initial version of the simulation and realizes that something 
important is missing. This leads to a refined conceptualization of the criterion system, 
which, in turn, leads to incorporating additional layers of sophistication into the simula-
tion. Throughout the process of simulation development, the goal is to approximate key 
features of the criterion system as closely as possible and in as much detail as is neces-
sary to answer the question at hand. It is during this phase of simulation design that 
theory construction and development often occurs. As the theorist carefully analyzes 
the criterion system, trying to capture and think through the key elements of it that 
must be captured in the simulation and those elements that can be omitted, important 
variables and possible relationships between those variables often become evident. We 
illustrate two case studies of this phenomenon.
Simulation of Information Accessing in Consumer Purchase 
Decisions
Jacoby has developed an informal theory of information accessing during decision mak-
ing and a program of research based on that theory using simulation technology. The 
initial simulations were developed in reaction to limitations perceived to be inherent 
in studies Jacoby had conducted on the subject of information overload in consumer 
decision making. According to the overload hypothesis, by increasing the amount of 
information to which a decision maker must attend during a brief period of time, a point 
will be reached beyond which the decision maker’s ability to cope with this information 
is strained and the quality of his or her decision making deteriorates. Conducted in 1971 
through 1973 (e.g., Jacoby, Speller, & Berning, 1974; Jacoby, Speller, & Kohn, 1974), the 
overload studies came about in response to arguments from consumer advocates who 
maintained that, when it came to communicating with consumers, “more information 
is better.” The overload studies were designed to assess whether this “more is better” 
assumption, or the competing overload hypothesis, would be empirically confirmed.
The overload studies employed variations of a common methodological protocol. 
First, questions were used to ascertain each research participant’s preferences for various 
features of a test product. Assume that the test product was ready-to-eat breakfast cereal. 
Each participant would indicate his or her preferences on such characteristics as type of 
grain (oat, rice, wheat, etc.), whether it was sweetened or not, whether it contained dry 
fruit or not, the size (in ounces) of the package, the price, and so on. Next, participants 
were randomly assigned to the cells of a fully experimental factorial design where one 
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factor was “number of brands” and the second was “number of features described for 
each brand.” Each factor had several levels (e.g., 4, 8, 12, or 16 brands for the first factor, 
and 4, 8, 12, or 16 features for the second factor). Thus, depending upon the cell to which 
he or she was assigned, the participant would receive as little as 16 items of information 
(4 brands × 4 features per brand), or as much as 256 items of information (16 brands × 
16 features per brand) to consider. Third, the research participants were instructed to 
examine and evaluate all the information provided to them and use this information as 
the basis for selecting the brand they would most prefer.
The dozen or so studies that Jacoby conducted found that, regardless of the prod-
ucts tested and whether the participants were undergraduates or adult heads of house-
holds, lived in the United States, Puerto Rico, or Germany, the pattern of findings 
generally reflected an overload effect. That is, the ability to select the brand that most 
closely matched one’s ideal brand improved with modest amounts of information, then 
decreased as the amount of information increased beyond some optimal level. Reports 
of these findings began surfacing in most consumer behavior textbooks, in marketing 
and advertising executive deliberations, and in regulatory agency policymaking. For 
example, the 1981 Federal Trade Commission Staff Report proposing precautionary lan-
guage in cigarette labeling cited the overload studies as the basis for its recommendation 
to have no more than three specific health hazards indicated at a time on cigarette pack-
ages, and to rotate these periodically.
Analysis of the Criterion System
As early as 1974, Jacoby began to express reservations about the applicability of these 
findings to the everyday world of consumer decision making (see Jacoby, 1975, 1977, 
1984). The disparity between the conditions of assessment and key features of in vivo 
consumer decision making convinced Jacoby that demonstrating that overload was pos-
sible using laboratory experimentation provided little basis for contending that it was 
probable in everyday life (the criterion system). To examine whether overload occurred 
in the field would require developing an empirical system or simulated environment 
that more closely paralleled and incorporated many of the key features of the crite-
rion system. The objective was to devise a simulated environment that would enable 
the researcher to examine, how and how much information consumers acquired, when 
left to their own devices, prior to making a purchase decision. This led to an intensive 
analysis of the criterion system.
Attention initially was limited to consumer choice behavior as it might occur in 
the context of a typical full-service supermarket, with the combination of consumer 
plus environment constituting the criterion system. This system was conceptualized as 
consisting of (1) a decision maker who, at least in part, relies on information acquired 
from the outside world; (2) a task environment containing a set of choice options (e.g., 
different brands of breakfast cereal), each of which has associated information (e.g., 
price, size, ingredients); and (3) an objective that the decision maker brings to the choice 
context (e.g., “Out of those available, select the breakfast cereal I would most like to 
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buy”). Considering how these three components typically played out in vivo, the follow-
ing features emerged as key characteristics of the criterion system.
First, information exposure in the criterion system was consumer-determined, not 
experimenter-determined. Consumers in the real world are active, not passive, informa-
tion seekers. That is, they do not enter supermarkets and passively wait to be force-fed 
certain fixed quantities of information (as was characteristic of the overload experi-
ments). Rather, they actively seek and attend to information on their own. Hence, to 
better understand what was probable in the real world, the simulation had to permit the 
participant an active stance in acquiring information from an available pool of informa-
tion.
Second, the task environment is saturated with information that can be used dur-
ing decision making. Consider the following. The consumer usually has a choice of 
supermarkets and grocery stores, with each of these outlets containing an overlapping 
but somewhat different assortment of products. Full-service American supermarkets of 
that era typically contained more than 25,000–35,000 different items on their shelves, 
almost all of which appeared in packages that contain considerable amounts of informa-
tion. For example, the typical American supermarket contains at least 50–80 different 
brands of breakfast cereal (out of more than 150 such nationally available brands). Even 
if one disregards all the photographs and drawings, most breakfast cereal boxes contain 
more than 100 separate items of information. The information-intensive nature of this 
environment is rendered even more complex by the fact that, in many product catego-
ries, the available brands (e.g., Crest toothpaste, Coca-Cola) come in different sizes, 
flavors, colors, etc.
Third, to avoid being overwhelmed by this complexity, the consumer’s prechoice 
information-seeking behavior reflects great selectivity. Consumers generally confine 
their shopping to one store and, when there, may not go down every aisle. Within any 
given aisle, they generally do not consider products in every product category. Even 
within a product category they do consider, as the number of options (i.e., brands, sizes, 
variations) increases, the consumer is less likely to consider all the available options. 
And when the consumer does pick up a package for one brand, he or she is not likely to 
attend to all the information that appears thereon. Thus, consideration of the criterion 
system suggested that consumers operating in vivo are highly selective in regard to how 
much and just which information they attend to.
Fourth, memory plays a critical role in decision making. Consumers need not and 
likely would not expend time or effort to acquire information from the external envi-
ronment if they already had that information in mind. When it comes to frequently 
purchased nondurables, knowing a product’s brand name enables one to bring forth 
from memory a considerable amount of directly relevant information. For example, 
seeing the brand “Budweiser” might stimulate the consumer to recall such things as 
the product being a domestic, not foreign, brew, the manufacturer’s name (Anheuser 
Busch), the manufacturer’s principal place of business (St. Louis), the packaging (which 
contains red and white colors and an “A and eagle” logo), the brewing process involving 
beechwood aging, and around the end of the year, its advertising including Clydesdale 
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horses. Sometimes what is brought forth from memory provides a sufficient basis for 
arriving at a purchase decision. At other times, we need to update or augment informa-
tion in memory (e.g., what is the item’s current price?) or, when considering something 
new, acquire information from the external environment as a basis for arriving at our 
decisions.
Additional reflection suggested a fifth important aspect of the criterion system. 
All participants in the information overload studies were given information in a set 
sequence. More than likely, this did not correspond to the sequence in which partici-
pants would have acquired the same information had they been left to their own devices. 
Since the scholarly literature contained a sufficient number of reports to show that the 
sequence in which information is obtained could be important, it was considered neces-
sary that the simulation permit participants to assess information in any sequence they 
desired.
Thus, as the basis for developing the initial simulation, the criterion system (con-
sisting of both the external information environment and the consumer’s internal infor-
mation processing) was conceptualized as reflecting the following key characteristics: 
In arriving at his or her purchase decision, the consumer relies upon both internal and 
external sources of information and, especially in regard to the latter, is active and selec-
tive in determining just which, how much, and in what order information is acquired. 
This analysis also led to the recognition that, given the vast amounts of information 
available in the decision environment (say, a supermarket or drug store), one could not 
study the entire environment but needed to focus instead on a limited portion of that 
environment (i.e., a product category, e.g., toothpaste). Attention thus was confined to 
studying whether the information overload effect would surface—as it had in the labo-
ratory experiments—when research subjects were permitted to operate in ways that 
more closely paralleled their behavior in selecting a brand of toothpaste or shampoo in 
naturalistic settings.
An Early Simulation
Jacoby developed these simulations before personal computers were available on a wide-
spread basis, so several rather crude versions of the simulated environment were imple-
mented relative to the simulations now in place. One early simulation consisted of a 
“strip board” device that presented participants with a matrix of information about dif-
ferent brands (e.g., of toothpaste or of cereal). The brands were represented in columns 
(e.g., the first column was labeled Brand A, the second column was labeled Brand B, and 
so on), and the rows were represented as information dimensions (e.g., price, size). The 
cells of the matrix contained the specific information about a given brand and a given 
information dimension where the row and column intersected. Although the row and 
column labels for the brands and information dimensions were visible, the information 
in the cells of the matrix was covered by horizontal strips of opaque tape. Each strip ran 
horizontally, covering the brand-specific information for all brands on a single type of 
information. For example, one strip covered the prices for each of the available brands; 
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another strip covered the size, and so on. Research participants could remove a strip, 
one at a time, thereby revealing the information in the cells for all brands on that type 
of information; for example, pulling off the tape strip over the price information would 
reveal the prices in the cells for all the brands. The simulation participants were told 
that they could acquire as much or as little of the information as desired, removing 
none, one, several, or all of the tape strips before making their choice about the brand 
they would choose. Further, they were told they could do so in any order they desired. 
In some simulations, information identifying the brand name (e.g., Crest) was available 
in the information pool (so that, if acquired, this information would enable the partici-
pants to access information about the brand and manufacturer from their memory). In 
other simulations, this type of information was absent from the pool.
Although crude, the strip board simulations represented significant improvements 
relative to prior research strategies. First, although scholars generally agreed that deci-
sion making was a dynamic process that unfolded over time, almost all of the research on 
decision making conducted to that point relied on static, cross-sectional, or simple pre–
post assessment methodologies. The prior overload research was typical of this genre. 
In a sense, it was “outcome research,” not “process research.” Crude as it was, the strip 
board device enabled information acquisition to be studied dynamically, as it occurred, 
rather than relying on cross-sectional verbal assessments made before (e.g., “What infor-
mation do you intend to use?”) or after the fact (e.g., “What information did you use?”).
Second, comparing poststudy debriefings with the information that the simulation 
participants acquired during the simulation led to greater appreciation of the fact that 
not all aspects of decision making operate at consciously retrievable levels. As informa-
tion processors, we may attend to information of which we had no prior knowledge 
and therefore could have had no intention to seek out or attend to. Moreover, evidence 
suggests that we are not capable of recalling all the information which we do acquire, 
or the sequence in which this information is acquired (see McGuire, 1976; Nisbett & 
Wilson, 1977). Without having to rely on fallible memory or verbal reports about search 
behavior, the simulation enabled us to directly assess information-accessing behavior as 
it unfolded. It also enabled us to directly examine just which information was ignored 
instead of having to ask potentially leading questions to make such determinations.
It is interesting to note that these features of the simulations were viewed as a 
strength by some methodologists and a weakness by others. On the one hand, the 
attempt to simulate core features of the criterion system led to a more accurate represen-
tation of the role of the information acquisition process in the real world. On the other 
hand, many facets of information acquisition were out of the experimenter’s control (e.g., 
the amount of information accessed, the sequence in which information was accessed), 
making it more challenging to make causal inferences from the collected data.
Iterating Simulations and Iterating Theories
As noted earlier, when building a simulation, it often is necessary for a researcher to go 
through several trial-and-error steps, what we call iterations, in order to obtain a rea-
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sonably faithful representation of the criterion system. In the process, new variables to 
include in the system might suggest themselves and new relationships to focus on also 
might become salient. As one iterates the system, one also gains theoretical insights, 
and revisions to the theory often occur as well. In this way, not only does the simulation 
become an improved representation of the criterion system, but theory becomes “iter-
ated” and improved as well. Although theoretical revisions based on data are a natural 
part of all methods of science, a unique facet of this dynamic for simulation research is 
that the scientist is not only concerned with improving theory but also with improving 
the simulation per se, so it can be used that much more effectively in future research.
To illustrate this iterative process, consider the strip board simulation and limi-
tations that were revealed by implementing it. One limitation that became apparent 
was with the restrictions it placed on information acquisition. Although the strip board 
enabled us to study the acquisition of types or categories of information (e.g., flavor, 
price), it did not permit us to analyze the acquisition of single pieces of information 
associated with a specific brand (e.g., the flavor of Crest toothpaste). Subsequent devel-
opments, especially computerized versions of the simulation, circumvented this prob-
lem. Research with the strip board device also failed to accommodate the fact that real-
world decision makers generally live with the consequences of their decisions. This led 
to a further change in the simulation to include authentic consequences. For example, 
simulation participants were told in advance that they would receive several “cents-off” 
coupons that could be redeemed at local stores, but only for the brand they selected. The 
simulation thus incorporated an element of consequentiality, an important feature of the 
criterion system.
Spurred partly by conceptual considerations as well as the availability of more 
powerful computers, the simulation continued to undergo several theory–simulation–
theory iterations. For example, unlike purchase decisions made in supermarket set-
tings—which involve consumers attending primarily to two dimensions of the external 
information environment, namely, “options” (brands) and “properties” (information 
provided on packaging for brands)—in vivo decision making often has decision makers 
obtaining option and property information from different sources. Hence, the simula-
tion was extended to permit testing of such “properties × options × sources” information 
environments (e.g., Chestnut & Jacoby, 1980; Hoyer & Jacoby, 1983). Predecision infor-
mation acquisition rarely occurs in a vacuum. Generally, decision making takes place in 
the context of important antecedents, such as things the decision maker sees, reads, or 
hears prior to engaging in decision making. In the consumer context, such antecedents 
include advertising, pertinent news articles, comments by salespersons, and word-of-
mouth communications from family and friends.
The simulation also was extended to examine the impact of such incoming com-
munications on information search (e.g., see Sheluga & Jacoby, 1978). In a modification 
that may hold the greatest potential both for extending and testing theory, the simu-
lation was further revised to allow scientists to study the incremental impact of item-
by-item information acquisition on such phenomena as uncertainty reduction (Jacoby 
et al., 1994), brand evaluations (Johar, Jedidi, & Jacoby, 1997), and attitude formation 
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(Jacoby, Morrin, Jaccard, Gurhan, & Maheswaran, 2002). Finally, as the simulation was 
extended to examine information accessing in other types of decision making (e.g., real-
world security analysts reaching buy–sell decisions for which there was a hard criterion 
for evaluating performance; e.g., Jacoby et al., 2002; Morrin et al., 2002), it was found 
that the theory that had evolved in regard to supermarket decision making had to be 
revised in several substantial respects, again reflecting the iterative relationship between 
simulations and theory development.
The above discussion demonstrates how, in developing simulations to test theories, 
the process of simulation development can contribute to theory development. Building 
a reasonably faithful simulation requires that one undertake a thorough analysis of the 
criterion system. Since the simulation is essentially a reflection of one’s theory of the 
criterion system, this analysis often will reveal key assumptions and other facets that 
help refine and extend the seminal conceptualization. This was the case for Jacoby as 
he developed the simulation for analyzing consumer information accessing. Thus, even 
when the motivation for designing the simulation may be the development of a research 
tool for testing theories, doing so can lead to theoretical insights before testing ever 
takes place. And once the simulation is tested, recognition of its limitations may also 
suggest ways for extending one’s theory.
Virtual Environments and Avatars
Another example of the use of simulations for theory development is recent work with 
virtual environments. In this research, participants either wear a head-mounted display 
that immerses them in a three-dimensional, computer-generated virtual environment, 
or they view a computer screen that has an engrossing and realistic virtual environment. 
In some studies, the participant is hardwired so that his or her body movements are 
shown on the computer screen. The virtual world typically is viewed from a first-person 
perspective, so that the screen mimics what one would see from one’s own eyes. Virtual 
humans, called avatars, can be introduced into the environment, and the researcher 
controls in real time how the avatars act and react in interactions with the research 
participant.
The use of avatars and virtual environments is occurring with greater frequency 
in research in the social sciences, as evidenced, for example, by the creation of a new 
journal, CyberPsychology and Behavior. This research has explored the use of avatars 
and virtual environments for the study of such diverse phenomena as online counsel-
ing, fear of public speaking, dating and interpersonal behavior, treatment of acropho-
bia (fear of heights), acquisition of medical knowledge by medical residents, consumer 
purchase decisions, interpretation of facial expressions, nicotine craving, eating disor-
ders, and friendship formation, to name a few. The studies have led researchers to posit 
basic questions about the generation of virtual environment simulations, such as the 
amount of visual fidelity that is required for an avatar to seem human, how the ava-
tar should interact with the environment so as to appear natural, the perceptual and 
memory skills that an avatar should be programmed to display in order to be perceived 
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as normal, and the amount of unpredictability and emotion that should be shown by 
the avatar so as to appear normal. In essence, a new set of questions about human 
behavior and perception has emerged in response to the simulation problem of design-
ing a realistic avatar. As social scientists have addressed these questions, they have 
embarked on collaborations with artists, computer programmers, and graphic design-
ers to form multidisciplinary teams for analyzing the subtleties of human actions and 
social perceptions—teams that, prior to simulations with virtual environments, simply 
did not interact with one another. The result has been promising new perspectives on 
basic mechanisms of perception and human interaction, independent of research that 
is formally conducted using avatars.
There is no question that with the increasing speed, processing capacity, and power 
of new computers, virtual environments and avatars will be a useful tool not only in soci-
ety more generally but in social science research in particular. As simulations become 
increasingly popular, ways of thinking about the human criterion system will expand 
accordingly.
SIMULATIONS AND VIRTUAL ExPERIMENTS
Another way in which simulations are used during the initial stages of theory construc-
tion is to use all-machine simulations to conduct virtual experiments that provide feed-
back on initial theoretical propositions. Once the theory is revised and refined so that 
it behaves well in the virtual experiment, it is applied to real-world dynamics (Davis, 
Bingham, & Eisenhardt, 2007; Sastry, 1997; Sterman, 2000). As an example, Davis, 
Eisenhardt, and Bingham (2005) unpacked the global construct of “market dynamism” 
into four subcategories: velocity, complexity, ambiguity, and unpredictability. They then 
designed a computer simulation of market systems to examine the effect of each compo-
nent on market behavior and ran the simulation with three of the components held con-
stant and the fourth construct varying. They did this for each component, in turn, and 
then amended their initial theory based on the results of the simulation. This theory was 
then applied to real-world scenarios of market dynamics (see also Repenning, 2002).
AGENT-BASED MODELING
Smith and Conrey (2007) describe a simulation-based approach to theory construction 
called agent-based modeling. This approach uses the spirit of virtual experimentation 
and was illustrated in the example at the beginning of the chapter on the economic 
recession in the United States. Agent-based modeling focuses on “agents,” who usually 
are simulated individuals, and variables that describe those agents and their environ-
ment. Rather than specifying the causal relationships between agent and environmental 
variables in the simulation, the emphasis of agent-based modeling is instead on specify-
ing the interactive processes that operate between agents, between environments, and 
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between agents and environments. The simulation then examines the output that results 
from the activation of the processes based on different system inputs.
An example of agent-based modeling is the work of Kalick and Hamilton (1986) 
on dating choices. Correlational studies have suggested that individuals tend to date 
those who are of equal attractiveness to themselves, often referred to as “attractive-
ness matching.” Very attractive people tend to date very attractive people, moderately 
attractive people tend to date moderately attractive people, and unattractive people tend 
to date unattractive people. In traditional research, the correlation between a person’s 
attractiveness and that of his or her partner is usually about 0.50. Some psychologists 
have hypothesized that people do not try to date potential partners who are more attrac-
tive than them because of fear of rejection and because people are more comfortable 
around people of similar attractiveness. In contrast to this correlational research and 
such conclusions, experimental studies suggest that people prefer to date very attrac-
tive partners, no matter what their own level of attractiveness is. How can this disparity 
between the correlational and experimental research be resolved?
Kalick and Hamilton (1986) conducted a computer simulation in which they cre-
ated a population of 1,000 agents (i.e., simulated people), representing 500 males and 
500 females. The individuals were randomly assigned a level of attractiveness ranging 
from 1 to 10. The male and female agents interacted at random and based on the other’s 
attractiveness, one extended a dating offer to the other. If both agents made a dating 
offer, they were classified as a couple and removed from the dating pool. This continued 
until all agents had been matched.
In one condition, a dating offer was extended if the partner’s attractiveness was 
roughly similar to the agent’s level of attractiveness. Under this algorithm, the simula-
tion produced a correlation between attractiveness levels for the final group of couples 
of about 0.85, which was too high relative to what correlational studies find. In another 
simulation trial, the probability that an agent extended an offer to a partner who had an 
attractiveness rating of 10 was set at 1.0; to a partner who had an attractiveness rating of 
9, the probability of extending an offer was set at 0.90; to a partner who had an attrac-
tiveness rating of 8, the probability of extending an offer was set at 0.80; to a partner who 
had an attractiveness rating of 7, the probability of extending an offer was set at 0.70; and 
so on. Thus, the more attractive the partner, the more likely it was that he or she would 
be extended a dating offer. Under this algorithm, the correlation between attractiveness 
levels for the final group of couples was about 0.50, which maps on well to the correla-
tional evidence. In studying the simulation results, Kalick and Hamilton found that the 
most attractive agents tended to couple up early on, so that the average attractiveness 
of the dating pool declined over time. This, in turn, resulted in the attractiveness of the 
couples decreasing over time. It was only through this analysis of the process of interac-
tion dynamics that the correlational and experimental evidence in other studies could 
be reconciled.
Agent-based modeling frameworks are popular in psychology, sociology, and eco-
nomics (Gilbert & Abbott, 2005). They have been applied to such diverse domains in 
sociology as the diffusion of norms, innovations to voting, the clumping of local net-
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works into larger social structures, and the evolution of social structures, to name a few 
(Cederman, 2005).
RESOURCES FOR CONDUCTING SIMULATIONS
The Suggested Readings at the end of this chapter provide some useful resources for 
learning more about simulations. There are a host of computer languages for use in 
simulations, with a prominent one being NetLogo, which can be found at ccl.northwest-
ern.edu/netlogo. NetLogo is a free, reasonably user-friendly modeling environment. More 
advanced tools include MASON by Luke, Cioffi-Revilla, Panait, and Sullivan (2004; see 
cs.gmu.edu/~eclab/projects/mason), and Repast (North & Macal, 2005; see repast.source-
forge.net).
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS
A simulation is the imitative representation of the functioning of one system or process 
by means of the functioning of another. The original system that one seeks to simulate 
is called the criterion system, and the imitative representation of that system is called the 
simulation. Simulations can be an effective tool for theory construction, especially for 
problems focused on criterion systems that are complex and dynamic. Simulations differ 
from laboratory experiments in that simulations generally allow participants to control 
the flow of events (whereas in laboratory studies, this is often controlled by the experi-
menter), and noise and irrelevant factors are embraced rather than eliminated. Whereas 
laboratory experimentation generally concentrates on a limited number of independent 
and dependent variables, simulations generally include a much greater number of vari-
ables. That said, we should note that laboratory experiments and research simulations 
can also be integrated, so that a given simulation has participants randomly assigned to 
different treatment and comparison groups.
Research simulations serve two basic functions: (1) to build and clarify theories, 
and (2) to test theories. Among the different types of simulations are pedagogical ver-
sus research simulations, descriptive versus analytic simulations, real-time versus com-
pressed-time versus expanded-time simulations, deterministic versus nondeterministic 
simulations, free versus experimental simulations, all-machine versus person–machine 
simulations, macro- versus microsimulations, and simulations varying in the content 
domain that is of interest.
One way in which simulations contribute to the theory construction process is by 
forcing the theorist to engage in a focused analysis of the criterion system in directions 
that might not otherwise have occurred. A second way that simulations contribute to 
theory development is through the conduct of virtual experiments. In this approach, 
a theory is translated into a computational model, and this computational model is 
subjected to initial validation by applying the model to hypothetical scenarios. Agent-
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based modeling is an extension of virtual experiments that also provides perspectives 
on theory.
The use of simulations for theory development is not without critics. Some scien-
tists believe that simulations are too removed from reality and make too many simpli-
fying assumptions. Simulations (especially those that do not involve human participa-
tion), the argument goes, simply cannot capture adequately the dynamic elements of 
how humans interact with their environment. The result is theories that are either too 
simple or, by virtue of their underlying mathematics and computer code, too complex. 
There are at least two counterarguments. First, since tightly controlled experiments and 
surveys conducted via interviews and self-administered questionnaires are generally 
unable to capture adequately the dynamic elements of how humans interact with their 
environment, behavioral simulations provide unique value for developing and testing 
theories regarding human behavior. Second, simulations may in fact be closer to the 
real-world phenomena they seek to study than are survey questionnaires and laboratory 
experiments.
Think about a phenomenon of interest to you. How would you design a simula-
tion to analyze factors that impinge on it? Conduct a careful criterion system analysis 
from the perspective of trying to create and implement a simulation. What fundamen-
tal assumptions are you making? What core constructs and processes do you need to 
capture? What are the dynamic interrelations among them? Can you conduct a virtual 
experiment to gain insights into your theory and refine or expand it? What starting val-
ues would you put in place and later vary? What variables would you unpack and how? 
What assumptions would you make? What new features might you add to the system? 
As you attempt to answer such questions, we suspect that the richness of your theory 
will increase.
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versity Press.–A description of a range of simulations and simulation strategies used in 
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ExERCISES
Exercises to Reinforce Concepts
 1. What major functions do simulations serve?
 2. There are a variety of different types of simulations. Identify and describe six 
of these.
 3. For what principal reasons do scientists use simulations?
 4. What is a criterion system? Provide three examples. Select one of the examples 
and identify the key features of this system that you think would need to be 
represented in any simulation designed to study that criterion system.
Exercises to Apply Concepts
 1. Find an example of a simulation in the research literature. Describe it in detail. 
Propose a future simulation based on this one that will advance the theory 
underlying the simulation.
 2. How would you go about developing a simulation of friendship formation? Of 
communication in your work environment? Of selecting a college or college 
major? Choose one of these topics, or another one of your choice, and describe 
the basic structure of a simulation that you would set up to help you derive a 
theory about the chosen phenomenon.
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Grounded and Emergent Theory
People will occasionally stumble over the truth, but most of the time they 
will pick themselves up and continue on.
—Winston ChurChill (1940)
The most popular methods of scientific analysis in the social sciences are based on 
confirmatory frameworks whereby a scientist begins with a well-articulated theory and 
then subjects that theory to empirical test. The theory is derived from common sense, 
knowledge of previous research, and the type of logical and creative processes described 
in Chapter 4. An alternative approach to theory construction is called grounded theory. 
This approach emphasizes an approach of letting theory emerge from data rather than 
using data to test theory. In traditional social science, the researcher enters a research 
situation with an a priori theory, and the purpose of data collection is to “confirm” or 
“disconfirm” that theory; hence the phrase confirmatory approach to science. In grounded 
theory, data are not used to test an a priori theory. Rather, data are used to evolve a 
theory. Typically, the data are collected by qualitative methods that may include obser-
vation, analysis of archival records, structured and unstructured interviews, and focus 
groups, to name a few.
There are areas in the social sciences that tend to rely on emergent theory orienta-
tions but that do not fall into the formal camp of grounded theory. The grounded theory 
approach has its roots in sociology, and there is a specialized jargon and methodology 
that has built up around it. Although we will refer to many aspects of grounded theory in 
this chapter, we consider theorizing more from the perspective of anthropology, where 
emergent theorizing has been a cornerstone of the discipline for over 100 years. Readers 
with formal anthropological training will be surprised at times by some of the grounded 
theory jargon we use, and readers with more formal training in grounded theory will 
see us sometimes deviate from prescribed practice. But the spirit of both approaches 
should come through, and the suggested readings at the end of the chapter can serve as 
the basis for further study and elaboration.
We begin this chapter by providing an overview of grounded and emergent theoriz-
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ing. We then discuss the frequently asserted stereotype that associates confirmatory or 
quantitatively oriented approaches to science with positivism and grounded/emergent 
approaches with constructivism. We argue that, in practice, epistemology is not strongly 
linked to the use of these frameworks. We next discuss how grounded emergent theo-
rists frame problems and questions, and the role of literature reviews in this process. We 
then describe six different types of data upon which grounded emergent theorists often 
rely. This overview conveys a sense of the richness of the data sources that are used 
when constructing a theory. These include archival records, direct observation, struc-
tured and unstructured interviews, focus groups, virtual ethnographies, and directive 
qualitative methods. Next, we discuss key processes in theory construction, including 
memo writing, theoretical sampling, and the analysis and coding of data. This leads to 
a discussion of grounded emergent theory in terms of process analyses and the appli-
cation of rhetorical theory to argument development. Finally, we discuss information-
processing biases that are important for theorists to overcome when developing theory 
from data.
GROUNDED AND EMERGENT THEORY: AN OVERVIEW
Grounded theory is associated with the classic work of Glaser and Strauss. The first 
application of grounded theory was published in the book Awareness of Dying (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1965). The book The Discovery of Grounded Theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) was 
written 2 years later to make explicit the methods that had been used in this research. 
The book became the basis for grounded theory approaches in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Glaser and Strauss were heavily influenced by symbolic interactionism, a general theory 
of human behavior put forth by George Herbert Mead (1932) and later articulated by 
the noted sociologist Herbert Blumer (1969; see Chapter 11). Symbolic interactionism 
is based on three premises: (1) that people act toward things based on the meanings 
of those things to them, (2) that meaning is derived from social interactions (i.e., the 
meaning of objects emerges socially through our interactions with others), and (3) that 
meaning is the result of an interpretive process used by people to deal with the stimuli 
that they encounter. According to Glaser and Strauss, an important part of theory con-
struction is discovering the meanings that different objects have to people and how 
their interactions are impacted by and define these meanings. This is best accomplished 
through intensive qualitative work based on direct contact with, and immersion in, the 
social world of those being studied.
Early writings on grounded theory emphasized that researchers were to set aside, as 
much as possible, preconceived ideas that they have about the phenomenon of interest 
and instead let relevant concepts and relationships emerge from rich qualitative data. In 
later years some grounded theorists have maintained this orientation, whereas others 
have encouraged the use of prior knowledge and cognitive heuristics to help explore the 
nature of meanings (Glaser, 1992).
Grounded theory construction typically begins by framing the research problem and 
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initial research questions in general terms. Data collection then commences in which 
the researcher pursues data that are rich, substantial, and relevant to the problem at 
hand. As a reasonable amount of data starts to accumulate, the grounded theorist under-
takes initial coding and interpretation of the data to gain a sense of the core concepts 
and the meanings of those concepts. A variety of coding strategies can be pursued, but 
a common strategy is one of comparing incidents (which we describe later). Throughout 
this activity, the theorist engages in a practice called memoing that involves writing ideas 
and conceptual notes “in the margins.” These memos are consulted at a later time, when 
the theorist begins to move toward integrating categories, specifying relationships, and 
delimiting a theory. At each point in the process, the theorist considers the possibility 
of collecting additional data in ways that complement, expand, or better inform the 
emerging conceptual structure. This process is referred to as theoretical sampling. It is 
meant to ensure that the relevant conceptual universe has been thoroughly explored. All 
of the above eventually leads to the writing of the theory. In grounded theory, the tasks 
of coding, comparing, memoing, integrating concepts, and theoretical sampling are key 
processes.
In contrast to grounded theory, emergent theory approaches are not tied to sym-
bolic interactionism, but they overlap with the grounded theory approach, more or 
less. These approaches emphasize description, understanding, and explanation, again 
relying heavily on qualitative data. According to this perspective, before one can theo-
rize, one must first be able to describe the people, events, activities, meanings, con-
texts, environment, and culture of interest. As one gains a reasonable knowledge base 
along these lines, one seeks to understand what the different objects and events that 
have been described mean and represent, not only to the actors, but also to the sci-
entist. Armed with such understanding, the theorist then seeks to explain why people 
behave or think as they do.
Imagine, for example, traveling to a remote area of South America and encountering 
a group of people who have been isolated from the rest of the world. In explaining the 
activities of this group, you might first write copious notes that describe the different 
people, events, activities, and contexts that you observe over an extended period of time. 
You might also learn to speak their language and gather as much information as you can 
about their history, by, for example, asking elders or examining relevant documents or 
historical residues. As you build your descriptive accounts, you try to understand what 
the different events, activities, and contexts mean to the people—that is, how they go 
about interpreting and orienting themselves to their environment. From this, you then 
build explanations of their behaviors—why they do what they do. It is within the con-
text of such description, understanding, and explanation that theory emerges.
POSITIVISM “VERSUS” CONSTRUCTIVISM
Although there are excellent expositions of grounded and emergent theory, some writ-
ers polarize the approaches relative to confirmatory approaches to science. More often 
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than not, a dichotomy is espoused that associates the confirmatory approach with 
positivism and the grounded approach with constructivism. Simplistic and unrepre-
sentative versions of positivism are then subjected to intense criticism. We believe that 
such characterizations are unfortunate. In our experience, science in practice rarely 
fits neatly into simple dichotomies. Rather, scientists blend approaches in different 
ways and to differing degrees for different problems. In addition, almost all scientific 
approaches have something positive to offer, as long as one does not carry them to an 
extreme.
As an example, a recent book on grounded theory characterized, in a value-laden 
way, positivist theorists as seeking causes, favoring deterministic explanations, and 
emphasizing generality and universality. By contrast, interpretive theory, which the 
author associated with grounded theory, “emphasizes understanding, allows for inde-
terminacy, and gives priority to patterns and connections rather than to linear reason-
ing.” We do not even know what “linear reasoning” means let alone why it is bad to 
engage in it. Nor do we know of any scientist who is uninterested in understanding the 
phenomenon he or she studies. Every scientist we know desires to discover patterns and 
connections. We know of no scientist who does not give great thought to the generaliz-
ability of his or her theories. Finally, why is seeking to find the causes of something so 
bad? One does not always have to seek causes, but doing so in some contexts and for 
some problems can be productive.
In the final analysis, we believe that one should strive to create a diverse set of tools 
for one’s theoretical toolbox and then use them in ways that help get the job done. We 
recognize that orientations to scientific research differ when one has an a priori theory 
and seeks to collect data to test it versus when one has no theory and desires to use data 
to construct a theory. In the end, the ultimate goal is to describe, predict, understand, 
and explain behavior in ways that help us make sense of our world and that allow us to 
derive benefits. Both the confirmatory and emergent approaches are complementary, not 
conflicting, means to these ends. Confirmatory approaches need not embrace positiv-
ism, nor must grounded approaches embrace constructivism.
FRAMING THE PROBLEM
A common first step in building a grounded theory is to specify the problem area that 
one wants to address, the question that one wants to answer, or the phenomena that 
one wants to understand and explain (Spiggle, 1994). This is typically done in general 
terms, because the framing of the problem and question might change as one gains 
more firsthand knowledge in the field. The spirit at this step and throughout most of the 
analysis is to avoid imposing preconceived ideas onto the problem. There are, of course, 
occasions when theorizing is pursued in a more targeted way, such as when an existing 
theory is only partially developed and would benefit from additional exploration and 
probing. As well, there are scenarios for which emergent theorists avoid framing a prob-
lem statement at all, instead intending only to obtain a sense of “what’s going on.” But 
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more often than not, emergent theorists begin with a statement of the general problem 
area or questions they want to address.
Emergent theorists recognize that it is impossible to approach theory construc-
tion with a complete blank slate, a tabula rasa. By definition, scientists bring to theory 
construction a set of concepts and meanings that are learned from birth and that allow 
them to make sense of the world in which they grew up and are now experiencing. An 
American social scientist may have a different “lens” through which to view events than 
a French social scientist or a Japanese social scientist. But the spirit of the emergent the-
ory approach is to try to set aside preconceived notions so as to be open to new concepts 
and relationships, all the while being cognizant of the “filters” that impact the interpre-
tations that are ultimately imposed. Strauss and Corbin (1998) speak of the construct 
of “theoretical sensitivity,” which refers to the researcher’s capacity, based on his or her 
experience, to focus on constructs that are central to the phenomena of interest.
An important part of framing the problem is specifying the population that you 
intend to study. For example, one might seek to study alcohol use in inner-city Latino 
youths in the United States. Or one might seek to study the relationship between eco-
nomic ideology and economic practices among the Mayan peoples of the western high-
lands of Guatemala. Or one might study the behavioral mechanisms surrounding the 
spread of HIV and AIDS in young gay men in the United States. In each case, the speci-
fication of the group about which one wants to theorize delimits the scope of theory. To 
be sure, the precise target population might change as one proceeds further into data 
collection and analysis, but some delimitation of the population of interest inevitably 
occurs at the outset.
THE ROLE OF PAST LITERATURE
Like other approaches to theory construction, the timing as to when one should access 
relevant background literature is subject to some controversy in grounded theory 
frameworks. Some theorists argue that one should approach a problem after being fully 
informed by the extant literature, whereas others believe that this only channels and 
biases one’s thinking. For example, Glaser (1978) recommends reading widely, but not 
pursuing the literature most closely related to the problem being researched so as to 
avoid channeled thinking. Some grounded theorists note that researchers may not even 
know at the outset the literature that will later be relevant.
Despite this orientation, the most common view is that past literature is an impor-
tant resource that needs to be consulted prior to data collection. To most scientists, 
grounded or otherwise, it only makes sense to have a good working knowledge of the 
relevant theories and past research as they approach a given problem area. Indeed, the 
process by which master’s thesis proposals, dissertation proposals, and grant proposals 
are evaluated at most institutions demands a careful consideration of the extant litera-
ture before embarking on fieldwork or the collection of data. The key is to ensure that 
such knowledge does not channel one’s thinking too narrowly.
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In some ways, the existing literature is a form of emergent data, just as archival 
records, interviews, focus groups, and observations are. The aim of the theorist is to 
compare the existing literature to the theory that emerges from data. Just as other data 
are subjected to coding and memoing, so should past literature be approached in this 
way, as one evolves a theory from all the different informational sources.
Of course, no matter what the orientation of grounded theorists is to past literature, 
when they write their theories, they include a scholarly and comprehensive consider-
ation of past research in their writings. The issue being discussed here is the timing of 
when to bring the extant literature to bear on the thinking of the researcher.
COLLECTING QUALITATIVE DATA
Given a problem statement, the grounded/emergent theorist collects data to provide per-
spectives on the phenomena of interest. The data sought are intended to cast a wide net, 
as one seeks to describe, understand, and explain the phenomena, broadly construed. 
The term ethnography is used in anthropology to refer loosely to a broad class of qualita-
tive methods applied with the purpose of providing a detailed, in-depth description of 
everyday life and practice. Because the theory construction process itself is so strongly 
tied to the data one collects, we briefly characterize some of the major methods that 
comprise ethnographies to provide a sense of the diverse sources of data one might con-
sult for constructing a theory.
Archival Records
An important source for understanding the historical roots and contexts of many phe-
nomena are archival records. If one wants to study adolescent drug use in the United 
States, for example, it may be helpful to explore as background the different policies and 
approaches to drug use that have been used in past decades, how the lives of adolescents 
over past generations have been affected by drug use, and the ways in which society 
has viewed and sanctioned adolescent drug use. In the field of anthropology, ethnohis-
torical methods have evolved that allow scientists to build an understanding of groups 
and societies through the historical study of maps, music, paintings, photography, folk-
lore, oral tradition, ecology, archeological materials, museum collections, language, and 
place names.
Archival data can be sought from many sources. Municipal and state governments 
often have a wealth of archival data about business transactions, real estate and land 
transactions, zoning, and court cases, all of which can be revealing about the past of a 
community. Newspapers, magazines, and other forms of media from the past also offer 
a wealth of information.
Good historical methodology requires that one not only gather historical informa-
tion from multiple sources but also critically evaluate those sources. For example, no 
person alive today personally knew Leonardo da Vinci, so how can we know anything 
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BOx 10.1. Anthropology and the Ethnographic Tradition
Emergent theory has had a central place in the historical development of anthro-
pology as a field. The “father” of anthropology is generally recognized as Franz 
Boas, a German-born academic who was a professor first at Clark University in 
1889 and later at Columbia University in 1899. Boas (1897) conducted research 
among the Kwakiutl Indians in British Columbia, Canada, and in the process 
developed new conceptualizations on race and culture. Boas felt that it was 
important to study all aspects of culture and that theory construction should 
be deferred until a group had been described as completely as possible. His 
meticulous and detailed ethnographies of the Kwakiutl reflected this orientation. 
Based on his emphasis on comprehensiveness, Boas advocated the “four-field 
approach” to anthropology, which emphasized human evolution, archeology, 
language, and culture. Each of these areas has since become a major subfield 
in anthropology. Boas was a highly influential figure on the conduct of ethnogra-
phies and the collection of qualitative data as a basis for understanding human 
behavior.
George Murdock was another influential anthropologist throughout the 
1900s who advocated combining qualitative and quantitative methodologies. 
Murdock focused on comparative analyses of different cultures. He compiled 
ethnographies from around the world and in 1949, in conjunction with other 
researchers at Yale University, he established the Human Relations Area Files. 
In 1954 Murdock published a list of every known culture, entitled the Outline of 
World Cultures. In 1957 he published the World Ethnographic Sample, a data 
set of 30 variables for each of 565 cultures. In 1969 he worked with Douglas 
White to publish a data set of 186 cultures with approximately 2,000 variables 
describing each one. The Human Relations Area Files, now maintained by an 
independent research organization, consists of large data sets and extensive 
ethnographies of over 365 different cultural groups from around the world. The 
ethnographies alone consist of over 800,000 pages of indexed information 
about different societies. An extensive indexing system allows the ethnographies 
to be readily accessed and searched for purposes of comparative analysis.
As one might imagine, Murdock’s work has been controversial among anthro-
pologists, in part, because of its combined quantitative and qualitative empha-
sis. However, one cannot deny his early impact on the field. Other notable 
anthropologists in the history of the field who embraced ethnographic analysis 
include Kroeber, Levi-Strauss, Malinowski, Mead, and Radcliffe-Brown, to name 
only a few.
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about him today? We have access to diaries, letters that he wrote, portraits of him, 
and we know what other people have said about him. However, all of this must be put 
together and interpreted. When we examine a document, it is essential that we evalu-
ate the credibility of the source and the context in which the source is making his or 
her observations. Historians must consider when the source materials were produced, 
the conditions under which those materials were produced, the intentions that moti-
vated the source, and the reliability of the source. They also must consider the broader 
historical context in which the documents were produced—the events that preceded 
and followed the creation of the documents—because the significance of any document 
depends as much on what comes after it as what came before it.
With the availability of high-speed computers and noninvasive scanners, archival 
materials are becoming increasingly available and accessible to researchers. Primary 
materials from the past are a rich source of ideas for theory building about current-day 
issues, and you will undoubtedly benefit from a study of historical and ethnohistorical 
methods and principles.
Direct Observation
Another rich source of qualitative data is direct observation. This takes many forms, 
including observing people at a single point in time to the classic method of partici-
pant observation. Sometimes people know they are being observed as part of a study 
and other times they do not. Sometimes the observer is physically present; sometimes 
the “observations” are recorded by an external device, such as a camera or a recorder, 
without the observer being present. Sometimes only the behavioral traces or behavioral 
residues that people leave behind are “observed” (e.g., studies that analyze the contents 
of people’s garbage). Sometimes the scientist becomes a full-fledged member of the group 
being observed, indistinguishable from other group members. Other times the scientist 
tries to “blend in” as much as possible, but stands out in a recognizable way, such as 
the North American anthropologist who lives among the Maya Indians of Guatemala to 
try to better understand their customs and day-to-day activities. Scientists may observe 
people for only a short time or continuously for extended periods of time. Researchers 
may select a specific location at a specific time and observe all that happens at that time 
in that setting, or they may follow people to different locations to observe their behav-
ior.
Crucial decisions with respect to observational methods include determining whom 
to observe, in what contexts to observe them, when to observe them, how to observe 
them, how often and how long to observe them, and in what form to make a record of 
those observations.
Observation can take many forms, and there is a degree of creativity in choosing the 
form of observation to pursue. For example, an academic social psychologist interested 
in understanding social influence processes took time off from his position at a major 
university and sought employment as a car salesman, an insurance salesman, a charity 
fund-raiser, an intern in an advertising company, and a retail salesperson—all with the 
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idea of learning about influence strategies as used in these professions. A number of aca-
demic researchers in the field of consumer behavior traveled in mobile homes as a group 
for almost a year across the United States to many diverse locations, making extensive 
observations about their own and others’ shopping experiences. Each night they would 
meet as a group and discuss what had transpired during the day, with the idea of for-
mulating a comprehensive theory of consumer behavior. Neither of these observational 
enterprises is typical of formal observation methods, yet both resulted in insightful 
accounts of the phenomena the researchers were studying.
Structured and Unstructured Interviews and Surveys
Interviews can be structured or unstructured. Interviews are unstructured to the 
extent that there is no detailed script for asking questions, independent of the answers 
a research participant provides. Instead, the line of questioning is at the discretion of 
the interviewer and takes different directions, depending on the answers provided. By 
contrast, structured interviews have an a priori set of questions that is asked in a given 
sequence. The questions are formulated by the scientist ahead of time, so as to directly 
address the issues of interest, and the order of questions is minimally affected by the 
answers that are provided. Qualitative interviews typically record a person’s responses 
verbatim, but occasionally the respondent is asked to choose between a small number of 
preestablished response categories.
Some interviews are completely structured whereas others are completely unstruc-
tured, but more often than not, there is a balance between the two in qualitative research. 
It is not uncommon for the first part of an interview to be unstructured and then to turn 
to a more structured format in the second part of the interview. A synthesis of struc-
tured and unstructured interviews creates the semistructured interview. Semistructured 
interviews have a range of topics and questions to be asked, but allow for new questions 
to be raised spontaneously by the interviewer, depending on what the interviewee says.
One popular type of interview is called a life history. It is a somewhat unstructured 
interview that is designed to elicit a sense of the life of the person being interviewed. The 
idea is that by understanding the life histories of key members of the target population, 
one will have a better understanding of the contexts in which behaviors are performed.
Life histories have different structures; a format that we find useful has several fac-
ets. After a set of introductory comments that establishes the focus for telling a life story, 
the respondents are asked to think about their life in terms of its “main chapters” and 
to tell us about those chapters, in whatever way they want. This part of the interview is 
unstructured. Next they are asked to identify a few key events that stand out in their life 
and to elaborate on each of them (e.g., what happened, how it happened, when it hap-
pened, with whom it happened, and what was special about it). After this discussion, 
respondents are asked to identify and talk about an event that defined the high point of 
their lives, an event that defined the low point of their lives, an event that was a turning 
point in their lives, their earliest memory, their most important childhood event, their 
most important event during adolescence, and their most important event as an adult. 
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Each event is thoroughly explored. Respondents are then asked to describe the single 
greatest challenge in their lives and then the biggest influences on their lives in terms of 
other people. Next, respondents are asked to consider their future and to describe it first 
in terms of hopes and dreams and then in terms of fears. Respondents are then asked to 
describe their values, political orientations, morals, and the spiritual side of their lives 
and how these have changed over time. The interview concludes with a final explora-
tion of the respondents’ lives in general as well as a solicitation for any other things we 
should know about to understand their lives. By the conclusion of the interview, which 
may take several hours, we have a rich sense of the individual’s life.
A comparable type of interview to the life history focuses on labor histories, but in 
this case, the line of questioning focuses on jobs and economic matters rather than life 
more generally. In addition to life and labor histories, unstructured and semistructured 
interviews typically are used to focus more directly on the phenomena of interest to the 
theorist.
Dick (1990) describes a structured interviewing method called convergent inter-
viewing in which two experienced theorists interview two informants, with one theorist 
interviewing one informant and the other theorist interviewing the other informant, 
each asking the same questions. The two theorists then compare notes, identifying com-
mon themes and points of agreement and disagreement between the two informants. 
The interview schedule is then revised for the next pair of interviews, so as to include 
probe questions to seek exceptions to the previous agreements as well as to seek expla-
nations for the disagreements. The interview schedule is dynamic and shifts from pair 
to pair, as provocative issues are identified by the two different theorists.
There are many types of specialized interviewing strategies that have evolved in 
different disciplines. For example, laddering is a technique that has its roots in psychol-
ogy and that has become popular in advertising and the analysis of consumer behavior 
(Veludo-de-Oliveira, Ikeda, & Campomar, 2006). It involves in-depth, one-on-one inter-
viewing in which the focus is on eliciting basic personal values underlying the choices 
people make. The respondent is led through a sequence of questions, each time involv-
ing probes focused on “Why is this important to you?” and “What does it mean to you?” 
For example, a graduate student might be asked why he or she prefers one school over 
another, to which the answer might be because it is more affordable. The next question 
might be “Why is a school being affordable important to you?” Every answer the respon-
dent gives is pushed further back to a more basic value by continually asking “Why is 
that important” to each response that is given.
Although interviews are the mainstay of a great deal of qualitative research, it is 
becoming more common for grounded and emergent theorists to pursue mixed-method 
forms of analysis, as discussed shortly.
Focus Groups
Another popular tool for qualitative researchers is the focus group. Questions are posed 
to a small group of individuals, usually 7–12 in number, in a group setting, and the 
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group members provide their reactions and perspectives for all members to hear. For 
example, a focus group might be conducted with a group of students to explore how 
they view teachers, and a separate focus group of teachers might be conducted to explore 
how they view students. Like interviews, focus groups are conducted along a range from 
unstructured to structured. Participants are selected because they share certain char-
acteristics that relate to the topic at hand. Focus groups are conducted by a moderator, 
who creates a permissive and nurturing environment that encourages different points 
of view. Multiple focus groups are often conducted on the same topic, with the composi-
tion of the groups sometimes varied strategically. The interactions are usually video- or 
audiotaped, and written transcriptions are derived from these recordings.
Focus groups can take many forms beyond the traditional focus group format. Some 
examples include (1) a two-way focus group, where one focus group observes another 
focus group and discusses the observed interactions and conclusions; (2) a “dueling 
moderator” focus group, where two moderators take opposite sides on an issue; (3) a 
participant-moderated focus group, where one of the participants is asked to assume the 
role of the moderator; (4) a teleconference focus group, where the participants are linked 
via teleconferencing; and (5) an online focus group, where computers and Internet con-
nections are the main source of communication.
Focus groups can be useful in that the ideas and thoughtful expressions of one 
member of the group can serve as a catalyst for the ideas and thoughtful expressions 
of other group members. However, at the same time, the public forum may inhibit 
responses and frankness. With online focus groups, members can remain anonymous at 
the cost of losing some richness in communications. A dominant personality or influen-
tial member also can undermine a focus group. Sometimes the conversations in a focus 
group can become sidetracked and off point, in which case the moderator needs to keep 
participants “on task.” Despite its weaknesses, the focus group can be a rich source of 
qualitative data.
Virtual Ethnographies
Virtual ethnographies are relatively new and extend the traditional notion of an ethnog-
raphy to technologically mediated interactions in virtual settings and virtual communi-
ties. The physical boundaries of a virtual community can span the entire world. Just as 
ethnographers immerse themselves in the world of a target community defined in physi-
cal terms, the ethnographer studying virtual communities tries to do the same.
Virtual communities can be based on memberships in news groups, mailing lists, 
e-mail patterns, participation in virtual conferences, multisite users of a web page, or 
memberships or participation in chat rooms. Basic ethnographic questions about a vir-
tual community include how many people belong to it, how long it has existed, how it 
defines itself, what its focus is, and who belongs to it. Many virtual communities are 
defined around topics; the nature and scope of these topics need to be documented. 
Often there is a special vocabulary or jargon that evolves in virtual communities, as well 
as a set of rules for communication, referred to as “netiquette” (Mason, 1996).
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A researcher can collect virtual ethnographic data by participant observation (e.g., 
by being a member of that virtual community) and saving e-mails and/or listserve mes-
sages sent to, and received from, community members. One also can conduct electronic 
surveys and in-depth interviews of individuals, usually over the Internet, as well as 
download and analyze graphics and structures of web pages.
There are virtual communities on an incredibly diverse range of topics. As the influ-
ence of the Internet and virtual technologies continues to grow, this will be an addi-
tional source of data and information about many social-science-related phenomena. 
One of our anthropological colleagues, for example, was surprised to recently discover 
web pages for many of the villages she has studied for years in remote areas of Central 
America.
Directive Qualitative Methods
Some qualitative methods assign research participants tasks to perform and then use 
the data produced in the context of those tasks to construct a theory. An example of 
this approach is the metaphor elicitation technique (MET) developed by Zaltman for 
advertising research (Zaltman & Coulter, 1995). This method focuses on a product 
(broadly construed as a “topic”) and asks participants to collect, prior to the main 
interview, photographs and/or pictures (from magazines, books, newspapers, or other 
sources) that indicate what the assigned topic means to them. Upon completing the 
task, a 10-step process is pursued using the pictures and images the person brings to 
the interview. Step 1 is called storytelling and involves having respondents tell how 
each picture is related to the topic. Step 2 focuses on missed issues and images, in 
which respondents describe any issue they were unable to find a picture about and 
to describe a picture that would capture that “missed issue.” In Step 3, respondents 
perform a sorting task, where they are asked to sort the pictures into meaningful piles 
and to provide a label for each pile. There are no restrictions on the number of piles or 
the number of pictures in each pile. Step 4 is construct elicitation, wherein respondents 
articulate the  differences between pairs of piles. In addition, the laddering technique 
discussed  earlier is applied. In Step 5 respondents identify the most representative image 
and elaborate on why it was their choice. In Step 6 respondents characterize the oppo-
site image; that is, they describe pictures that might typify the opposite of the task 
they were given. Step 7, called sensory imaging, asks respondents to use other sensory 
modalities to represent the topic. In Step 8 respondents work with the interviewer to 
create a mental map, based on everything that has been discussed in previous steps. 
This is a graphical device that positions each key construct identified in the previous 
steps in a separate rectangle or box, and then connects the boxes with lines to show 
the linkages (or lack of linkages) between them. In Step 9 respondents create a sum-
mary image, in which they make a montage of their images, putting them together so 
as to express issues that are important to them. Finally, in Step 10, called making a 
vignette, respondents create a vignette or story that communicates important issues 
related to the topic.
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In sum, there are many methods for collecting qualitative data that can yield rich 
accounts of the phenomena in which a theorist is interested. A detailed discussion of 
these methods is the topic of a research methods book, not a theory construction book. 
Our intent is merely to provide you with a sense of the types of qualitative data with 
which grounded or emergent theorists work in the context of formulating their theories. 
Even the above is an inadequate representation, as there are many other forms of quali-
tative data that we have not mentioned (e.g., video recordings, collections of folklore and 
oral traditions, case studies).
Mixed-Methods Research
There has been debate in the social sciences about which method of data collection is 
best, the qualitative or quantitative method. Qualitative methods are associated with 
the data collection strategies discussed above, whereas quantitative methods are associ-
ated with surveys, closed-ended questionnaires, rating scales, and statistical analyses. It 
is becoming increasingly recognized that both approaches have strengths, so research 
that uses both approaches in complementary ways is becoming more common. Mixed-
methods research is typically defined as research in which investigators mix or combine 
quantitative and qualitative methods of data collection (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2002). 
From a theory construction standpoint, we believe that the use of multiple methods 
and multiple frameworks offers the best opportunities for generating new and creative 
ideas.
MEMO WRITING
As noted earlier, memo writing occurs at various phases of the data collection and the-
ory construction process. Researchers write down field notes to themselves about ideas 
and insights they have “on the spot,” which they then consult when analyzing their data, 
or when they formally posit their theory. One type of memo is called a code memo, which 
is a note relevant to the creation or coding of categories. A theoretical memo, by contrast, 
focuses on theoretical propositions linking categories or variables. Operational memos 
contain directions about the evolving research design and data collection strategies. 
Memo writing occurs in the field during data collection and also during data analysis.
Memo writing does not have to take the form of formal notes. For example, Zaltman 
(Zaltman & Coulter, 1995) sometimes writes memos in the form of vignettes that he 
thinks capture the kinds of metaphors that apply to his participants, or he draws images 
that graphically capture important dynamics that he observes.
Memos have a central role in grounded theory frameworks because they are often a 
crucial link between the data and the writing of the theory. They are a core part of the 
process of theory construction.
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THEORETICAL SAMPLING
Grounded theorists emphasize the importance of theoretical sampling in the context 
of constructing theory from data. This is purposive sampling that often occurs after 
initial data have been collected and preliminarily analyzed. The purpose of theoretical 
sampling is to strategically increase the diversity of one’s sample with the idea that this 
diversity will provide new information that will help one better appreciate and define 
the constructs and propositions that are evolving. The motivation behind theoretical 
sampling is not to obtain representativness, but rather to seek out new information 
that provides perspectives on the boundaries and nature of concepts and relationships 
between them (Charmaz, 2006).
Some grounded and emergent theorists emphasize analyzing qualitative data so as 
to understand the “three mosts”—that is, most of the thinking of most people most of 
the time (Zaltman & Coulter, 1995). This approach focuses attention on such matters as 
how many people mention certain constructs or certain themes. Theoretical sampling 
augments this orientation by encouraging the seeking out of new constructs, even if 
they are atypical, and exploring the limits of one’s conceptions.
Related to the concept of theoretical sampling is theoretical saturation. This term 
refers to the decision to stop data collection because more data will not add anything 
new to the theory that has been, or is being, created.
The notions of theoretical sampling and theoretical saturation underscore another 
feature of grounded theory approaches: that data collection and data analysis often are 
realized simultaneously. It is only through the continual interplay between data collec-
tion and data analysis that one can make judgments about theoretical saturation and the 
need for additional sampling.
ANALYZING AND CODING DATA
The heart of grounded and emergent theory construction occurs at the level of data 
analysis. It is here that the scientist combines the insights gained during the act of data 
collection, the insights gained from reading past literatures, the field notes, and the 
information contained in the data to derive a theory. There is no single, correct way 
to abstract theory from qualitative data. Some theorists work solely at the level of nar-
ratives derived from a careful review of the data, others theorists rely on formal data 
coding, and others do both. Some researchers prefer a “top-down” approach, starting 
with general themes and then focusing on increasingly concrete representations within 
those themes. Other researchers prefer a “bottom-up” approach, starting with the con-
crete activities that people perform and then deriving more general themes from them. 
Some researchers prefer to embark on the process by avoiding, as much as possible, the 
imposition of an a priori framework on data interpretation, whereas other researchers 
apply a simple, flexible framework to start the analysis. Still other theorists impose a 
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detailed framework, but always with a willingness to amend, adapt, augment, and drop 
categories and concepts.
An Example from Anthropology
Here, we provide an example of one approach to deriving theory from the coding of data 
that will make the above concrete, recognizing that it is only one of many different strat-
egies that could be pursued. In this example, the researcher, Professor Liliana Goldin, 
is an anthropologist studying the impact of globalization on Mayan families and culture 
in the highlands of Western Guatemala. The particular research we discuss is a study 
analyzing the impact of maquila factories on Mayan families (Goldin, 2009).
The western highlands of Guatemala are a largely rural area, with townships and 
a few small cities located throughout. The traditional means of subsistence is through 
agriculture, in which a family grows crops on a small parcel of land, lives off a portion of 
the crops, and barters or sells the remaining crops at market. Mayan inheritance tradi-
tions are such that land is passed to all the children in the family, with the land parcel 
divided equally among them. With a high birthrate, this makes smaller plots of land 
available to each successive generation. The use of pesticides and certain types of fertil-
izers has made land productive for the Maya in the short run, but it also has undermined 
the fertility of the soil in the long run. On top of this, throughout history, the federal 
government has seized much of the most productive land of the Maya. Coupled with 
other political and natural events (e.g., genocide during civil wars, devastating earth-
quakes), many Maya have had to turn to means of survival other than agriculture.
With the rapid advent of globalization and the extremely low wages paid to Mayan 
Indians, maquila factories (also called export processing factories) have begun to appear 
in the highlands. These are foreign-owned factories that specialize in using unskilled 
labor to prepare exports for sale and use in other countries. For example, parts of cloth-
ing are sent from the United States to Guatemala, where the factory workers sew them 
together. The assembled clothes are then sent back to the United States, tax free, and 
sold to the American public.
The factories tend to hire young adolescent girls, who work long hours under oppres-
sive conditions, typically for about $6 a day. The workers are thankful for the opportu-
nity to earn a steady wage, although turnover is high, about 50% every 6 months. Many 
workers are fired (for not being productive enough, for doing poor quality work, for 
complaining, or for attempting to organize), and others quit because of the hardships of 
employment or for personal reasons.
The presence of the factories in communities is having a profound impact, not only 
economically, but also on the Mayan culture. For example, whereas an adolescent female 
previously spent time helping her parents in the field and around the house, this form of 
labor has changed. The girl who works in the factory now is a source of steady income 
and contributes to the household in new ways. Often the money she earns is used to pay 
for the education of boys, to buy food, and to help with general household expenses. 
Usually the girl is given a small discretionary amount of money to spend on herself. 
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A certain sense of independence is felt by the adolescent girl that comes with maquila 
work. The gender dynamics in the household are changing as a result of the factories 
and this, in turn, is affecting other facets of Mayan life.
Professor Goldin has conducted research in the Mayan communities for over 20 
years. She lived in the townships with local families for 2 years and has returned to the 
area every year for extended stays. She is fluent in both Spanish and the Mayan language 
spoken in the area. Over the years, she gained considerable knowledge of the people, 
the culture, and the many changes that they have experienced. She also has researched 
their history through archival analyses, examining records dating to the invasion of the 
Spaniards in the 16th century.
The data for her study of the impact of the maquila factories include archival analy-
ses; focus groups with maquila workers and nonworkers; interviews (including life and 
labor histories) of workers, nonworkers, and their families; discussions with owners; 
physical observations of the factories (though access is restricted by the factory owners 
and management); maps of the region and the locations of the factories on those maps; 
photographic accounts; and formal quantitative surveys. As an example, we consider a 
strategy she used to analyze interview data. For pedagogical reasons, we present a sim-
plified account of the coding/analysis process.
Goldin started with a typology of the general areas that she wanted to explore. 
These included, for example, the effects of the maquilas on economic and labor prac-
tices, economic ideology, wealth and resources, gender dynamics, health, and family 
dynamics. She began by reading through all of the interviews so as to gain a general 
sense of their content and to see if any initial themes, propositions, or “story lines” 
jumped out. She then read each interview in earnest, placing a color-coded tag next to 
any segment that mentioned or dealt with economic issues, a different colored tag next 
to any segment that dealt with gender dynamics, and so on for each category of her 
typology. A given segment could be classified into more than one category. We call these 
level 1 categories.
Goldin defined a “segment” as any important thought or expression that the respon-
dent made about a given topic. Such segments could be several paragraphs in length, a 
single paragraph in length, a sentence in length, or even a partial sentence. A key deci-
sion by a theorist analyzing qualitative data is specifying how a segment will be defined 
and how to identify the beginning and end of a segment. Some theorists define segments 
on a word-by-word basis in order to pursue a formal linguistic analysis of the data. Gol-
din defined a segment as a meaningful thought about a topic.
In the course of classifying segments into level 1 categories, additional areas on 
which she should focus suggested themselves, thereby creating new level 1 categories. 
For example, in her early studies with the Maya, it was serendipitously discovered that 
religious conversions from Catholicism to Protestantism were associated with the type 
of economic strategies that people tended to pursue. Further exploration of this result 
revealed a complex and fascinating story of the interplay between religious ideology and 
economic practice. A level 1 category on religion was therefore added to the framework.
Next, Goldin focused on a specific category 1 topic, say gender dynamics, and col-
272 FRAMEWORKS FOR THEORY CONSTRUCTION
lected together all those tagged segments that focused on that topic. The segments for 
this topic were reread and a typology of themes within the gender dynamic topic area 
was developed. In other words, a set of level 2 categories was created within each level 
1 category. The level 2 categories were derived, in part, using what grounded theorists 
call the method of segment contrasts or, more simply, the method of contrasts (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998, also use the term constant comparison to refer to this method). In the 
method of contrasts, the theorist compares one segment with another segment, noting 
to him- or herself what is common and what is different about the two segments. This 
process is repeated many times, comparing different pairs of segments (in principle, all 
possible pairs of segments) until a conceptual framework for a typology starts to emerge, 
based on the many observed communalities and differences. During the process, notes 
are taken about the similarities and differences between segments and their possible 
implications. At some point, a formal typology of the level 2 themes within a level 1 
category evolves. Goldin carefully reviewed her notes and elaborated and clarified the 
typology accordingly. She then assigned descriptive labels to the different categories or 
themes, a process that grounded theorists refer to as naming, and abstracted the major 
ideas being expressed. With the tentative typology in place, Goldin then repeated the 
process of reading each segment within the given level 1 category, but instead of com-
paring one segment to another, she now compared each segment to the taxonomic struc-
ture to determine which level 2 category fit it. Called the method of classification, this 
process led to further enhancements and refinements of the typology. Finally, the dif-
ferent segments were color-coded and tagged as to which level 2 categories they repre-
sented, thereby completing the level 2 categorization process. This process was repeated 
for each level 1 category.
The above strategy for creating level 2 categories is next repeated to create level 3 
categories. A given level 2 category is selected and all segments that are tagged as mem-
bers of the category are collected together. After an initial reading of all segments, the 
method of contrasts and the method of classification are applied, together with memo 
FIGURE 10.1. Tree diagram of category levels.
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writing, to produce a typology of level 3 categories within each level 2 category. Figure 
10.1 presents a tree diagram to reflect the resulting structure.
The process can be repeated yet again for the level 3 categories to create a fourth 
level of categories, and so on. At some point, the theorist makes the decision that further 
layering is beyond the scope of what he or she is trying to accomplish.
Once these steps are complete, theorists typically step back from the more micro-
level analyses and think about the interconnections between the level 1, level 2, and 
level 3 categories more generally, in light of all the information processed. The idea is to 
adopt a “big picture view” and to examine the different phenomena as an interconnected 
system rather than focusing on its component parts. Indeed, knowing that this type of 
“big picture” analysis eventually will take place, researchers typically include notes and 
thoughts about the larger dynamics during the process of memo writing at the earlier 
stages.
Computer-Assisted Analysis
We described the above process referring to color-coded tags assigned to segments to 
flag the different categories of the segment at each category level. In point of fact, not 
only did Goldin do this, but she also created computer codes for each category (cor-
responding to each type of tag) for use in a computer program. Specifically, a given 
interview was broken down into segments, and each segment was then assigned a level 1 
category code, a level 2 category code, and a level 3 category code. Multiple codes could 
be assigned if a segment fell into more than one category. This process was repeated for 
every interview and then the data for all interviews were merged into a single data file. 
The computer program was then used to sort through the segments to isolate almost 
instantly all segments associated with a given category at a given level. For example, 
when Goldin wanted to examine all segments focused on spousal interactions (a level 2 
category) reflecting gender dynamics (a level 1 category), the computer sorted through 
the database and showed only these segments, with a respondent identifier for each one. 
In precomputer days, this process was pursued rather clumsily by sorting through index 
cards with one segment written on each card.
For the method of contrasts, the computer can display all possible pairs of seg-
ments at any given category level or it can display a random sample of the segment 
pairs or some systematically defined subset of pairs. This is important for several rea-
sons. First, sometimes the sheer amount of information is overwhelming when pursu-
ing the method of contrasts. For example, suppose there are 40 different segments to 
compare. In this case, there are 780 combinations of two segments to compare, which 
is a great deal of information to process. If 10 interviews are conducted and each 
interviewee mentions 10 segments in a given category, then there are 100 segments to 
compare. In this case, there are 4,950 unique combinations of two segments. It simply 
is not feasible for the human mind to process this amount of information. By forming 
all possible pairwise combinations of segments and then selecting a random sample 
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of these using a computer, the task of systematically comparing pairs of segments 
becomes more manageable.
In sum, computers permit flexible and efficient accessing and pairing of segments. 
Instead of fumbling with index cards, pages of text, and tags, or instead of relying on 
memory, segments can be grouped, organized, and processed in diverse ways with a 
few keystrokes on a keyboard. This can facilitate theory development. Some of the more 
popular qualitative-based software programs include AnSWR, Atlas.ti, C-I-SAID, Deci-
sion Explorer, Ethnograph, N6, Nudist, and NVivo.
Defining and Manipulating Segments
In the preceding example, Goldin defined a “segment” as any important thought or 
expression that the respondent made about a given topic. Segments can be conceptu-
alized using different criteria. Some researchers conceptualize segments broadly and 
others conceptualize them narrowly. Some researchers think about segments in terms 
of semantic meanings, others in terms of their affective content, others in terms of the 
processes they reflect, others in terms of who the actors are, and still others, at whom 
the action is being directed. Theorists do not necessarily choose between these differ-
ent schemes. Rather, they can use all of them. Thus, multiple codes can be assigned to 
a segment, with some codes focusing on the meaning of the segment, some focusing on 
processes that are occurring in the segment, some focusing on the affective content of 
the segment, and so on. With the help of computers, one can access segments almost 
instantly using any given segment conceptualization that has been coded.
For example, one might have the computer focus on the affective content of all 
segments across all people interviewed and show first the text of all segments that are 
expressions of positive affect and then all segments that are expressions of negative 
affect. This could be pursued across all segments or, perhaps, focusing only on segments 
within a given level 1 category (e.g., those segments pertaining to gender dynamics). Or 
it could be pursued only for segments within a specified level 2 category (e.g., within 
gender dynamics, focusing on spousal interactions). Or it could be pursued only for 
specified level 3 categories.
To make matters more complex, the accessing of segments also can vary as a func-
tion of individual differences of the people interviewed. For example, the theorist might 
request that the computer show all segments expressing positive affect in the area of 
gender dynamics for male participants. This could then be repeated for female partici-
pants, with the theorist then making gender comparisons.
Guiding Questions and Coding Families
When thinking about defining and characterizing segments, some grounded theorists 
encourage analysts to use orienting questions to help them think about possible codes 
to assign and how to define segments. For example, Glaser (1978) described 18 “coding 
families” that researchers can use to develop codes and segments. Strauss (Strauss & 
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Corbin, 1998) described a coding family of “Six Cs” that stresses causes, consequences, 
and boundary conditions. Strauss and Corbin (1998) describe a set of diverse heuristics, 
much like those described in Chapter 4, as a way of exploring the different interpreta-
tions and conceptualizations one might apply to data.
Although numerous guiding questions and orientations have been suggested to 
help direct an analyst, there also are grounded theorists who believe that one should 
avoid such questions and coding families and simply let matters emerge from the data. 
You need to think about the approach that best resonates with you.
Open Coding, Axial Coding, and Selective Coding
Expositions of grounded theory offer a framework for coding data that is similar to the 
approach used by Goldin, but somewhat different. Distinctions are made between three 
types of coding: open coding, axial coding, and selective coding (Strauss & Corbin, 
1998). Open coding involves developing initial categories for the words, sentences, 
phrases, or paragraphs under consideration. Axial coding involves imposing a coding 
scheme onto the categories from open coding that identifies connections between the 
categories. Strauss and Corbin draw the analogy of “putting an axis through the data” 
to connect the various categories identified in open coding. The connections between 
categories can come in the form of (1) conceptualizing the categories as causally related, 
(2) conceptualizing the categories as different aspects of a common dimension, and/or 
(3) conceptualizing the categories as part of a process, among others. Selective coding 
involves identification of the central themes and integrating the open and axial catego-
ries accordingly. The term selective is used because the analyst concentrates on a subset 
of core categories and connections around which to build the theory.
In sum, a great deal of thought is required regarding how to code qualitative data 
for later review and synthesis. Theorists can exercise considerable creativity in the ways 
in which they define and manipulate segments. Qualitative analysis is time consuming 
and difficult, but it offers many rewards in terms of theory construction.
THE STATISTICAL ExPLORATION OF RELATIONSHIPS
Grounded and emergent theorists are interested in exploring relationships between 
concepts, categories, and variables in the context of the qualitative data they col-
lect. This process sometimes can be assisted by the use of statistical methods. Some 
grounded theorists oppose the use of statistical methods in the theory construction 
process, complaining that it removes them too far from the data and encourages sim-
plistic thinking. Sometimes this argument is valid and sometimes not. It is beyond the 
scope of this book to describe the many ways in which statistical analysis of ethno-
graphic data can foster effective theory construction. We encourage readers to keep an 
open mind rather than embrace general condemnations of statistical or quantitative 
analysis.
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PROCESS ANALYSIS IN EMERGENT THEORIZING
As noted earlier, many emergent theorists emphasize process-oriented perspectives in 
their theorizing. Surprisingly little, however, has been written on how to think in terms 
of processes on a concrete, practical level. We discussed such matters briefly in Chapter 
4 and consider them again in Chapter 11, but some observations, as derived from the 
grounded/emergent theory, literature are offered here.
Webster’s dictionary defines a process as “a systematic series of actions directed 
to some end” (e.g., the process of homogenizing milk) and as “a continuous action, 
operation, or series of changes taking place in a definite manner” (e.g., the process of 
decay). The essence of these definitions involves the notions of action and change—
that is, describing actions that lead entities from Point A to a different Point B. Char-
maz (2006) suggests that the following questions be asked when thinking in terms of 
process:
1. How does the person act while engaged in this process (i.e., what are the actions 
and states that describe the process)?
2. How does this process develop?
3. How does the person claim to think and feel in this process?
4. What might the person’s observed behavior indicate or signify while engaged in 
the process?
5. When, why, and how does the process change?
6. What are the consequences of the process?
A useful tool for thinking about processes is the process map, a graphical device, 
much like a flow chart, that summarizes the flow of a process. Constructing process 
maps helps the theorist see the sequence of events, the branches that can occur in a pro-
cess, and how all the different events in a process are related to one another. It can be a 
powerful heuristic device for theory construction because the sheer act of creating one 
often leads to insights that might not otherwise be gained.
Here are the major steps involved in creating a process map: (1) Determine the start 
and termination points of the process, (2) list the different events in the process, (3) 
sequence the events, and then (4) think about the logical relations among the events. 
The process map is then drawn using a conventional symbol notation, as shown in 
Figure 10.2. In constructing process maps, the theorist must think about how detailed 
the events in the process map should be. The more specific and detailed the events are, 
the more intricate the mapping. Variants of process maps used in qualitative research 
include flow charts, decision trees, and kinship maps.
We consider additional strategies for thinking about change and processes in Chap-
ter 11. As we have stated in earlier chapters, it is rare to find emergent theories that focus 
exclusively on process. Rather, there is a blending of process- and variable-oriented 
thinking that draws upon many of the tools for explanation that we have discussed thus 
far.
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MOVING TO THEORETICAL STATEMENTS: USING PRINCIPLES  
OF RHETORIC
After formal analysis of data, memos, and field notes, the researcher sets about the task 
of describing his or her theory. Scientists have different ways of doing so. Some scientists 
describe the relevant variables within the theory and the relationships between them, 
developing the logic and past empirical support for those relationships. These scientists 
might use path diagrams to help them present their theories (see Chapter 7). Other sci-
entists present the theory in the form of propositions, conclusions, or theses, and then 
weave a set of arguments in support of those statements. The arguments are logically 
derived from common sense, past theory, empirical data from past research, and/or the 
formal ethnographic research used to construct the theory. All of these approaches to 
theory description have merit.
Emergent theorists tend to frame their theories using propositions and then develop 
supporting arguments. Given such an orientation, it is useful to consider perspectives 
from the field of rhetoric, which describes strategies for forming reasoned and convinc-
ing arguments in support of conclusions and theses. We do so now, deferring until 
Chapter 12 a discussion of strategies for writing about grounded and emergent theo-
ries. The focus here is on building effective argument structures in support of proposi-
tions. We recognize that there can be more to theories than presenting propositions and 
arguments in support of those propositions. However, a good portion of many theories 
adopts this general strategy; hence it is instructive to consider principles from rhetoric.
Deduction, Induction, and Abduction
Rhetoricians distinguish three means of persuasion: (1) logos, which are strategies that 
rely on logic and emphasize induction and/or deduction; (2) pathos, which are strategies 
that rely on emotions and emotional reactions; and (3) ethos, which are strategies that 
rely on attributions of expertise, trustworthiness, or charisma. Science, ideally, invokes 
logos.
Two types of argument structures based on logos are induction and deduction. Induc-
tion is a type of reasoning wherein one provides a limited number of examples and, 
from these examples, infers a general rule or principle. In other words, one moves from 
specifics to the general. Consider this example of inductive reasoning: John was not 
admitted to college X, Barbara was not admitted to college X, and Joan was not admitted 
to college X; therefore, college X is a difficult school to which to gain admittance. The 
important feature of this strategy is to ensure that the examples used are representative 
of the general case. Thus, when utilizing an argument based on induction, one needs 
to make a convincing case that one can validly infer the general rule from the specific 
instances under consideration and that the specific instances are not exceptions. This 
standard should be applied, for example, when a grounded or emergent theorist is pro-
viding exemplars of a theme or exemplars to support an argument or proposition.
Deduction is a type of reasoning wherein one asserts a general principle that all 
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agree is true and then argues that the case at hand is an instance of it. For example, we 
might all agree that immigrating to a new country for the first time is stressful in the 
early stages of the immigration process. Because John is a new immigrant, we conclude 
that he is experiencing stress in his life. The important feature of this logical strategy is 
to ensure that the example fits into, or is part of, the larger category to which the rule 
applies and which everyone agrees is true.
Both induction and deduction are reasonable strategies of argumentation, and sci-
entists make use of one, the other, or both a great deal. It sometimes is helpful to analyze 
your theoretical arguments to determine if you are relying on induction or deduction. 
If you are relying on induction, have you made a strong case that the exemplars are 
representative and that the general rule reasonably follows from them? If you are using 
deduction, have you made a strong case that the instance you are considering is indeed 
a member of the more general class or group to which consensual rule applies? And is 
the consensual rule indeed consensual and widely accepted?
The philosopher Charles Peirce (Martin, 1979) suggested another form of inference, 
FIGURE 10.2. Conventional symbols for a process map.
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called abduction: that is, inference to the best explanation. This is a method of reason-
ing in which one chooses the hypothesis that would best explain the relevant evidence. 
Abductive reasoning starts from a set of accepted facts and infers their most likely expla-
nation. It stands in opposition to Popper’s falsification principles (1963). According to 
Peirce, there are hundreds of possible explanations for a phenomenon, and it is not 
possible to empirically falsify every possibility. Instead, we “abduct” only those expla-
nations that are more plausible. Abduction is not a form of symbolic logic but instead 
a form of critical thinking. It is controversial in the field of rhetoric and philosophy 
because most treatments of inference emphasize the rules of formal logic.
Toulmin’s Model of Argumentation
The British philosopher Stephen Toulmin (1958) suggested a theory of reasoning in 
which argumentation is said to have six interrelated parts. The first part is the claim, 
which is the conclusion, proposition, or thesis that the scientist seeks to establish. The 
second part is the data, which are the empirical “facts” to which the scientist appeals 
in support of the thesis. The third part is the warrant, which are statements that help 
link the data to the claim. For example, if the claim is that “standardized tests like the 
SAT [Scholastic Aptitude Test] are biased against minorities,” a piece of data in sup-
port of this might be that Latinos who have the same grade-point average in school as 
European Americans tend to score lower on the SAT than the European Americans. A 
“warrant” for this claim–data link is that a person’s grade-point average in school is a 
reasonable indicator of the underlying abilities that the SAT is intended to measure. A 
fourth part of the argument is the backing, which are statements and supporting evi-
dence that certify the warrant. Backings are statements that do not support the main 
point directly, but that support the warrants that link the data to the claim. In our SAT 
example, they would be evidence for the assertion that a person’s grade-point average 
in school is a reasonable indicator of the underlying abilities that the SAT is intended 
to measure. Backings are important because if the warrant is invalid, then the validity 
of the argument is undermined, which weakens the claim. A fifth part of the argument 
is the rebuttal, in which counterarguments or positions opposed to the argument are 
considered and refuted. The sixth part of the argument, the qualifiers, articulates the 
degree of certainty in the claim and describes exceptions to the claims and the limits of 
its generalizability.
There may be multiple pieces of data in support of a claim, multiple warrants link-
ing a given datum to the claim, multiple backings for a given warrant, and a complex 
structure of rebuttals and qualifiers. We find it useful to apply Toulmin’s (1958) model 
to theoretical analyses as a way to better isolate the nature and strengths of the lines 
of reasoning being developed. For a given claim, what are the different pieces of data 
being invoked to support it? For each datum, what are the warrants? For each war-
rant, what are the backings? Have counterarguments been taken into account? How 
have these been refuted? What qualifiers need to be applied and taken into account? 
Application of the Toulmin framework reveals both the strengths and weaknesses of 
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an argument structure and can be useful for scientists as a tool to help refine their 
theories.
Weak Arguments
Theories of rhetoric identify weak forms of argumentation or weak appeals that appear 
relevant to a claim but that really are not relevant. These represent “traps” of which sci-
entists should be cautious as they describe the support for their theses, conclusions or 
theoretical propositions. Knowledge of such traps also can help you critically evaluate 
theories that you read, as sometimes theorists invoke them as a form of weak argumen-
tation. We describe 16 common examples, but there are many more, in practice:
1. Argumentum ad hominem (argument toward the man). This strategy praises or 
criticizes people who make a claim, rather than discussing the claim itself. It occurs 
when scientists make personal attacks against a critic, as during debates about the mer-
its of a theory.
2. Argumentum ad populum (argument to the people). This strategy asserts that 
because most people believe that a claim is true, then the claim must be true. Popular 
acceptance of a claim does not validate it. Just ask Galileo or Copernicus.
3. Argumentum ad traditio (appeal to tradition). This strategy asserts that a claim 
must be true because it is part of tradition. A variant of this is that because a claim was 
true in the past, it must be true in the future. Such logic does not always hold.
4. Argumentum ad verecundium (appeal to improper authority). This strategy 
invokes someone with expertise in another area that is not really appropriate for the 
claim at hand. For example, one might invoke the endorsement of a claim by a Nobel 
 prize-winning economist about the appropriateness of a reading program for elemen-
tary-school-age children.
5. Argumentum ad misericordiam (argument from pity). This strategy makes an 
emotional appeal to try to convince someone to accept a claim based on emotion, inde-
pendent of the logic underlying it.
6. Petitio principii (begging the question or circular reasoning). This strategy uses 
a claim to support an argument underlying that claim, which is circular. For example, 
a reinforcement theorist might argue that “a mother reinforces a child’s behavior and 
therefore maintains the behavior by paying attention to the child every time the child 
performs the behavior.” How does the theorist know that giving attention to the child is 
reinforcing? “Because it maintains the behavior.” This is circular reasoning.
7. Dicto simpliciter (hasty generalization). This strategy improperly uses inductive 
reasoning when there are too few samples to prove a point. One is too quick to form a 
generalization from specific instances.
8. Non causa pro causa (not the cause for a cause). This strategy invokes a false 
cause of an event for the real cause. Consider the claim “Drinking wine in moderation, 
say, a glass a day, reduces the risk of heart disease.” This claim asserts a false cause. 
More specifically, there are socioeconomic differences in wine-drinking behavior, with 
higher-class individuals being more likely to drink a glass of wine a day than lower-class 
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individuals (who are more likely to drink beer). Better access to health care reduces the 
risk of heart disease, and upper-class individuals have better access to health care than 
lower-class individuals. Asserting that drinking a glass of wine a day has beneficial 
health effects is a position that is non causa pro causa because the real source of the effect 
is social class, not drinking wine. If social class is held constant, there is no association 
between wine consumption and the risk of heart disease.
9. Ignorantio elenchi (irrelevant conclusion). This strategy uses an argument for one 
claim and redirects it to inappropriately support a different claim. A variant is to change 
the subject or divert the argument from the real question at issue.
10. Non sequitur (it does not follow). This strategy invokes a claim that does not 
follow from the previous statements or arguments. Logicians often use the term in refer-
ence to formal syllogistic errors. For example, arguing that marijuana is a gateway drug 
to heroin use because almost all heroin users started on marijuana is a non sequitur (we 
discuss why this is so later in the chapter).
11. Argumentum ad ignorantium (argument from ignorance). This strategy appeals 
to a lack of information to prove a point, or arguing that since the claim cannot be dis-
proved, it must be true. For example, one cannot prove that ghosts do not exist, there-
fore they must exist.
12. Argumentum ad speculum (hypothesis contrary to fact). This strategy tries to 
prove something by using hypothetical examples that are not applicable.
13. Either–or fallacy. This strategy creates false dichotomies, arguing that there are 
only two choices when actually there are more.
14. Equivocation. This strategy uses a word or term in a different way than the 
author used it in the original claim or argument.
15. Stacking the deck. This strategy involves ignoring examples that run counter to 
a claim, focusing only on examples that support it.
16. Argument from the negative. This strategy states that because one position is 
untenable, the opposite position must be true. Both could be in error.
Principles of rhetoric have much to offer scientists in their efforts to develop effec-
tive theories, as scientists consider the evidence and various arguments for or against 
theoretical propositions. We encourage you to explore this discipline in your further 
readings. Carefully analyze your propositions and the argument structures you evolve 
in support of them. Consider if you are invoking induction, deduction, and/or abduction 
and make sure you do so appropriately. Map out the claims, the data, the warrants, the 
backings, and consider rebuttals and qualifiers, per the Toulmin model. Finally, review 
your arguments and make sure you that are not falling prey to using one or more of the 
weak argument forms described earlier.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS
A major approach to theory construction is that of grounded or emergent theorizing. 
Whereas the dominant method of scientific analysis in many areas of the social sci-
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ences is based on confirmatory frameworks (i.e., using data to test theory), emergent 
theory emphasizes a process of letting theory emerge from data. Grounded theory is 
associated with the classic work of Glaser and Strauss (1967), with early approaches 
emphasizing its link to the theory of symbolic interactionism. However, many emergent 
theory frameworks are not tied to symbolic interactionism, and, indeed, the discipline of 
anthropology has a longstanding tradition in emergent theorizing that is distinct from 
grounded theory. The emphasis in anthropology is on description, understanding, and 
explanation.
Grounded/emergent theory construction typically begins by framing the research 
problem. Data collection then commences, usually taking the form of qualitative 
data. The methods used include archival research, direct observation, structured and 
unstructured interviews, focus groups, and virtual ethnographies, to name a few. The 
data sought are intended to cast a wide net, as one seeks to describe, understand, and 
explain the phenomena of interest, broadly construed. The term ethnography is used in 
anthropology to refer loosely to a broad class of qualitative methods applied with the 
purpose of providing a detailed, in-depth description of everyday life and practice.
As a reasonable amount of data start to accumulate, the grounded theorist under-
takes initial coding of the data to gain a sense of the core concepts and the meanings that 
seem to be operative. The coding and analysis of data often involve defining segments. 
Typically, a “segment” is any important thought or expression that a research participant 
makes about a given topic. However, segments can be defined using a variety of criteria. 
A common strategy for analyzing the meaning of segments is the method of contrasts, 
which involves comparing segments and creating categories from this comparison pro-
cess. At some point, a formal typology is evolved, and then the researcher compares seg-
ments with the evolved taxonomic structure. This is called the method of classification.
Memo writing occurs throughout the research process; researchers record notes to 
themselves about ideas and insights they have “on the spot.” Grounded theorists also 
emphasize the importance of theoretical sampling, which is a purposive type of sam-
pling that often occurs after initial data have been collected and preliminarily analyzed. 
The purpose of theoretical sampling is to increase the diversity of one’s sample, with the 
idea that this diversity will provide new information that will help one better appreciate 
and define the constructs and propositions that will constitute the theory.
After analysis of the data and memos, the scientist creates the formal theory. A com-
mon strategy used by emergent theorists is one of presenting the theory in the form of 
propositions, conclusions, or theses, and then elaborating a set of arguments in support 
of those propositions and conclusions. Theories of rhetoric and argumentation are use-
ful in helping grounded/emergent theorists specify their theory in effective ways. Rheto-
ricians distinguish three types of arguments: logos, pathos, and ethos. Logos arguments 
rely on logic and emphasize induction and/or deduction; pathos arguments rely on emo-
tions and emotional reactions; and ethos arguments rely on attributions of expertise, 
trustworthiness, or charisma. Science, ideally, invokes logos.
The British philosopher Stephen Toulmin (1958) suggested a six-part model that 
can be used to analyze argument structures. Theories of rhetoric also identify weak 
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forms of argumentation that appear relevant to a claim but that really are not relevant. 
These represent “traps” of which scientists should be cautious as they describe the sup-
port for their theses, conclusions, or theoretical propositions. Examples include argu-
mentum ad hominem, argumentum ad populum, argumentum ad tradition, argumentum ad 
verecundium, argumentum ad misericordiam, petitio principii, dicto simpliciter, non causa 
pro causa, ignorantio elenchi, non sequiturs, argumentum ad ignorantium, argumentum ad 
speculum, either–or fallacies, equivocation, stacking the deck, and argument from the 
negative.
In emergent theory construction, social scientists rely on their ability to observe oth-
ers and derive theoretical insights from those observations. Psychologists have identified 
limitations to human information processing that can bias and shape the way in which 
we think about things (see Appendix A). These include limitations of human memory, 
the conditional symmetry bias, the tendency to see systematic events in random events, 
the compound probability bias, bias due to the availability of information in memory, 
order effects, and difficulties ignoring irrelevant information. Graduate training in disci-
plines that emphasize qualitative methods needs to educate students about these limita-
tions and then train them to either eliminate them or to take the biases into account.
Grounded and emergent theorizing are useful and productive approaches to build-
ing theories. It is hard to argue with the idea that a powerful strategy for building a 
theory is to immerse yourself in as rich and meaningful a way as possible in the phe-
nomena you are studying and the lives of the people directly involved with that phe-
nomena. Some argue that one loses objectivity with such immersion, but, from the per-
spective of theory construction, it is unclear if this argument justifies abandoning such 
an obviously rich source of ideas. There are, of course, some areas where grounded 
theory approaches are limited. For example, researchers who study the neuroscience of 
attitudes with the goal of mapping electrical activity in the brain associated with drug 
addiction probably are not going to get very far in their quest by pursuing grounded 
theory approaches that interview people about why they use drugs and the meaning and 
place of drugs in their lives. Or are they? Perhaps the nature of electrical activity in the 
brain is tied to the way in which people construe and think about drugs, with different 
parts of the brain being activated in different ways as a function of these different ways 
of thinking about things. Keep an open mind as you think about ways to build your 
theory. Just maybe the approaches that your first reaction is to dismiss will turn out to 
be the basis for a novel insight.
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ExErcisEs
Exercises to Reinforce Concepts
 1. How does an emergent theory approach differ from the confirmatory approach 
to science?
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 2. Provide an overview of the grounded theory approach to theory construction.
 3. What are the key points that you should take into account when framing a 
problem in emergent theory construction?
 4. Briefly characterize the major methods for qualitative data collection.
 5. What is a life history interview?
 6. Describe different kinds of focus groups.
 7. What is a virtual ethnography?
 8. What is memoing? Why is it important?
 9. What is theoretical sampling? What is theoretical saturation? How are the two 
related?
 10. Describe the process of creating multiple levels of categories when coding 
data.
 11. What is the difference between the method of contrasts and the method of clas-
sification?
 12. In what ways can computers assist in the processing of qualitative data?
 13. What are the advantages and disadvantages of using family codes and guiding 
questions?
 14. What are logos, pathos, and ethos?
 15. What is the difference between induction, deduction, and abduction?
 16. Describe Toulmin’s model of argumentation and discuss why it is relevant for 
theory construction.
 17. Identify and define 5 of the 16 types of weak arguments. Give an example of 
each.
 18. What is the magic number 7 plus or minus 2, and what are its implications for 
constructing theories?
 19. Give an example of the conditional symmetry bias.
 20. Give an example of the compound probability bias.
 21. How is availability of information to memory important for how a scientist 
builds a theory?
Exercises to Apply Concepts
 1. Find an example in the research literature of a study that presents a theory 
based on either grounded or emergent theory approaches. Describe the theory 
  Grounded and Emergent Theory 287
in depth and the methods the theorist used to evolve the theory. Analyze the 
theory using all the principles of rhetoric and argumentation discussed in this 
chapter.
 2. It is not feasible to conduct a full ethnographic accounting of a phenomenon 
and then develop your own theory about it in the context of a one-semester 
course on theory construction. However, you can expose yourself to features 
of the approach on a small scale. For example, you might go to a church, a fra-
ternity party, a cafeteria, a factory, a community center, a classroom, or some 
other setting and make observations about a phenomenon of interest to you. 
Use all of the principles discussed in this chapter to make your observations 
and then try to derive a small-scale theory based on these. Conduct relevant 
literature reviews. After building your theory, carefully analyze it in terms of 
the facets described in the preceding exercise.
 3. In the first class I ever taught (Jaccard) as a new professor, I assigned a large 
class of 250 students the task of thinking of a social norm and then going out 
and breaking it during the ensuing week. The students were to write a report 
of how people reacted to it and, just as important, what their own reactions 
were while breaking the norm. Based on this experience, the students were to 
write an analysis of social norms and, in essence, build a mini-theory of social 
norms. I felt that the exercise combined many interesting features of a field 
study that would serve class discussion well. It was not until the next class, 
when the students reported some of the activities in which they had engaged, 
that I realized I had made a serious mistake, essentially giving students a valid 
excuse for acting strangely. This once-in-a-Jaccard-lifetime assignment was 
quite successful in the theoretical insights it yielded as well as the recognition 
by students of how powerful norms are in American society. We are not assign-
ing this exercise to you here.
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Appendix 10A
THE LIMITS OF INFORMATION PROCESSING
In emergent theory construction, social scientists rely on their ability to observe others and derive 
theoretical insights from those observations. Psychologists have identified limitations to human 
information processing that can bias and shape the ways in which we think about things. In this 
appendix, we describe a number of these processing limitations, so that you can be aware of the 
ways in which they might color your view of the world as you approach the theory construction 
process. These limitations may cause you to think more narrowly than you want, make faulty 
inferences, or focus on concepts or ideas to the exclusion of others that are important. A good 
grounded/emergent theorist will be aware of these tendencies as he or she approaches field obser-
vations and do his or her best to avoid bias because of them. Indeed, this is true of any theorist who 
relies on observation or inference to form theoretical propositions.
THE MAGIC NUMBER 7 PLUS OR MINUS 2
One important class of limitations for making inferences is the limitation of human memory. Psy-
chologists often think of human memory as being like a computer. The computer receives infor-
mation from the environment (a keyboard), converts that information into a specialized code, the 
code is stored in immediate memory (random access memory; RAM), and then some is saved to 
a hard disk. Later, the information is retrieved, either from RAM or from the hard drive. Humans 
are exposed to information from the environment. They encode this information and then store it 
in temporary memory. Some of this information is passed to more permanent memory, which can 
then be retrieved for later use.
Psychologists distinguish three types of memory. Sensory memory stores all stimuli that reg-
ister on the senses (e.g., touch, sight, hearing). Information is held in sensory memory only for a 
fraction of a second to 3 seconds. If the sensation does not draw the attention of the individual, 
the memory vanishes forever. If attention is drawn to it—that is, if we notice it—it is encoded and 
then passed into short-term memory, also called working memory.
Short-term memory is a temporary storage system, where a piece of information is stored and 
held for perhaps 20 seconds, after which it fades away and is lost. Some of the information in short-
term memory is passed to long-term memory, which is a more permanent memory that can hold 
vast amounts of information. Short-term memory is not just a passive bin of storage for sensory 
input information. Rather, humans “move” memories from long-term memory into short-term 
memory and then manipulate the contents in complex ways. Short-term memory is a dynamic 
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information-processing center, but it also is fleeting. It is for this reason that many psychologists 
prefer to call it working memory.
What is the capacity of working memory? In a classic paper, George Miller (1956) argued 
that humans can hold about 7 chunks of information in working memory. He refers to “the magic 
number 7 plus or minus 2” because across a wide range of studies and tasks, the evidence suggests 
people can simultaneously hold between 5 and 9 chunks of information in working memory. To 
be sure, sometimes a chunk of information can be composed of many organized bits of informa-
tion (e.g., a chess master’s vision of a chessboard with all the pieces organized in a well-known 
configuration), but the human mind has clear limitations to the number of chunks of information 
it can process in working memory at one time. Simon (1974) has suggested that the magic number 
7 might actually be somewhat less, closer to 4 or 5.
This limitation is important because it suggests that scientists are restricted in the number of 
variables, concepts, and relationships to which they can attend at any given instant. For theoreti-
cal analyses that are complex, scientists must rely on recording information externally and then 
processing that information sequentially. There also is evidence that people do not necessarily 
process information in the ways they think they are processing it. For example, when making 
judgments, people tend to think they use more information than they actually do, and they tend 
to think they use it in more complex ways than they actually do (Wiggins, 1973). To us, all of this 
underscores the importance of using thinking aids to assist in processing large amounts of infor-
mation when constructing a theory (e.g., aids such as a path diagram discussed in Chapter 7, a 
process map, or a systemized strategy of note recording). It also underscores the importance of the 
computer (and, in some cases, multivariate statistical methods) that can simultaneously process 
relationships between hundreds of pieces of information. The human mind, unassisted, is simply 
incapable of doing this.
The point we wish to stress is the importance of recognizing that we are limited in our abili-
ties to process large amounts of information, and we need to approach our theorizing strategies 
and interpretation of data accordingly.
Conditional Symmetry BiaS
People often process probabilistic information, but they do not always do so in conformity to 
objective probability theory. An example is the conditional symmetry bias. You may have heard the 
assertion that marijuana is a gateway drug that leads to heroin use. As evidence, some cite the fact 
that the proportion of heroin users who have smoked marijuana is large. This proportion repre-
sents what statisticians call a conditional probability, symbolized as p(M|H), where M  is past use 
of marijuana and H represents using heroin. The symbol p(M|H) is read as “the probability that a 
person has used marijuana, given that the person is a heroin user”; this conditional probability is 
usually quite large, near 0.95. But this in no way means that the reverse conditional probability, 
p(H|M), is also large: p(H|M) is the probability that someone is a heroin user given that the person 
has smoked marijuana. As it turns out, this probability is quite small (near .05). The conditional 
probabilities are not symmetrical (i.e., equal in value) even though many people assume they are. 
The tendency to assume equal conditional probabilities is called the conditional symmetry bias.
As another example, a survey of 74 CEOs working for Fortune 500 companies led a scientist 
to conclude recently that there may be a link between childhood pet ownership and future career 
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success. About 95% of all the CEOs as children had possessed a dog, a cat, or both. The CEOs 
that were interviewed commented on how pet ownership had helped them to develop many of 
the positive character traits that made them good managers, such as responsibility, empathy, and 
respect for other beings. Note that the datum being reported is p(owned pet in childhood|CEO) = 
.95. Because this probability is large, the inference is made that the two variables are linked. But 
what we really want to focus on is p(CEO|owned pet as child): that is, given that you owned a 
pet as a child, what is the probability that you will become a CEO? This is very, very small. Here, 
again is the erroneous assumption of symmetry in the conditional probabilities.
We have found several cases of conditional symmetry bias in scientific reports and in scien-
tific theories. When inferring relationships, one must be careful not to commit this logical fallacy. 
A correct inference of a relationship goes well beyond considering the information in the condi-
tional probabilities p(A|B) and/or p(B|A). For details, consult any introductory book on probability 
theory. Although emergent theorists rarely formally calculate conditional probabilities, they do 
make inferences about relationships based upon observations they have made and notes they have 
taken. The inference of a relationship might be based on a subjective or intuitive representation of 
a conditional probability. For example, after interviewing a large number of heroin users, the sci-
entist might make the observation that almost all of them started their drug habit using marijuana. 
The inference of marijuana as a gateway drug may then be formulated, even though we know that 
such an inference cannot be made from such data.
WHEN RANDOM IS NOT RANDOM
Random events happen all the time, but people sometimes find it difficult to recognize random-
ness. People impute meaning into random events and build theories around them as if they were 
systematic, usually because they do not understand the dynamics of randomness.
As an example, suppose we flip a coin four times. Which of the following sequences is more 
likely to occur:
Sequence A: H H H H 
Sequence B: H T T H
Most people will say sequence B. The correct answer, however, is that they are equally likely to 
occur. Each has a probability of .0625 of occurring. This is obvious if we list the 16 different out-
comes that could occur on the four flips:
H H H H 
H H H T 
H H T H 
H H T T 
H T H H 
H T H T 
H T T H 
H T T T 
T H H H 
T H H T 
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T H T H 
T H T T 
T T H H 
T T H T 
T T T H 
T T T T
Note that the probability of sequence A occurring is 1 out of 16, and 1/16 = .0625, and so is the 
probability of sequence B.
In a random process such as multiple coin flips, people think that the number of heads will 
equal the number of tails, and when this expectation is violated grossly, they tend to make attribu-
tions of nonrandomness that can be incorrect. In the example above, on how many trials in the 
four coin flips do we get an equal number of heads and tails? From the above listing, of the 16 
possible outcomes, six have two heads and two tails. Thus, the probability of observing two heads 
and two tails is 6/16 = .375. This means that it is almost twice as likely that one will not observe 
an equal number of heads and tails in a given random sequence of four flips than it is that one will 
observe two heads and two tails. This is counterintuitive to most people.
There are many features of randomness that are nonintuitive and we need to be careful not 
to let our intuitions about randomness lead to attributions of systematic relations in what are 
essentially random events. Training in probability theory and statistics helps one to appreciate 
these nuances.
COMPOUND PROBABILITY BIAS
Another common bias is the compound probability bias. Suppose a woman has just started using 
birth control pills. Let A be the event of a minor side effect occurring, say, innocuous cramps, and 
suppose that the probability of this event is .80. Let B be the event of her boyfriend approving of 
the use of the birth control method and suppose that the probability of this event also is .80. What 
is the probability of both events occurring; that is, what is the probability that both the minor side 
effect and boyfriend approval will occur? Most people will say it is .80, but is this correct?
It turns out that the correct answer is .64. Specifically, in probability theory, if events A and B 
are independent (which is reasonable to assume in this case), then it can be shown that p(A and B) 
= p(A)p(B). That is, the probability of both events occurring equals the product of the two prob-
abilities that each event will occur in isolation. The compound probability fallacy is that people 
tend to overestimate the joint occurrence of events, given their perceptions of the probabilities of 
each individual event.
Here is another example. Suppose you are in charge of a complex missile system whose suc-
cessful functioning depends on each of 500 parts working correctly. Suppose that the probability 
of a part functioning correctly the first time it is used is .99. What is the overall probability that the 
system will work the first time it is used? Most people would say it is quite high. Assuming inde-
pendence, however, the probability is .99500, which equals about .01. The chances that the missile 
system will work the first time are about 1 in 100, or 1%! Just as laypeople are susceptible to the 
compound probability bias, so may the scientist be susceptible to such bias when conducting field 
observations and making judgments about the occurrence of joint events.
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AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION FROM MEMORY
When we are asked to make a judgment about something, we frequently search our memory and 
then formulate a judgment based on the information that is retrieved from memory. The informa-
tion that influences our judgments most is the information that is easily retrieved from memory. 
The problem is that information that is most available in memory is not always the best informa-
tion on which to base a judgment. What factors influence availability of information to memory? 
There are many. One factor is how recently we have been exposed to, or thought about, the infor-
mation. For example, Higgins, Rholes, and Jones (1977) primed participants in an experiment 
by having them read lists of positive or negative attributes. Later that day, when they were asked 
to make attributions of an ambiguously described person in a different experiment, the research 
participants were more likely to use categories and words that had been primed earlier. Identical 
behaviors were interpreted as “self-confident” or “arrogant” depending upon whether positive or 
negative words had been used for the priming task in the previous experiment. Such “priming 
effects” can have obvious implications for judgments a scientist might make in the field because 
such judgments can be colored by the information to which the scientist has been exposed (i.e., 
primed with) prior to making the observations.
Unique events also stand out and hence, they are more likely to capture our attention and be 
encoded and passed to long-term memory or retrieved from long-term memory. Suppose we read 
to you the following list of names:
Steve Smith 
Joan Gerber 
Bill Clinton 
Jeanne Weiss 
John Glass 
Martha Smith 
George Bush 
Glenn May 
Michelle Gayle 
Lilly Stanton
After we read the list aloud to you, we might ask you how many males were on the list. This is 
the task that Kahneman and Tversky (1972) used in their research. They read lists of names to 
people and then asked them to estimate the number of males and females on the list some time 
later, without forewarning people that they would be asked to make such a judgment. The correct 
answer for the above list is five males and five females, that is, half the list has male names. In the 
Kahneman and Tversky study, most people said the number of males was two or three. The research 
participants judgments were biased toward the number of famous males in the list (Bill Clinton and 
George Bush), because these names were more prominent and hence more “available” in memory.
ORDER EFFECTS
Suppose we describe the same person to two different individuals. The description provided to the 
first person is that the target individual is intelligent, sincere, honest, conceited, rude, and nervous. 
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The description provided to the second person is that the target individual is nervous, rude, con-
ceited, honest, sincere, and intelligent. Note that the exact same information has been provided to 
each person, and only the order of it has been changed. For the first person, the positive descrip-
tors come first followed by the negative descriptors (pro–con). For the second person, the order is 
reversed (con–pro). One would expect that the reactions to, and evaluations of, the described indi-
vidual would be the same, on average, since exactly the same information has been presented. But 
this is not the case. When people are presented descriptors in the pro–con order, they tend to form 
more favorable impressions of the individual than when they are presented the descriptors in the 
con–pro order. The order in which we are presented or exposed to information can bias the judg-
ments we make. Scientists are just as susceptible to these order effects as laypeople, and care must 
be taken to counteract this bias when making field observations and collecting and analyzing data.
IGNORING INFORMATION
Sometimes we are exposed to information, but we want to ignore it or not take it into account when 
making judgments. For example, in some court cases, jurors are told something by a lawyer, the 
opposing lawyer makes an objection, the objection is sustained, and then the jurors are instructed 
to ignore the information. But do they? Cialdini (2001) describes a study in which people were 
randomly selected from jury lists and then exposed to a recording of a trial about a woman who 
was injured in a car accident by a reckless driver. Jurors were randomly assigned to one of three 
conditions. In one condition, the juror heard the case and no information was provided about 
whether the driver had liability insurance. In a second condition, the juror heard the case, and it 
was revealed that the driver had liability insurance. In the third condition, the juror heard the case, 
it was revealed that the driver had liability insurance, and then the judge disallowed the informa-
tion and asked the juror to ignore it. If people ignore the information, then judgments in the third 
condition should be the same, on average, as judgments in the second condition. The mean award 
by jurors for pain and suffering in the first condition was about $33,000, for jurors in the second 
condition it was about $37,000, and for jurors in the third condition it was about $46,000. Not 
only did the jurors fail to disregard the information, they apparently gave it more weight by being 
told to ignore it. Later studies revealed that jurors tended to give it more weight because they saw 
it as “privileged” information.
Just because we want to ignore information does not mean that we can indeed ignore it when 
forming judgments. When judging the type of soil in a plot of land for making planting decisions, 
farmers are told that they should ignore the moisture content of the soil samples. Yet invariably, the 
moisture content impacts their judgments about how much of the core components of the soil is 
present (e.g., the amount of sand particles, the amount of clay particles). And if we are told by an 
informant that information is special, we tend to give it more weight in our judgments, even if the 
information is not special (Cialdini, 2001). Such biases can color the judgments scientists make in 
the context of their field observations, and they need to be dealt with accordingly.
ADDITIONAL PROCESSING LIMITATIONS
Psychologists have identified a wide range of additional limitations that people bring to bear as 
they process information and make judgments, among them (1) the base-rate fallacy (the tendency 
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to ignore base-rate information when making frequency judgments), (2) the confirmation bias 
(the tendency to seek information that will confirm one’s expectations or beliefs), (3) the egocen-
tric bias (the tendency to see oneself as the center of attention; the tendency to see oneself and 
one’s activities as unique), (4) the false consensus bias (the tendency to overestimate the degree 
to which other people agree with oneself), (5) halo effects (the tendency to evaluate the specific 
attributes of an object based on one’s overall evaluation of the object), (6) illusory correlation 
(the tendency to see two unrelated events as being related), (7) the negativity bias (the tendency 
to weigh negative information more heavily than positive information), (8) the self-serving bias 
(the tendency to attribute successful outcomes to self and failures to extenuating circumstances), 
(9) unrealistic optimism (the tendency to distort reality in a direction that enhances self-esteem 
and maintains personal efficacy and optimism), and (10) wishful thinking (the tendency to see 
desirable outcomes as more probable and undesirable outcomes as less probable). All of these can 
impact the judgments of the people who report about the world about them as well as the judg-
ments of the scientist directly.
Graduate instructors, training in disciplines that emphasize qualitative methods, need to edu-
cate their students about the limitations of human information processing and then help train 
them to take them into account and, where possible, adopt strategies to overcome them. In our 
experience, these disciplines could benefit from multidisciplinary interactions with psychologists 
and decision theorists to better keep abreast of these limitations and methods for overcoming 
them. We encourage you to make learning and keeping up on this literature part of your training 
and professional growth as a scientist.
  295 
11
Historically Influential Systems  
of Thought
A hunch is creativity trying to tell you something.
—Frank Capra (1956)
There are many ways of thinking about the world, and we have tapped into only a few of 
them. In this chapter we briefly describe historically influential systems of thought that 
large numbers of social scientists have used to theorize about diverse phenomena. We 
also consider some lesser known but still influential thinking strategies that might be of 
use to you as you approach the theory construction process. We advocate what is some-
times known as meta-triangulation in theory construction, or the building of theories 
from the perspective of multiple paradigms (Lewis & Grimes, 1999). After introducing 
you to a dozen or so different systems of thought, we encourage you to think about the 
phenomena in which you are interested from each perspective. That is, think about the 
phenomena through the lenses of different thought systems and see what new ideas and 
insights result. To be sure, not all of the systems will “work” for you, but even if only a 
few do, you will be that much further ahead.
We do not describe the different systems in depth; doing so would require book-
length manuscripts on each topic. Instead, we expose you to the spirit of each frame-
work. As you become more familiar with the frameworks in the course of your studies, 
they may take on greater or lesser import in your scientific efforts. There are ardent 
critics of each framework, including some who would be appalled that we even mention 
a given framework. Similarly, some critics will feel that we have left out an important 
framework. Whatever the case, we believe that each framework has something of value 
to contribute.
The frameworks are an eclectic group that can be organized in multiple ways. We 
grouped together one set of frameworks under the general rubric of “grand theories” 
as discussed in sociology and anthropology. These include materialism, structuralism, 
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functionalism, symbolic interactionism, and evolutionary perspectives, along with a 
critical commentary of these grand theories from the perspective of postmodernism. 
Next, we discuss frameworks that draw heavily on metaphors. These include neural 
networks and systems theory. We then consider frameworks that emphasize the analysis 
of change followed by two psychological frameworks. We conclude with the discussion 
of frameworks inspired by methodological innovations, namely multilevel modeling and 
person-centered theorizing.
Some of the frameworks are more popular in some disciplines than others. For 
example, materialism is more widely used to analyze phenomena in sociology and 
anthropology than in psychology. This should not, however, deter you from using a 
framework, no matter what your discipline. Also, some of the frameworks are dated in 
that their dominance in a given discipline has waned with time. This also should not 
deter you from using the framework as a way of possibly generating new perspectives 
and ideas about the phenomena you are studying.
GRAND THEORIES
In the fields of anthropology and sociology, distinctions often are made between grand 
theories and middle-range theories (Mills, 1959). Although the characterizations of these 
two approaches vary, grand theories are seen as comprehensive, inclusive theories of 
human behavior and society, whereas middle-range theories are more focused accounts 
of specific phenomena (but for an alternative characterization, see Alford, 1998). Most of 
the social sciences currently operate at the level of middle-range theories, but there are 
notable grand theories that theorists often draw upon in formulating their middle-range 
theories. The present section considers a selection of these grand theories: materialism, 
structuralism, functionalism, symbolic interactionism, and evolutionary perspectives. 
We also discuss postmodernism, though it certainly is not a grand theory in the tradi-
tion of the other frameworks. Rather, it is a critical commentary on some of the funda-
mental assumptions underlying the grand theories.
Materialism
Materialist theories emphasize the analysis of human behavior and social institutions 
from the perspective of the material aspects of society. The approach has its roots in the 
work of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Although Marxist theory primarily has been 
used to motivate political ideologies and political analysis, it also has been used as a 
form of scientific analysis (Plattner, 1989). Marxist frameworks emphasize the concepts 
of history, ideology, and the analysis of inequalities in social power and wealth. When 
trying to understand human behavior, one examines the types of ideologies that people 
have held and how these ideologies are shaped by inequalities in wealth and the means 
of producing that wealth. A materialist pays careful attention to who creates the prod-
ucts that society values and how they go about doing so, how products are converted 
into wealth, and how the wealth is distributed among different segments of society.
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According to Marx, economic inequalities often are structured along social lines 
that ultimately define socioeconomic classes. In capitalist societies, wage workers com-
prise one class and capitalists comprise another class. In materialistic models, class dis-
tinctions also are extended to other groups, such as men versus women and the elderly 
versus youth, primarily based on their control over the means of production. Material-
ism involves a careful analysis of the historical context in which the above relations 
emerge and change over time, as well as those aspects of ideology, production, and 
class that have remained stable. Also of importance is identifying the ideological means 
by which the members of the lower class have accepted their positions and by which 
members of the upper class justify their high status. These systems of beliefs, also called 
hegemonies, are an integral part of materialist analysis.
At the most general level, materialist frameworks highlight the central role of eco-
nomic issues in impacting behavior and society. One of the authors (Jaccard) remembers 
early in his career explaining his research on teen pregnancy to a cultural anthropolo-
gist with a Marxist bent. He described how he analyzed the beliefs and attitudes that 
teens have about sexual activity, the peer pressures that teens experience, the emotions 
and affect surrounding adolescent sexual relationships, how issues of sexuality impact 
the self-concept of adolescents, and, finally, the important role of feelings of efficacy. The 
anthropologist politely listened for about half an hour, even though at times she looked 
bewildered by all the jargon being thrown about. She responded with a two-sentence 
reaction: “Jim, it’s class. It’s all about social and economic class.” Of course, there is more 
to adolescent pregnancy than class issues, but the comment started Jaccard thinking 
about the broader contexts of adolescent sexual risk behavior. Further reflection led to 
an analysis of the economic underpinnings of adolescent risk behavior and the class 
dynamics that are involved.
There are numerous examples of useful analyses that have adopted materialist 
perspectives. Sidney Mintz (1986) conducted a thorough study of sugar production in 
the Caribbean and highlighted the ways in which the introduction of this commodity 
changed world economic relations, generated new forms of labor, augmented the slave 
trade, and completely transformed Caribbean economies. The newly acquired tastes 
of the English ruling elites for sugar led to global needs for sugar and contributed to 
a forceful new dynamic in the world economy. In typical form of a materialist, Mintz 
focused on history, power relations, and the economy to provide a complex and inte-
grated analysis of social, cultural, and economic processes surrounding sugar produc-
tion.
In another insightful analysis, June Nash (1989), in her book From Tank Town to 
High Tech: The Clash of Community and Industrial Cycles, studied deindustrialization in 
the northeastern United States, documenting the impact on a town of the closing of a 
General Electric plant that built products for the military. She showed how the changes 
associated with the closure paralleled changes in the country and in the world more 
broadly and how these macro-level changes could be used to make sense of the local 
developments. Her analyses emphasized economic dynamics at the local, national, and 
world levels and their impact on the lives of individuals.
The materialist framework is not without its critics, but one cannot deny the poten-
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tial centrality of the kinds of questions it poses when analyzing cultural and societal 
influences on behavior. Consider carefully how different goods related to the phenom-
ena in which you are interested are produced, allocated, and valued in society. Pay atten-
tion to the sources of power, who controls them, and how that power is exercised and 
transferred. Think about potential conflicts between groups over the allocation of goods 
and the monopolization of sources of power. Think about how all of these factors perme-
ate political ideologies, economic systems, religion, and educational systems and how 
these, in turn, impact behavior.
As you apply the above, be flexible in conceptualizing what constitutes “goods.” For 
example, suppose you are studying abortion. How is abortion made available, allocated, 
and valued in society? Who are the sources of power with respect to abortions (e.g., hos-
pitals, clinics, government, religious organizations, Planned Parenthood)? Who controls 
these organizations (e.g., owners of hospitals, owners of clinics, politicians, religious 
leaders)? How is control of these organizations exercised and passed on from one year 
or one generation to the next? What types of conflicts have occurred between which 
groups over the Roe v. Wade decision that made abortions widely available to women? 
How do political ideologies, economic systems, religion, and educational systems impact 
access to abortion? The materialist framework encourages you to think about your phe-
nomena on a more societal level in the context of issues of power, class relations, and 
control of resources.
Structuralism
Structuralism is a system of thought that derives from linguistics and is most strongly 
associated with the writings of Claude Levi-Strauss. It is related to the theory of trans-
formational-generative grammar developed by Noam Chomsky, which we use as an 
analogy for describing structuralism (though Chomsky based his analysis, in part, on 
the work of Levi-Strauss). According to Chomsky, underneath the surface structure of 
language is a “deep structure” that represents a finite set of organizing principles that 
serve as a universal linguistic blueprint for all languages. By carefully analyzing the 
surface structure of many different languages, one can isolate this blueprint. Chom-
sky argues that analyses of language at the surface structure makes them appear more 
diverse than they really are. At a deeper level, all languages have a small number of 
organizing principles, and the task of the linguist is to discover these.
Levi-Strauss, an anthropologist, approached the analysis of culture from this same 
perspective. Although cultures appear diverse on the surface, he argued that there is a 
core set of underlying organizing principles and structures. Structural analysis of a phe-
nomenon focuses on trying to isolate the basic underlying structural principles associ-
ated with it. Levi-Strauss stressed the importance of both the conscious and the uncon-
scious when considering the bases of human behavior.
Levi-Strauss conceptualized human thought in terms of the principle of binary 
opposites (good–evil, light–dark, tall–short); that is, he argued that people think in 
a binary or dialectical nature. Thoughts are expressed differently in cultures through 
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transformations, but such transformations are constrained by the structural operations 
of the human mind. Structuralism focuses on discovering how people think rather than 
what people think. Levi-Strauss used the metaphor of code, emphasizing the impor-
tance of decoding surface structure events into their deeper meanings. In doing so, Levi-
Strauss argued that the scientist should seek analysis of contrasts and opposition.
As an example of a structuralist perspective, Ortner (1974) conducted an analysis 
of why women have subservient roles and are judged as being inferior relative to men 
across cultures, worldwide. She argued that the disparity derived from oppositional ide-
ologies that associated women with nature and men with culture. She used these oppos-
ing associations to articulate structuralist arguments in support of her thesis. Ortner’s 
work has been controversial and her thesis has been refuted, but her work crystallized 
questions and new perspectives on gender and culture (e.g., MacCormack & Strathern, 
1980). As another example, Goldin (1987) conducted a structural analysis of Spanish and 
Mayan assumptions about markets and exchange in Western Guatemala. She identified 
two contrasting interpretive frameworks used by the Spaniards and the Maya. Whereas 
the Spaniards preferred enclosed, elevated, artificially illuminated market environments 
in which to sell goods and the goods organized in accord with Spanish classifications, 
the Maya preferred open markets, with goods laid out on the ground, natural lighting, 
and a categorization system consistent with Mayan culture. Her analysis of these views 
highlighted the oppositional nature of the underlying logic of the two cultures, which is 
consistent with a structuralist perspective.
Structuralist thinking has its strong and weak points, but for purposes of this book, 
we highlight the following structuralist principles: (1) Think about your phenomena by 
finding the deeper structure underlying the seemingly diverse surface structure events 
surrounding it, (2) consider the potential role of both conscious and unconscious fac-
tors that might be operating, and (3) think about matters in binary or dialectical terms, 
focusing on opposites and contrasts (see Rychlak, 1994, for an interesting application of 
dialectical thought).
Functionalism
Functionalism has been an influential conceptual framework in sociology and anthro-
pology. Notable functional theorists include Durkheim, Evans-Pritchard, Malinowski, 
Merton, Parsons, and Radcliffe-Brown. There are two major types of functionalist the-
ory, one focused at the societal level (as typified by the work of Durkheim) and the other 
focused at the individual level (as typified by the work of Malinowski), although there 
is overlap between them. Some refer to the societal-based frameworks as structural func-
tionalism and the individual-based frameworks simply as functionalism.
Every society has functional requirements for its survival. Functional analysis 
explores social institutions and segments of society in terms of the functions they serve 
to this end and conceptualizes society as a system of interdependent parts that tend 
toward equilibrium. A society is in equilibrium if there is no conflict, if people know 
what is expected of them, and if societal expectations are met. Parsons (1951, 1971) 
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argued that equilibrium is attained through socialization processes and through social 
control—that is, sanctions imposed either informally through norms and peer pressure 
or through formal organizations, such as schools and prisons. Functionalists think of 
society as a collection of systems within systems. For example, Parsons discusses the 
personality system within the small-group system, the small-group system within the 
community system, the community system within society, and societal systems within 
the world system.
Merton (1968) distinguished between latent and manifest functions. Latent func-
tions are consequences of a cultural or institutional action that are not explicitly 
intended or recognized by members of a society. Manifest functions are consequences 
that contribute to equilibrium and that are intended and recognized by societal mem-
bers. An example of a latent function was described by Edwards (1979), who contrasted 
the “efficiency movement” with the “human relations movement” in the field of indus-
trial relations. The former movement traditionally was thought to emphasize efficiency 
in organizational settings through strict control of the workers, whereas the latter move-
ment was thought to downplay control in favor of a more humanistic orientation toward 
increasing productivity. Edwards’s analysis showed that when examined at the latent 
level, the human relations movement exerted just as much control over workers as the 
efficiency movement, but in different and subtler ways.
Functionalism has fallen into disrepute in some areas of the social sciences. For 
example, the idea of a society functioning to achieve equilibrium has been criticized 
because so many segments in society seem to operate independently of other segments. 
Functionalism also has been criticized for being ahistorical, focusing on the functions 
that institutions serve at present rather than how they evolved over time and the histori-
cal forces that shaped them. Despite these limitations, we find it useful to sometimes 
think about a phenomenon or an entity in terms of the kinds of functions it serves, say, 
for the individual, the family, the school, the neighborhood, or the community. Instead of 
asking about the causes of something, ask what functions it serves. Think of the systems 
in which the phenomena are embedded and ask what functions those systems serve. As 
you articulate functions, think in terms of those that contribute to the betterment of the 
individual, community, and/or society. What are the manifest functions that are operat-
ing and what are the latent functions? Needs are important components of functional 
analyses (e.g., social needs, economic needs), because functions often are associated 
with the meeting of such needs. What are the needs that define a functional analysis for 
your topic area? Consistent with criticisms of functionalist approaches, think of whether 
there is conflict and lack of equilibrium in the organization, institution, or problem you 
are considering. Is the conflict intrinsic and productive, or is it dysfunctional?
An example of a nontraditional application of functionalism is the work of Katz 
(1960), who developed a functionalist theory of attitudes. According to Katz, an atti-
tude can serve one or more of four functions for the individual: (1) an ego-defensive 
function (that protects one’s ego), (2) a value-expressive function (that allows one to 
expresses one’s values), (3) a knowledge function (that allows one to be informed about 
matters), and (4) a utilitarian function (that allows one to gain positive consequences or 
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have pleasing experiences). Katz theorized that the strategy that a change agent (e.g., an 
advertiser, a health educator) should use to change an attitude depends on the function 
that the attitude is serving. For example, if an attitude largely serves an ego-defensive 
function, then the advertising or educational strategy used will be different than if that 
attitude serves a knowledge function. As part of his theory, Katz described the persua-
sion strategies that are appropriate for each function.
Symbolic Interactionism
Symbolic interactionism is an influential theory in sociology, anthropology, education, 
and political science, and it incorporates useful perspectives for theory construction. It 
often is linked to grounded theory frameworks, but its applications extend far beyond 
such theories. Our discussion of symbolic interactionism follows closely the classic 
work of Herbert Blumer (1969).
Symbolic interactionism is based on three premises: (1) that people act toward 
things based on the meanings of those things to them, (2) that meaning is derived from 
social interactions (i.e., the meanings of objects emerge socially through our interac-
tions with others), and (3) that meaning is the result of an interpretive process used by 
people to deal with the stimuli that they encounter. The interpretation of stimuli has two 
phases. First, the actor indicates to him- or herself the things toward which he or she is 
acting. Second, the actor selects, checks, suspends, regroups, or transforms the mean-
ings in light of the situation. Symbolic interaction occurs when one individual interprets 
the meaning of another individual’s actions or gestures.
According to symbolic interaction theory, interaction involves mutual role taking 
in which each person tries to see things from the other person’s point of view. Only 
through such role playing can you communicate meanings, because you must under-
stand the frame of reference of the other individual for communication to occur. The 
self also is a critical concept in theories of symbolic interactionism. People are the object 
of their own actions, and as a result, they have a self-concept. The self-concept derives 
from how you think others view you. By having a self, you can interact with yourself and 
make indications to yourself. This is what sets humans apart from animals.
Human action is the result of a person’s interpreting the events that transpire in a 
situation and then forming plans of action in light of those events. Symbolic interaction-
ism focuses on understanding how individuals construe the environment about them 
and how they then choose to act upon that environment. The image is not one of an 
individual being “pushed around” by this cause or that cause, but rather of an active, 
interpreting individual, choosing to take certain actions.
According to symbolic interactionism, our experience of the external environment 
is subjective, the result of the meanings we impose on it. Objects in the environment are, 
in this respect, social creations. They are defined and construed in terms of the images 
that we have of them in our mind. But symbolic interactionists also recognize that the 
empirical world can “talk back” and can challenge or resist our images of it. This, in 
turn, may lead to a new image.
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Blumer (1969) argues that social scientists rarely have firsthand knowledge of the 
empirical worlds they study. Academics who study drug addiction usually have not lived 
the life of a drug addict nor have they directly experienced the world in a way a drug 
addict does. Blumer emphasizes the inherent outsider role of social scientists and the 
need for these scientists to experience as closely as possible the world they are study-
ing. Blumer emphasizes the central role of exploratory analysis, participant observation, 
and intensive case studies in the pretheory construction stages. Such activities help the 
researcher form the concepts, images, and ideas used in a theory. Blumer believes it is 
both arrogant and egocentric of social scientists to impose their view of the world on a 
phenomenon with which they have limited experience. Social scientists must first gain 
relevant experiences and get as close to the phenomenon as possible to adequately theo-
rize about it.
As you construct your theories of human behavior, even though you may not adopt 
a formal symbolic interactionist perspective, it might be useful to think about your 
theory in these terms. How do the actors in your theory construe their world and the key 
elements within it? What meanings are they using and how do they communicate these 
meanings to others with whom they interact? How do they view themselves and how are 
they forming action plans in light of their interpretations? What are those action plans? 
How is the setting impacting the meanings that the individuals extract and use? How do 
the meanings of one actor overlap with, or differ from, the meanings of another actor?
Evolutionary Perspectives
Evolutionary theories of human behavior have a long and somewhat controversial his-
tory in the social sciences. Although some might argue that evolutionary perspectives 
do not constitute a grand theory, they certainly have been used to explain a diverse set 
of phenomena in many disciplines. The process of evolution can be defined as gradual 
changes over time in the organic structure of organisms. It was hypothesized to oper-
ate by biologists long before Darwin formulated his famous theory of evolution. Dar-
win’s primary contribution was to specify the mechanisms by which evolution occurred. 
Central to evolutionary approaches are the concepts of adaptation and natural selection. 
Adaptation is the product of inherited characteristics of a species that have come into 
existence through natural selection (Buss, Haselton, Shackelford, Bleske, & Wakefield, 
1998). Natural selection has three defining characteristics: (1) variation, (2) inheritance, 
and (3) selection. Variation refers to the fact that organisms within a species vary in a 
large number of ways. Such variation allows evolution to operate. Some of these varia-
tions are genetically transferred from parents to offspring across multiple generations. 
This is the process of inheritance. Some of the inherited attributes are better suited to 
reproduction and survival than other attributes. Organisms with such adaptive attri-
butes produce more offspring, on average, than those lacking these attributes, because 
they are more likely to survive and reproduce as a result of them. Across many gen-
erations, the result is natural selection toward the adaptive attributes. As one example, 
scientists have speculated that pregnancy sickness (food aversion, nausea, vomiting) 
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during the first trimester is the result of selection to protect the embryo against maternal 
ingestion of teratogens. In essence, natural selection acts like a sieve that filters out prob-
lematic and nonadaptive behaviors (Dawkins, 1996). Over many generations, the result 
is a set of behaviors that interacts with the environment so as to promote reproduction 
and survival of species.
In addition to adaptive attributes, evolution produces by-products of adaptation. 
By-products are attributes that do not solve adaptive problems but which are con-
founded with attributes that do. For example, the whiteness of bones is a by-product 
of the fact that bones contain large amounts of calcium, which is associated with bone 
strength and which has evolved through natural selection mechanisms Finally, there 
are behaviors that are neither adaptive nor by-products of adaptation, and these are 
viewed as random noise in the evolutionary process. Evolutionary scientists differ in 
how they classify behavior into these three categories. For example, some view lan-
guage as a by-product of large brains, whereas others view language as adaptive in its 
own right.
Evolutionists emphasize that there are constraints on adaptation so that optimal 
adaptation seldom results. Adaptation is a slow process that may take thousands of 
years. Lack of genotypic variation can constrain the course that adaptation takes. Some 
adaptations have both costs and benefits associated with them, resulting in the evolu-
tion of costs as well as benefits to the species. Finally, adaptations do not operate in 
isolation and must coordinate themselves with other adaptations. This process of coor-
dination can result in compromises that undermine optimal evolution. For all these rea-
sons (time lags, restricted variation, accompanying costs to benefits, and coordination), 
adaptation does not always function optimally.
Bereczeki (2000) emphasizes three fundamental scientific orientations of evolu-
tionary analysis: (1) adaptation, (2) ultimate causation, and (3) individualism. In terms 
of adaptation, the evolutionist seeks to identify how a behavior functions historically to 
increase survival and/or reproduction of the species. The focus is thus on a functional 
analysis of behavior rather than trying to identify the causes of behavior in a classic 
cause–effect framework. What functions could the behavior have served in terms of sur-
vival and reproduction? In what ways could the behavior enhance survival or increase 
reproduction? Such functional analysis is a hallmark of evolution theories.
A second important characteristic of evolutionary analysis is a focus on ultimate 
causation (Bereczeki, 2000). Social scientists explore the causes of behavior at many 
different levels. Most social scientists are interested in specifying the proximal determi-
nants of behavior, with lesser interest in understanding more distal determinants. By 
contrast, evolutionists search for the “ultimate causes” of behavior by tracing them to 
natural selection and the function they serve to promote survival of the fittest.
A third feature of evolutionary analysis is an emphasis on individualism. In tradi-
tional theories of evolution, the emphasis was on the idea of group selection; namely, 
that individuals evolved so as to act for the good of the group. In the 1970s, a group of 
biologists shifted this focus toward individualism, that is, the view that selection works 
mainly at the level of the individual so as to enhance an individual’s own genetic fitness. 
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These individual interests, in turn, determine the social institutions that emerge from 
them.
Evolutionary perspectives on human behavior have critics, and some of the cri-
tiques are themselves a rich source of ideas. For example, Lickleiter and Honeycutt 
(2003) criticized genetic–evolutionary accounts of human development by noting that 
the cellular machinery of humans probably has more control over genes than genes do 
over the cellular machinery of humans. Lickleiter and Honeycutt (2003) review evi-
dence for the fundamental importance of developmental regulatory systems and posit an 
epigenetic approach to behavior that promotes systems-based analysis that goes beyond 
simple views of causality.
Evolutionary perspectives can be applied to any human phenomena and are not 
restricted to biologically based behaviors. Evolution, as a metaphor, can be used to con-
struct many interesting questions (e.g., How do relationships evolve? How do attitudes 
evolve? How do personalities evolve?). How might evolutionary perspectives be used to 
analyze the growth of a business or an organization? Some businesses and organiza-
tions “survive” whereas others do not. Could an evolutionary perspective be adapted to 
analyze such dynamics?
As an example of the use of the evolutionary framework for the analysis of nonbio-
logical processes, Mahfouz, Philaretou, and Theocharous (2008) analyzed interpersonal 
attraction using evolutionary metaphors. According to these theorists, variation is repre-
sented by exposing oneself to a pool of available mates, selection takes place through the 
learning of courting mechanisms and socialization processes that maximize the mate’s 
level of physical attractiveness, and retention is reflected in the initiation of strategies for 
ensuring the successful carrying out of the dating process, with the ultimate purpose 
being that of generating a long-term commitment. Their analysis yielded several insights 
into dating that are not apparent in traditional theories of dating. Evolutionary perspec-
tives also have been offered on such diverse phenomena as schizophrenia (Pearlson & 
Folley, 2008), teachers’ negative affect toward gifted students (Geake & Gross, 2008), 
the development of authoritarianism (Hastings & Shaffer, 2008), violent crime (Barber, 
2008), and on-site web-page preferences and navigation (Stenstrom, Stenstrom, Saad, & 
Cheikhrouhou, 2008), to name a few.
What are the ultimate causes of the phenomenon you are studying? Do any of your 
variables, concepts, or processes have a basis in the survival of the species? What sys-
tems might constrain or regulate the impact of the ultimate causes you identify? What 
are the roles of time lags, limited variation, accompanying costs, and coordination in 
explaining your phenomenon?
Postmodernism: A Critical Commentary on Grand Theories
Postmodernism is not a formal system of thought but instead a critical commentary on 
assumptions frequently made in social science theories and research. It is controver-
sial even among postmodernists. The term postmodernity means “after modernity,” and 
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reflects a rejection of the basic tenets of an orientation called modernity. Modernism 
is associated with the Renaissance era and evolved essentially at the same time as the 
capitalist state. As applied to social science, Gergen (2001) argues that there are three 
major tenets of modernism that postmodernists question. First, in traditional modernist 
thought, humans are seen as having the capacity for reasoned and rational deliberations. 
According to this viewpoint, the thoughts and subjective knowledge of people are key 
to understanding behavior because a person’s thoughts mirror reality, albeit sometimes 
imperfectly so. Postmodernists question the concept of rationality as traditionally con-
ceived. According to postmodernists, a person is judged to be rational by a community 
only if he or she adopts the particular codes of discourse common to that community. 
For example, scientists are judged as being rational by the scientific community only to 
the extent that they adopt the discourse rules of the community of science. From this 
point of view, rationality is relational rather than absolute and can shift from one dis-
course community to another. Being rational is nothing more than a form of communal 
participation. Rationality is relative.
Second, in the modernist tradition, distinctions are made between the inner world 
of the mind and the external world of the material. An objectively knowable and ratio-
nal world is believed to exist that contains systematic cause-and-effect relationships. In 
contrast, postmodernism emphasizes a social constructionist viewpoint (see Chapter 
2). To speak of the world at all requires language. The words of a language are not mir-
rors of the world but rather arbitrary parts of a language system. To describe an external 
reality of causal relations reflects nothing more than participation in a language that 
draws upon the repository of thoughts and knowledge of a particular cultural tradition. 
Reality, like rationality, is relative.
Third, modernism holds that language is a means of conveying knowledge to oth-
ers and hence, it is “the bearer of truth” (Gergen, 2001). The postmodernist view is 
that language is the result of a cultural process that is generated within the context of 
human relationships. Language becomes meaningful not from its subjective and objec-
tive underpinnings but rather from its use in action.
Postmodernists are suspicious of authoritative declarations or statements of “truth.” 
They view such declarations as oppressive and silencing, especially for oppressed groups, 
such as females, members of certain ethnicities, and third-world peoples. For postmod-
ernists, understanding is individualized, and there are an infinite number of possible 
interpretations. To declare one interpretation as correct is to oppress others. Gergen 
(2001, p. 808) captures this philosophy as applied to psychology as follows:
As psychological theories are exported to the culture more generally, what are the rever-
berations in cultural life? When one holds that the primary ingredients of the mind are cog-
nitive, when one views behavior as genetically prepared, when one distinguishes between 
pathology and normalcy, which doors are opened within the culture, and which are shut? 
. . . Who is helped and who is hurt when psychologists distinguish between the intelligent 
and unintelligent, the pathological and normal, the prejudiced and unbiased? What form of 
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culture is created when exploitation, infidelity, and rape are viewed as biologically prepared 
actions of the male?
Gergen argues that it is important for theorists to think about how they are framing 
problems and how this might impact other members of society. This, in turn, might 
impact the choices one makes in framing a problem. Gergen goes on to emphasize the 
liberating role of postmodernism for psychological theory:
If scientific descriptions and explanations of the world are not demanded by the nature of 
the world itself, then one is released from the shackles of the taken for granted. Most impor-
tantly, one is invited into a posture of theoretical creativity. Scientists are liberated from the 
task of being mere mirror holders to the world as it is and challenged to articulate new and 
potentially transformative conceptions. The task is not simply that of describing what cur-
rently exists but of creating intelligibilities that may foster worlds to come. Metaphorically, 
the function shifts from that of scribe to poet. (p. 810)
Postmodernists vary in the extremity of their positions within postmodern phi-
losophy. Some reject any attempt at theory construction as futile because everything is 
relative, whereas others view theory construction as another form of dialogue among 
an infinite number of possible dialogues. The postmodernist approach emphasizes the 
importance of understanding the cultural context in which behavior occurs and the 
cultural context in which interpretations of behavior are made.
Postmodernists often engage in a process called deconstruction, a strategy of analy-
sis associated with the philosopher Jacques Derrida (Thomassen, 2006). Derrida objects 
to attempts to turn deconstruction into a coherent analytic strategy, but there are themes 
associated with it that many have sought to depict. As applied to textual narratives, 
deconstruction focuses on identifying what the text represses—what it does not say—
and its incongruities. Rosenau (1992) suggests that deconstruction involves (1) finding 
an exception to a generalization and pushing it to the limit so that the generalization is 
undermined, (2) interpreting arguments in a text in their most extreme form, (3) avoid-
ing all absolute statements and seeking to make statements that are striking, (4) deny-
ing the legitimacy of categories because one can always find exceptions, (5) accepting 
nothing and rejecting nothing, and (6) using new and unusual terminology to avoid the 
surplus meaning associated with more established terms.
Although we have difficulty with several tenets of postmodernism, we find it healthy 
at times to think about concepts, relationships between concepts, and processes from 
this perspective. As you choose variables, concepts, and processes to study and elabo-
rate theoretical narratives about, what groups or viewpoints are you affecting by the 
way you frame the underlying issues? How are your viewpoints filtering your questions 
and observations? If you rejected the three major tenets of modernism (that people are 
rational, that there is an objective reality, and that language is a mirror of that reality) 
and adopted the perspective of the postmodernist, how would this perspective shape 
the kinds of variables, concepts, and processes you study? How would this impact your 
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explanations of events? What would happen if you tried to deconstruct the narrative 
account of your theory? Sometimes we write out a theory and then subject it to the 
deconstruction process, with the result being new insights or perspectives.
FRAMEWORKS USING METAPHORS
In this section we describe two general systems of thought that make use of biological 
metaphors. The first is the framework of neural networks, which combines causal analy-
sis and process analysis in ways that are distinct from the theory construction processes 
described in previous chapters. The second framework, systems theory, has its roots in 
metaphors from physiology. Physiologists view the human body as a collection of inter-
acting systems, each with its own combination of functions and purposes. These include 
the nervous system, the musculoskeletal system, the circulatory system, the respira-
tory system, the gastrointestinal system, the integumentary system, the urinary system, 
the reproductive system, the immune system, and the endocrine system. These systems 
coordinate to promote the survival and effective functioning of individuals over time. 
In systems theory frameworks, one analyzes a phenomenon in terms of the system in 
which it is embedded and then how that system interacts with other systems to impact 
outcomes of interest. 
Neural Networks
Neural network theories do not have the “track record” of the grand theories described 
in the previous section, but they are becoming increasingly influential in the social sci-
ences. They use neural mechanisms as metaphors for analyzing a range of behaviors 
and mental phenomena. We present the core elements of a neural network approach in 
abstract form, weaving in an example to make it more concrete. Neural networks are 
popular in the analysis of learning, memory, and information processing. They can be 
readily applied to decision making, attitude formation, prejudice, and most any phe-
nomenon that involves the processing of information by individuals. The framework 
also can be adapted to describe relationships between organizations and organizational 
structures.
The basic unit in a neural network theory, a neuron, is connected to other neurons. 
The neurons are organized into layers, with the first layer representing the input layer 
and the last layer representing the output layer. The layers of neurons in between are 
called hidden layers. For example, in a neural network model of impression formation, 
each neuron at the input level might be a unit reflecting the different pieces of informa-
tion that a person is given about a stranger. Suppose we describe a teacher to a prospec-
tive student using three personality traits and then ask the person how much he or she 
would like the teacher. Each piece of trait information is fed to a separate neuron in the 
first layer and then these propagate to the neurons in the second layer, and so on, until 
the final output layer is reached. Essentially, the neurons at the first level are predictors 
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and the neurons or units in the last layer are outcomes. The input and output layers are 
usually observable (the input information and the output response) and the layers in 
between usually are not observable; hence the terminology hidden layers.
Any given neuron can be active or inactive. Activation is binary in character; that 
is, it takes on the value of 1 (active) or 0 (not active). The presentation of the trait infor-
mation activates some neurons, called input neurons, but not others. An activated input 
neuron reaches a neuron at the next layer through threshold units. There is a separate 
threshold unit for each output neuron. A threshold unit can be active or inactive. When 
the threshold unit becomes active, it “fires” like a synapse to activate the next neuron it 
is connected to. The threshold unit has an activation index that reflects its accumulated 
energy toward activation. The threshold unit also has a threshold value relative to its 
activation index, such that when the threshold value is exceeded by the activation index, 
the threshold unit fires, thereby activating the next neuron. Multiple neurons can feed 
into the threshold unit, each through a weighted connection, to impact its activation 
index. The connection can be either excitatory (i.e., the input neuron can either increase 
FIGURE 11.1. A neural network.
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the activation index) or inhibitory (i.e., the input neuron can decrease the activation 
index). The larger the weight of the connection, the greater the contribution of the neu-
ron to the threshold unit.
Figure 11.1 presents a simple schematic of the process. Information is presented 
about traits 1, 2, and 3, and these activate input neurons 1, 2, and 3, respectively. These 
neurons are linked to a hidden layer neuron (liking for the teacher), and this neuron is 
linked to an output neuron (taking a class from the teacher). Input neurons 1, 2, and 3 
feed into the threshold unit for the layer 1 neuron. Their contribution to the threshold 
unit is reflected by the weights of the connections (w1, w2, and w3). The more the weight 
for a given neuron deviates from 0, the greater the contribution it has for potentially 
activating the neuron to which it is connected. For example, the neuron for trait infor-
mation 1 might have a larger weight (w1) than the neuron for trait information 2 (w2). 
The activation index of the threshold unit is signified by a1 and its value is determined 
by the weighted combination of the connections from each of the input neurons. If the 
value of a1 exceeds the threshold value of the threshold unit (TV1), then a synaptic-like 
firing occurs, and the layer 1 neuron is activated. The same process occurs linking the 
layer 1 neuron to the output neuron.
This is a simplistic representation that is intended to convey the basic processes 
involved in a neural network. The example we described could be expanded so that 
other layer 1 neurons impact the output. Also, through the acquisition of experience, 
the weights of the connections (w1, w2, and w3) can change. Thus, neural networks can 
“learn” as the strength of connections increases or decreases. For example, if a person is 
told by several different individuals that a teacher has a particular trait, then this repeti-
tion may strengthen the connection between that trait’s input neuron and neurons in 
other layers. Neural network theorists have described a wide variety of learning strate-
gies that neural networks can incorporate. A specialized branch of mathematics and sta-
tistics has evolved for the analysis and structuring of neural network approaches. Neural 
network models take many forms and can be quite complex in nature.
Interesting examples of neural network models abound in the social sciences. For 
example, Marshall and English (2000) applied neural network analysis to model the 
association between social workers’ overall assessments of the risk status of children in 
child protective services and information about 37 separate risk factors from the state 
of Washington’s risk assessment matrix. Marshall and English found complex relation-
ships between the risk information available and caseworker judgments of risk that 
were not evident from more traditional modeling strategies. The neural network analysis 
indicated that only a small number of the 37 risk factors were actually used by casework-
ers when making their judgments and, as a result, the state of Washington revised its 
risk assessment matrix. In addition, new training methods were implemented to reem-
phasize the importance of certain risk factors (e.g., history of domestic violence) known 
to be related to recidivism but which the neural network analysis showed were not being 
used by caseworkers in their decision to place a child in foster care. Neural networks 
map closely onto another type of model, called connectionist models.
You may find it constructive to reconceptualize your theory using a neural network 
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metaphor. What would constitute the neurons for the input layer in your theory? What 
would be the neurons in the output layers? What are the hidden layers and how are they 
organized? What neurons are connected directly to other neurons? How much does it 
take to activate a neuron (as reflected by the threshold value of the threshold unit con-
nected to it)? Do some of the threshold units in your network have higher threshold 
values than others, and if so, why? Do some neurons contribute more to a threshold unit 
than other neurons (as reflected by their different weights, wi)? What can you conjecture 
about these differential weights and the sources of the differences? There is an extensive 
literature on neural network modeling that can assist you in answering these and other 
questions (see Abdi, Valentin, & Edelman, 1999, for an introductory treatment)
Systems Theory
General systems theory was introduced by Ludwig von Bertalanffy in the 1940s, who 
presented the theory using biological metaphors. Systems thinking is pervasive in every-
day life, as evidenced by such concepts as the health care system, the family system, 
political systems, ecological systems, and banking systems. General systems theory has 
been subject to a wide range of interpretations. Sadovski (1974) found over 35 different 
definitions of what a “system” is in scientific writings. It is impossible to convey a uni-
fied view of systems theory in light of this. Indeed, one of the main complaints against 
general systems theory is that it is too vague. We emphasize here systems concepts that 
reflect different ways of thinking about phenomena relative to the other frameworks 
discussed in this chapter.
At the simplest level, one can think of a system as an organized entity whose inter-
related elements interact with one another so as to achieve some common goal. There are 
many types of systems: A static system remains invariant over time; a dynamic system 
is constantly changing; a closed system has limited or no interaction with the environ-
ment or other systems; an open system interacts with the environment or other systems, 
exchanging inputs and outputs.
Systems theory adopts a holistic approach rather than a reductionist approach to 
analysis. It seeks to gain insights into the functioning of the overall system by examin-
ing the interrelationships and connections between the component parts of the system. 
It is not enough, for example, in a family system to separately analyze the mother, the 
father, the son, and the daughter. Rather, one must examine how these elements interact 
and the interconnections between them to more fully understand family functioning. 
Systems theory emphasizes understanding processes rather than causes. Instead of ana-
lyzing why families communicate, for example, the focus is on how families communi-
cate and how this changes as a function of settings and contexts.
Systems theory also emphasizes the concept of feedback. Feedback refers to a cir-
cular process in which input is transformed by the system into output, and the output 
is brought back to the system as input. Feedback loops allow a system to regulate its 
behavior and are integral to system analyses.
Many systems have regulatory mechanisms that strive to maintain equilibrium. An 
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analogy is a thermostat that heats a home during winter. The equilibrium point is the 
temperature at which the thermostat is set. The thermostat monitors the room tempera-
ture and sends a signal to the heater to turn on if the room’s temperature falls below the 
equilibrium point and for the heater to turn off if the temperature is above the equilib-
rium point. Systems analysis examines such regulatory mechanisms, emphasizing the 
underlying processes that are taking place, the feedback loops that are operating within 
the system, and the continual adjustments that are being made among the many system 
elements. Another concept emphasized in systems theory is that of equifinality, which 
refers to the idea that there may be several equally effective ways to achieve a goal (Van 
de Ven & Poole, 1995).
Brinberg and McGrath (1985) discuss three facets of systems that theorists can 
consider when thinking in terms of systems theory, either for the system as a whole or 
at various levels of a system. First is system well-being, which refers to the identification 
of conditions and behaviors that threaten the health and safety of the system or that 
constrain the positive development of the system. Second is system task performance 
effectiveness, which refers to conditions and barriers that hinder the system from carry-
ing out its tasks or achieving its goals. Third is system cost, which refers to expenditures 
of energy and resources in pursuit of task performance.
There are many examples of systems theory approaches in the social sciences. In the 
field of criminal justice, for example, Van Gigch (1978) used systems theory to analyze 
major components of criminal justice (police, courts, and corrections) and the agencies 
and institutions that serve those components. Van Gigch identified the inputs and out-
puts of each institution and argued that these were regulated by the needs of the overall 
criminal justice system. His theory emphasized that the criminal justice system as a 
whole was greater than the sum of its parts. He also argued that the criminal justice sys-
tem is, itself, a subsystem within larger political, economic, educational, and technical 
systems, all of which impact how the criminal justice system functions. Kraska (2004) 
argued that the systems approach to criminal justice facilitates macro-level analyses of 
criminal justice and offered numerous suggestions for reform based on such analyses. 
Bernard, Paoline, and Pare (2005) offer a theory of criminal justice based on nine propo-
sitions that derive from systems theory perspectives.
As another example, in the 1980s, questions were raised in Canada about the health 
risks of a herbicide called Alachlor. Three different stakeholders performed what each 
characterized as objective, scientific assessments of the risks of Alachlor, but each came 
to a different conclusion. Hatfield and Hipel (2002) used systems theory to isolate the 
bases of the differing conclusions and advocated for the use of general systems theory in 
risk assessments more generally.
Systems theory is widely used in analyses of families (Freeman, 1993; Wood, 2002) 
and organizations (Takahashi, Kijima, & Sato, 2004). Thinking about your theory, what 
happens if you think about matters in terms of processes performed by systems rather 
than variables? What insights do you gain by describing how things function rather 
than trying to describe why things function as they do? Are there feedback loops? Are 
their regulatory mechanisms? In what ways is the whole larger than the functioning of 
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the individual parts? As noted earlier, the human body has a nervous system, a skeletal 
system, a circulatory system, a respiratory system, and a multitude of other systems. 
These systems are interrelated and work together toward the common goal of keeping 
a person alive. Can you use this as a metaphor for the phenomena that you are study-
ing? What are the core systems in your theory? How are they interrelated and how do 
they interact with one another? How does one system depend on the other? What are 
the functions of each system and what processes take place in the system to allow these 
functions to be fulfilled?
FRAMEWORKS EMPHASIZING STABILITY AND CHANGE
Although all of the frameworks discussed can be applied to the analysis of change, there 
are perspectives on stability and change worth mentioning that stand apart from these 
systems of thought. Van de Ven and Poole (1995, 2005) describe four conceptual orienta-
tions to process-based analyses of change. First, there is a life-cycle model in which the 
developing entity (an individual, a couple, a social group, an organization) is thought 
to move through a set of preconfigured or preprogrammed phases from beginning to 
end. For example, human development is often thought to progress from infancy to 
childhood to adolescence to young adulthood to adulthood to older adulthood, with 
noteworthy cognitive, moral, emotional, social, and physical changes associated with 
each phase of development. A second framework for process analyses of change identi-
fied by Van de Ven and Poole is a teleological model that conceptualizes individuals as 
moving toward a goal or end state in a purposeful way; the person specifies a goal and 
takes action to reach it. In a third framework, a dialectical model, the person or entity is 
viewed as being influenced by opposing events and forces, some promoting change and 
others promoting stability. Change is interpreted in the context of the balance of power 
between these opposing forces. The final framework, an evolutionary model, emphasizes 
cumulative change, as discussed earlier in the context of evolutionary perspectives on 
theory construction.
These four approaches to process-based analyses of change are not mutually exclu-
sive. All four mechanisms, or some combination of them, can operate to produce or 
characterize change. Van de Ven and Poole (1995) described 15 different frameworks 
that involve various combinations of the four mechanisms.
Related to the life-cycle model of Van de Ven and Poole (1995) are stage theories 
of change. These theories conceptualize people as moving through sequential stages 
in their progress toward some outcome or end state. Unlike the life-cycle model, how-
ever, progression through the stages is not necessarily predetermined. A stage theory 
specifies what the stages are, the criteria used to classify a person (or other entity) as 
in one stage as opposed to another stage, and the processes or requirements that must 
be mastered or achieved to move from one stage to the next. Stage theories are com-
mon in such disciplines as developmental science, health, and organizational studies. 
As an example, in the area of smoking cessation, the transtheoretical model identifies 
five stages through which a person is presumed to progress (Prochaska, DiClemente, 
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& Norcross, 1992). The first stage is the precontemplation stage, where a smoker has no 
intention of quitting smoking in the next 6 months. In the contemplation stage a smoker 
is thinking about quitting some time in the next 6 months but does not plan to quit in 
the next month. The preparation stage marks the smoker’s intention to quit within the 
next month and includes at least one unsuccessful 24-hour quit attempt in the past year. 
In the action stage the smoker successfully quits smoking for any time between 1 day 
and 6 months. After 6 months of being smoke free, the ex-smoker is said to have reached 
the maintenance stage. According to the transtheoretical model, the type of intervention 
that one uses to help a person stop smoking differs depending on the “stage of change” 
in which he or she is. For example, someone in the precontemplative stage will need dif-
ferent information and support than someone in the maintenance stage.
Stage theories differ in at least five ways. First, some stage theories permit the entity 
(e.g., a person, a family, an organization) to revert back to previous stages, whereas 
other stage theories dictate a forward progression only. Second, some stage theories 
require that entities spend a fixed minimum amount of time in a stage, whereas other 
theories permit movement through stages with no time constraints. Third, some stage 
theories define stages in terms of categories along a single continuum, whereas other 
stage theories define the stages multivariately. For example, the first three stages of the 
transtheoretical model represent a trichotomization of the intention to quit smoking 
along a time dimension (never, within 6 months, within 1 month). By contrast, Freud’s 
psychoanalytic theory of the stages of psychosexual development (the oral stage, the 
anal stage, the phallic stage, the latency stage, and the genital stage) involve distinctly 
different dimensions at each stage. Fourth, some stage theories permit entities to skip an 
intermediate stage, whereas other theories require each entity to progress through each 
stage in sequence. Finally, some stage theories characterize movement from one stage to 
another in terms of large, dramatic shifts in behavior, whereas others view the passing 
from one stage to the next as a more gradual process.
Dixon and Moore (2000) discuss stage theories from the perspective of the devel-
opmental ordering of two or more skills or types of knowledge. Consider two different 
but interdependent skills, A and B. Dixon and Moore argue that if acquisition of one 
skill is developmentally dependent on the acquisition of another skill, then this, for all 
intents and purposes, is a stage theory. If the development of skill B is dependent on 
the development of skill A, then skill A is the first stage and skill B is the second stage. 
Dixon and Moore suggest different models of developmental ordering for stage theories. 
Developmental synchrony occurs when both skills begin development at the same time 
and basically develop at the same rate. One skill is dependent on the other, but the 
dependence is instantaneous. Partial developmental priority occurs when the two skills 
start at the same time, but one develops at a faster rate than the other. The level of skill 
B might be dependent on the level of skill A, but there is a lag between the acquisition 
of a level of skill B and the acquisition of a certain level of skill A. The lag may not be 
complete in that only a certain level of mastery of skill A is required for skill B to start 
developing. Complete developmental priority occurs when skill A must be fully mastered 
before skill B can begin to develop.
There are many examples of stage theories in the social sciences, with the tran-
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stheoretical model described above being one. As another example, Duck (1982) devel-
oped a stage-like theory of relationship dissolution that consists of six phases. First, 
there is a breakdown phase where one or both partners become distressed over the way 
the relationship is being conducted. This eventually leads to an intrapsychic phase that 
is characterized by brooding about the relationship. Nothing is said to the partner at 
this time, but the focus is on one’s feelings that the relationship is damaged. This phase, 
which is characterized by uncertainty, anxiety, and hostility, is followed by the dyadic 
phase, where partners confront each other and talk through their feelings about the 
relationship. If a decision is made to break up, they move to a social phase, where they 
tell others of their decision and seek social support. This, in turn, leads to the grave-
dressing phase, where the relationship is seen as being “dead,” with the recognition that 
it must be “put away.” During this phase, the individual builds a narrative about what 
the relationship was, reinterpreting it and labeling it in light of his or her current feel-
ings. Finally comes the resurrection process in which the individual re-creates a sense of 
his or her social value and defines what he or she wants out of future relationships. This 
theory was recently updated and enhanced by Rollie and Duck (2006), who emphasize 
predominant processes throughout the dissolution experience and elaborate on the role 
of communication at each phase.
In your theory construction efforts, consider if you want to conceptualize any of 
your variables or phenomena using a life-cycle model, a teleological model, a dialectical 
model, or an evolutionary model. Consider imposing a “stage” framework. If you think 
in these terms, elucidate the criteria for defining stages and make decisions about the 
evolution of stages using the dimensions we discussed on how stage theories differ. Can 
people revert back to previous stages? Must people spend a fixed minimum amount of 
time in a stage? Can your stages be defined in terms of a single dimension or must they 
be defined multivariately? Can people skip a stage? Are the shifts from one stage to the 
next gradual or dramatic? What is the developmental ordering of the “skills,” “knowl-
edge,” or “events” in your theory in the spirit of the Dixon and Moore analysis?
PSYCHOLOGICAL FRAMEWORKS
Several influential frameworks in psychology offer unique perspectives relative to the 
frameworks we have discussed thus far. We focus on two systems of thought, reinforce-
ment theory and positive psychology. Although there are other theories that are either 
more contemporary or more influential historically, we focus on these two frameworks 
because they complement well those that have already been discussed.
Reinforcement Theories
Reinforcement theory achieved prominence primarily in psychology, but it also has 
been applied in education, sociology, political science, and public health. Reinforcement 
theories emphasize the concepts of stimulus and response. A stimulus is an external or 
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internal event that leads to the performance of a behavior, which is termed the response. 
Stimuli have three functions: (1) elicitation, (2) discrimination, and (3) reinforcement. 
An eliciting stimulus evokes an instinctual, natural response, such as the sight of food 
stimulating salivation. A discriminative stimulus does not directly elicit a response but 
sets the stage for the response. It signals to people that they should respond in a certain 
way. For example, when a child is eating at the dinner table, he or she may exhibit dif-
ferent table manners when the mother is present than when the mother is absent. The 
mother, in this case, is a discriminative stimulus. Reinforcing stimuli occur as a posi-
tive or negative consequence of a response. Reinforcement theories focus on identifying 
the roles of relevant stimuli as being eliciting, discriminatory, and/or reinforcing. For 
example, if a child acts aggressively, reinforcement theory focuses on identifying what 
stimuli in the environment are serving to positively reinforce such behavior and what 
discriminative cues are present that signal the permissibleness of aggressive behavior.
In some (but not all) reinforcement theories, the concept of drive is important. 
Clark Hull (1943) proposed that there is an underlying, unlearned, biological source of 
core needs related to metabolic processes, such as the need for food, water, and sexual 
contact. When a person is deprived of the satisfaction of these needs, a drive force is cre-
ated that activates behavior in the direction of trying to satisfy them. When satisfaction 
of the need is obtained, reduction in the drive occurs. Dollard and Miller (1950) identi-
fied two types of drives: (1) primary or innate drives and (2) secondary drives that are 
the product of learning (e.g., a drive toward monetary rewards or a drive toward verbal 
rewards). Another facet of reinforcement theory is to analyze the fundamental drive 
states, both primary and secondary, that may underlie behavior.
A fundamental tenet of reinforcement theories derives from Thurstone’s law of effect. 
This law states that if positive consequences follow an individual’s response to a stimu-
lus, then he or she will probably repeat that response in the presence of the stimulus 
on future occasions. Conversely, if a response to a stimulus is followed by negative con-
sequences, then the individual will avoid repeating that response to the stimuli in the 
future. One can increase or decrease the probability of a behavior occurring by manipu-
lating reinforcers of the behavior. Positive reinforcers are stimuli that serve to strengthen 
the response; negative reinforcers are stimuli that strengthen the response when they are 
removed. For example, if an aversive stimulus is removed in response to a behavior, then 
the removal of that stimulus serves as a negative reinforcer. Punishments are stimuli that 
reduce the strength of the response. When analyzing behavior, reinforcement theorists 
also analyze what stimuli may be operating as reinforcers for the behaviors and what 
stimuli might be operating to punish the behavior. By identifying these stimuli, one 
begins to understand the bases of the behavior.
The effectiveness of a reinforcer in shaping behavior depends, in part, on the sched-
ule of its administration. There are two broad types of reinforcement schedules: contin-
uous and intermittent. Continuous reinforcement occurs when a behavior is reinforced 
each time it occurs. Research suggests that continuous reinforcement is the fastest way 
to establish new behaviors or eliminate undesired behaviors. Intermittent schedules 
occur when only some instances of a desired behavior are reinforced.
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Stimulus generalization is an important process in reinforcement theories. It refers 
to the situation in which a novel stimulus evokes a response that was previously learned 
in relation to a different though similar stimulus. For example, if two situations are very 
similar to each other and individuals learn to respond in a certain way in one of the 
situations, they probably will respond the same way in the other situation. Discrimina-
tion refers to an individual’s ability to differentiate stimuli and respond differently to 
them. Generalization and discrimination go hand in hand: They allow individuals to 
economize their behavior by generalizing stimuli, on the one hand, yet make important 
distinctions and respond differentially, on the other hand. Another key point of analysis 
for reinforcement theories is the analysis of stimulus generalization and how reinforce-
ment histories from one context may generalize to another context.
Extinction is another important process in reinforcement theories. It refers to the 
progressive decrement in a response under continual nonreinforcement. Thus, if a 
response is no longer reinforced in the presence of a stimulus, then the response will 
eventually extinguish. Some people extinguish responses quicker than others. Resis-
tance to extinction is a function of (1) the amount of prior reinforcement, (2) the strength 
of the drive to obtain the reinforcer during extinction, (3) the amount of work or effort 
involved in performing the response, and (4) the schedule that was used to reinforce the 
behavior initially.
Although reinforcement theories have their critics, we often find it useful to “put 
on the hat of a reinforcement theorist” and think about how such a scientist would ana-
lyze the outcome variables in which we are interested. More often than not, explanatory 
constructs suggest themselves that otherwise would not have. What stimuli are elicit-
ing the behavior? What reinforcers are operating to encourage the behavior? Are there 
any potential negative reinforcers? What punishments are operating to discourage the 
behavior? Are there any basic drive states that may be impacting the behavior? What are 
the operative reinforcement schedules—that is, what is the dynamic process by which 
reinforcers are being administered? Are there discriminative stimuli operating that 
point to one type of behavior in the presence of those stimuli but a different behavior in 
the absence of those stimuli? Is the behavior impacted by a person’s history in similar 
situations to the ones we are studying? To what situations might the effects of variables 
generalize? If we want to extinguish a behavior, how would we go about removing rein-
forcers? What would make some people more (or less) resistant to extinction? Trying to 
answer these questions, even if you are not a reinforcement theorist, can often be a rich 
source of ideas and perspectives.
Reinforcement theory and the many variants of it are widely used in behavioral inter-
ventions to impact inappropriate and destructive behaviors in children, adolescents, and 
adults (e.g., Durand, 2002; Kazdin, 2008; Patterson, 1975). These interventions identify 
the behaviors that need changing and then analyze these behaviors in terms of the ques-
tions noted above. As relevant reinforcers affecting the behavior are identified, they are 
either removed or new reinforcers are added. Or, if a desired reinforcer is being adminis-
tered only intermittently, then a more effective reinforcement schedule is implemented. 
Or, if the child, adolescent, or adult is responding inappropriately only in the presence 
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of a certain discriminative cue, then attempts will be made to eliminate that cue. If the 
child, adolescent, or adult performs appropriate behaviors in one setting, then methods 
for generalizing that response to other situations will be introduced.
Reinforcement theory is no longer a cornerstone of mainstream psychology, which, 
ironically, makes it all that more useful for generating unique perspectives on behavior 
relative to more dominant theories. Reinforcement theories typically are used to analyze 
the behavior of individuals, but there is nothing to prevent you from thinking about 
groups, organizations, or other larger units in these terms. For example, when studying 
relationships within or between hierarchically structured organizations, how does one 
department or unit affect another from the perspective of reinforcement theories? Not 
all of the concepts we outlined apply, but many of them do. Again, try to use the different 
theoretical perspectives we are presenting in creative ways that go beyond the routine 
application of them.
Humanism and Positive Psychology
A longstanding approach to the analysis of human behavior is that of humanism, which 
recently has been reinvigorated by a movement in psychology called “positive psy-
chology” (Bacon, 2005; Kimble, 1984). Positive psychology focuses on understanding 
strengths and virtues, positive emotions, and positive institutions within society (Selig-
man & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). It seeks to understand what factors contribute to these 
phenomena and how they can be nurtured and developed. It has its roots in psychol-
ogy in the classic work on client-centered therapy as espoused by Carl Rogers (1961). 
This theory emphasizes people’s innate tendencies to seek self-actualization and health, 
when conditions permit.
Seligman (2002) presents a positive psychology framework that emphasizes the 
concept of strengths, which he believes are distinct from other psychological constructs, 
such as traits and abilities. According to Seligman, strengths are valued in their own 
right and are characteristics or attributes that parents want for their children. Strengths 
tend to be valued in all cultures. Examples include creativity, wisdom, bravery, leader-
ship, humility, and integrity. Peterson and Seligman (2004) present a taxonomy of 24 
strengths that are organized in terms of six higher-order virtues. Bacon (2005) pres-
ents an alternative taxonomy that emphasizes focus-oriented strengths and balanced-
focused strengths. Focus-oriented strengths emphasize individual growth and develop-
ment, whereas balance-oriented strengths emphasize bringing about harmony within the 
self and between the self and others.
A major contribution of positive psychology is that it has focused theorizing on out-
come variables that have a positive character to them. Whereas much of social science 
is aimed at understanding negative outcomes, such as unhealthy behavior, prejudice, 
family dissolution, suicide, drug use, HIV-related behaviors, conflict, and survival under 
adversity, positive psychology shifts the focus to how normal people flourish under nor-
mal or benign conditions. Thus, this framework impacts the kinds of outcome variables 
on which you might choose to focus your theories.
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Positive psychology also has implications for the kinds of causes you might focus on 
and the strategies you use to develop interventions. This point is illustrated in research 
on adolescent problem behaviors. Most interventions aimed at addressing such behavior 
are problem-specific. For example, there are school-based interventions aimed at pre-
venting sexual risk taking, smoking, drug use, and alcohol use. These programs focus 
on the beliefs and attitudes of adolescents toward the problem behavior in question, peer 
influences on these behaviors, and opportunity structures that make it easier to perform 
the behaviors. An alternative approach to intervention design is one that emphasizes not 
the problem behaviors of youths but rather the positive features of adolescent develop-
ment (Catalano, Berglund, Ryan, Lonczak, & Hawkins, 2002). Known as positive youth 
development (PYD) programs, these interventions assume that the same individual, fam-
ily, school, and community factors that influence positive outcomes in youth also impact 
youth-related problem behaviors. PYD interventions focus not on problem behaviors but 
instead on promoting bonding, resilience, spirituality, social skills, moral competence, 
self-efficacy, belief in the future, prosocial norms, and other general orientations toward 
life that serve the positive development of youths. The idea is that youths who have such 
positive orientations will be less likely to engage in problem behaviors. In this case, a 
“positive” focus on human behavior impacts the kinds of explanatory variables one 
chooses to emphasize relative to the more traditional problem-related beliefs, attitudes, 
and norms.
We believe that positive psychology perspectives are worth considering when think-
ing about outcome variables and factors that impact them. If your theory is focused on 
a negative outcome state, might you also consider adding positive states to your theory? 
When thinking about ways of reducing a negative state, what positive factors might 
you try to enhance to do so? Instead of reducing the negatives, might your theory be 
expanded to increase the positives?
FRAMEWORKS INSPIRED BY METHODOLOGY
Multilevel Modeling
Social scientists in many disciplines have long advocated the importance of incorporat-
ing into theories the broader contexts in which individuals behave. Research adopting 
such perspectives has increased exponentially with the recent advent of a statistical 
method of analysis called multilevel modeling. To be sure, the rudiments of multilevel 
modeling have been around for decades, but it is only in the last 15 years or so that rea-
sonably user-friendly software has become available to make sophisticated multilevel 
modeling accessible to social scientists. This, in turn, has shaped the kinds of multilevel 
questions that scientists ask. In this section we describe multilevel thinking with the 
idea that bringing such frameworks to bear on the phenomena you study may provide 
you with new insights and perspectives.
Consider the case in which we wish to explain student performance on math 
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achievement tests. One set of explanatory variables focuses on individual differences, 
such as gender. A theorist might offer the proposition that boys score, on average, higher 
than girls because of a host of socialization factors, which we do not elaborate here 
in the interest of space. This proposition can be diagrammed using a path model (see 
Chapter 7), as in Figure 11.2a.
Students attend different types of schools, and it is possible that the type of school 
they attend also impacts their test performance. For example, students who attend pri-
vate schools might perform better on math achievement tests than students who attend 
public schools by virtue of the smaller class sizes and more individualized attention they 
receive. The type of school is a contextual variable in the sense that students are “nested 
within” different types of schools. This influence can be diagrammed in conjunction 
with the gender effect, as in Figure 11.2b.
Finally, the theorist might argue that the type of school moderates the impact of 
gender on math achievement scores. Specifically, the theorist reasons that in private 
schools, where students receive more individualized attention, the gender difference 
between boys and girls is lessened when compared with public schools. This yields the 
revised path diagram in Figure 11.2c.
Figure 11.2c (and Figure 11.2b) represents a two-level model. Units in the first level 
(students) are nested within units of the second level (schools), and the characteristics 
of the second-level units (i.e., characteristics of the schools) are thought to influence the 
FIGURE 11.2. Examples for multilevel modeling. (a) Level 1 analysis; (b) multilevel model; 
(c) multilevel model with moderation.
a
 
b
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level 1 outcome variable (math achievement) and/or influence the way in which level 1 
characteristics (gender) impact the outcome variable.
Multilevel modeling invokes a frame of mind in which theorists think about explan-
atory variables at different levels, focusing on cases where level 1 units are nested within 
level 2 units. There are many such examples. Students are nested within schools, and 
characteristics of both the students and the schools can influence performance on tests. 
Employees are nested within organizations and characteristics of both the employees 
and the organization can influence employee behavior. Patients are nested within hos-
pitals and characteristics of both the patients and the hospitals can influence patient 
recovery. Infants are nested within families and characteristics of both the infants and 
the families can influence infant development.
The above are examples of two-level models. Multilevel theorists also work with 
three-level models in which level 1 units are nested within level 2 units, which, in turn, 
are nested within level 3 units. For example, students are nested within schools, which, 
in turn, are nested within counties. Characteristics of the students, the schools, and the 
counties all can influence performance on tests. As another example, in organizational 
analyses, employees might be nested within departments, which, in turn, are nested 
within organizations. Characteristics of the employees, the departments in which they 
serve, and the organizations all can influence job performance.
The relationships between variables at the different levels can be expressed in a 
variety of ways, such as through the use of propositions in narratives, path diagrams 
(per Figure 11.2), and/or via mathematical equations. The essence of multilevel model-
ing, however, is a focus on nested units and the explanatory variables at each level of 
nesting.
In some theories, level 2 variables are treated as aggregations of level 1 variables. For 
example, the morale of a family (level 2) might be the average morale across the different 
family members (level 1), and the cohesiveness of a family (level 2) might be the variance 
of the morale across family members (e.g., in some families, all members have the same 
level of morale, whereas in other families, morale differs considerably from one family 
member to the next). In other cases, the level 2 variables are defined independently of 
the level 1 variables, such as the case where a school is public or private, or whether the 
school has a strict or lax policy for expelling students caught with marijuana.
There is a robust literature on multilevel analysis. As you think about the phenom-
ena in which you are interested, consider if they are amenable to multilevel analysis. 
What are your level 1 units, what are your level 2 units, and what are your level 3 units? 
What explanatory variables are relevant at each level? Within a given level, what are the 
causal relations between the variables? What are the causal relations across levels? If 
you adopt a causal framework, are there moderated effects? Are there mediated effects? 
Are your level 2 variables simple aggregates of your level 1 variables, or are they defined 
independent of them? Are your level 3 variables simple aggregates of your level 2 vari-
ables, or are they defined independently of them? The multilevel framework encourages 
you to think about explanatory variables in ways that differ from more traditional forms 
of analysis and that may therefore enrich your theory.
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A unique application of multilevel modeling is the analysis of “growth curves.” This 
application reconceptualizes temporal dynamics by viewing individuals as level 2 units 
and assessment occasions as level 1 units nested within the level 2 units. For example, 
consider the data for three individuals in Figure 11.3, where the outcome variable at a 
given occasion is a behavioral count, namely, the number of alcoholic drinks consumed 
in the past 2 weeks. This behavior is measured at each of four occasions: the beginning 
of the first, second, third, and fourth years of high school. All three individuals show a 
linear change in alcohol consumption over time, and all three individuals have roughly 
the same average level of drinking across the four time periods. However, the individuals 
vary in the sharpness of the increase in alcohol consumption across time, as reflected by 
the differing slopes of the lines plotting their behavioral trajectories. Individual A shows 
only a slight increase in drinking, Individual B shows a moderate increase in drinking, 
and Individual C shows a more marked increase in drinking across time. The individu-
als with the steeper slopes progress toward higher levels of drinking more quickly than 
the individual with the flatter slope. Instead of explaining individual differences in the 
average drinking score across time, the focus of this multilevel model might be instead 
on explaining individual differences in the slope of the line that describes how drinking 
changes over time. Such “growth curve” analyses are becoming increasingly common 
in the social sciences. For example, in education research, there often is interest in how 
reading or math skills change over time and the kinds of trajectories that children show 
as they move from kindergarten through the elementary school grades. Thus, another 
option for building theories is to focus on behavioral trajectories over time.
FIGURE 11.3. Example of the analysis of behavioral trajectories.
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BOx 11.1. Collaboration
Theory construction often benefits from collaborating with other individuals. 
Through the exchange of ideas and perspectives, it is possible for individuals 
involved in the collaboration to gain insights that they may not have obtained 
working on their own. When we think of collaboration, we usually think of col-
laborations between scientists, between professors and students, or between stu-
dents. But collaborative partnerships can be broader than this and can include 
collaborations between a social scientist, on the one hand, and journalists, poli-
cymakers, representatives from institutions or agencies, and key individuals in 
professional organizations, on the other hand.
Levine and Moreland (2004) have reviewed the research literature on effec-
tive collaborations and state that collaborations tend to be more successful if 
they include both similar and dissimilar orientations of participants. You don’t 
want a collaborator who merely echoes what you think. Instead you want some-
one who can add to your knowledge base and who can complement the points 
of view that you bring to the collaboration. On the other hand, if the collabora-
tor has a very different way of characterizing matters, it may be difficult for you 
to communicate effectively with him or her, as neither of you can transcend the 
specialized jargon ingrained in your training.
Usually, effective collaborations happen with individuals who are similar 
in terms of life stage, status, values, and interaction style (Levine & Moreland, 
2004). By contrast, similarity on dimensions such as knowledge and abilities 
inhibits creativity, as it narrows the pooled knowledge base (Farrell, 2001). Far-
rell (2001) found that more successful collaborations tend to happen in dyads 
or triads. With a large number of collaborators, usually a natural pairing off of 
smaller dyads occurs, and it is in these dyads where much of the creative work 
happens (Farrell, 2001).
When brainstorming ideas as part of a larger group, several disadvantages 
have been noted. These include evaluation apprehension, production blocking, 
and a reluctance to discuss unshared ideas. These obstacles can be overcome 
by talking about them at the outset of the collaboration, and it usually is easier to 
do so in dyads, where each participant feels comfortable with the other person. 
The key is to create the right environment for intellectual exchange.
Within a dyad, some people collaborate by writing text together, side-by-
side at a word processor, with one person doing the typing. Debates not only 
focus on ideas but also on such matters as word choice and sentence structure. 
Alternatively, one person might write an initial draft and then this and subse-
quent drafts are exchanged, with each person providing feedback to the other. 
Whichever approach is used, the key is to develop a communal orientation to 
theory construction rather than one of just exchanging ideas in a linear, noncom-
municative way. In general, it is important that both members have a sense of 
cont.
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Person-Centered Theorizing
Whereas variable-centered approaches to theorizing focus on identifying relationships 
between variables, person-centered approaches emphasize the identification of groups 
or “clusters” of individuals who share particular attributes in common. The statistical 
methodological technique most often associated with person-centered theorizing is clus-
ter analysis and its variants. Cluster analysis applies statistical algorithms to measures 
of constructs to identify “clusters” of individuals who exhibit common profiles across 
those measures. As an example, developmental science has identified numerous key 
parenting dimensions, including (1) expressions of warmth and affection, (2) exertion 
of control versus laxness, (3) engagement with one’s child in shared activities, (4) use of 
reasoning and explanation during disciplining, (5) use of monitoring and supervision, 
and (6) quality of communication (Schaefer & DiGeron, 2000). If one conceptualizes 
parents as being “low,” “medium,” or “high” on each dimension, there are 36 or 729 
possible parenting styles defined by the combination of the six dimensions with three 
levels each. In practice, not all of these styles occur with equal frequency and indeed, 
some combinations may not occur at all. Cluster analysis is a method that quickly and 
efficiently identifies parents who share common profiles across the six dimensions and 
thereby permits scientists to identify the most commonly occurring parenting styles in a 
population. Such strategies can be applied to any area of study where multiple variables 
are of interest. For example, there have been many person-centered analyses of health 
behavior to identify health-based lifestyles of the United States population as well as 
healthy and unhealthy lifestyles in other countries (Clatworthy, Buick, Hankins, Wein-
man, & Horne, 2005). Similarly, person-centered analyses have been used to identify 
clusters of social groupings in social network analysis (Freeman, 2006).
In marketing, cluster analysis is often used to identify market segments for pur-
poses of developing tailored advertising strategies. Segmentation in marketing typically 
is pursued using four variable categories (Kotler, Roberto, & Lee, 2002): (1) demographic 
segmentation, which divides populations into segments based on variables such as age, 
ownership of the ideas and a sense that a true collaboration has occurred. This 
outcome fosters sustained collaboration.
An important part of collaboration is not just generating ideas but also identi-
fying ideas that are good enough for further consideration in the research. Being 
open to, as well as being willing to give, constructive criticism is important in this 
regard. Joseph Bordogna, a deputy director of the National Science Founda-
tion, emphasizes the importance of (1) building trust among partners, (2) making 
sure everyone has something to gain from the collaboration, and (3) ensuring a 
diversity of perspectives.
-
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gender, income, occupation, education, religion, ethnicity, and cohort (e.g., generation Y, 
echo boomers); (2) geographic segmentation, which divides populations into segments 
according to geographical areas, such as states, regions, counties, cities, and neighbor-
hoods as well as related elements, such as commuting patterns, places of work, and 
proximity to landmarks; (3) psychographic segmentation, which divides populations 
into segments based on social class orientation, personality, values, and lifestyle; and (4) 
behavioral segmentation, which divides populations into segments based on knowledge, 
attitudes, and practices relevant to the product being marketed (e.g., user status, usage 
rate, loyalty status, readiness for change). Segments are defined based on some combina-
tion of these variable classes. Cluster analysis is used to help marketers identify large 
population segments that are likely to be receptive to a product, that can be reached in 
cost-effective ways, and that can be targeted using a common rather than diverse adver-
tising strategy.
As you theorize, consider if a person-centered perspective advances your efforts. 
Are there multiple dimensions or groups of variables where it would help to identify 
segments of individuals (or segments of other entities, such as families or organizations) 
who share common profiles across those dimensions? If so, what profiles or pattern 
of clusters across the dimensions do you expect to observe and why? Which clusters 
or profiles do you think will occur most frequently in your population? Why? As you 
begin to think about “segmenting” your population as a function of response patterns 
across variables, you may gain new insights into the phenomena you are addressing. 
For introductions to cluster analysis, see Everitt, Landau, and Leese (2001) and Kauf-
man and Rousseeuw (2005). For a discussion of recent extensions of cluster analysis to 
procedures that integrate person-centered and variable-centered theorizing, called mix-
ture modeling, see Lubke and Muthen (2005), Muthen (2001), and Muthen and Muthen 
(2000).
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS
We have considered over a dozen different perspectives for thinking about human 
behavior, including materialism, structuralism, functionalism, symbolic interaction-
ism, evolutionary perspectives, postmodernism, neural networks, systems theory, 
stage theories, reinforcement theories, humanism, multilevel modeling, and person-
centered theorizing. These frameworks complement and augment the frameworks of 
causal thinking, mathematical modeling, simulations, and grounded theory described 
in Chapters 7–10, as well as the strategies discussed in Chapter 4 for idea generation. We 
use the frameworks presented in this chapter by role-playing a scientist who embraces 
the particular system of thought, and then thinking about how that scientist would 
analyze the phenomenon in which we are interested. Sometimes this leads to new and 
productive insights, and sometimes it does not. But by forcing ourselves to invoke each 
of the perspectives, it helps us think through our phenomena in more depth and often 
yields insights we would not have thought of otherwise. Of course, there will be some 
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phenomena for which a given framework simply does not seem relevant, and there is no 
reason to force the matter. But usually we find that a couple of the frameworks are both 
applicable and useful.
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ExERCISES
Exercises to Reinforce Concepts
 1. Describe the basic tenets and principles of materialism.
 2. Describe the basic tenets and principles of structuralism.
 3. Describe the basic tenets and principles of evolutionary perspectives.
 4. Describe the basic tenets and principles of postmodernism
 5. Describe the basic tenets and principles of neural networks.
 6. Describe the basic tenets and principles of systems theories.
 7. Describe the basic tenets and principles of stage theories.
 8. Describe the basic tenets and principles of reinforcement theories.
 9. Describe the basic tenets and principles of humanism.
 10. Describe the basic tenets and principles of multilevel modeling.
 11. Describe the basic tenets and principles of person-centered theorizing.
Exercises to Apply Concepts
 1. Pick an existing theory in an area of interest to you and try to recast it using at 
least one of the frameworks described in this chapter.
 2. Pick an outcome variable and analyze it from the perspective of any two of the 
frameworks described in this chapter. Compare and contrast the approaches 
and the conclusions you make.

Part IV
CONCLUDING ISSUES
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Reading and Writing about Theories
The ability to express an idea is well nigh as important as the idea itself.
—Bernard BaruCh (1942)
Throughout your career as a scientist, you will read research reports that describe theo-
ries. Many of you will write articles that summarize or describe your own theories or 
the theories of others. In this chapter we discuss practical issues to consider when you 
read and write about theories. We focus first on reading theories and then on writing 
about theories.
The ways in which theories are written in professional reports differs by discipline. 
In disciplines that emphasize experimentation and empirical efforts to test theories, 
the theories often appear in reports of the results of empirical tests. In disciplines that 
emphasize emergent/grounded theories, the theories are usually written in narrative 
form and typically are not the subject of a study designed to formally test an a priori 
theory. Rather, the theory emerges from the data. There are, of course, exceptions to 
both of these characterizations. In our discussion of reading about theories, we separate 
the two approaches, describing first how you will typically see theories presented in 
outlets emphasizing formal theory tests, and then considering how theories are written 
about in outlets emphasizing grounded and emergent theorizing. We encourage read-
ers to work through both of these sections no matter what your personal orientations 
toward theory construction. Our discussion of principles to consider when writing your 
own reports that present theories focuses on issues that generalize across approaches to 
theory construction.
READING ABOUT THEORIES IN OUTLETS EMPHASIZING THEORY 
TESTS AND CONFIRMATORY APPROACHES TO SCIENCE
Journal articles are probably the most common source of material about theories and 
tests of theories. These articles typically contain four major sections: introduction, 
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methods, results, and discussion. In disciplines that emphasize grounded and emergent 
theories, the format differs from this, but even in these cases, the spirit of the four sec-
tions appears in most articles. We consider each section and how to read and extract 
from all of them information about a theory. We do not consider methodological matters, 
such as research design and how to evaluate the quality of empirical tests of theories. 
We focus instead on how to identify and clarify the theory being tested as well as the 
revisions of the theory the researcher proposes based on the results of the study. It 
may seem unusual to consider methods for extracting theories from research reports, 
because one would think that articles would be clear about the theories being consid-
ered. Unfortunately, this is not always the case.
We adopt a variable-centered and causal modeling perspective in this section, 
because these are the dominant approaches used and because it is easier to make certain 
points. As we have argued in other chapters, even grounded/emergent theorists who 
primarily rely on process-oriented accounts of explanation sometimes use variable-cen-
tered frameworks when analyzing individual phases of their process, so there is some-
thing to be gained for such individuals in these sections as well.
The Introduction Section
The introduction section describes the general problem, reviews the relevant literature 
on the problem, develops the theory to be tested, reviews the relevant literature on the 
theory, and presents the hypotheses to be tested by the study. Statements also are made 
about how the research will advance knowledge about the problem area as well as how 
the research will advance knowledge about the theory.
The essence of theories in most such reports is their variables and the posited rela-
tionships between them. A useful strategy for mapping out the theory being tested is to 
first make a list of all the major variables the author mentions in the introduction sec-
tion that involve the theory being tested. After doing so, write out the formal conceptual 
definition of each variable/concept. Sometimes the author will provide an explicit con-
ceptual definition, but other times, the conceptual definition is assumed to be known 
because the variable or concept is used so often in the scientific literature that there is 
widespread consensus about its definition. In such cases, you might still write out the 
conceptual definition so that you can be explicit about the theory, but that is a matter 
of choice. If the author does not provide a conceptual definition, and you are not aware 
of a consensual definition, then generate your own “working definition” based on your 
reading of the article thus far and your past knowledge of the problem area.
Once the concepts/variables and definitions are in place, draw a path diagram of the 
causal relationships between the variables based on the information in the introduction. 
Use the methods for path diagramming described in Chapter 7. The path diagram might 
include direct causal relationships, indirect causal relationships (with either partial or 
complete mediation), moderated causal relationships, reciprocal causation, spurious 
relationships, and/or unanalyzed relationships. As you draw the diagram, you may be 
surprised to find that the theorist does not specify causal links that you think should be 
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addressed. Or you may find that the theorist is vague about certain relationships. As we 
discuss later, you may still be able to “complete the theory” based on material in other 
sections of the report. The idea is to complete the path diagram as best you can, based 
on the material in the introduction.
The Method Section
In the method section the researcher describes methodological features of the empiri-
cal study that was conducted to test the theory. This typically includes subsections that 
describe the research participants, the measures used in the study, how the data were 
collected, and any other procedural facet that is scientifically relevant. The subsection 
on the characteristics of the study participants is important theoretically, because it 
suggests the population to which the theory is applicable. To be sure, the author may 
envision the theory as applying to populations broader than the one reflected by the 
particular sample studied, but at the very least, the sampled population provides some 
sense of the generalizability of the theorizing.
The section on measures also is of interest. It is here that the researcher provides 
concrete instantiations of the constructs being studied. If the researcher was vague 
about a conceptual definition in the introduction section, here you can examine it and 
formulate a conceptual definition based on the measures, because the measures usually 
are specific and concrete. For example, a researcher might theorize about the construct 
of intelligence in the introduction section, but never define it. In the method section you 
discover that the researcher measured intelligence using the Peabody Picture Vocabu-
lary Test (PPVT). As it turns out, the PPVT emphasizes the verbal aspects of intelligence 
and focuses on the breadth of vocabulary and facility with words. The use of this mea-
sure implies a certain conceptual commitment to the meaning of intelligence, and, in 
this case, the conceptual definition might be construed as one that reflects verbal intel-
ligence.
Sometimes you will be surprised at the way in which a construct is discussed 
in the introduction section as compared to the instantiation of it that appears in the 
method section. The measure may reflect a narrower conceptualization than you think 
is appropriate, or it may reflect a broader conceptualization than what you expected. For 
example, when discussing the concept of intelligence in the introduction, the researcher 
might use it in a context that reflects more than verbal intelligence, but when examining 
the measure, you might discover that the PPVT was used.
Next to each variable you listed in the introduction section, modify any conceptual 
definitions you had initially written based on your reading of the method section. Then 
write a brief description of the measure that was used for each construct (or the strategy 
that was used to manipulate it) next to the conceptual definition. Revisit the concept as 
it was presented in the introduction, the conceptual definition written next to it, and 
the measure that was used to assess it. Based on these, you should be able to derive a 
reasonably clear sense of the variables involved, their conceptual meanings, and how 
reasonably the measures reflect or represent those meanings.
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The Results Section
The results section typically reports how the collected data were analyzed and the 
ensuing results. Although the analysis may be purely qualitative, in most cases, results 
sections describe the application of statistical techniques. If a researcher was vague or 
fuzzy about relationships between variables in the introduction section, it is here that 
he or she must be more explicit. Almost all major statistical methods focus on character-
izing relationships between variables. Just as measures are more specific instantiations 
of variables, statistical tests are more specific instantiations of presumed relationships 
between variables. Appendix 12A describes how different statistical tests map onto dif-
ferent causal models and how statistical tests can be used to infer the causal models 
being addressed.
The Discussion Section
The discussion section addresses, among other things, whether the empirical tests were 
consistent with the theory. If the theory was not supported, then revisions in the theory 
are suggested. If the theory was supported, then the researcher often highlights the 
implications of the results and what future research is needed. Typically, the researcher 
will encourage the future study of new direct causes, mediators, moderators, extensions 
to new outcomes, or applying the theory to other contexts and populations to establish 
generalizability. In all cases, you should be able to repeat the process you performed in 
the introduction section: Make a list of the variables involved, write out the conceptual 
definitions of each, and then draw the path diagram to make explicit the relationships 
between the variables.
In sum, an effective strategy for reading about theories is to make a list of the vari-
ables involved in the theory, write out their conceptual definitions, and then draw a path 
diagram to reflect the presumed causal relationships that operate between the variables. 
If the theorist is vague or unclear about the above, then clarity can usually be achieved 
by examining more closely the measures used in the study (the methods section) and 
the statistical analyses that were pursued (the results section).
READING ABOUT THEORIES IN OUTLETS EMPHASIZING 
GROUNDED/EMERGENT THEORY
Articles that publish reports of grounded or emergent theories have a somewhat dif-
ferent format than articles based on confirmatory approaches that report theory tests. 
Although some grounded/emergent theory articles represent a blending of qualitative 
and quantitative approaches, our discussion here elaborates traditional grounded/emer-
gent theory styles of presentation, with an emphasis on qualitative data.
Articles using grounded/emergent theory typically begin with a statement of the 
problem, brief background material to provide a context, and a brief characterization of 
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the relevant past literature. The data, typically in the form of field notes and responses 
to interviews, are woven into the presentation of the theory and the theoretical propo-
sitions, as they unfold sequentially in the main body of the article that follows this 
introductory material. Prior to embarking on this portion, it is common to provide an 
overview of the major conclusions, so the reader can keep the “big picture” in mind as 
the particulars are developed. Also, prior to the major theory/data section, there is usu-
ally a short method section that discusses in global terms how the data were collected, 
who they were collected on, and how they were analyzed. It is here that authors build a 
case that they involved themselves adequately for purposes of conducting an informed 
grounded/emergent analysis. The article typically ends with a section on conclusions 
and theoretical/practical implications. It is in this section that the new theory is posi-
tioned, relative to extant theory and prior literatures, though this also takes place in the 
primary narrative as well.
The main body of the article that describes the theoretical propositions and data 
usually presents a concept or theoretical proposition in the abstract, then provides one 
or two examples from the collected data to illustrate. The examples often are vivid 
and image provoking. Here is an excerpt from a paper (Goldin & Jaccard, 2006) by an 
anthropologist discussing the need to take into account the general living conditions of 
women when developing programs to address parent–adolescent communication about 
HIV issues for women living in some of the poorest neighborhoods of Guatemala City, 
Guatemala:
People in precarious communities are deeply aware of the links between the high levels of 
domestic violence and the breakdown of the family—manifested by a lack of communica-
tion between parents and children, neglect of children due to tremendous economic pres-
sures, machismo, and a high incidence of single mothers facing difficult situations—and 
the tendency of young people to look for solace in drugs, alcohol, sexual relationships and 
gangs (Goldin, Rosenbaum, & Eggleston, 2006). In addition to domestic violence, issues 
of child care are prominent in women’s descriptions of the problems they face. Accounts of 
children being sold, given up to the care of others, working at young ages, or taking care of 
yet younger siblings while the mother works, are common. The lack of support networks 
coupled with the need to work long hours for minimal wages force many women to leave 
their children unsupervised for long hours every day. The women often show remarkable 
determination to “manage” otherwise impossible situations. A not untypical account told to 
us by one woman, Amelia, is illustrative:
“It was 1983 and I was very sad. Everything seemed the same to me. I just didn’t care. That 
year my boyfriend had been killed. Leaving a party, a man shot him. I was with him and 
saw the man who shot him, but there was nothing I could do about it. That was very difficult 
for me, and so I decided to move to La Esperanza with my mother and siblings. We made a 
hut with pieces of wood and sheet metal. I met the father of my children here. He was a good 
friend. He even came to the cemetery with me to bring flowers to my dead boyfriend, and he 
didn’t drink at the time. I became pregnant and soon he started drinking. We didn’t get married 
and he did not live with me. I had my first child and was alone with the baby. What hurt me the 
most was that he wasn’t interested in the baby. He used to live just a block away, but neither 
336 CONCLUDING ISSUES
he, nor anyone in his family ever came to visit my baby. It made me so sad. Then a few months 
later I got pregnant again. I also spent this pregnancy by myself. My daughter was already 
three months old when we finally started living together. But often I think it would have been 
better to live alone. I left him once. That time, he wanted to hit me and I said ‘no, you are not 
going to beat me because, just imagine, I feed you, I wash your clothes, and support you, and 
I’m not going to tolerate your blows.’ I left for a month. I went to Escuintla to live with my sister 
for a while. But then I had to return, because [the father of my children] and his mother had 
rented out the small place where we lived. He has never worked. I think in all these years, he’s 
worked continuously for about two months. He not only doesn’t bring anything home but he 
takes things that I buy. I have no water, I have no electricity, but he doesn’t help. One time, he 
left for two weeks because he had taken my new iron to sell it and buy liquor. I was so angry 
that I insulted him. I usually don’t swear, but that day I told him all sorts of ugly things and he 
left. And I had just gotten the results of a pregnancy test. They were positive. I was expecting 
my third child. I was desperate. He returned later, but it’s always the same. The children didn’t 
use to be afraid of him but now, when he’s drunk, they don’t want to get close to him. He is very 
rough with the kids and speaks to them in a crude language.”
While poverty affects all segments of society, women and children tend to be the most 
affected as they are usually the most vulnerable sector of society, subject to several layers 
of oppression and marginalization, particularly in societies where machismo prevails. Our 
research in precarious neighborhoods has made it clear that to ignore the conditions under 
which these women and children live and to assume that simple messages of the dangers 
of unsafe sex will resonate with them given all that they must contend with is unrealistic. 
Consider the words of another mother:
“I am not an exemplary mother. I just don’t have the time. I don’t have time to take care of 
them. I have to leave them unsupervised most of the time, but I would like to be able to spend 
more time with them. At least I provide them with food. If I limit the hours I work I would have 
limited food to give them. Maybe here is where I am failing. I put more effort in the job than in 
them. They are my life. They need me more. But I feel I give them everything I can.”
What is needed is an integrated approach that is aimed at the level of the household. As 
women acquire the skills they need to provide for themselves, the coping strategies they 
need to help deal with the domestic and neighborhood violence that surrounds them, and 
as they build better support networks and child care scenarios, they can be more effective 
at addressing the developmental needs of their adolescent children beyond the basics of 
survival. Health messages delivered in the context of an organization that has contributed 
positively to the lives of women in these ways and that has come to earn the trust and 
respect of the women and the community can be effective.
The paper discussed more generally the development of a women’s co-op to address 
the economic and health obstacles women face in their lives. The paper identified the 
issues that need to be addressed when structuring women-centered community organi-
zations in precarious neighborhoods to encourage parent–adolescent communication to 
reduce the HIV infection rate, using narratives and field notes to highlight these points. 
One conclusion of the paper was that these women have so much with which to contend 
in their lives, just trying to survive from one day to the next, that until these most basic 
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of needs are addressed, health programs that often conflict with the day-to-day survival 
strategies of the women and that focus on longer-term health consequences were des-
tined to have marginal impact.
As with any scientific report, one expects the emergent theory to be clearly devel-
oped and articulated. In cases where the emergent theory is variable-centered, one can 
use the same principles described earlier to clarify the constructs and their interre-
lationships. For process-oriented theories, one can consider creating a process map, 
as discussed in Chapter 10. As with the variable-centered approach, it often is useful 
to write out the key concepts and propositions in the theory. The method section of 
articles using grounded or emergent theory often characterize the elicitation questions 
for the life and labor histories as well as the focused interviews. The description of these 
questions may provide clues about conceptual definitions if the researcher was vague 
about them in the introduction. For accounts that adopt an approach of elaborating 
propositions and supporting arguments, one can make a list of each conclusion and the 
arguments relevant to it and then apply the Toulmin model described in Chapter 10 to 
evaluate the theoretical statements. One also can be sensitive to the 17 argumentation 
fallacies discussed in Chapter 10.
WRITING ABOUT THEORIES
In this section we identify issues to consider when presenting your theory, focusing on 
general points that are relevant in all reports. Later sections discuss issues specific to 
writing in certain outlets.
How You Say It Can Be as Important as What You Say
Over the course of our careers, we have seen articles by colleagues with very good ideas 
be rejected for publication, and we have seen articles with what we thought were weak 
ideas published in journals that are highly competitive. Although there are many reasons 
for this variability, one reason is how the theory is “packaged” in the written product—
that is, how the theory is presented. A description of a theory is not unlike the telling of 
a story, with some people being better storytellers than others. We wish that the world 
was structured such that it was purely the quality of the idea that mattered. But it is not. 
If you can’t communicate your ideas well, and if you can’t get people excited about your 
ideas, then you are going to have a difficult time publishing your work. You need to be 
both clear and engaging as you present your ideas.
In graduate school, one of the authors (Jaccard) was taken aside by a senior gradu-
ate student who, somewhat tongue in cheek, decided to tell the struggling first-year 
student the secret to writing scientifically. “Try to think of the most boring and dry way 
you can say something in the fewest words possible, and you will be a successful scien-
tific writer.” In essence, the message was to get to the point and to be concise in getting 
there. The graduate students were taught to avoid “cute titles” for articles and instead to 
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include the main variables in the title and not much more than that. We also were taught 
to avoid journalistic tricks, such as starting an article with a gripping, real-life event of 
an individual who had experienced the phenomenon (or something related to it), and 
then using this as a lead into the presentation of the science. The objective was to get to 
the science right away. The strategy of giving phenomena a memorable label (e.g., “fun-
damental attribution error”) also was viewed as “marketing” and was frowned upon.
Increasingly, articles are published today that attempt to engage readers on non-
scientific grounds, using clever witticisms to convey basic ideas. Sternberg (2003) and 
others (e.g., Peter & Olson, 1983) suggest a mindset for scientific writing that is similar 
to an advertiser: “Keep in mind that you have something to sell, namely your ideas, and 
sell it” (p. 22). Scientists are only human, and if they have to listen to someone tell a 
story, they would rather hear it from a good storyteller than a bad storyteller. One hopes 
that the true science does not get lost in the style of storytelling. If you use writing styles 
and strategies that are not central to the science so as to engage the reader, do not forget 
that the science is your first priority!
Briefer Is Better, But Don’t Be Too Brief
Readers appreciate papers that are concise and to the point. A lengthy theoretical descrip-
tion is often greeted with dread and sometimes hostility. On the other hand, you need to 
make your case and provide background to your theory. Don’t be afraid to use the space 
you need, just make sure you need it. Due to the costs of production, most journals have 
strict limits on the number of manuscript pages that can be published. You typically will 
find your hands tied because of this restriction. Sometimes you may elect to publish in 
an outlet not only because the outlet reaches the intended audience, but because it also 
does not have strict limits on the number of pages. The journal may be less prestigious, 
but at least you will be able to say what needs to be said and build your case effectively. 
As the social sciences move more toward electronic media and paperless journals, per-
haps editorial boards will be more open to longer articles that develop the underlying 
logic and implications of a theory in more scholarly ways. Some editors would still want 
page limits in such cases, arguing that authors need to get to the point. The bottom line 
is that you need to be scholarly and thorough while at the same time being as brief and 
concise as possible.
Prepare an Outline
Many people benefit by preparing an outline of the section of the manuscript where the 
theory is presented (and for that matter, the entire article) prior to actually writing about 
it. An outline helps you keep the logical sequence of your presentation in mind as you 
write. It also makes it easier to recognize if you have omitted something crucial. Writ-
ing from an outline can help prevent the inclusion of irrelevant thoughts. Some people 
like to write brief outlines consisting of only key terms or phrases; others prefer to write 
complete-sentence outlines.
As discussed in Chapter 10, some scientists frame their theories in terms of conclu-
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sions or theses and the discussion of arguments for or against those conclusions. One 
type of outline could follow the basic structure of Toulmin’s model of argumentation, as 
described in Chapter 10. The outline structure would cover (1) an introduction to the 
problem and a statement of the thesis; (2) presentation of the data/evidence in support of 
the thesis, along with relevant warrants; (3) development of backings for the warrants; 
(4) consideration of counterarguments to the thesis; (5) consideration of qualifiers that 
limit the scope or applicability of the thesis; and (6) a summary restatement of the thesis 
and its implications.
Provide a Road Map
It often is useful to provide readers at the outset with a “road map” of where you are 
headed in the narrative. This usually consists of a short paragraph, strategically placed 
after some introductory orientation, like “In this article, we first discuss the prevalence 
of adolescent drug use. Next, we consider. . . .” In other words, provide an overview of 
the structure of the theoretical presentation. It also helps to make liberal use of headings 
and to make the headings reasonably descriptive.
Provide a Succinct Review of the Current Knowledge
It goes without saying that you need to review past research and summarize the current 
knowledge about the topic area you are addressing. Often, the “kiss of death” for a paper 
submitted for publication is the omission of a key article or result from the literature. 
Journal space is costly and a reader’s attention span has its limits, so you usually do not 
have the luxury of writing about all relevant past research in depth. You might do so in 
a dissertation, but not in a journal article. If a large body of literature already exists on 
your topic, try to cite and incorporate published literature reviews. The primary objec-
tive of your literature review is to provide a sense of what is already known about the 
topic you are addressing so as to set the stage for describing how your theory will make 
a contribution relative to this body of work.
Discuss the Implications and Importance of Your Theory
The importance and implications of your theory may be clear to you, but this does not 
mean that your readers will automatically recognize them. It helps to be explicit about 
what new insights and perspectives your theory has to offer. Directly answer the ques-
tion “What is new here?” and envision a reader who is constantly saying “So, who cares, 
anyway?” Consider adding a section at a strategic location (e.g., the end of the introduc-
tion), tilted “Summary, Innovations, and Implications.”
Keep Your Target Audience in Mind
Before writing a paper, it helps to have made a decision, at least tentatively, about the 
journal to which you plan to submit the paper for possible publication. Various crite-
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ria can be used as the basis for selecting a journal. One criterion is to publish in the 
journal(s) generally acknowledged to be the most rigorous. Another criterion is the audi-
ence you want to reach (i.e., the readers of a particular journal). When writing, keep in 
mind the kinds of scientists (and, when relevant, other key individuals) who will be 
reading the article, their backgrounds and orientations, and the biases they are likely to 
hold. This awareness helps you structure and frame your theory in an optimal manner. 
The type of scientist who reads a journal can best be determined by examining who pub-
lishes in the journal, the type of articles published in it, and who cites work published in 
that journal. The former can be determined by examining recent issues of the journal, 
and the latter can be determined by referring to the Social Science Citation Index (SSCI, 
available in libraries or online). The SSCI provides a list of every published article that 
has cited a target article. In addition, senior researchers and colleagues in the field can 
be consulted about these matters.
Before a target audience will ever see a paper, however, it must first be accepted 
for publication. This means that you must also write with another audience in mind, 
namely, the likely reviewers of the article. If your theory is well articulated, clearly laid 
out, and makes a contribution, then these strengths will count a great deal toward your 
paper being accepted by a reviewer. With a complex theory and a complex study (or set of 
studies) surrounding a theory, it sometimes is difficult to anticipate all the reactions and 
issues that two or three diverse (and anonymous) reviewers will have. Having a draft of a 
paper reviewed by your colleagues for purposes of feedback can help in this regard.
Using Figures
Journal space is limited, so editors typically discourage the use of many diagrams or 
figures. If any, articles generally contain only two or three figures. For variable-centered 
frameworks that rely on causality, a path diagram (see Chapter 7) can speak a thousand 
words and is an effective visual aid when presenting a theory. Some theorists provide 
the path diagram early in the introduction section and then use it to organize an ensuing 
narrative that considers each path (or a cluster of paths) in the diagram. The relevant 
literature is reviewed for each path to provide a sense of current knowledge about it and 
then the contributions of the study to be reported are developed relative to this litera-
ture. Other theorists present a narrative organized in this way, but reserve the presenta-
tion of the formal diagram until the end of the narrative, as a kind of grand, multivariate 
summary.
Some theorists list theoretical propositions and label them with phrases like “Prop-
osition 1.” Such propositions formalize a theory and highlight its most important points. 
One can translate a path diagram into propositions and present the logic verbally rather 
than using a figure. For example, in the case of mediated relationships, a form of syl-
logistic reasoning is implied with a minor premise, a major premise, and a conclusion. 
Consider the case in which the impact that watching violence on television has on 
aggression is assumed to be mediated by the perceived legitimacy of acting aggressively. 
The syllogistic structure underlying this concept is:
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Proposition 1: The more televised violence that people view, the more legitimate 
they perceive it is to act aggressively.
Proposition 2: The more legitimate viewers perceive aggression to be, the more 
aggressively they behave.
Proposition 3: The more televised violence that people watch, the more they will 
behave aggressively.
In the language of syllogisms, proposition 1 is the minor premise, proposition 2 is the 
major premise, and proposition 3 is the conclusion. Some scientists prefer presenting 
theoretical propositions in the above format, whereas others prefer narratives combined 
with figures. There is no correct way to present a theory in this respect.
Cite Sources for Your Ideas, Text, and Related Items
Section 3.1.3 of the Council of Science Editors’ White Paper on Promoting Integrity 
in Scientific Journal Publications defines plagiarism as “the use of text or other items 
(figures, images, tables) without permission or acknowledgment of the source of these 
materials” (p. 39). All of us are familiar with plagiarism. Many are not as familiar with 
“piracy,” which the White Paper defines as “the appropriation of ideas, data, or meth-
ods from others without adequate permission or acknowledgment. The intent is the 
untruthful portrayal of the ideas or methods as one’s own” (p. 39). In other words, not 
only is it unethical to use the exact words of another author without permission, it also 
is unethical to use ideas originated by others without adequate permission or acknowl-
edgment.
Both authors, as well as a number of our colleagues, have been subject to blatant 
idea theft and, in some instances, plagiarism as well, and it is frustrating. Although 
many scientific societies and professional organizations have codes of ethics prohibiting 
plagiarism, a lesser number have corrective mechanisms for handling the problem. All 
too often, there is not much one can do about plagiarism or piracy.
That said, sometimes it is hard to remember the sources of your ideas. Moreover, 
there are instances (as with introductory texts, including this one) where providing 
citation after citation would burden readers. Further, some journals place limits on the 
number of citations one can use, so that authors submitting work to such journals some-
times are left in a quandary as to which prior works to cite and which to ignore. So, 
piracy is not always a cut-and-dry matter. However, you should always approach your 
writings in the spirit of giving credit where credit is due.
Spelling, Grammar, Typos, and Punctuation
If your manuscript has spelling errors, poor grammar, and/or “typos,” then some 
readers will conclude that you are “sloppy” and don’t care enough about your topic. 
 Scientists are noted for being careful and methodical thinkers, and the view is that 
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BOx 12.1. PowerPoint Presentations of Theories
PowerPoint presentations are commonplace, and you often will present a theory 
using this form of media. Here is a list of 40 things to consider as you prepare a 
PowerPoint presentation:
 1. Make your first or second slides an outline of your presentation.
 2. Follow the order of your outline for the rest of the presentation.
 3. Use one or two slides per minute of your presentation.
 4. Write in point form, not complete sentences.
 5. Include no more than 4–5 points per slide.
 6. Avoid wordiness: Use key words and phrases only.
 7. If possible, show 1 point at a time by adding points dynamically to the 
same slide:
This helps the audience concentrate on what you are saying.•	
This prevents the audience from reading ahead.•	
 8. Do not use distracting animation.
 9. Use at least an 18-point font.
10. Use different-sized fonts for main points than for secondary points.
11. Use a standard font such as Times New Roman or Arial.
12. Place words in all capitals only when necessary—it is difficult to read.
13. Use a color of font that contrasts sharply with the background.
14. Use color to reinforce the logic of your structure (e.g., light blue title and 
dark blue text).
15. Use color to emphasize a point, but only occasionally.
16. Using color for decoration is distracting.
17. Use backgrounds that are attractive but simple.
18. Use backgrounds that are light.
19. Use the same background consistently throughout your presentation.
20. Data in graphs are easier to comprehend and retain than are raw data.
21. Always title your graphs.
22. Minor gridlines on graphs usually are unnecessary.
23. Proof your slides for spelling mistakes, the use of repeated words, and 
grammatical errors.
24. If your presentation is not in your first language, have a native speaker 
check it.
25. Use a strong closing and summarize the main points of your presentation.
26. Consider ending your presentation with a “question slide” that invites 
your audience to ask questions or that provides a visual aid during the 
question period.
27. Show up early for your talk. Check whether your equipment works prop-
erly.
28. Check whether the projector’s resolution is the same as your laptop’s. If 
cont.
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these attributes should generalize to other areas of the scientific process, even to the 
level of spelling, grammar, typos, and punctuation. It is best to be compulsive in this 
regard.
In sum, when presenting your theory, good communication is the key. How you 
say something can be just as important as what you say. Being brief and to the point is 
preferred, but not at the expense of being scholarly. Many theorists benefit by creating 
 it isn’t, then your slides may be cropped, may jump, or may lose scan 
lines.
29. Don’t leave Standby Power Management on your laptop on; make sure 
that your laptop does not turn off if you’re inactive for a while during 
your talk.
30. Don’t leave your screen saver on.
31. Don’t use the mouse as a pointer. Moving a mouse on a slide show may 
cause a pointer to appear that is suboptimal in terms of performance.
32. Don’t use the edges of the slide. Some projectors crop slides.
33. Do not assume your presentation will work on another person’s laptop. 
Disk failures, software version mismatches, lack of disk space, low mem-
ory, and many other factors can prevent this. Check these out before your 
presentation.
34. Practice moving forward and backward within your presentation. Audi-
ences often ask to see the previous screen again.
35. If possible, preview your slides on the screen you’ll be using for your pre-
sentation. Make sure that they are readable from the back-row seats.
36. Have a Plan B in the event of technical difficulties (e.g., transparencies 
and handouts).
37. Practice with someone who has never seen your presentation. Ask him or 
her for honest feedback about colors, content, and any effects or graph-
ics you’ve included.
38. Do not read from your slides.
39. Do not speak to your slides. Face the audience, not the slides.
40. When possible, run your presentation from a hard disk rather than a 
floppy disk or a flash drive. Using a floppy disk or flash drive may slow 
your presentation.
Note. Compiled from the following websites: www.iasted.org/conferences/
formatting/Presentations-Tips.ppt; www.anandnatrajan.com/FAQs/powerpoint.
html; and kinesiology.boisestate.edu/kines442/tips_for_making_effective_powerp.
htm
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outlines prior to writing. If you are developing many ideas, be sure to provide an over-
view of what you will be covering and make liberal use of headings. State the general 
problem and then do a succinct review of current knowledge. In addition to presenting 
the theory, be sure to discuss its implications and importance. As you do so, keep your 
target audience and reviewers in mind, give credit where credit is due, and correct those 
typos! In the final analysis, the best way to get a sense of writing styles is to read first-
hand articles in the outlets where you will be publishing your work. It is through such 
readings that you will get a sense of the organizational structures and writing styles that 
typify successful writing in the areas of study you pursue.
GRANT PROPOSALS, TECHNICAL REPORTS, AND PRESENTATIONS
Social scientists write for different outlets, although by far the most common one is 
scientific journals. All the principles discussed above will usually serve you well inde-
pendent of the outlet for which you are writing. Technical reports usually include an 
“executive summary” that is intended to capture the essence and main conclusions of 
the larger project in one to three pages. The idea is that a top-level executive usually is 
too busy to read about the details: He or she just wants to get to the bottom line quickly 
and efficiently—but have the entire report available should he or she desire to read in 
greater detail.
It is becoming more common for researchers to seek funding for their research 
efforts. Grants can be pursued either from federal or state governments or from private, 
not-for-profit organizations. Typically, the social scientist writes a formal grant proposal 
and submits it for review by the agency that ultimately decides to fund (or not fund) 
the research. The level of detail and the description of the underlying theories guiding 
the research vary considerably, depending on the funding source and the goals. Many 
agencies focus on applied problems and are most interested in addressing those rather 
than advancing science or helping to accumulate knowledge about the problem area. In 
short, their focus is on solutions. Other agencies understand the importance of build-
ing a strong knowledge base through both theory and research and demand that strong 
theories guide efforts of the research they fund. If you pursue funding for your research, 
look carefully at the proposal guidelines developed by the funding agency, determine 
the focus and goals of the agency, and try to find examples of successful proposals in 
your field to see how theory was presented in those proposals.
In terms of oral presentations, you typically will give presentations that are either 
15 minutes long (e.g., at a scientific convention) or 45–50 minutes long (e.g., at a job 
talk or a colloquium). Usually only a small portion of this time is used to describe your 
theory, perhaps one-fourth or one-third of the allocated time. In oral presentations you 
might spend a few minutes on a literature review that summarizes current knowledge, a 
few minutes laying out the theory itself, a few minutes describing what is new and inno-
vative about the theory you propose, and a few minutes on its implications. The book by 
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Alley (2003) in the Suggested Readings section provides numerous useful strategies for 
structuring presentations.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS
When reading theories in scientific reports, we want to capture the essence of the theory 
being addressed. For variable-centered theories, a useful strategy is to make a list of the 
variables in the theory, write out their conceptual definitions, and then draw a path dia-
gram to reflect the presumed causal relationships that operate between the variables. A 
well-specified theory will clearly articulate the concepts on which it focuses, the nature 
of those concepts, and the relationships between variables. If the theorist is vague or 
unclear about these matters, you often will find clarity as the researcher instantiates his 
or her theory in the methods and results sections. For process-oriented theories, you 
should list the relevant processes and try to characterize each, perhaps using the process 
map described in Chapter 10.
When writing about your theory, there are several key points to keep in mind. 
These include:
1. Attend not only to what you say but also to how you say it.
2. Be brief and to the point, but not at the expense of good scholarship.
3. Work from outlines.
4. Provide readers with an overview of the organization of the paper.
5. Make liberal use of headings.
6. Provide a succinct review of the literature and characterize the current state of 
knowledge about the phenomena you are studying.
7. Discuss the implications and importance of your theory.
8. Give credit for ideas where credit is due.
9. Always keep in mind the target audience and reviewers.
The best way to get a sense of good scientific writing is to read articles in journals where 
you intend to publish and take note of the styles used in articles that resonate with you.
SUGGESTED READINGS
Alley, M. (2003). The craft of scientific presentations. New York: Springer.—A host of strategies 
for making effective scientific presentations, based on the techniques of scientists who are 
effective presenters.
Becker, H., & Richards, P. (2007). Writing for social scientists: How to start and finish your 
thesis, book, or article. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Council of Science Editors. (2008). White paper on promoting integrity in scientific journal 
publications (www.councilscienceeditors.org/editorialpolicies/whitepaper).—An excel-
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lent source of information on the roles and responsibilities of authors, editors, reviewers, 
sponsoring societies, and media in regard to publishing scientific papers.
Friedland, A., & Felt, C. (2000). Writing successful science proposals. New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press.—Strategies for writing grant proposals.
Locke, L., Silverman, S., & Spirduso, W. (2004). Reading and understanding research. Thou-
sand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Matthews, J., Bowen, J., & Matthews, R. (2000). Successful scientific writing. New York: 
Cambridge University Press.—More writing strategies, but written for the biomedical and 
medical sciences.
Peter, J. P., & Olson, J. (1983). Is science marketing? Journal of Marketing, 47, 111–125.—A 
discussion of the importance of selling readers on your ideas.
Sternberg, R. (2003). The psychologists’ companion: A guide to scientific writing for students 
and researchers. New York: Cambridge University Press.—A book filled with ideas for 
more effective writing by social scientists.
KEY TERMS
Introduction section (p. 332) Results section (p. 334)
Methods section (p. 333) Discussion section (p. 335)
ExERCISES
Exercises to Reinforce Concepts
 1. Describe the strategy you would use to discern a theory from the introduction 
section of a journal article.
 2. In what ways can you use the method section to help give clarity to a theory?
 3. Describe what you think are the most important points to keep in mind when 
writing about a theory.
Exercises to Apply Concepts
 1. Choose an article that empirically tests a theory and write a short summary 
of that theory. Identify points in the theory that need clarification or elabora-
tion.
 2. Write a report that presents either a theory of your own or an existing theory 
from the literature using all the principles discussed in this chapter.
 3. Prepare a PowerPoint presentation of a theory and present it to someone.
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Appendix 12A
Inferring Theoretical Relationships from the Choice  
of Statistical Tests
This appendix describes how to discern presumed theoretical relationships between variables 
based on the statistical methods that were chosen by the theorist to analyze data. In doing so, we 
adopt a causal framework as our point of analysis. We assume you are familiar with each statistical 
test we discuss. If not, then skip the section describing that particular test.
t-TEST
A t-test examines a quantitative outcome variable and whether the mean scores on that outcome 
differ between two groups. For example, one might want to determine if there are gender dif-
ferences in attitudes toward restricting the legalization of abortion. The two groups, males and 
females, represent an independent variable or a presumed “cause,” and the variable whose means 
are computed and compared (attitudes toward restricting the legalization of abortions) is the pre-
sumed “effect.” The underlying causal model that typically motivates the analysis is a direct causal 
relationship, as shown in Figure 12.1a. This is true for both the independent group’s t-test and the 
correlated group’s t-test. The direction of the mean difference isolates the nature of the relation-
ship, and the magnitude of the effect (in raw score units) is the magnitude of the absolute mean 
difference. Cohen’s d is typically used to index the strength of the relationship in a standardized 
metric. Thus, if a researcher applies an independent group’s t-test to data or a correlated group’s 
t-test, the model in Figure 12.1a is probably the theory that motivates the analysis.
ONE-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
The one-way analysis of variance is an extension of the t-test, and it, too, has an underlying causal 
model that usually reflects a direct causal relationship. The different groups comprising the factor 
represent the independent variable or the presumed “cause,” and the variable whose means are 
compared is the presumed “effect.” The underlying causal model that motivates the analysis is 
shown in Figure 12.1b.
For example, a one-way analysis of variance might be performed to compare three religious 
groups, Catholics, Protestants, and Jews, on their attitude toward having large families. The over-
all F-test reveals whether there is a relationship between religion (the independent variable) and 
family size attitudes (the outcome variable). If the overall or omnibus F-test is statistically signifi-
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FIGURE 12.1. Causal models underlying statistical tests (text example on left, generic form 
on right). (a) Two Group/Condition t-Test; (b) One-Way Analysis of Variance; (c) Chi-Square 
Test of Independence and Test of Proportions; (d) Pearson Correlation/Linear Regression: Direct 
Cause Model; (e) Pearson Correlation: Common Cause or Spurious Effect Model; (f) Two-Factor 
Analysis of Variance; (g) One-Way Analysis of Covariance: Mediation; (h) One-Way Analysis of 
Covariance: Independent Influence and Error Reduction; (i) Partial Correlation: Mediation.
a
b
c
d
e
f
g
h
i
cont.
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cant, then we conclude there is such a relationship (at least, in terms of means). If the test is not 
statistically significant, then we cannot conclude that such a relationship exists. Pairwise com-
parisons of group means isolate the nature of the relationship, and indices such as omega squared 
or eta squared measure the strength of the relationship in standardized metrics. This underlying 
causal model holds for both between-groups and repeated measures analysis of variance. Thus, if 
a researcher applies a one-way analysis of variance to data, the model in Figure 12.1b is probably 
the theory that motivates the analysis.
CHI-SQUARE TEST OF INDEPENDENCE AND TESTS OF PROPORTIONS
The chi-square test of independence examines the association between two categorical variables. 
For example, a theorist might believe that there are gender differences in political party identifica-
tion and test this hypothesis using the chi-square test of independence. Gender is the independent 
variable or the presumed “cause,” and political party identification is the presumed “effect.” A sta-
tistically significant omnibus chi-square test is consistent with the proposition that a relationship 
exists. Figure 12.1c presents the causal model that motivates this analysis. Follow-up comparisons 
focused on specific cells of the contingency table isolate the nature of the relationship, and indices 
such as Cramer’s V or the phi coefficient measure the strength of the relationship on a standard-
ized metric.
A variant of the chi-square test of independence is a test of the difference between two propor-
tions. For example, a researcher might compare the proportion of male seventh graders who have 
engaged in sexual intercourse with the proportion of female seventh graders who have engaged in 
sexual intercourse. The significance test roughly maps onto the chi-square test of independence in 
FIGURE 12.1. (cont.) (j) Partial Correlation: Common Cause or Spurious Effect Model; 
(k) Multiple Regression; (l) Hierarchical Multiple Regression—Mediation.
j
k
l
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a 2 × 2 contingency table, with gender as rows and whether the individual has had sex as columns. 
Thus, the model in Figure 12.1c also captures the causal model that typically motivates a test of 
the difference between two proportions.
In sum, if a researcher applies a chi-square test of independence or a test of the difference 
between two proportions to data, the model in Figure 12.1c is probably the theory that motivates 
the analysis.
PEARSON CORRELATION AND/OR LINEAR REGRESSION
A Pearson correlation examines the degree to which the relationship between two variables 
approximates a linear relationship. The predictor variable, X, is the presumed “cause,” and the 
criterion variable, Y, is the presumed “effect.” For example, a researcher might compute the cor-
relation between individuals’ degree of religiosity and how much money they donate to religious 
organizations over the course of a year. Figure 12.1d presents the causal model that often motivates 
a correlation analysis, which is a direct causal relationship.
Another model that might motivate the calculation of a correlation coefficient is a spurious 
effect or “common cause” model. If two variables are thought to be related because they share a 
common cause, then there should be a correlation between them. For example, if fear of AIDS 
impacts both attitudes toward using condoms and attitudes toward having sex, then one would 
expect attitudes toward condoms and attitudes toward having sex to be correlated. A statistically 
significant correlation between two variables is consistent with the proposition that they share a 
common cause. The “common cause” or spurious correlation model motivating a correlation coef-
ficient is presented in Figure 12.1e.
There are other models that might motivate a bivariate correlation analysis (e.g., to identify 
a variable as a potential confound or to document an unanalyzed relationship), but the above two 
models are by far the most common ones motivating the calculation of a correlation. Usually you 
can discern which of the two theoretical orientations the researcher has adopted based on material 
from the introduction and/or discussion section.
FACTORIAL ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
We describe the case of factorial analysis of variance (FANOVA) using a two-factor design. Exten-
sions to three-factor or four-factor designs are straightforward. In a two-factor analysis of variance, 
the quantitative dependent variable whose means are being computed and compared is the out-
come variable or the presumed “effect.” We refer to one of the factors as X and the other factor as 
Z; these are the presumed “causes.” In FANOVA one typically examines three “effects”: the main 
effect of X, the main effect of Z, and the interaction between X and Z. There are separate omnibus 
F-tests for each effect. As an example, let X be gender, Z be grade in school, and the outcome vari-
able be adolescents’ degree of satisfaction with their relationship with their mother. The FANOVA 
tests if there is a significant mean difference in satisfaction as a function of gender (collapsing 
across grade in school), a significant mean difference in satisfaction as a function of grade in school 
(collapsing across gender), and if the gender difference in satisfaction varies significantly as a func-
tion of grade in school. Figure 12.1f presents the causal model that typically motivates a FANOVA. 
The main effects reflect direct causes, and the interaction effect reflects a moderated relationship. A 
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researcher who conducts a factorial analysis of variance usually is testing if the data are consistent 
with the causal paths noted in Figure 12.1f. This underlying causal model holds for both between-
groups and repeated measures of factorial analysis of variance.
ONE-WAY ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE
A one-way analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) is comparable to a one-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA), except that a covariate is included in the analysis. For example, a researcher might 
analyze the same variables as the one-way ANOVA (described above) by comparing three religious 
groups (Catholics, Protestants, and Jews) on attitudes toward having large families. However, a 
covariate is introduced into the analysis, namely, each individual’s degree of religiosity. The com-
parisons are conducted on group differences in attitudes toward large families, holding constant 
(or covarying out) religiosity.
The underlying causal model for this analytic method usually takes one of two forms. The 
first is a mediation model and is illustrated in Figure 12.1g. The covariate is thought to be a (com-
plete) mediator of the effect of the “factor” on the dependent variable. For example, the effect of 
religion on family size attitudes is thought to be mediated by the fact that religious groups differ, 
on average, on how religious their members are. If, after holding the covariate constant, the effect 
of the factor on the outcome variable is no longer statistically significant, then this is consistent 
with the proposition that the covariate is a complete mediator of the effect. If the effect of the factor 
on the outcome variable remains statistically significant, then this is consistent with the proposi-
tion that the factor has independent effects on the outcome variable over and above the covariate.1 
Thus, some form of mediational model often motivates an analysis of covariance.
The second causal model commonly underlying analysis of covariance is shown in Figure 
12.1h. In this model, the researcher views the factor and the covariate as each having independent 
influences on the outcome variable. Including the covariate in the analysis reduces bias in the 
parameter estimates (by avoiding left-out variable error) and also reduces the error term, which 
can increase the power of the statistical test. Mediation is not an issue in this model. The focus 
instead is on assessing the effect of the factor while simultaneously taking into account the effect 
of the covariate.
Although other causal models can motivate a one-way analysis of covariance (e.g., a spuri-
ous effect model), the above two (or a combination of them) are the most common motivators of 
this test. If a researcher conducts an analysis of covariance, it usually is with one of the above two 
models in mind. More often than not, you can discern which of the two models the researcher is 
using from the text in the introduction and discussion sections.
FACTORIAL ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE
A factorial analysis of covariance is comparable to a factorial analysis of variance, except that a 
covariate is included in the analysis. The causal model underlying the factorial analysis of covari-
1Formal statistical tests to evaluate partial or complete mediation are more complex than simple covariate-
based procedures such as the ones described in this section. This does not alter the fact that mediational 
models often are the motivating sources of covariate-based analyses, such as analysis of covariance, partial 
correlation, and hierarchical regression.
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ance is the same as that for the factorial analysis of variance (see Figure 12.1f), except for the addi-
tional role of the covariate. Like the one-way ANCOVA, the covariate is typically seen as taking 
on the role of a mediator or as an independent influence on the outcome, whose inclusion in the 
model reduces error and increases the statistical power of the test.
PARTIAL CORRELATION
A partial correlation analysis is similar to a Pearson correlation analysis but includes a covariate. 
One of two causal models typically motivates a partial correlation analysis. The first model is a 
mediational model and is illustrated in Figure 12.1i. A researcher might want to test if a variable Z 
is a partial or complete mediator of the effect of X on Y. For example, to test if liberalness mediates 
the relationship between education and attitudes toward voting for a Democratic presidential can-
didate, a partial correlation between years of education and attitudes toward the candidate might 
be computed, partialing out liberalness. A statistically significant partial correlation is consistent 
with the proposition that education has an independent effect on attitudes toward voting for the 
Democratic presidential candidate over and above liberalness. If a statistically significant correla-
tion between education and voting attitudes becomes nonsignificant when liberalness is partialed 
out, then this is consistent with the proposition that liberalness mediates the relationship between 
education and voting attitudes (but see footnote 1).
The second causal model that often motivates a partial correlation analysis is a common cause 
or spurious effect model. For example, a researcher might argue that the relationship between 
parent–adolescent communication about birth control and adolescent intentions to use birth con-
trol is spurious due to the common cause of age of the adolescent: As adolescents get older, parents 
are more likely to talk with them about issues surrounding the use of birth control. As adolescents 
get older, they also are more likely to use birth control, often for reasons that have nothing to do 
with parental communication. So the argument might be that any association between parent–
adolescent communication and use of birth control is spurious. If one calculates a partial correla-
tion between parent–adolescent communication and adolescent use of birth control using age of 
the adolescent as a covariate, a statistically significant correlation is consistent with the proposition 
that the correlation is not spurious. Figure 12.1j reflects these dynamics.
As before, other types of causal models may motivate the use of partial correlation analysis, 
but the above two models are the most common bases for partial correlation.
MULTIPLE REGRESSION
Multiple regression analysis involves regressing an outcome variable, Y, onto two or more predic-
tor variables. Figure 12.1k presents the causal model that typically motivates this analytic method. 
As an example, a researcher might regress job satisfaction onto two variables: (1) how stressful the 
job is and (2) how much an individual gets paid, as reflected by his or her annual salary. A statisti-
cally significant regression coefficient for a given predictor is consistent with the proposition that 
there is a causal path between the presumed “cause” (the predictor variable) and the presumed 
“effect” of job satisfaction.
It is possible to use multiple regression to pursue moderated relationships using product 
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terms and a wide variety of other types of casual relationships. However, traditional applications of 
multiple regression with several predictors evaluate models of the form in Figure 12.1k.
HIERARCHICAL REGRESSION
Hierarchical regression analysis is typically used to address either mediation or covariate control. 
For the case of mediation, the researcher typically enters the mediators on the first step of the 
analysis and then the more distal causes on the second step. In the case of complete mediation, the 
prediction is that the increment in the multiple correlation at the second step will not be statisti-
cally significant. A statistically significant increment in the squared multiple correlation implies 
that one or more of the distal causes has an independent effect on the outcome variable over and 
above the mediators.
For example, a researcher might study self-esteem as an outcome variable in adolescent Lati-
nos. The researcher theorizes that self-esteem is influenced by ethnic pride (i.e., how much pride 
the adolescent takes in being Latino). The adolescent’s ethnic pride, in turn, is thought to be a 
function of the ethnic pride of his or her mother and father. The impact of maternal and paternal 
ethnic pride on adolescent self-esteem is thought to be mediated by adolescent ethnic pride. Figure 
12.1l presents the underlying causal model. The analyst performs a hierarchical regression by first 
regressing adolescent self-esteem onto adolescent ethnic pride. A statistically significant regres-
sion coefficient should be observed. If more than one mediator is thought to be operating, then 
all the mediators are entered into the regression equation at this first step. At the second step, the 
researcher adds the two distal variables to the equation, hypothesizing that the regression coef-
ficients for the two distal variables will not be statistically significant, but for the mediators, the 
regression coefficients will remain statistically significant.2
For the case of covariate control, the covariates that are to be controlled are entered on the 
first step of the analysis and then the key “causes” of interest are entered on the second step. If the 
key causes impact the outcome over and above the covariates, then the increment in the multiple 
correlation should be statistically significant. If a significant increase in the multiple correlation is 
observed, then this is consistent with the proposition that there is an effect of the “causes” on the 
outcome variable over and above the covariates. The fundamental causal model for this analysis is 
the same as for multiple regression (see Figure 12.1k), with the covariates representing one set of 
predictors and the key “causes” representing the other set of predictors, all in the same equation.
As with all the methods discussed, one can usually discern the underlying model motivating 
a hierarchical regression analysis from the introduction and discussion sections. There are other 
models that can motivate hierarchical regression, but the ones described above are those you will 
most typically encounter.
LOGISTIC REGRESSION AND THE GENERALIZED LINEAR MODEL
Logistic regression is analogous to multiple regression but focuses on the case where the out-
come variable is dichotomous. The generalized linear model extends regression-like analyses to 
2There are better ways of testing the mediation model than hierarchical regression; these make use of 
structural equation modeling. Nevertheless, you occasionally will encounter use of hierarchical regression 
to test mediation.
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count variables (e.g., Poisson regression; negative binomial regression), categorical outcomes with 
more than two categories (e.g., multinomial logistic regression), or ordinal outcomes (e.g., ordinal 
regression). The fundamental causal model that motivates all these techniques is the same as that 
depicted in Figure 12.1k for multiple regression. When hierarchical tests are conducted in the 
context of these models, causal models similar to those discussed for hierarchical regression typi-
cally motivate the analysis.
STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODELING
Structural equation modeling (SEM), an analytic method designed to evaluate the viability of caus-
al models, can be drawn in the form of path diagrams. The theoretical structure the researcher is 
using when SEM methods are pursued is usually evident from the accompanying path diagrams.
There are other statistical tests you will encounter, but the above represent a good sampling 
of the major statistical tests used by social scientists. Once an investigator applies one or more of 
these tests, he or she usually is invoking a causal model of the form that we described above for 
each test. If a researcher has not made clear the presumed theoretical relationships between vari-
ables or the underlying causal model that is the focus, then you can often discern this by examin-
ing the statistical tests that the researcher reports in the results section.
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Epilogue
The most important fundamental laws and facts of physical science 
have all been discovered, and these are now so firmly established that 
the possibility of their ever being supplemented in consequence by new 
discoveries is exceedingly remote.
—Albert MiChelson, noted German scientist (1903), stated 
before Einstein’s groundbreaking work in physics
This final chapter covers odds and ends that did not fit well in previous chapters. The 
organization is eclectic, but we felt it important to touch on the issues. We begin by dis-
cussing competing theories. We then consider post hoc theorizing, wherein one derives 
theory after data have been collected rather than before. Next, we revisit the notion of 
influential theorizing and describe some of the career implications of pursuing creative 
theorizing. Finally, we recap areas for self study that build theory construction skills.
COMPETING THEORIES
As you build a theory about a phenomenon, you may develop competing theories that 
either make opposite predictions or that account for the same phenomena but use differ-
ent explanations and assumptions. In such situations, you should not abandon the com-
peting theories and force yourself to endorse a single theory. Rather you should embrace 
the differences and pursue research that competitively tests the theories against one 
another (or conduct research that will allow you to integrate them). Many scientists 
consider research that conclusively chooses between two or more logical and plausible 
theories to be inherently more interesting than a study that yields results regarding a 
single theory (Platt, 1964).
POST HOC THEORIZING
In some disciplines, scientists scorn what they call post hoc theorizing. The confirmatory 
approach to research is one wherein a scientist uses a theory to derive a set of testable 
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hypotheses and then designs a study to test those hypotheses. Based on the test, the 
theory is either rejected or not rejected. In post hoc theorizing, a researcher collects 
data, sometimes based on an initial set of ideas that are only vaguely articulated, and 
then uses statistical analysis to examine the many possible relationships in the data, 
noting cases where relationships manifest themselves. The researcher then creates a 
theory to account for the observed relationships. The theory is post hoc in the sense 
that it is derived after data are collected and is based on inspection of statistical indices 
of many possible relationships between variables. The major complaints against this 
approach are that (1) it capitalizes on chance relationships in the data and (2) that any 
semi-creative scientist can generate an explanation after the fact for just about anything, 
making the theory arbitrary.
Despite these objections, some camps in the social sciences are sympathetic to post 
hoc theorizing or variants of it. As noted in Chapter 10, social scientists who adopt a 
grounded or emergent theory orientation are open to letting theory emerge from data 
rather than positing theories a priori. Such theorists do not necessarily embrace “sta-
tistical witch-hunts” across large numbers of statistical associations, but the general 
philosophy accepts post hoc analysis. There also is a branch of statistics entrenched in 
Bayesian principles that does not evaluate the worth of an explanation based on when 
the explanation is offered (namely, either a priori or post hoc). According to Bayesians, 
what matters most is whether the data are consistent or inconsistent with the explana-
tion. More specifically, the crucial factors to consider are (1) the prior odds of the truth 
of the explanation before the data were collected; (2) the probability that the observed 
data would pattern themselves in the way they did, given that the explanation is true; 
and (3) the probability that the observed data would pattern themselves in the way they 
did, given that the explanation is not true. The timing of when the explanation is offered 
(a priori or post hoc) is only relevant if it affects one or more of these factors. For a dis-
cussion of Bayesian logic, see Lee (2004).
Our own position is that if one adequately takes into account chance effects (and 
there is a host of strategies for doing so), then theories offered on a post hoc basis are 
worthy of consideration.
INFLUENTIAL SCIENCE
As noted in Chapter 4, some theories represent major contributions to the field, whereas 
other theories make modest or small contributions. Most theoretical advances are of this 
latter type. One way that scientists measure the impact of a published article is to exam-
ine its citation count—that is, how many other published articles cite that article. The 
idea is that the more people who cite an article, the more influential it is. By this stan-
dard, most articles published in the social sciences are not very influential. The modal 
citation count for a published article is zero, and this includes self-citations. About 6% 
of publishing scientists produce 50% of all publications, a figure that has not changed 
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much since the 1920s. The reality is that it is difficult to publish impactful theories and 
research, and relatively few scientists do so.
Highly cited theories and research are not necessarily creative. Some of the most 
widely cited articles in the social sciences are straightforward psychometric studies 
that develop a measure for a heavily researched construct. We are not downplaying the 
importance of such measurement-oriented research, but on a dimension of creativity 
and theoretical insight, the contributions of such articles are more limited.
Nor is creative research necessarily impactful. John Cacioppo (2004, p. 118) com-
ments on recent trends in the field of social psychology as follows:
We value the prize of a theory that makes non-obvious predictions, that illuminates flaws in 
social reasoning and interactions, that illustrates not only the inadequacy but the idiocy of 
common sense. Such work is unquestionably clever, but does the pursuit of the witty at the 
expense of the comprehensive put personality and social psychologists at risk of becoming 
the editorial cartoonists of the social sciences?
Cacioppo’s concern derives from the growing number of theories and studies in social 
psychology that focus on cute, fun, clever, or counterintuitive demonstrations rather 
than focusing on the nuts and bolts of building comprehensive theories of behavior.
In the context of the above, we reiterate one last time the importance of deciding 
to be creative and seeking impact in your work. As you pursue your theoretical efforts, 
we urge you to keep the values of creativity, impact, and comprehensiveness at the fore-
front.
CAREERS AND CREATIVE THEORIZING IN SCIENCE
Creative research that pursues big ideas can be greeted with resistance and skepticism 
by scientists entrenched in the dominant scientific paradigms. The work may initially 
be difficult to publish, and it may take years to build an empirical base in support of 
the new theory. This is not true of research that accepts standard presuppositions and 
then builds on scientific knowledge in more modest and traditional ways. If asked, most 
scientists would not admit to a bias against “crowd-defying” ideas. But the reality is 
that scientists are trained to think in terms of a common paradigm, and this paradigm 
dominates their evaluation of other ideas. As such, there inevitably is some bias against 
crowd-defying ideas. This bias has implications for career pursuit and development.
Consider the traditional path of a student pursuing doctoral training in the social 
sciences with the idea of securing an academic career in a research-oriented college or 
university. Typically, a PhD is obtained after 4 years of advanced study. At this time, doc-
toral students seek to transition to the role of assistant professor via a position at a col-
lege or university. When making decisions about which applicants to interview, a major 
criterion used by search committees is that applicants must set themselves apart from 
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other applicants in terms of the quality and quantity of their scientific publications. A 
typical position at the assistant professor level will have 75 or more applicants, although 
this varies depending on the discipline. In some universities and subfields, there may be 
as many as 300 applicants. Initial decisions are made by a search committee, who review 
the vitae that applicants submit. Usually the top three or four candidates are invited for 
in-person interviews. These interviews generally occur within the first few months of 
the fourth or final year of one’s graduate training. This means that research you conduct 
during your fourth year is less likely to be considered when it comes time to apply for 
jobs, because this research has not been accepted for publication at the time your vita is 
considered by the search committee. The time frame for a graduate student to produce 
publications is, in reality, 3 years, not 4 years (unless one extends graduate training 
beyond the customary 4-year period).
For a research project to be published, the scientist must develop an idea, collect 
and analyze data to test or explore the idea, and then write a research report and sub-
mit it to a journal for publication. This process takes a minimum of 6 months, usually 
longer. Once the paper is submitted for publication, it must be peer reviewed (which, 
depending upon the journal, takes 3 months or more), the result of which usually is an 
editorial decision to “revise and resubmit” before final acceptance (which takes an addi-
tional 3 months). Thus, the minimum time lag between when a research idea is formed 
and when a research report is accepted for publication typically is about 1 year. This 
time lag means that only research that is started before the early part of the third year of 
graduate study has a chance of being accepted for publication in time to have an impact 
on your job prospects. The bottom line is that it is the first 2 years of graduate study that 
are crucial for deciding one’s career prospects, and these need to be research focused. 
Most students spend their first year of study taking required courses and gaining scien-
tific knowledge and background to better prepare themselves for conducting research. 
In the typical 4-year program, this leaves the precious second year of graduate study as 
the one that ultimately has a major impact on one’s career fate.
One way that graduate students adapt to these demands is to become involved in 
the research programs of their major professor. By working in an already established 
program of research, students can produce joint authored publications with their major 
professors at a competitive and reasonably rapid pace.
It is against this backdrop that one must face the realities of developing and con-
ducting research related to a crowd-defying idea. Given the possible resistance to such 
an idea and the time it takes to lay the groundwork and empirical base for such a theory, 
it is unlikely that a graduate student who pursues this type of research will be com-
petitive on the job market when his or her graduate studies are completed because it is 
unlikely that this work will be completed in time to be published. Our suggestion is to 
strike a balance between the idealistic side of science and the practical side of science. 
By all means, pursue your big ideas. Take the risk and see where it leads you. Science 
needs this type of creative pursuit. But while you are doing so, also develop a second 
research program that will lead you to the publications you need, the training you need, 
and the contacts you need to be competitive on the job market. This will require extra 
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work on your part, but hopefully it will be worth it. We are not suggesting that your 
“second” research program be something in which you are not interested or something 
to which you are not committed. Indeed, it often can supplement or be a smaller part of 
your crowd-defying idea. But in making the choice to purse a big idea, we suggest that 
you give practical considerations their due weight, or else you may find yourself with no 
viable prospect for a job in academia. Idealists may not like this advice. It may indeed be 
possible for you to carve out your own, highly innovative program of research without 
regard to a second research program of the nature we are describing. But this will be 
rare and it requires an exceptional student, an exceptional major professor (who is will-
ing to support the student), an exceptional graduate program, and an exceptional set of 
environmental supports.
These same time demands are equally oppressive for new faculty hired as assistant 
professors. In our opinion, the pressure is even greater because such faculty can no lon-
ger rely upon their major professors, at least in the way they did during graduate school. 
New professors typically work for 7 years and then are evaluated for tenure. If they are 
granted tenure, they are given a lifetime contract. If they are not granted tenure, they 
are fired. If denied tenure, it is difficult to obtain another academic position. So tenure 
decisions are penultimate for new professors.
Because institutions want to provide you with a year to find a new job should you 
be denied tenure, the formal tenure review process typically starts at the beginning of 
your sixth year of employment, not your seventh year. At this time, you are expected to 
have established an independent research program and, depending on your particular 
discipline and the type and prestige of your host institution, you are expected to have 
published anywhere from 5 to 25 high-quality publications in your field. Given the time 
lags associated with publishing described above, any research you conduct near the end 
of your fifth year probably will be too delayed to count toward your tenure decision. This 
means that you have 4–4 ½ years to produce. Your first year as an assistant professor 
usually is consumed by the logistics of moving to a new location, preparing lectures for 
the courses you will teach, and getting a research program set up (e.g., recruiting gradu-
ate and undergraduate students to help, buying equipment, and so on). This reduces the 
time you have to conduct research to gain tenure to years 2–4. To make matters worse, 
the faculty who ultimately evaluate you for tenure start to form impressions of how 
productive you are from the beginning of your employment, so if you produce noth-
ing in your first year or two, this often leads to a negative impression. It is against this 
backdrop that you must decide to pursue a crowd-defying idea, with its attendant time 
delays and risks.
Our advice to young scientists in these circumstances is the same as what we gave 
the graduate student. Pursue your big ideas. But also develop a second research program 
that respects the practical constraints in which you are operating. If you do not, you may 
end up being fired with no prospect of pursuing the big ideas you treasure.
The above scenarios vary from one discipline to the next, but the bottom line is the 
same. You need to be both an idealist and a realist. If you pursue only the idealistic side 
of science (the side that we love and that emphasizes advancing knowledge in creative 
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and fulfilling ways), your career may come to a screeching, unexpected halt, and you 
may find yourself unable to do what you love. If you pursue the practical side only, you 
may find yourself poorly equipped to pursue an independent research program that 
makes sufficient contributions to science. Indeed, you may not receive tenure because 
your research is considered pedestrian. Find a balance between idealism and realism, 
but never let go of your idealism. Pursue it with a vengeance when reasonable opportu-
nities present themselves.
SCIENTIFIC PARADIGMS
Thomas Kuhn (1962) has written a series of books on scientific paradigms and the struc-
ture of scientific revolutions. His work is controversial and has numerous critics, but 
some of his ideas are worth mentioning here. Kuhn characterizes scientific research as 
consisting of paradigms that represent commonly agreed-upon assumptions, meanings, 
and methods for characterizing and summarizing phenomena. According to Kuhn, the 
evolution of a paradigm is influenced by many factors, and true science is just one of 
them. Historical, social, and political factors also come into play.
Kuhn (1962, 1970, 2000) described scientific revolutions as passing through four 
stages. During the first stage, called normal science, ordinary scientific research and 
scientific progress occurs. The dominant paradigm sets the agenda for the type of theo-
rizing and research that is pursued, and it shapes scientific thinking accordingly. The 
second stage is the appearance of an anomaly. Some problems are harder to solve than 
others by the prevailing paradigm, and this difficulty can induce a period of crisis. Or 
flaws in the dominant paradigm start to accumulate, leading some scientists to question 
it. The third stage is crisis. If a problem or finding provokes a crisis, the grip of the para-
digm on science weakens. A few especially creative scientists break out of the confines of 
the dominant paradigm, rejecting one or more of its defining tenets and proposing new 
ones. The final stage is revolution, where the advocates of the emerging paradigm gain 
control of the power structure in science, namely, journal editorships, granting agencies, 
and textbooks. The old paradigm is replaced by the new, beginning the cycle again with 
that of normal science.
According to Kuhn (1970), scientists are trained to adhere to the dominant para-
digm to the point that science is reduced to small incremental gains in knowledge that 
resist extra-paradigmatic thinking. This research increases the precision and scope of 
thinking, but all within the constraints of the presuppositions of the day. Kuhn (1970) 
argues that some scientific decisions are not logical but instead are based on values, poli-
tics, and consensus in the scientific community. He believes that younger researchers 
are more likely to recognize these problems and show a willingness to explore different 
approaches because they are less entrenched in the paradigm of the day.
Kuhn’s analysis has critics, but certain elements ring true. Being aware of the domi-
nant paradigms and the way in which one’s thinking can be channeled by them is a key 
to breaking through to make truly creative contributions.
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A PROGRAM OF SELF-STUDY
Throughout this book we have made reference to a “theoretical toolbox” and identified 
areas wherein it would be useful for you to pursue further reading over and above your 
substantive domains of interest. The areas are diverse, and it is rare to find a graduate 
program that emphasizes all of them. A summary list of these areas is provided below. It 
is not that areas omitted from this list are unimportant. Rather, we believe that the list 
serves as a starting point. In these days of electronic search and access to articles and 
books, it is much easier to set aside regular time to update oneself in these areas, even 
if one must do so fleetingly.
We suggest five strategies to stay current on these topics. First, once or twice a year, 
conduct an electronic search through reference databases in libraries and examine all 
abstracts of articles and books in a given topic area. Flag a subset to obtain and read. By 
reading the abstracts and titles, you will gain a sense of “what is out there,” even though 
you may not choose to read every article. Read review articles and/or articles/books that 
you judge will most impact your substantive work. Our electronic searches include not 
only major electronic library-based databases (such as Medline, PsychInfo, Sociological 
Abstracts, Social Work Abstracts), but also major sellers of books (e.g., amazon.com). 
For the latter, when you select a book to examine, many sellers display related books 
and books that others who purchased that book also purchased. This can facilitate the 
process of identifying potentially relevant books.
Second, identify a small group of scientists whose work you have come to admire 
and whom you judge to be particularly creative and insightful. Every year, conduct an 
electronic search to examine the abstracts of all articles they published that year. Obtain 
and read a subset of these articles, focusing on those that seem interesting or useful. A 
variant of this strategy is the identification of web pages of certain individuals or pro-
fessional organizations (e.g., American Academy of Pediatrics) to regularly consult for 
information and leads about further study and relevant literatures.
Third, identify certain journals that consistently publish important articles in a 
given target area. Make a point of scanning the abstracts of every article published in 
those journals in a given year, again with the idea of then identifying a subset of articles 
to obtain and read.
Fourth, use several search engines (e.g., Google, Yahoo!) to conduct electronic 
searches of the areas of study. This strategy taps into web pages that people have created 
to address different topics and can lead to a wealth of information about a topic area that 
is not in the formal scientific literature. To be sure, there is a great deal of misinforma-
tion on the web, and one must be careful in this regard. But there also is a tremendous 
amount of useful information to be found.
Fifth, talk to colleagues about their work and attend colloquia sponsored in your 
department and other departments as much as possible, especially when the topics are 
on the list provided below. Many researchers also find it useful to attend professional 
conferences and their workshops.
In no particular order of importance, here we list a suggested program of self-study 
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(that we personally use) of areas of which you might keep abreast over and above your 
substantive domains of interest:
 1. Creativity: Read current literatures on creativity that may give you new thinking 
strategies.
 2. Psychometrics: Read literatures in psychometrics that help you define and think 
about constructs in general as well as in your substantive areas of study.
 3. Philosophy of science: Read the classics in philosophy of science as well as more 
current-day perspectives on science from the perspective of philosophers.
 4. Causality and causal modeling: Read literature on statistical, methodological, 
conceptual, and philosophical issues on causality in general as well as modera-
tion, mediation, spuriousness, reciprocal causality, longitudinal modeling, and 
latent variables, in particular.
 5. Simulation methods: Read about simulation methodology, especially as it applies 
to emerging technologies.
 6. Mathematical modeling: In addition to mathematical modeling in general, read 
literatures on chaos theory and catastrophe theory.
 7. Grounded/emergent theory construction: Read literature on strategies for con-
structing grounded theories and qualitative data analysis.
 8. Rhetoric and communication theory: Read literature on methods of argumenta-
tion, logic, and theories and methods of debate.
 9. Cognitive biases and limitations of information processing: This literature tends to 
appear mostly in cognitive psychology, social psychology, consumer behavior, 
and decision making. It will help keep you attuned to biases that can enter into 
your thinking.
10. Historical methodology. For research involving analysis of primary sources and 
archival materials, staying abreast of good historical methodological practices 
is important.
11. General systems of thought: Touch base with the literatures on all of the topics 
discussed in Chapter 11. These include neural networks, stage theories, rein-
forcement theories, humanism and positive psychology, symbolic interaction-
sism, systems theory, materialism, structuralism, functionalism, postmodern-
ism, and evolutionary perspectives.
12. Statistics: Keep abreast of recent developments in probability theory, explor-
atory statistical methods, structural equation modeling, nonlinear modeling, 
multilevel modeling, and longitudinal methods.
13. Scientific and nonscientific writing techniques and presentation strategies: Strive to 
find more effective ways of presenting your theories.
In addition, to staying abreast of the above literatures, we also make it a point to 
stay current on our substantive areas of interest and, as time permits, to read biogra-
phies and autobiographies, and other works of fiction and nonfiction that may expand 
our thinking.
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CONCLUDING COMMENTS
A great deal of material has been covered that hopefully will help you develop theories 
or build on existing theory. As you pursue your career and strive to develop theories, we 
want to underscore the importance of being resilient. You will face criticism and nega-
tive feedback. All of us do. The key is not to let this feedback grind your efforts to a halt 
or get you too discouraged. Listen to it, work with it, decide what is worthwhile, and 
keep a forward focus. The classic characterization of reaction to feedback by the famous 
psychologist Benton Underwoood (1957, p. 222) is as much applicable today as it was 
some 50 years ago:
The rejection of my own manuscripts has a sordid aftermath: (a) One day of depression; (b) 
one day of utter contempt for the editor and his accomplices; (c) one day of decrying the 
conspiracy against letting truth be published; (d) one day of fretful ideas about changing 
my profession; (e) one day of re-evaluating the manuscript in view of the editor’s comments 
followed by the conclusion that I was lucky it wasn’t accepted.
Despite the ups and downs you ultimately will experience, if you stay with it and be 
resilient, and if you approach your science with curiosity, an open mind, and a diverse 
theoretical toolbox from which to work, positive contributions probably are in your 
future.
SUGGESTED READINGS
Kuhn, T. (1996). The structure of scientific revolutions (3rd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press.—A classic on paradigm shifts in science, but controversial.
Kuhn, T., & Conant, J. (2000). The road since structure: Philosophical essays, 1970–1993, with 
an autobiographical interview. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.—More on Kuhn’s 
work.
KEY TERMS
post hoc theorizing (p. 355) stage of crisis (p. 360)
stage of normal science (p. 360) stage of revolution (p. 360)
stage of appearance of an anomaly (p. 360)
ExERCISES
Exercises to Reinforce Concepts
 1. Discuss the reasons why people object to post hoc theorizing. Is post hoc theo-
rizing ever justified?
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 2. What are the major stages in Kuhn’s analysis of paradigm shifts? Characterize 
each.
Exercise to Apply Concepts
 1. Develop a program of self-study for this next semester or year. Implement it! 
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